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ABSTRACT
This thesis looks at the process of city planning in 
Australia in its political, historical, social and intellectual 
context. It begins by outlining the redistributive possibilities 
of city planning (Introduction) and then proceeds to analyse why, 
in practice, these possibilities have not been realised.
Chapters 1 and 5 explore the extent to which the in­
tentions of planners themselves have been 'reformist' at different 
times and on what understanding of society (or social theory) 
these intentions have been based.
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 look at efforts to introduce 
planning as a function of government in three Australian cities 
between the turn of the century and the second world war and 
examine the nature of the opposition. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 look 
at planning in practice since the second world war and explore 
the conflicts between planning intentions and political realities. 
Has planning in practice reinforced or tended to ameliorate in­
equalities between rich and poor? Which groups benefit most from 
the metropolitan planning schemes now in operation in Adelaide, 
Melbourne and Sydney?
Chapter 9 summarises the most important obstacles, 
particularly the private ownership of property, in the way of 
a more redistributive approach to city planning and assesses the 
likelihood of future change.
INTRODUCTION
INEQUALITY, CITY PLANNING AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION
.... There can be no history without a point of 
view; like the natural sciences, history must be 
selective, unless it is to be choked by a flood of un­
related material .... The way out of this dilemma is 
to consciously introduce a preconceived point of view, 
that is to write that history which interests us. This 
decided, it remains for the writer to state his bias and 
define the frame of reference in which his observations 
and criticisms are to be made.
Popper 1961 : 150
More than 130 years ago Alexis de Tocqueville in his 
Introduction to Democracy in America told his readers that the 
book was written 'under the impression of a kind of religious 
dread produced in the author's mind by the contemplation of this 
irresistible revolution which has advanced for so many centuries 
in spite of all obstacles.' (de Tocqueville 1945 : 7) He was of 
course referring to the advance of democratic egalitarianism.
Since then men in every generation have echoed 
de Tocqueville's belief that equality was irresistibly on the
march. The era of post-war optimism generated the idea that a
v
relentless bulldozer was working away with great force in all 
advanced capitalist countries and bringing into being levelled, 
egalitarian societies.
Only a minority of social scientists has questioned the 
reality of this alleged triumph of equality. R.H. Tawney (1931)
ii
was one of the first to do so in Britain, followed in the post­
war period by writers like Richard Titmuss in Income Distribution 
and Social Change (1965), Peter Townsend (1967), J.E. Meade (1964) 
and Ralph Miliband (1969). For the United States, Kolko (1962) 
has suggested that there was no significant trend towards income 
equality in the U.S. between 1910 and 1959 and H.P. Miller (1964) 
argues that the 'social revolution' has not merely been marking 
time for twenty years but that it is beginning to move backwards. 
C. Wright Mills (1956), Baran & Sweezy (1966) and Gunnar Myrdal 
(1944, 1963) have explored the political, economic and social 
dimensions of inequality in the U.S. These studies reveal that 
there do exist in those countries very large differences in the 
distribution of income (Miller 1964 : 12) and also in what Meade 
(1964 : 27) has called a 'really fantastic inequality in the 
ownership of property.'
In Australia the conventional wisdom has always been 
that this is an egalitarian society^^whose base rests on the 
arbitration system, ease of economic advancement and few higher 
educational requirements for this advancement. How accurate is 
this picture? Even if these things were once true McFarlane 
(1968 : 206) argues that many of the circumstances associated 
with these trends are changing; the arbitration system is not 
'holding the line' on income distribution, technological change
(1) For documentation of this mainstream of Australian thought 
see R.W. Connell Images of Australia 1969
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is enforcing higher education as a factor in economic advancement.
McFarlane's analysis of the distribution of income in 
Australia shows that in 1956-7 73 per cent of all 'adult' males 
received less than<£l200 per year, and this group represented only 
about one half of the total income which accrued to all adult males. 
The other side of this coin was that only about 6 per cent of adult 
males received more than ^ 2000 a year yet individuals in this 
bracket acquired more than 20 per cent of all male income. There 
were no significant changes in this income distribution between 
1957 and 1966. (McFarlane 1968 : 203-5) According to a more 
recent survey by Embery & Podder (1972) the richest 10 per cent 
of families in Australia received 23.7 per cent of the national 
income while the poorest received only 2.1 per cent. That is, the 
former group are on average ten times better off than the latter.
Moreover, also contrary to popular myth, the taxation 
system does not serve to redistribute income more equitably. As 
Bentley, Collins & Drane (1973) have shown, taxation policies in 
Australia have a regressive effect on incomes up to about $7000 p.a., 
when indirect as well as direct taxes are considered.
As far as ownership of company shares is concerned 'peoples 
capitalism' is a myth^^:
while the distribution of income remains grossly unequal 
in the absence of a tax system as rigorous as that in the 
U.K. or U.S., particularly in view of the prevalence of
The percentage of the population owning shares has not increased 
since 1929, when it was 10 per cent.
hidden sources of inequality: subsidies and depreciation
allowances to companies as tax deductible items, untaxed 
capital gains, inequality of educational opportunity, 
expense account living. (McFarlane 1968 : 62)
Roper (1971) has detailed the inequality of educational
opportunity. The Martin Report (1964) for example, after a review
of empirical surveys, emphasised that of school-leavers whose
fathers are in the category 'unskilled or semi-skilled' (and who
total 33 per cent of the fathers of all male leavers) only 1.5 per
cent entered university.
The origins of this thesis lie in the writer's concern
with the political, economic and social manifestations of inequality
that exist in Australia, particularly as they affect the 'quality of
life' in Australian cities. My interest in city planning stems from
the traditional concern of the town planning movement since the turn
of the century with social reform, that is, with many of the issues
(housing, health, recreation) that contribute to a more egalitarian
society. J.J. Cahill, the New South Wales Minister for Local
Government in 1945, summarised this tradition in his introduction
of the Local Government (Town and Country) Bill:
The principles of town and country planning may be stated 
simply as an attempt to regulate in advance the orderly 
arrangement and use of land .... so as to promote, for the 
greatest good of the greatest number, the improvement of 
community life and of the environment in which our people 
live; to enable the people to enjoy the benefits of social 
security, good health, safety, education, recreation, 
employment and shelter, good communications, public utilit­
ies and amenities. (N.S.W. PD 1945 : 1767-68)
While town planning ideas encompassed these very broad aims, it has 
never been within the power of the town planning techniques of zoning
Vand subdivision control to achieve this breadth of intention.
The great irony of land-use or statutory planning historic­
ally has been that planners have lacked control over that fundamental 
resource - land. Some of the effects of this have been land specu­
lation (often using land-use plans as a 'speculator's guide'), land 
shortages, shortages of development funds, and the essentially 
negative role which planning has played, responding to planning 
applications and to major private developments rather than initiat­
ing and controlling urban development for the public benefit.
Stretton's pioneering but impressionistic study argued
that
very big cities are both physical and psychological 
devices for quietly shifting resources from poorer to 
richer and for excusing or concealing - with a baffled 
but complacent air - the increasing deprivation of the 
poor. (Stretton 1970 : 310)
But apart from Stretton's work there has been a general neglect, 
in planning schools and in the social sciences, of empirical re­
search into the equity or distributional aspects of large cities, 
or of policy research into ways in which city planning could 
tackle the problem of the income transfers from poor to rich 
that occur in the process of indefinite, single-centred growth 
of cities.
City development does have significant effects on income 
distribution, whether deliberate or accidental. If we define 
'real income' as 'command over resources', it is clear that real
vi
income is a function of locational accessibility and proximity 
(Harvey 1972 : 309) though location alone obviously does not make 
one well off. But accessibility, to employment opportunities, schools, 
beaches, welfare services, can be obtained only at a price. This 
price is generally equated with the cost of overcoming distance, 
using time, or of land itself. As we change the spatial form of 
a city (by relocating housing, transport routes, employment oppor­
tunities, sources of pollution and so on) so we change the price of 
accessibility for any household and hence the distribution of real 
income.
Some of these resources (educational and health services, 
open spaces) are located by public action, others by private enter­
prise. It is important to recognise that 'the redistributive aspect 
of general governmental functions is far from trivial and increases 
with city size.' (Thompson 1965 : 117) No matter who the decision­
maker, the very act of locational choice has distributional sig­
nificance. It is unfortunate therefore that there have been so few 
criteria developed for determining the location of public activities. 
Public finance concepts have been largely 'spaceless', while loca­
tion theorists have neglected the problem of public facility location. 
(Thompson 1965 : 257). Since the location of public services could
U)
Harvey (1972 : 298) defines proximity as being close to some­
thing which is not made use of. A household may thus find 
itself proximate to a source of pollution, to a source of noise, 
or to a rundown environment. This proximity imposes certain 
costs upon the household, e.g. in cleaning and laundry bills, 
sound-proofing, or in mental or psychological strain.
vii
be an important means of income redistribution in our economy, 
more attention ought to be paid to the policies which govern 
location.
Much of what goes on in a city, particularly in the 
political arena, can be interpreted as an attempt to influence 
the locational choices of public and private organisations in 
order to gain income advantages. City planning could influence 
the redistribution of income by changing the location of jobs 
and housing; the value of property rights; and the price of 
resources to the c o n s u m e r . D i f f e r e n t  groups seek to control 
these mechanisms through the exercise of political power.
It is in this area, the politics of city planning, 
that the central thrust of the thesis lies. Crudely put, who 
wins and who loses in the distribution of goods and services 
(and increases in property values) involved in planning decisions? 
Have planners themselves been aware of the equity effects of 
their plans? Does the redistributive potential of city planning 
explain some of the opposition to its introduction over the last 
seventy years?
Most Western students of politics tend to work from the 
assumption that power in western societies is competitive, frag­
mented and diffused; that everybody, directly or through organised
^  It cannot change the topography of a city or the location of 
its central business district, both of which have a major 
impact on a city’s relative inequalities.
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groups, has some power. In these societies citizens enjoy universal 
suffrage, free and regular elections, supposedly representative 
institutions, effective citizen rights including the right of free 
speech, association and opposition under the protection of the law, 
an independent judiciary and a free political culture. One result 
of this view is to exclude almost by definition the possibility that 
the state might be a rather special institution whose main purpose 
is to defend the predominance of a particular class majority.
(Miliband 1969 : 4-5)
This thesis does not assume as given the pluralist- 
democratic model.^ Rather it enquires in each of the situations and 
issues analysed as to where ultimate power lies, and what this sug­
gests about the nature of Australian society.
It has been argued so far that city planning could become 
one means of contributing to equity in income redistribution. Whether 
it is in practice depends partly on the recognition of the possibility, 
(which, it will be argued, was not articulated in Australia until 
Stretton's work of 1970) and partly on the degree of political sup­
port given to planning authorities by state and federal governments.
The reasons for the absence of this political support in the past 
are a large part of the following story, which begins with an examina­
tion of the formative ideas and British origins of the early town
(1) R.A. Dahl Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City 
(1961) is the most often cited exposition of this model.
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planning movement.
Chapter One looks at the extent to which the early 'planners' 
were aware of equity issues, and establishes the view of society on 
which their ideas were based. Consistent with the middle class 
backgrounds of most members of the planning movement was the desire 
to have a cross-partisan appeal, the aim of ameliorating class 
differences and promoting social harmony, and hence the insistence 
on the technical rather than the political nature of planning.
Chapters Two, Three and Four move from the world of planning 
ideas to the practical arena of politics and explain why efforts to 
introduce planning legislation between the two world wars met with 
so much resistance.
During and after the second world war a Federal (Labor) 
Government became interested for the first time in the problems of 
the cities and recognised the connections between physical planning 
and national economic and social planning. Chapter Five analyses 
the conflict between the reformist ideology of the Labor Government 
and the radical implications of some of its urban planning ideas 
(land nationalisation, regional planning and citizen participation) 
and suggests areas of similarity and difference between the Labor 
Government of the 1940s and that elected in 1972.
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight return to the three states 
and describe post-war efforts to implement city planning. These 
chapters deal with the nature of the opposition to city planning 
and with the nature of the metropolitan plans (land-use and
Xtransportation) eventually produced for each city. They suggest 
that the business and property interests who had originally 
opposed planning legislation have been able, in the post-war 
period, to manipulate the planning process for private gain. The 
political power of business and property interests has militated 
against political support for a radical city planning programme 
and has forced planning authorities into the position of respond­
ing to private developments rather than initiating and controlling 
city growth and change. But both major political parties have been 
reluctant to support purposeful planning because both have viewed 
any impediment to economic growth as undesirable.
By way of conclusion Chapter Nine looks at the problems 
of applying a redistributive approach to city planning in a property- 
owning democracy and assesses the likelihood of future radical 
change. Some of the areas from which change can be expected range 
from a changing set of interests within the capitalist class to an 
emerging middle class concern with environmental amenity and a 
radical building union’s concern with the future of the city and 
the opportunities for the working class within it. But the most 
powerful initiative for change is that of the new Department of 
Urban and Regional Development established in December 1972 by 
the newly elected Federal Labor Government. The old problems of 
class power and property ownership that confront the efforts of 
this new Department (particularly in the sphere of land reform)
complete the story which this thesis tells.
* * *
Methodologically the project has laboured under a number 
of difficulties. Primary source material is not readily available 
from official files or relevant private papers covering the last 
thirty years. Businessmen, government officials and politicians are 
usually reticent about events and decisions in which they have been 
involved, especially when the enquiry is made by a student.
Not least of the difficulties is the paucity of research 
on urban politics and urban economics in Australia and the absence 
of any coherent urban, political or social histories of any of the 
three cities on which this thesis concentrates.^^ There is also 
a lack of material on social class, residential location and com­
parative accessibility to the whole range of urban services. The
(2)only published exceptions to this are Manning's work on Sydney 
and Jones (1969) on Melbourne and some current work being done by 
Davis and Spearritt (1974), also on Sydney, and by Stimson (1973) 
on Adelaide. But these works only cover the present and the recent 
past. There has been no historical information compiled on the 
questions of location, social class and comparative accessibility or 
even on changing transport patterns, employment locations and
The first urban social history of any Australian capital city 
in the twentieth century is only now being undertaken, on Sydney 
between 1920 and 1950, by P. Spearritt at A.N.U.
(2)
An Economic Study of Location-Specific Service ccnd Regulations in 
Sydney (unpublished Ph.D thesis A.N.U. 1972) and Municipal Finances 
and Income Distribution (U.R.U. monograph, Canberra, 1973)
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occupational structures. All of these are areas for future research 
which would be not only intrinsically interesting but also of use to 
future urban policy-makers.
CHAPTER ONE
The emergence of the town planning movement 
1900-1918 : Health, Convenience and Amenity
'On the grounds of public health and well-being absolute freedom to lay out 
a town anywhere and in any fashion should be limited' .
John Sulman, 1890
'Town planning covers almost everything that makes for the commercial and 
industrial expansion of cities and the convenience and health of their 
dwellers' .
John Sulman, 1921
'An owner's right to use his property for profit was a formidable historic 
tradition . . . established business interests increasingly gave much of 
the important support for zoning, a phenomenon not so surprising as it may 
first appear. Zoning might put controls on entrepreneurs' abilities to 
develop their land in whatever way they wished, but even more importantly 
it could stabilise and increase property values '.
Robert Goodman, 1972
'. . .of all the areas of social control, urban planning is perhaps the 
most peculiarly subject to political complexities and resistances, both 
in the setting of goals and the implementation of plans'.
R.S. Parker, 1972
CHAPTER OUTLINE
1. Urbanisation and Australian history: the British Town Planning
Movement.
2. Social, aesthetic and administrative concerns, 1900-1913.
3. Overseas trips, comprehensive reports, formation of Town Planning 
Associations, 1913-15.
4. Transition from ideas to legislative phase, 1915-20; the failure 
of legislation and the sobering of The Town Planning movement. 
Australasian Town Planning Conferences 1917, 1918 and 1919. 
Enduring Dilemmas.
5. Conclusions.
1.
In the nineteenth century the high income countries of the world 
began to experience a pronounced trend towards increasing urbanisation. 
Australia was in the vanguard of this process. Adna Weber's comparative 
study of international urban growth published in 1899 pointed out that in 
Australia nearly one third of the entire population was settled in and 
about the capital cities, 'a most remarkable concentration'. (Weber 1963: 
138) By any standard of comparison contemporary Australia must be ranked 
as one of the most highly urbanised countries in the world, with eighty 
five per cent of its population living in towns with a population of more 
than one thousand according to the 1971 census.
Yet historians and other scholars have, as Glynn (1970) commented, 
traditionally looked to the outback, the bush ethos, for an explanation 
of Australian development and for the ideas and beliefs which make up the 
Australian heritage. One of the few scholars to break with this tradition 
has been the economic historian N.G. Butlin, who wrote of the period 
1860-1900 that
The outstanding characteristic of Australian economic 
history was . . . the exceptional rate of urbanisation of 
the local population and the extraordinarily early orien­
tation of economic activity towards commercial-industrial 
specialisation and the tertiary services of urban society. 
By 1891, two-thirds of the Australian population lived in 
cities and towns, a fraction matched by the United States 
only by 1920 and by Canada not until 1950. Most of 
Australian capital equipment went into growing towns, 
most of the expanding workforce was employed in urban 
occupations and the greater part of gross product came 
from urban activity . . . The process of urbanisation 
is the central feature of Australian history, overshadowing 
rural economic development and creating a fundamental 
contrast with the economic development of other 'new' 
countries. (Butlin 1964: 6)
2The building industry absorbed about one-third of total Australian 
investment between 1860 and 1890. In the three decades after 1860 there 
were three successively larger building booms in urban areas, culminating 
in the major metropolitan booms of the 1880s, the over-supply of houses, 
and the collapse of the market in the early 1890s. Building reached a 
peak in different cities at different times, but in each case the boom went 
far beyond the housing market and became an urban land boom, with suburban 
subdivision and land speculation extending well ahead of building.
(Glynn 1970: 19)
This building boom was the most important physical manifestation 
of Australian urbanisation. One of the results of the boom was that 
housing development raced ahead of the provision of other urban facilities, 
with the result that 'Australian towns and cities grew primarily as a 
sprawl of detached cottages with only primitive commercial, industrial 
and social equipment.’ (Butlin 1964: 213)
Around 1900 the problems emerging from this haphazard growth 
became subjects of public discussion. They still are. This thesis is a 
study of the history of the ideas of those concerned about the planning, 
administration and government of Australian cities and of their efforts 
to transform public policy. This chapter looks at the derivative nature 
of the town planning movement which emerged in Australia between 1900 and 
1918 by first looking at British thinking of the time and then tracing 
its influence in the personalities and ideas of members of the Australian
planning movement.
3The extent of British influence is evident in the importance of 
1 2Charles Reade and John Sulman in the early planning movement; in the 
exodus to Britain between 1912 and 1915 of government officials from each 
state to study and report on British developments, and in the frequency 
with which British examples were cited in Australian discussions and 
reports.
The development of town planning as a reform movement in Britain 
can be traced originally to the concern of some intellectuals and 
politicians about the social and economic consequences of the industrial 
revolution. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, while Britain 
grew wealthy from her cities and industry, many of her poets, novelists 
and essayists pictured this development as a deterioration from the pre-
3industrial golden age. Two lines of thought developed from these origins. 
Writers and philosophers condemned the life of industrial cities. But 
more practically minded men sought to improve it materially by sanitary 
reform and by creating model industrial villages.
The movement for sanitary reform was the result of an awareness 
of some of the alarming qualities of the new congested districts.
C.C. Reade: 1880-1932; journalist in New Zealand until 1910. 1913,
Assistant Secretary and lecturer for Garden Cities and Town Planning 
Association of Great Britain: 1914, organiser and lecturer of 
Australasian Town Planning Tour: 1916-1920 South Australian Government 
Town Planner: 1917, organised first Australian Town Planning 
Conference in Adelaide: 1919, prepared draft of S.A. Town Planning 
and Development Bill.
J. Sulman: 1849-1928, F.R.I.B.A. (N.S.W.), architect in London 1870- 
1885, Sydney 1886-28; lecturer in architecture at Sydney University 
1887-1912; first President of Town Planning Association of N.S.W.,
Vernon Lecturer on Town Planning at Sydney University 1918, President 
of Town Planning Advisory Board in N.S.W. Department of Local Government.
for example, Wordsworth, Ruskin, Morris, Engels, Kingsley, Cobbett,
T.H. Green, D.H. Lawrence: especially Wordsworth's Prelude and London
1802 .
4Even if he were not his brothers keeper, every man 
of property was affected by the multiplication of thieves; 
everyone who valued his life felt it desirable not to 
have a mass of carriers of virulent diseases too close 
at hand. (Ashworth 1954: 47)
There were signs that such dangers did exist and to look into their extent 
and reveal their nature to the wider public were the tasks of the famous 
investigations, both public and private, of the 1830s and 1840s. The 
titles of these reports indicated the major problems involved:
The Moral and Physical Conditions of the Working Classes of Manchester 
(Dr. J P Kay); The Health of Towns (House of Commons Select Committee,
1840); The Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great 
Britain (Edwin Chadwick, Poor Law Commissioner, 1842); and the Royal 
Commission into the State of Large Towns and Populous districts (1844-5).
It was morality (or more exactly, criminality) and disease that were 
causing concern. Overcrowding and congestion, poverty, crime, ill-health 
and heavy mortality were shown to be conditions commonly found together 
and a causal relationship was therefore assumed.^
The reform proposals of the Select Committee Report on the Health 
of Towns involved a radical departure from the existing practice. But 
the explicit grounds on which their framers sought to justify them are 
indicative of the terms in which urban problems and urban reform were 
seen. There were two principal arguments. Firstly, the existing unhealthy 
conditions of towns created an economic loss (in reduced productivity of 
labour) which adversely affected the whole community. Secondly, towns 
fostered unrest and defiance of the law, which threatened the social 
structure. Remedial efforts were therefore desirable on grounds of both
There was plenty of evidence of the effect of the new industrial towns 
on health. The presentation of some of it in statistical form was 
facilitated when the information available in the decennial census 
was supplemented by that from the compulsory registration of births, 
marriages and deaths, introduced in 1837. (Ashworth 1954: 48)
5humanity and expediency. The Select Committee of 1840 declared that
some such measures are urgently called for, as claims 
of humanity and justice to great multitudes of our fellow 
men, and as necessary not less for the welfare of the 
poor than the safety of property and the security of 
the rich. (Ashworth 1954: 54)
Property was a major consideration. The need to keep it inviolate 
was not only an argument for social reform but also imposed limitations 
on the reform that might be attempted.
Ashworth (1954: 65) attributes the inadequacy of the legislative 
response to urban reform in the nineteenth century to two characteristics 
of the public at large: first, a zeal for economy in public administration
and a narrow interpretation of what constituted economy; secondly a 
pervasive apathy about the whole subject of sanitary improvement, which 
seemed to be of minor importance when set beside the achievements of 
industry and commerce.
But complementing the legislative efforts of the sanitary reformers 
were the practical attempts to improve living and working conditions by 
some philanthropic industrialists. Salt's Saltaire, Lever's Port Sunlight 
and Cadbury's Bourneville were models of social, industrial and educational 
reform. But they were models that were rarely copied. The private 
philanthropy that concerned itself with the quality of the daily lives of 
the working people found far more than it could cope with in the centres 
of the great towns. Its impact was necessarily limited and localised.
By the turn of the century there were two main approaches to urban 
problems. The first was the line of thought continuing from the writers 
and philosophers of the nineteenth century, advocating the abandonment of 
both technology and the profit system and a return to certain pre-industrial 
values. The second, less radical, was that derived from the sanitary
reformers and utopian town planners, which chose to 'quarantine' the 
technology (by separating it from residential areas) but to leave unchall­
enged the economic structure and means of production.
One historian of British town planning (Ashworth 1954) argues that 
the South African War increased the urgency of the demand for the improve­
ment of the health of towns because of the high proportion of recruits 
found physically unfit. But there was doubt about achieving much more 
along the old lines of public health and housing policy and 'the minds 
of some sought a more comprehensive approach, which they called town 
planning.'(Ashworth 1954) Their models were the new towns and villages 
and garden suburbs of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
Their theorist was Ebenezer Howard.'*' Letchworth Garden City and Hampstead 
Garden Suburb were the product of this movement started by Howard in the 
early part of the twentieth century.
Howard belonged in the tradition of a group of early nineteenth 
century writers: Spence, the land reformer who sought the nationalisation 
of land; James Buckingham, who published a plan for a model industrial 
town in 1848; Edward Gibbon Wakefield, who pointed out the necessity for 
a more systematic plan of colonisation for distant lands; and not least, 
Henry George and Peter Kropotkin. (Mumford 1965: 29)
Ebenezer Howard and the Garden City Movement fostered basically 
anti-city planning, emphasising such factors as environmental health, 
housing and sanitation with the object of making living conditions more
E. Howard 1850-1928. Clerk, farmer, court-reporter, and inventor. 
Author of Garden Cities of Tomorrow (1902) ’’It is evidence of a 
certain innocence of political theory and inexperience in affairs 
that Howard should, in his own words, have 'swallowed whole' Bellamy's 
vision [in Looking Backward 1888] of the Communistic Boston of 2000 
A.D.' (Osborn 1945)
7healthy and less visibly grim. His concept of town-country was intended to 
combine the advantages of town and country living while avoiding the 
disadvantages of both. His fundamental idea was to create independent 
new communities of limited size, with workplaces as well as homes, and 
with land in community ownership. This was the key to the economic problems 
of the community. Profits accruing to the community from public ownership 
of the land were to be used to eliminate poverty and care for the disadvan­
taged. (Howard 1898)
Howard wanted to recreate the social mix of the country town, while 
changing its economic structure. Unfortunately the radical economic 
aspects of his proposals were not taken up by later disciples of his 
ideas. This was not surprising given the class background of those who 
joined, for example, the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association.
It purported to speak in the name of the urban poor, but drew its member­
ship from the middle and upper social classes and directed its appeal to 
what Osborn termed 'influential people'. (Simmie 1971) Letchworth and 
Welwyn Garden City were the natural offspring of such a movement. Their 
lay-outs, adapted to contours and existing natural features and making free 
use of cul-de-sacs, provided a dramatic contrast to the rigid grid-iron 
layout with small backyards rather than gardens, which had been the almost 
universal rule for the homes of all except the very well-to-do. And this 
was made possible only by the adoption of comparatively low densities, 
which acted as an automatic means of social segregation in commercially 
based suburban development, where the price of the land was beyond reach 
of lower income groups. (Keeble 1961)
The 1909 Housing and Town Planning Act reflected this prevailing 
ideology that suburbanisation (in garden cities, or more generally, 
garden suburbs) was to be the salvation of the town. For a while town
8planning was regarded as virtually synonymous with 'suburban lay-out on 
garden city lines' (Ashworth 1954). The spread of the suburbs was 
supposed to rid the old city centres of congestion, which would auto­
matically raise their quality. Low density became the over-riding principle 
of planning for the next decade (1910-20) and was enshrined in the 1919 
Act.
The 1909 Act had empowered Local Authorities to make town planning 
schemes in respect of land in course of development or likely to be used 
for building purposes, in order to secure proper sanitary conditions, 
amenity and convenience in connection with the layout and use of land.
In fact, very few schemes were made under the 1909 Act, (Keeble 1961: 16) 
but its importance as a guiding example or precedent was certainly noted 
and quoted in Australian debates.
The Housing and Town Planning Act of 1919 introduced a new 
principle by placing an obligation on Borough and Urban District Councils 
with populations exceeding 30,000 to prepare and submit planning schemes 
within a given period, but the Housing Act of 1923 provided a depressing 
example of the way in which the strength and determination behind 
planning legislation ebbs and flows, for it gave planning authorities the 
opportunity to withdraw or modify any provisions of planning schemes which 
had given rise to claims for the payment of compensation.
The Town and Country Planning Act of 1932 marked important advances 
in planning legislation in that it extended the application of planning to 
built-up areas, provided for the payment of compensation to people whose 
property was injuriously affected by any scheme, and authorised the 
recovery from anyone whose property was increased in value by any scheme of 
up to half of the amount of increase. Thus it authorised collection of
betterment.
9Perhaps more significant in terms of the provision of housing and 
the development of planning ideology were the huge public authority 
housing schemes built in the inter-war period. Research conducted into 
three of these schemes, by Terence Young in Becontree and Dagenham in 
1934 and by Ruth Durant in Watling in 1939, was largely responsible for 
the re-emergence of the ideologies of community and social integration.
The origins of these ideologies can be traced back to a reaction against 
the loss of the church's concern for the whole spiritual life of man as 
a result of changes taking place during the nineteenth century in 
Britain.^
These values were affirmed by the National Council of Social 
Service when it issued a report in 1943 on 'The Size and Social Structure 
of a Town'. Among their recommendations were that 'all development of 
housing policy should be based on the neighbourhood unit', regarded as a 
community with a maximum of 2,000 dwellings (7-10,000 people) and furnished 
with the communal facilities required for the full development of the 
life of the neighbourhood; and that in the interest of social variety, 
and in order to enable families of different backgrounds and experiences 
to mix, each neighbourhood unit should be socially balanced, containing 
houses of different types and sizes inhabited by families belonging to 
different income groups.
This report is a milestone in the documentation of the ideologies 
of physical planning. It contains proposals that foreshadow most of the 
early post-war reports, Acts and planning practice.
1 Samuel Barnett was representative of the growing difficulties and
concern of the church in executing its pastoral duties in the new and 
growing cities. In 1883 he read his famous paper 'Settlement of 
University Men in Great Towns' to an assembly at Cambridge. This was 
followed by the founding of Toynbee Hall in Whitechapel which was the 
forerunner of the community centre and an attempt to bridge the 
social distinctions between the East and West Ends of London.
(Simmie 1971)
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But up to the second world war town planning was limited in 
function and regarded mainly as a means of controlling new development 
in order to improve the physical standards of architecture and amenity.
A number of strands of earlier reform movements had been put together 
by 1900 in a series of arguments for town planning as the best means of 
co-ordinating the reform and future growth of urban areas - utopian urban 
design, promotion of public health, improved working class housing, 
better provision of services and reform of urban government. The 
Housing and Town Planning Acts of 1909 and 1919 were the culmination of 
the first phase of town planning in which health, housing and planning 
were linked for the first time in national legislation.
But this legislative solution was remedial and palliative. it 
did not attack the cause of the ills which the town planning movement 
sought to improve - the problem of poverty. This was not surprising given 
the class background of the reformers.
They sought to ameliorate harsh social conditions and to avoid 
divisive conflict. Planning was their means of maintaining social harmony 
and accordingly was presented as an issue that transcended class and party 
divisions, benefitting all sections of the community, from working and 
middle class residents to landowners (by maintaining the value of developed 
land through the preservation of the 'character' of particular neigh­
bourhoods by zoning) and capitalists (through the cultivation of a healthy 
work force).
From Ebenezer Howard to the N.C.S.S. Report in 1943 two concepts 
were essential components of physical planning ideology; the notions of 
community and of social integration, and the concomitant assumption that 
both could be achieved by physical arrangements. The idea of community 
arose as compensation for some of the social changes involved in the
transition from a feudal, landbased society to an industrial society. The 
idea of social integration arose in opposition to the social and physical 
manifestations of inequalities in the distribution of capital. Both, 
however, looked backwards to the social structures of a rural society 
exemplifying gemeinschaft and organic solidarity (but also inequalities in 
the distribution of land and power) rather than forward to a less class- 
stratified society where power and opportunities would be shared more 
equally by all members of the community.
The assumption that physical arrangements rather than economic
change could bring about the social reform that planners desired is a
weakness in the social theory of town planning that persists to this day.
2Apart from the radical economics of Professor Irvine no member of the 
early planning movement in Australia perceived that in order to achieve 
most of their social aims physical or town planning must be closely 
allied with economic planning.
Stretton's 1970 futuristic prediction was the first indication of a 
change of direction in Australian thinking. 'Metropolitan planning... 
must one day be integrated as the land use and communications branch 
of central economic planning...The 'chief planner’ will have to be the 
Premier. The chief 'planning document' will have to be his budget.
His chief executants will probably include massive development corporations 
directed by economists and dealing in as much as a third of all new 
urban land.' (Stretton 1970: 226-7) He added that these notions 
'are still no more than radical theorists' dreams of the twenty-first 
century' but these predictions have become the new Federal promise of 
1973 under the Department of Urban and Regional Development.
R.F. Irvine: 1861-1941. Professor of Economics in Sydney University
1912-24; Special Commissioner on Housing of Workingmen 1912-13; 
author of Housing of workingmen in Europe and America^1913), The 
Place of the Social Sciences in a modem university 3 The Veil of 
Money3 'Town Planning’’ (Daily Telegrccph 7 March 1914), 'Do we want 
Town Planning?' (Architecture December 1916), 'Town Planning11 
(Building April 1917)
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2.
By the turn of the century Australian cities had become subjects 
of wider public discussion. The expatriate English architect Sulman gave 
several addresses after his arrival in Australia in 1885. One of these,
'The Layout of Towns', delivered to the Australian Association for the 
Advancement of Science at Melbourne University in 1890, contained the 
earliest use of the term 'town planning'. His recent knowledge of British 
conditions was evident in his preoccupation with disease, unsanitary 
conditions and public health. ’’On the grounds of public health and well­
being almost absolute freedom to lay out a town anywhere and in any fashion 
should be limited,'- he argued. When misuse of land and the privilege of 
private ownership ’’takes so glaring a form as originating conditions that 
must inevitably tend to produce disease it is the absolute duty of the 
State to interfere''. (Sulman: 1890). He advocated fixing a minimum size 
for building lots, limiting the area of suburbs to a maximum of one square 
mile with open space between suburbs of at least an eighth of a mile, and 
refusal of subdivision approval unless satisfactory water supply and 
drainage schemes were provided for.
But Sulman was ahead of his time in these concerns, for most dis­
cussion about cities around the turn of the century focussed on municipal 
problems. Australia had not kept pace with overseas developments during 
the depression of the 1890s and Sydney, by 1900 the largest Australian city 
with a metropolitan population approaching half a million, had not kept pace 
with the advances in city government that were taking place in such centres 
as Birmingham and London. Looking back from 1917 Charles Reade claimed 
that 'the stress of local evils pressed more heavily upon the New South 
Wales capital'' thereby producing "'some of the early developments of the 
movement which has set Australian cities definitely in search of city
planning reforms.'' (Reade 1917)
The Webbs, during their short visit of 1898, compared the local 
government of Sydney to that of London 'prior to 1885' and advocated the 
establishment of a Sydney County Council to supersede the functions of 
the forty municipal councils. (Austin 1965: 31). These views were 
similar to those of J.D. Fitzgerald,1 who had met John Burns (a principal 
author of the British Housing and Town Planning Act of 1909) in a visit 
to England. In 1898 he addressed the Sydney Toynbee Society on 
'Municipal Statesmanship in Europe', attacking the lack of interest in 
municipal affairs in Australian cities. (Miller 1961)
Two Greater Sydney Conferences in 1900 foundered. The first, with 
a majority of city aldermen had favoured unification, while the second, 
with a majority of suburban aldermen, had favoured federation.
(Fitzgerald 1906: 37-49). This conflict recurrently foiled attempts 
to create one central government for Greater Sydney.
There were other reasons though, besides the issue of municipal 
reform, for an increasing interest in the problems and development of 
Sydney. Railways and slum reform for example, eventually became 
components of the town planning movement that emerged in 1913. The stress 
on overseas precedent so common in all discussion of improvements at this 
time was evident in the appointment in 1907 of T.R. Johnson of Great 
Northern Railways England as Chief Commissioner of Railways. (Rydon and 
Spann 1962: 79)
J.D. Fitzgerald 1862-1924: one of the first Labor members elected to 
N.S.W. Legislative Assembly in 1891. Printer. Barrister from 1900. 
Leader of Legislative Council in Holman Government 1915. Minister of 
Local Government and Public Health in National Government 1916.
Chairman of Housing Board which planned and built the model Daceyville 
Garden Suburb. President of first and second Australasian Town Planning 
Conferences in 1917 and 1918; active in 'movements for town planning, 
civic improvement, better housing of the working classes and municipal 
reform (especially Greater Sydney) since 1890'. (Who's Who in 
Australia 1922) Visited Europe four times to study city government. 
Author of Municipal Statesmanship in Europe (1898). and Greater Sydney
and Greater Newcastle (1906) See Spearritt, 1973, for bibliography of 
Fitzgerald's urban writing.
The slum issue was first raised in 1896, when Archdeacon Boyce'*' 
predicted catastrophe in health or crime or both if something were not 
done about Sydney's slums. In March 1900 bubonic plague broke out in the 
Darling Harbour Wharves area, almost paralysing the activities of the city 
and forcing the government to act. (Freeland 1968: 225-6) This crisis 
crystallised a number of issues concerning redevelopment. Perhaps the 
most important result was the setting up of a statutory authority, the 
Sydney Harbour Trust, which signified the entrance of the state into an 
area previously a private preserve. This body of appointed rather than 
elected commissioners was criticised by Fitzgerald for being 'entirely 
independent of municipal control'. An elective committee of a council is 
the servant of citizens, he argued, but a statutory board is their master. 
(Fitzgerald 1906: 21-2) Similar complaints had been made in 1902 at the 
annual conference of the political Labour League when it was resolved 
that members of the Water and Sewerage Board and other boards and 
commissions should be elected by adult suffrage. (Rydon and Spann 1962: 
23-4). These demands indicated recognition by Labor supporters that 
councils and boards had powers that affected them and should therefore 
be subject to democratic control. They recognised, at least implicitly 
that decisions concerning city development and redevelopment were not only 
technical but political.
But others, less politically committed to the interests of a 
particular social class, resented the intrusion of 'politics' into questions 
of improvements, arguing that the chief criteria should be financial
F.B. Boyce 1844-1931: Rector of St. Paul's Sydney since 1884: Canon
of St Andrew's since 1900. Archdeacon of West Sydney since 1910.
Active worker in womanhood suffrage cause, social work, old age pensions. 
First President of British Empire League in Australia 1902, 1909, 1911. 
Leader of campaign in 1908 and 1909 for abolition of slums of Sydney
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viability and technical expertise. In his Improvement of the City of 
Sydney (1907) Sulman claimed that 'one competent expert will produce a 
better scheme in less time and at less cost than any board or combination 
of representatives.'
The differences of approach of Sulman and Fitzgerald were evident 
in their attitudes to the Wexford Street resumption scheme. Sulman thought 
the scheme 'undoubtedly good insofar as it gets rid of a congested area 
of low-class property'. (Sulman 1907: 221) But Fitzgerald criticized 
the proposals for their lack of provision for ' rehousing of people'. 
(Fitzgerald 1906: 109)
In 1906 Fitzgerald's newspaper articles were published as the book 
Greater Sydney and Greater N e w castlethe theme of which was the need for 
united city government and for a Housing of the Working Class Act. He 
argued for a body that could deal with Sydney 'on one harmonious and 
artistic plan' and which would have the power 'to improve the city area 
by resuming and demolishing slum quarters and rebuilding on a better 
plan . . and to erect or provide model lodging houses for the poor, as 
the great British municipalities do' (Fitzgerald 1906:49) Sulman had not 
yet become interested in workers' housing but he and Fitzgerald eventually 
worked together on the planning of the Daceyville Garden Suburb in 1912-13 
and united two important strands of the emerging town planning movement: 
Fitzgerald with his perspective as an elected Labor Party representative 
whose basic concern was social reform, Sulman from his perspective as a 
trained expert whose interest in architecture had widened to an overall 
interest in city development.
The growing interest in the 'improvement' of Sydney culminated in 
1908-9 in the appointment of a Royal Commission on the 'Improvement of 
the City of Sydney and Suburbs', which sat for twelve months. Its final
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recommendations included proposals for wholesale demolitions, creation of 
new streets, subways, tunnels and arterial thoroughfares one hundred feet 
wide from city to suburbs, street widening, construction of a system of 
underground railways, the promotion of a building act, powers to munici­
palities to resume and remodel unsanitary areas, provide workmen's cottages, 
playgrounds and so on, and finally to enable councils to make and execute 
town planning schemes on the lines of the British Act of 1909. (Winston 
1956: 26-28). Winston laments the fact that, apart from the Daceyville 
Housing Scheme, little was done to implement the recommendations of the 
Royal Commission. But the odd amalgam of values and conflicting approaches 
to city improvement evident in the list of recommendations made any 
concerted action unlikely. The emphasis on the 'monumental' approach, 
the creation of important thoroughfares and civic grandeur, suggested an 
effort to imitate Hausmann's achievements in Paris under the autocratic 
rule of Napoleon III with no clear realisation of the economic or 
sociological consequences involved. No doubt the fact that ten of the 
principal witnesses to the Commission were engineers and three architects 
(listed in Winston 1956: 110) contributed to the dominance of this approach. 
It is likely that only the participation of Fitzgerald in the Commission 
ensured the inclusion of the social welfare goals of workers' housing and 
slum clearance.
The McGowen Labor Government which came into office in 1910 was 
concerned about slum areas and rising rents as a factor in reducing real 
wages (McFarlane 1966: 4) and established a Housing Board in 1912.
Fitzgerald became Chairman of this body, the creation of which may have 
been encouraged by the passing of the Workers Dwellings Act in Queensland 
in 1909. But it differed from the Queensland Act in a way that illustrated 
the influence of town planning ideas. For rather than supply advances for 
the erection of random dwellings, the Housing Board proposed the building
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of a garden suburb. Work on it began in 1912 and Sulman, as supervising 
architect, came into contact with Fitzgerald. Sulman's interest in 
planning at this time was stimulated by his friendship with the newly 
appointed Economics Professor at Sydney University, R.F. Irvine, who was 
appointed by Holman in 1912 to investigate the provision of workingmen's 
housing in Europe and America. The report produced by Irvine in 1913 was 
published as a Government white paper and not long after its release the 
Town Planning Association was formed at a meeting in the Sydney Town Hall 
on October 17th 1913. (Taylor 1914: 112-14)
3.
The years 1913 to 1915 were a period of intense activity for the 
emerging town planning movement. The various strands of the reform move­
ment coalesced in the formation of Town Planning Associations in each 
state; three state governments sent civil servants overseas to study and 
report on planning and housing; and in 1914 Reade and Davidge made their 
Australasian town planning tour, receiving official recognition and 
financial support from all State Governments as well as from municipal 
and other bodies.
The formation of Australia's first Town Planning Association in 
N.S.W. in 1913 brought together men with widely differing political 
ideologies and approaches to planning. The main aim of the Association 
was 'to advocate proper planning of Australian cities and towns' (Taylor 
1914: 112-14) but its many sub-aims revealed the diverse interests of its
membership, which included the figures who dominated the Sydney movement 
from 1900 to 1930 - architects Sulman, Walter Burley Griffin and Vernon,
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municipal interests represented by Sir Allen Taylor'*' and J. Garlick (later
2a City Commissioner), engineers like Bradfield , housing and social
3reformers Irvine and Fitzgerald, real estate developer Richard Stanton 
and George Taylor, editor, with his wife, of the Building and Real Estate 
Magazine.
The concerns of the Association were with housing and rehousing; 
the reporting of 'nuisances' such as smoke which could be 'inimical to 
public health and comfort'; parks and reserves; 'disfigurement of the city 
by hoarding advertisements'; water supply, lighting, and the width of 
roads; and public health. The Association also supported a modern Building 
Act, and the establishment of a Chair of Architecture and Town Planning at 
Sydney University. It saw its most important task as that of persuasion, 
reporting and publicising the town planning cause. (Taylor 1914)
George Taylor's views were representative of the 'right wing' of 
the planning movement. His book Town Planning for Australia (1914) was
Sir Allen Taylor: Lord Mayor of Sydney 1905-6, 1909-12, member of 
Legislative Council, "prominent in the commercial life of the State" 
(Who's Who in Australia 1922)
J.J.C. Bradfield: 1867-1943: M.E., M. Inst. C.E., Chief engineer of
Metropolitan Railway Construction with N.S.W. Railways from 1912.
Fellow of Senate of Sydney University since 1913. Vice-President of 
Town Planning Association of N.S.W., member of Town Planning Advisory 
Biard, member of Town Planning Institute, London. Author of approved 
design of Sydney Harbour Bridge and Electric Railways for Sydney and 
suburbs. Publications - Linking Sydney and North Sydney; Report on 
City and Suburban Electric Railways presented to Parliament 19143 
Transit Problems of Greater Sydney3 Industrial Developments in N.S.W. 
since 1902. See Spearritt, 1973, for complete bibliography of 
Bradfield's work.
R. Stanton: Vice President of Real Estate Agents and Auctioneers
Association of N.S.W., three times Mayor of Ashfield, founder of 
HaberfieId Garden Suburb, member of N.S.W. Town Planning Advisory Board, 
managing director of Haberfield Pty Ltd, Stanton & Son Ltd, City of 
Sydney Real Estate Co. Ltd., London and Lancashire Insurance Co. Ltd., 
Town Planning Co. of Australia Ltd.
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preoccupied with civic beauty, vistas, spectacle and monumental grandeur, 
tree-lined streets and so on. He supported zoning as a means of ’distri­
buting population into districts of varying character... (because) human 
nature will never be levelled.' (Taylor 1914: 78) He believed that people 
got the kind of city they deserved.
The Jerry Builder has long been a scapegoat for 
bad suburban construction, but he is only a product of 
the people. Those for whom he builds get what they ask 
for. Let them request decent homes and be prepared to 
pay for them and they will get them.... It is useless 
to expect a decent city unless we have a decent people.
(Taylor 1914: 99)
This was not typical of most members of the planning movement who 
believed that a physically improved city would improve the morals, health 
and welfare of its poor people. Taylor opposed ’fool legislation’ like 
the fair rents Act and 'state socialism' building people's homes. (Taylor 
1918: 40, 122).
Such was the conservative strand of the movement. At its most 
radical extreme was R.F. Irvine, whose interest in town planning was part 
of an overall socialist critique. In 1914 he put forward the theory that 
unequal income distribution was a major source of economic crisis, 
concluding that at almost every stage of industrial evolution there had 
existed a fund which might have been redistributed more equitably without 
in any way impairing the efficiency of production. Trained in economics 
and history, Irvine believed in applying these skills on behalf of radical 
social change. He appeared on behalf of workers at major investigations 
into wages and conditions in 1913, 1920, 1921 and 1930. In his evidence in 
1920 to the Piddington Royal Commission on the Basic Wage he showed that 
Australia's percentage of rent to total wages was the highest in the world 
despite inferior housing standards, and suggested a Henry George type of 
land tax, municipal ownership of outlying land and a public brickworks to 
keep down housing costs. In his book The Roots of our Discontent he
attacked the idea that capitalism could be regarded as a permanent economic 
system and analysed the vested interests opposed to social change. He 
showed the social ills resulting from allowing the laws of supply and demand 
to determine economic life, attacked property as the real source of poverty 
and industrial unrest and criticised the concentration of credit power in 
private hands. To avoid harm to the standard of living of the workers he 
sought a series of solutions - social legislation, cooperation to raise 
productivity, experiments in industrial democracy and co-operative owner­
ship. As one who was prepared to go beyond the intellectual view he 
advocated rent control, building license control, town planning and control 
over land and speculation. He was 'obsessed with town planning and wrote 
prolifically on this question'. (McFarlane 1966)
Irvine's 1913 Report to the New South Wales Government on Working­
men's Housing was one of three comprehensive reports prepared for State 
Governments in this period. In Perth the inspiration behind the town 
planning movement was W.E. Bold, Perth City Council's Town Clerk. Bold 
reported to the Council in 1910 on the importance of planning the growth 
of the metropolitan area, quoting experience in Belgium, Britain, France 
Sweden and America. He related land values to transport access, noted the 
importance of betterment and directed attention to the importance of public 
ownership of land on the outskirts of cities in order to control future 
development. He recommended zoning, control of building density and room 
densities, and the undergrounding of telephone, telegraph and electricity 
cables. (Webb 1968)
In 1911 and again in 1913 the Perth City Council called for planning 
and urged the creation of an amalgamated region. In 1913 it sent Bold on 
a world tour to study municipal conditions and to attend the Imperial Health 
and Town Planning Conference, at which Ebenezer Howard, Raymond Unwin and
Seebohm Rowntree were among distinguished contributors. He also visited
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Letchworth, and the garden suburbs of Hampstead, Wembley Hill, Boling, 
Bournville, Port Sunlight, and London County Council housing schemes.
His subsequent report stressed the need for a city plan as 'the 
keystone of the arch of successful municipal effort.' (Webb 1968: 3)
The Greater Perth movement he regarded as a means not simply of improving 
the efficiency of municipal services but of extending the civic boundaries 
to include control of all areas into which the city and its suburbs could 
spread in the next twenty five years.
The West Australian Town Planning Association was formed in 1916
partly as a consequence of Bold's report ... partly as 
a public reaction to a remarkable series of public 
addresses in 1915 by Charles Reade on town planning 
and partly as a means of securing legislation.
(Webb 1968: 4)
Meanwhile in Victoria in 1915 J.C. Morrell's'1' Report on Town
Planning was submitted to the Minister of Public Works. This report
intended to show what is being done in other countries to 
avoid the danger, as threatened in most cities, by 
unsanitary conditions, bad housing and bad town planning 
and to illustrate what may be done in Victoria for the 
improvement of our cities as well as for the health and 
welfare of our citizens. (Victorian Parliamentary 
Papers 1915: 825)
Again the stress was on overseas innovation and the lament was that 
Australia was falling behind in important areas of social progress.
Morrell's report was full of concern for better housing and better living 
environments, referring to Letchworth as a community where people live 
'in health, happiness and prosperity instead of merely existing'.
(V P P 1915: 826) and he emphasised the interconnected nature of housing 
and town planning. His concept of town planning was comprehensive, involving
J.C. Morrell, A.R.I.B.A., architect with Public Works Department of 
Victoria. Author of Report on Town Planning for Victorian Government, 
1915.
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the recognition that planning could and should be a forward looking, 
anticipatory activity rather than just fixing up past mistakes.
'By foresight and imagination anticipated progress and health may be 
provided for in advance ... thus avoiding costly alterations and incon­
veniences arising from haphazard growth and expansion'. (V P P 1915: 826)
He attacked those who confined their thinking about planning to such ideas 
as fine architecture, traffic regulation and transportation and the City 
Beautiful 'without including the fundamental questions of city life and 
development' and compared this narrow interpretation with the accepted 
definition of the term in Britain as 'covering all that influences the 
health and welfare of the citizens; therefore housing, sanitation, 
transportation, architectural beauty and design, street formation and 
traffic convenience and regulation are all included to enable a satisfactory 
means of studying and solving the problems caused by their relationship 
with each other'.
Like Irvine, Morrell was favourably impressed by the British Housing
and Town Planning Act of 1909 and the power it gave to local authorities
'to control the future growth of a town', in particular the powers for
zoning, for insisting on the necessary provision of services (streets,
sewage disposal, water and lighting) in all sub-divisions, and for preventing
overcrowding by limiting the number of houses to the acre and thus avoiding
slums. Like most of the social reformers involved in town planning at the
time, Morrell worked from an assumption of physical determinism and an
awareness of the cost to society of a bad environment:
Who can say of the vast array of the unemployed how 
large a portion of the industrially inefficient are so 
because of lowered physical vitality caused by disad­
vantageous living conditions? To what extent is the 
forbidding atmosphere of so many homes an element in 
the problem of inebriety? Of the burdens which the 
State is called on to bear in the support of alms­
houses for the dependent, hospitals for the sick, 
asylums for the insane, prisons and reformatories for 
the criminal, what portion can fairly be attributed to 
early adverse environment?
(V P P 1915: 832)
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Like the British professional and middle class members of the
planning movement Morrell adhered to the concepts of community and social
balance. His report said of Hampstead Garden Suburb -
While it is neither desirable nor possible to mix the 
dwellings of all classes together indiscriminately, the 
promoters of the suburb have proved that it is not only 
desirable but possible by proper planning that all classes 
of a community may and should live together in close 
relationship; that a wide variety of classes and types 
of people produces a healthy, interesting and open 
minded society.
(V P P 1915: 888)
Morrell's Report influenced the thinking of the Victorian Town Planning 
Association which had been formed in 1914. In South Australia the visit 
of Reade and Davidge in the same year led to the emergence of the South 
Australian Town Planning Association.1 In New South Wales the Town 
Planning Association had started strongly, partly because its members were 
well placed to influence government policy - Fitzgerald in state housing, 
Bradfield in transport, Garlick in local government, and at the University, 
Sulman, Vernon Memorial Lecturer in Town Planning 1916-27, and Irvine.
With influential individuals in each state the town planning move­
ment was ready to make the transition from the propagandist to the 
administrative and legislative phase.
4.
Charles Readeclaimed in 1917 that the lecturing tour which he and 
Davidge made in 1914 had had permanent results in educating public opinion 
and paving the way for the introduction of legislation. With Bills for the 
reform of urban administration before the New South Wales and Victorian 
Parliaments in 1915 and a Town Planning and Housing Bill (drafted by Reade)
1 These are dealt with in more detail in chapters two and three.
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before the South Australian Parliament in 1916 the success of the town 
planning movement seemed assured. But the euphoria did not endure. Both 
the Greater Sydney and the Greater Melbourne Bills were defeated by hostile 
Upper Houses on the issue of broadening the franchise and the South 
Australian Bill met a similar fate because it was seen to threaten property 
rights, the basis of the Establishment's wealth.
After the failure of these legislative efforts to secure power and 
status for town planning, there followed a period of sober reassessment, 
evident in the themes that emerged from the two Australasian town planning 
conferences held in Adelaide in 1917 and Brisbane in 1918. With 300 
delegates in Adelaide and 600 in Brisbane from all States, including most 
of the groups interested in planning,'*' the views expressed at these 
conferences can be taken as representative of the state of planning thought 
in Australia at that time.
There were several strong statements by the social reformist school 
of planning thought. A paper by the Tasmanian delegate W N Hurst (Assist­
ant Secretary for Lands) for example, argued that 'if there is any method 
by which cities can improve the lot of the worker let the community be told 
what that method is'. Hurst advocated legislative power to enforce state 
purchase of large estates for the purpose of subdividing, adequately
servicing, then reselling 'on fairly long terms to persons of small capital
2- the most deserving class in every community.' He identified the land
The list of delegates to both conferences illustrates the contemporary 
breadth of interest in the issues of town planning ranging from members 
of Government to members of government departments, statutory bodies, 
town planning associations, local government bodies, Institute of Civil 
Engineers, Institute of Surveyors, Master Builders Association,
Chambers of Commerce, Board of Control of Soldiers Garden Village, 
Health Society of N.S.W., National Council of Women of N.S.W., Creche 
and Kindergarten Associations etc.
In 1973 the Federal Labor Government's idea of Land Commissions in each 
State may bring Hurst's 1917 proposals to fruition. Since the second 
world war state housing commissions have also pursued policies similar 
to Hurst's recommendations, but have suffered from a shortage of funds.
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speculator as the bane of all planning, held scant respect for the 'sacred 
rights and privileges of planning' when this threatened 'the welfare of the 
many' and believed that the greatest injustice of present society was the 
fact that 'poor people could not get houses to live in at rents within 
their means.' (Hurst 1917: 129-133)
Sulman’s paper, 'The Cities of Australia and their development', 
went beyond the desire for economic and orderly development, aiming for 
social improvements of various kinds. He argued that new suburbs should be 
separated from each other by boundaries of open space, that employment 
opportunities should be provided in these new areas, and that a sense of 
identity could be achieved by community centres. He believed that the most 
urgent question before the conference was the limitation of city growth, by 
which he meant 'the prevention of continuous building and confining all new 
centres of population within a limit of about 30,000 inhabitants divided 
from the next centre by at least a quarter of a mile of open country.' This 
was essential because 'Sydney is already subdivided to ten to fifteen miles 
out and will soon all be built over unless steps are taken to prohibit it.' 
(Sulman 1917: 60) Sulman wanted each suburb to be 'a town in miniature, 
with all the conveniences, amenities and responsibilities.' (Sulman 1921: 
100) His thinking was clearly derivative of Howard's Garden City theory, 
but it omitted the most radical element of that theory, municipal ownership. 
What significance should be made of this omission? It may be that Sulman 
thought municipal or public ownership far too radical for the contemporary 
climate of opinion. If so it indicates the limits of this early 'reform' 
period. On the other hand the omission may indicate the limits of Sulman's 
own 'reformism'.
Sulman's thinking was not confined to the potential achievements in 
the planning of new areas. But in his thoughts about improving existing 
cities he revealed the dilemma that faced reformers. Utopian solutions
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were all very well for new areas but the existing cities were far more 
complex problems and more urgent in terms of immediate need. Sulman's town 
planning lectures, published as a book in 1921, focussed on these problems 
of 'congestion during the hours of work and congestion in the dwelling, the 
chief evils to be combated.' (Sulman 1921: 35) He argued that transport 
problems should form part of the city plan instead of being considered, as 
had been the custom, as separate engineering problems, and that those 
dispossessed in slum reclamation should be re-housed in garden suburbs and 
provided with cheap land and transport. (Sulman 1921: 188-9) Sulman now
Iviewed town planning in broad terms as covering almost everything that makes 
for the commercial and industrial expansion of cities and the convenience 
and health of their dwellers' (Sulman 1921: 206) but, like others involved 
in town planning, he felt the need to show that planning was a paying 
proposition.
Fitzgerald, in his Presidential address to the second conference, 
said of the first that
It brought together for the first time a set of men whose 
brains, energy and ability were concentrated upon a subject 
of the most vital import to humanity today ... to plan 
out the destiny of Australian city dwellers in the 
future. For it is an unchallengeable fact that our 
movement will change the destiny of urban populations 
and that our propaganda will make our civil conditions 
better... our citizens healthier ... that our town 
planners' devices will save millions ... The hardest 
task of the first conference was to convince a doubting 
public that we were not a mere band of dreamers ... 
that we could stand the severest test of a Chamber 
of Commerce.
(Fitzgerald 1918: 26)
This statement suggests that war and the 1915 and 1916 legislative defeats 
had not dimmed the optimism of the town planning movement. On the contrary, 
it felt itself to be on the verge of great influence and success, an 
attitude common to many of the contributor's papers. This confidence was 
based partly on the breadth of interests represented at the conferences and 
partly on the expectation in most states that town planning legislation was
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imminent. But Fitzgerald's own approach to planning had ’changed insofar as 
he expressed a new criterion for the movement, that it 'could stand the 
severest tests of a Chamber of Commerce'. This stress on financial 
viability had been an important consideration for some figures in the 
movement but not, generally speaking, of those politically left of centre. 
Yet, as is evident in a majority of papers at both conferences, this was 
now one of the two major pre-occupations.
In 'The Future of Australian Cities' Councillor Rigby (Vice
President of the Victorian Town Planning Association) and T.G. Ellery
(Town Clerk, Melbourne City Council) argued that
even the businessman, the unidealistic person of 
utilitarian outlook, should remember that city planning 
attracts industries, commerce and visitors; it produces 
better transport facilities, improved hygenic conditions 
and better and less expensive living quarters and food 
supplies. City planning is a business proposition of 
the first importance.
Similarly, W. Scott Griffiths (N.S.W. Town Planning Association, later 
South Australian Government Town Planner, 1923-29) wrote, 'my principal aim 
is to supply evidence to those who possess doubts as to the commercial or 
business value of town planning'. (Scott Griffiths 1917) And Fitzgerald 
said in 1918, 'I say now to the practical man, all this is good business. 
This is business government. A balance sheet could be shown of actual 
profit in all these schemes'. (Fitzgerald 1918: 27) Even the advocates of 
garden cities used economic profitability as their rationale. Mr T. Price, 
Mayor of Toowoomba, in a paper on the 'Proposed Industrial Garden City at 
Darra, Queensland' wrote that 'it is now possible to so plan industrial 
cities that they will turn out a far greater quantity of material wealth 
at less cost' and of Letchworth Garden City (in contrast to what Morrell 
had thought important about Letchworth) that 'it pays well in cash, it pays 
well in industrial efficiency, and above all in the health, comfort and 
happiness of the citizens.' (Price 1918: 36-9)
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W.E. Bold, in a paper on 'The Distribution of Parks, Playgrounds . 
and Open Spaces' argued that 'provision of parks and playgrounds pays a 
city - in increase in land values, attraction of population, improvement 
of public health and reduction of delinquency.' (Bold 1918: 150) And the 
argument for zoning was given an economic basis in a paper on 'Zoning of 
Cities and Towns' by H.F. Halloran (surveyor, real estate agent and 
auctioneer) which argued that New York property owners welcomed zoning as 
necessary in the interests of public health, safety and general welfare, 
and for the conservation of property values.' (Halloran 1918: 163-4)
This suggests that along with the idealism, enthusiasm and optimism 
there existed a basic insecurity and lack of confidence. Palmer (1972) 
observed of the British movement that idealistic social reformers often 
had to link their arguments to practical considerations to gain a hearing, 
and that the most effective argument was that sanitary and housing reform 
would save money for the ratepayer in the long run. Poverty, under­
nourishment, ill-health and overcrowded conditions would sap the spirit and 
strength from the workers and place a burden on public charity, whereas in 
a good environment their health and well-being, and hence their productivity, 
would be ensured.
It may be that the most effective arguments that reformers could 
bring forward were those that demonstrated reform to be financially 
profitable. If Australian reformers used this argument as a 'strategy' 
(rather than from genuine conviction that economic factors were the most 
important issue) this indicates a great deal about the contemporary political 
scene. If their perception of the situation was that change would only be 
possible if it were in the financial interest of those groups who held 
economic and political powers then the possibilities of radical reform were 
indeed limited, especially in the area of land reform and property rights.
If, on the other hand, economic arguments were used in the conviction that
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these were the most important issues, this suggests a great deal about the 
reformers' ideology. It indicates that their reformist intentions were 
limited to palliatives that would strengthen rather than threaten the 
status quo.
The second preoccupation of these two conferences was with the 
administrative and political problems of a planning authority. While most 
delegates recognised the need for some kind of planning legislation there 
was very little agreement either about the best way to allocate planning 
powers or about the scope of those powers. The Lord Mayor of Adelaide, for 
example, argued that housing had nothing to do with town planning, while 
others like Morrell insisted that the two issues were essentially related.
But most of the papers in 1917 and again in 1918 were devoted to arguing 
the relative merits of a central, expert-dominated planning authority as 
opposed to local council autonomy.
In 1917 Rigby and Ellery argued that 'the haphazard development 
of our cities and suburbs is due to the absence of any controlling authority 
with jurisdiction over whole metropolitan areas'. They advocated the 
establishment in each State of a governmental body as a strong central 
authority for the control of planning and development, to be composed 
largely of experts, and to be entirely independent of local prejudices'. 
(Rigby and Ellery 1917: 54) Also in favour of a central body formulating 
or at the very least having final discretion over schemes was E. Milner 
Stephen, a barrister and alderman on the Sydney City Council. He too bel­
ieved that town planning was 'a problem for experts' and it was on this point 
that opposition to the notion of a central authority usually centred, 
claiming it to be undemocratic or authoritarian. In South Australia this 
was the most contentious question to emerge in the debates over the 1916 
Town Planning and Housing Bill which Reade had played an important part in 
framing. He explained his attitude at the 1917 Conference and again in
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1918. He regarded the creation of a large metropolitan council, to control 
city, suburbs and all contiguous land not yet built on, as 'the obvious 
solution'. But in South Australia, and perhaps in other States, he argued, 
'the possible creation of a Greater Adelaide Council controlling city, 
suburbs and adjacent areas, is far removed from the sphere of immediate 
practical achievement'. The only feasible alternative therefore was to 
set up a central town planning authority which would work in conjunction 
with existing municipal councils and statutory bodies. (Reade 1917)
Reade's position was not accepted by the conference and the con­
sensus that finally emerged in 1917 was that 'full town planning powers be 
conferred on local authorities with right of control by the state govern­
ment . ' ^
In 1918 Reade modified his position and advocated cooperation between 
a central .technical authority, local councils and statutory bodies. Garlick, 
the Under Secretary of the N.S.W. Department of Local Government, argued the 
case against Reade for initiation and control of town planning by local 
governing bodies. Discussion of their papers centred around whether powers 
of initiation should reside solely with local authorities, whether powers 
of initiation and control should lie with local authorities,or alternatively, 
with a combination of representatives from a central authority and local 
bodies, or whether a separate town planning department should be created 
and empowered to initiate town planning schemes and leave their imple­
mentation to the local authorities concerned.
The resolution finally passed by the 1918 Conference amounted to an
endorsement of Reade's views, that it was not advisable to set up an
arbitrary body of experts, but also not advisable to give individual
councils the absolute right to decide whether they would or would not plan,
 ^ This was one of a list of resolutions passed at the end of the 1917 
Conference and recorded on pages 153-158 of the Official Volume of 
Proceedings.
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irrespective of adjoining councils or statutory bodies. But the issue has 
never been satisfactorily resolved in subsequent legislation and persists 
as an enduring dilemma to this day.
At the end of the 1918 Conference Fitzgerald remarked that he had 
'never been in any deliberative body so large and so important as this in 
which there has been so little friction'. It was true that all the 
resolutions proposed at the conclusion of the conference were passed 
unanimously except for one. But the one that failed raised a significant 
point, suggesting that the consensus approach to planning that prevailed 
in the two Conferences was only possible because discussion was confined to 
matters that were largely uncontroversial and did not involve any basic 
or political changes. The resolution that failed was put forward by 
Alderman Branston of Sydney and asked for 'provision to be made to prevent 
speculators from monopolising business and residential allotments in towns, 
that an immediate assessment of the unimproved land values of the State be 
made and the enactment of legislation reserving all future increments to the 
State ...' (Official Volume of Proceedings 1918: 187)
The resolution was opposed by two speakers. Mr E.H. Cowdrey 
(N.S.W. Town Planning Association) argued that 'these proposals are 
political and have nothing to do with the conference at all'., while 
Councillor Rigby said that the latter section of the resolution 'if it means 
anything, means the nationalisation of land. I am not in favour of that. 
(Applause)' What is important is the suggestion, by the first objector, that 
if proposals are at all 'political' then they should not be presented to 
the Conference. This was an attitude shared by other town planning 
advocates. Sulman, for example, saw 'no valid reason for political party 
issues being introduced' and believed that municipal government was 
'administrative and not legislative'. (Sulman 1921: 213)
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This belief that municipal government was administrative rather than 
legislative belongs in the same ideological mould as the belief that town 
planning decisions were technical rather than political. This unwilling­
ness to come to grips with politics, which has been a feature of the 
planning movement for the past seventy years, can be explained in terms of 
its historical origins. Consistent with the middle class backgrounds of 
most members of the planning movement was the desire to have a cross-partisan 
appeal and the aim of ameliorating class differences and promoting social 
harmony. Significant to this developing ideology was the fact that Irvine, 
the only radical thinker who supported town planning, withdrew from active 
participation in the movement after 1917, probably because the trend of the 
movement in favour of this consensus view of politics and social change was 
not in his view the way to solve the problems of society, especially the 
problem of poverty.
The waste and inefficiency of cities troubled those social reformers 
who involved themselves in the planning movement and they prided themselves 
on trying to reduce it. But most regarded utopian thought as a luxury and 
radical thought as a folly, especially when some businessmen, politicians 
and civic leaders still saw planners as visionaries. Proposals expressing 
or implying deep dissatisfaction with the present order would only have 
provoked further disparagement, which they could ill afford. This was 
evident in the treatment of Irvine by the business community. City banks 
and insurance companies agitated for the foundation of an Economics Society 
to offset Irvine's radical ideas and their influence on students. He was 
eventually forced to resign from the university by pressures from the 
Establishment, ostensibly over a private matter. But in an exchange in the 
N.S.W. Parliament one of Irvine's adversaries, Sir Daniel Levy,"^ argued that
 ^ Sir Daniel Levy 1872-1937, lawyer. M.L.A. for Darlinghurst 1901-37. 
Speaker of Legislative Assembly 1919-25, 1927-30, Fellow of Sydney 
University Senate. Trustee of Public Library, Mitchell Library, 
Australian Museum. Director of Sydney Hospital, Eastern Suburbs 
Hospital, Benevolent Society of N.S.W.
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'it is not right that men in public positions should express views on 
contentious political matters' and a Labor parliamentarian claimed that 
Irvine had been victimised because of his radical views. (McFarlane 
1966: 15-17)
Sulman, in contrast to Irvine, was an apolitical man who worked 
cautiously from within the system. He participated on numerous boards and 
commissions, yet his achievements over such a long period were minor.
This illustrates a central dilemma of the planning movement. Although it 
was initially inspired by a social reformist zeal it submerged the broader 
problems of social and political change in its concentration on day to day 
problems and in its effort to win professional respectability. This may 
have been partly because the rapidity of urban growth demanded 'practical' 
plans and immediate decisions and partly a decision (which all reformers 
must face) to accept the attainable improvement rather than to struggle 
unsuccessfully for the unrealisable ideal.
5.
City planning in Australia developed as a reform movement around 
1900 which was concerned with conditions in Australian cities but was heavily 
derivative of British thinking. The movement was organised by middle class 
reformers who were disturbed both by what was happening to the cities 
aesthetically and by the living conditions of the urban working class. But 
their motives were not simply altruistic. They believed that slums 
threatened their cities physically (by breeding crime, violence and disease) 
and politically (by breeding discontent).
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Partly because of their conservative nature the reformers held what 
Gans (1969) has called a 'facility-centred theory of social change'. They 
believed that if the poor were provided with a set of properly designed 
facilities, ranging from a house and garden to better work places and parks 
and playgrounds, they would not only give up their slum abodes but would 
also give up the pathologies associated with poverty (crime, violence and 
so on).
This theory of social change based on assumptions of environmental 
or physical determinism was the conventional wisdom of the early town 
planning movement and was supported by many businessmen, property owners 
and their economic and political associates. These groups were interested 
in creating an attractive central city retail area, in building low density 
residential areas and improving transport facilities. They were particularly 
interested in ensuring that the slums did not 'infect' the central business 
area. They were concerned primarily with buildings and facilities and they 
made common cause with the early reformers.
What the poor needed most was economic aid, not parks and play­
grounds. Presumably the reformers could have developed anti-poverty 
programs, reorganising the industrial economy so that unemployment and 
poorly paid employment would be eliminated. But Irvine was the only member 
of the town planning movement to advocate such fundamental structural 
changes. The rest failed to do so because politically they were quite 
conservative. They had no desire to change the economic system or the 
social order. Their concerns were health, convenience and amenity; order,
efficiency and beauty.
CHAPTER TWO
ADELAIDE:
PROPERTY, PRIVILEGE AND POWER
'By the early twentieth century ... the city's boosters claimed 
that all Adelaide's citizens could enjoy the pleasures of both town and 
country, as the gentry had done. Adelaide was described as a Garden 
City in which all the people were close to parkland and public squares, 
or farms, orchards and vineyards. The claims made for Adelaide as a 
Garden City were to some extent justified, though they encouraged an 
enormous complacency about the city's condition and inhibited any planning 
for its future growth.'
(Hirst 1973: 218)
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1.
In spite of the well known work of Colonel Light in its initial 
planning, Adelaide had to wait eighty years for a second theorist to think 
constructively about the desirable nature of the city's development.
Charles Reade left in 1920, after four hard years battling for acceptance 
of a few of his ideas, but within nine years the whole legal and admini­
strative apparatus for planning which had largely been his creation was 
dismantled. From then on successive Liberal governments showed no interest 
at all in town planning and when, in 1950, public pressure urged them to 
reconsider, it was a further sixteen years before a new Labor government 
finally gave legislative sanction to planning ideas.
At first sight it would seem that planning ideas were premature at 
the time of Reade, that the planning movement emerged with his arrival and 
inspiration, and folded on his departure. But to attribute the demise of 
planning in the 1920s to the failure of one man's campaign to revolutionise 
the citizens' level of consciousness on urban issues would be to explain 
history by pure chronological coincidence and to ignore the social, 
economic and political structure within which planning ideas had to survive. 
This chapter attempts to outline some of the obstacles to the progress of
planning in South Australia.
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...the rich were used to cosy but lawful relations 
between business and government (Stretton 1970: 143)
Town planning ought to be taken out of the hands of 
landlords and their agents, who desire mainly to see 
how many houses can be got onto a given space
(Gunn (Labor MHA for Adelaide) SAPD 1915: 275)
2 .
It is not insignificant to the issue of urban planning that between
1917 and 1965 the Liberals, (later the Liberal Country League - LCL)
enjoyed a monopoly of political power.^ This Liberal Party was supported
by two distinct groups - later three when it merged with the Country Party
in 1932 - the Adelaide Establishment and the Adelaide middle class. The
Establishment consisted of a number of old, interrelated Adelaide families,
augmented by others admitted through wealth and intermarriage (Moss, 1961).
Although their wealth often originated with land, the sources of wealth
2were increasingly commercial, financial and even industrial ventures.
This elite
exercised, prior to the post war economic transformation, 
a degree of financial influence and control probably 
unparalleled by any group in any Australian state.
Labor held office only twice in these 48 years - from 1924-27 and from 
1930-33. By 1915 the two-party system had been firmly established.
Both parties had their headquarters in Adelaide. "The chief strength 
of one party was its majority support among Adelaide's people, and not 
least among the advantages of the other was its access to Adelaide's 
wealth." (Hirst 1973: 219)
Country and city capital were thus connected and shared similar vested 
interests. 'Merchants and professional people in the city invested in 
mining and grazing. Pastoralists who moved from the country to 
Adelaide had many opportunities to extend their interests. There were 
few who did not find seats on local boards of banks and insurance 
companies. Among the promoters and early directors of the Bank of Adel 
the squatting fraternity was well represented by Tarlton, Magery, Crozier, 
and Hay. City property worth thousands of pounds gave the pastoralists 
Cudmore, Newland, Hay and Tennant valuable alternative sources of income. 
Hawker, Newland, Waite, Horn, Bagot, Williams and Price all profited 
from the large holdings of Broken Hill mining shares.' (Hirst 1973: 37) 
Hirst's section on 'A Gentry in Adel.' gives the best account yet of the 
interconnected nature of rural and urban capital and their monopoly of 
political power.
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Its sons were schooled at St Peter's or Prince Alfred 
colleges, or perhaps Geelong Grammar, and their 
education frequently capped by a period at Oxford or 
Cambridge...Cultivated and frequently libertarian on 
moral and religious issues, they were economically, 
socially and politically conservative...they fought to 
preserve a nineteenth century constitution, a socially 
hierarchical order, and a laissez-faire economic 
system.
(Blewett & Jaensch 1971: 8)
And they had the necessary political power to achieve these ends. Lacking 
any popular base, but possessing money, property and influence, their 
natural habitats were the restricted franchise Legislative Council, the 
property-dominated Adelaide City Council, the party organisation and a 
political structure that sheltered them. 'Their political influence 
derived not solely from ability and social prestige, but also from the role 
the old families played in staffing and financing the party organisation.' 
(Blewett & Jaensch 1971: 9).
Their natural allies, to become formal allies through the merger
of 1932, were the 'yeoman proprietary' who formed the core of the Country
Party, cautious guardians of the small farmer economy and dedicated
preservers of rural interests and rural values. Neither of these two
groups were potential supporters of planning, with its connotations of state
intervention, and constraints on individual economic freedom,'*' and above all
2its likely constraints on land, the basis of their wealth. Their hold on
Farmers had in fact gained considerably from govt assistance - railways, 
cheap rates, Roseworthy Agricultural College, land laws etc. So they 
didn't mind State intervention - so long as it favoured them.
'Land remained the most common form of investment (between 1870 and 1917). 
Some people bought land merely as a speculation; others leased it to 
farmers. Of the 129 estates over 5000 acres ... in 1890, several were 
leased to farmers and owned by Adelaide capitalists, or were managed from 
Adelaide for British investors. ...Apart from the large proprietors, many 
individuals in Adelaide ... owned properties in the country. Among those 
who supplied information on the cost of farming operations to a Royal 
Commission in 1875 were ... two of Adelaide's largest land agents and 
speculators. ... Frequently Adelaide land agents and speculators were 
the purchasers of large portions of country towns. ... Adelaide people 
owned most of the water frontages at Port Pirie and Port Augusta.
(Hirst 1973: 27-8)
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the state's political power was tight and unassailable. A ratio of two 
country seats to one metropolitan was virtually enacted in 1901 when it 
was provided that country electorates should have half as many electors 
as city districts. In 1913 the Peake Govt made the 2:1 ratio independent 
of population. (Smith 1963) Hence farmers were the largest single social 
group in the Lower House. When they merged with the Liberals in 1932 the 
Country Party was given a guarantee that the existing ratio of rural to 
metropolitan seats would be maintained and this two to one ratio meant that 
under the dispensations of the 1936 and 1955 redistributions the extra­
metropolitan region had 26, the metropolis 13 seats.
And, making doubly sure of their ascendancy, the Upper House and 
its powers were modelled on the mid-nineteenth century House of Lords. It 
could reject any bill, including money bills, sent from the Assembly, and 
in effect could amend any bill, for its recommended amendments were backed 
by the ultimate sanction of rejection. Franchise provisions for the council 
were restrictive. Complex in form, in practice they embodied a 'head of 
household' franchise (effectively excluding women and students, and the 
poor in general). As late as 1965 only 38 per cent of Assembly electors 
were on the Council roll (Blewett & Jaensch 1971: 40). Boundary arrange­
ments accentuated the inequality in distribution of voting power. Three of 
the five four-member districts are non-metropolitan. Thus for over a 
generation representation in the Council has been sixteen LCL to four ALP.
The third social group providing the power base of the Liberal 
Party, the urban middle class, was politically depressed in comparison with 
the power and influence of its two allies, at least until the 1950s. It 
lacked the wealth, prestige and influence of the Establishment, and the 
structure of the electoral system denied it representation commensurate 
with its numbers both in the Party and in the Parliament. Until the 
emergence in the House of Assembly in the 1950s of Robin Millhouse, a young
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barrister and energetic and aggressive spokesman for the urban middle class, 
it had been content to follow Establishment figures and their policies.
Within this highly conservative political, social and economic 
framework those in favour of radical town planning measures had to 
manoeuvre. Analysis of their efforts to implement planning proposals 
reveals the extent to which they were victims of an impenetrable power 
structure. But first a look at the nature of the early planning movement.
3.
By 1914, in a worldwide context, there existed a reasonably 
articulate set of thoughts about town planning which involved the conver­
gence of streams of thought which had flowed separately in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century: aesthetic aspirations about the City Beautiful;
social thoughts about housing, overcrowding, health and slums; and political 
and economic thoughts about metropolitan administration and the planning 
of utilities and services.
At the outbreak of the Great War there was widespread interest in 
each Australian state in the concepts of the planning movement but this 
interest was, by and large, unorganised and fragmented. No one involved in 
the incipient movement in Australia seemed possessed of a comprehensive 
understanding of the connectedness of these streams of thought. The 
arrival in Australia in 1914 of Charles Reade and W.R. Davidge as repres­
entatives of the British Garden Cities and Town Planning Association (in 
the British Association for the Advancement of Science lecture tour of 
Australia), overcame this problem of direction and coordination, tempor­
arily at least.
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Reade in particular left a significant legacy in South Australia, 
where he was employed as Government Town Planner from 1916 to 1920. Born 
in New Zealand in 1880 into a family distinguished in literature, Charles 
Reade seems to have developed an interest in and a flair for exposing and 
denouncing slums and advocating better housing and amenities (public gardens, 
children's playgrounds and the like) as a journalist in Auckland and 
Wellington. There, in 1911, he had created a stir by an effective 
exposure (with the aid of lantern slides) of unsanitary housing in those 
cities. In New Zealand he had written articles on housing projects in 
Australia, Britain and Germany, which led him to Britain, the heart of the 
new town planning movement, in 1912. There he was Assistant, then Acting 
Secretary of the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association of Great 
Britain, which had been responsible for the creation of Letchworth Garden 
City, and other projects and had been influenced in initiating the 1909 
Housing and Town Planning Act. His interest in Australia was heightened in 
November 1912 by a lecture 'Planning the new Australian Capital' by 
Davidge, (Veale 1967: 76) and in 1913 he accompanied Davidge on the 
Australian lecture tour to 'promote up-to-date planning legislation'. It 
was in this interlude in Britain that Reade accumulated the body of 
knowledge concerning planning legislation and experiments in Britain,
Europe and America that he was to expound so energetically in his six 
years in Australia (and later in the Malay States, Rhodesia and South 
Africa before his suicide in 1933). No personal impressions of Reade the 
man seem to have survived apart from a few obituary comments which appeared 
in the Town Planning Institute Journal (vol.xx, No. 2, November 1933) 
describing him as 'a man of delightful personality, with a strong sense of 
humour and a rich fund of anecdotes. He did great work in unsettled 
districts, under trying conditions and often against a distinct hostility 
towards town planning in local official quarters'.
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He certainly met with considerable hostility, criticism and oppo­
sition from various public bodies in Adelaide, from the City Council and 
from some politicians and technical bodies (particularly from the 
Surveyors' Institute and the Licensed Landbrokers' and Real Estate Agents' 
Institutes) and not a little of this must have been provoked by his out- 
spokeness. For example, he alienated the Adelaide City Council within 24 
hours of his arrival in 1914 by such comments as 'There was a great deal of 
smugness and complacency in Adelaide' and by challenging the City Council 
in a lecture entitled 'Garden Cities versus Adelaide slums and suburbs'.
From that point on he had an enemy in both the Acting Mayor of the day, . 
Lewis Cohen, and the City Council, which was later to prove a major 
obstacle when planning proposals largely drafted by Reade came before 
Parliament in 1916 and in 1920. But his energy and enthusiasm attracted 
and converted many to the cause, including the Liberal Attorney-General of 
1917-20 and Minister in charge of town planning, H.N. Barwell (Premier 
1920-24), many local councils, and at least two local left-wing newspapers, 
The Critic and The Daily Herald.
Since Reade provided not only the inspiration but most of the 
intellectual sustenance of the movement in South Australia his ideas 
deserve some attention. In general terms his proposals for Adelaide are 
revealed in a pamphlet 'Recommendations in Regard to Planning', written 
with Davidge in 1915 after their Australasian tour. He advocated a Town 
Planning Act to deal with both undeveloped areas adjoining the city and with 
the improvement of areas already built up. The essential provisions of 
such an Act should include power to lay down street and building lines, to 
vary the width of roads, to prescribe the maximum height and character and 
limit the number of buildings to the acre, to prescribe special districts 
for factories and other purposes, to acquire lands for open spaces, park 
belts, street and city improvements, acquisition of unsanitary areas for
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the building of garden suburbs at the government valuation prior to the 
initiation of the town planning scheme, and to secure for the public a 
proper proportion of the betterment arising from any public improvement 
under town planning. He believed that all main or arterial roads should 
be subsidised or maintained by the state; that cheap and rapid transport, 
provided by the state, should be an integral part of town planning schemes; 
that tenement houses should be strongly discouraged and the principle of 
one family, one house firmly maintained; that scenery and natural features 
and objects of historic or scientific interest should be preserved and belts 
of open country permanently reserved on the outskirts of cities and new 
suburbs and that the principles of the Garden City movement should be applied 
or adapted to every scheme of town planning and to every new town created 
in the state (Reade & Davidge 1915: 1-2).
He approved of the low density spread of Australian cities but 
wanted their layouts improved, slums abolished, good homes built for 
workers, and public parks, open spaces and children's playgrounds provided. 
His plan for Colonel Light Gardens, the garden suburb created after an Act 
of 1919, embodied his views of enlightened town planning - no through traffic 
along residential streets, zoning of areas according to their best use, 
residential and commercial areas designated, building line requirements 
laid down, and the number of houses to the acre specified. Sites were 
provided for open spaces and public buildings and provision was made for 
wide tree lined streets (Veale 1967: 77).
At a meeting of the Municipal Association of South Australia in 
September 1919, Reade spoke on the economic as well as the social difference 
between 'planning' and 'subdividing' land, emphasising that new areas 
should be planned as a whole, not subdivided piecemeal. To do this 
councils needed town planning powers. The mere control of subdivisions, or
any legislation attempting to solve existing difficulties under this head,
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he argued, was foredoomed to failure. Councils must be able to plan areas 
in anticipation of development and to determine the uses to which land 
should be put, to regulate the number of houses to the acre, and generally 
to encourage the orderly development of new districts {The Express3 17 
September 1919).
He was particularly attuned to the needs and rights of workers.
In a visit to Port Pirie in 1919 to advise on housing conditions he argued
that 'discontented workmen are largely the product of bad housing conditions.
Remove the cause and industrial trouble is reduced to a minimum!. (This
utilitarian argument was probably intended to persuade employers of the need
for better suburbs with better transport and argued that convenient access
to the sea and hills was necessary in the interest of public welfare, to
provide Port Pirie residents 'with changes of scene and atmosphere, one of
the necessities of modern town life'. Slums, he argued, were detrimental
to industrial efficiency and created discontent.
It was no use telling a man he should not waste his 
money; he was a victim of his environment, and while 
that was permitted to be squalid no improvement could 
be expected. Men in such conditions troubled little 
about the effect of their actious on other people...
Besides the immediate effect of slums, the harm to 
future generations had to be considered. People who 
lived in slums took little care of their children.
Reade then recommended to the Smeltors Company that they build a model
garden suburb for their workers, for humane as well as for sound business
reasons (Port Pirie Recorder3 4 June 1919).
The extent of Reade's influence on the South Australian planning 
movement is obvious from the reorganised constitution in 1916 of the South 
Australian Town Planning and Housing Association, a body formed after 
Reade's initial visit in 1914. The objectives of the Association are 
clearly derived from Reade's 1915 pamphlet of recommendations for town 
planning in South Australia. They included provision by Parliament of 
an up-to-date Town Planning and Development Act and Housing Act
4Under which existing shortage and overcrowding will be 
replaced by modern garden city and social welfare 
facilities, including the removal of existing un­
hygienic conditions which are a menace to the public 
health and national welfare,
supplemented by a modern Building Act; state advances at low rates of 
interest for financing town planning and housing schemes; substitution of 
modern schemes of town planning and garden city development in place of 
haphazard growth with the general objective of securing 'convenience, 
health and amenity'; zoning factory, commercial, recreational and residential 
areas, including limitation of houses to the acre, the proportion of land 
which could be built on, and the height, use and character of building 
generally; public adoption of garden city methods of housing and estate 
development; and 'provision of parks and open spaces, including children's 
playgrounds and the proper planning of them, including facilities for 
recreational institutions or clubs and the encouragement of social welfare 
generally'. (Town Planning and Housing Association of South Australia, 
pamphlet on reorganised constitution, 31 March 1916, Publishers Ltd., 
Adelaide, 1916).
The Town Planning and Housing Association was very active between 
1916 and 1920 in supporting proposed planning legislation, giving public 
lectures (often using Reade as their spokesman), and recruiting new members 
and bodies to their cause. By 1919, in seeking wider membership, the 
Association had invited local councils to affiliate and appoint two members 
to the Association's council, which 'would have an active voice in deter­
mining the scope and character of proposed legislation on town planning, 
building and housing'. (Advertiser3 1 August 1919). By August of that 
year every metropolitan council with the exception of the Adelaide City 
Council and the Corporation of Norwood and Kensington had affiliated with 
the Town Planning and Housing Association and appointed delegates to it 
(Register3 23 August 1919) . Significantly, only two members of the
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Adelaide City Council had voted in favour of joining the Town Planning 
Association (Advertiser3 5 and 7 August 1919) .
One of the most prestigious and useful recruits to the planning 
movement at this time was H.N. Barwell, Attorney-General and Minister in 
charge of town planning in the Peake Liberal Government (1917-20) and 
Premier from 1920-24. Just before the introduction of the Town Planning 
and Development Bill in 1919 he addressed members of the Town Planning and 
Housing Association on 'Town Planning', proclaiming that
Social betterment and town planning almost of necessity 
went together. The advantages of modern town planning 
benefited most of all the poorer classes, and that was 
one of the reasons why it had his support.
(Barwell 1919: 3)
This appreciation of, and support for, the reformist or 'social 
betterment' aspects of town planning was unusual for a Liberal politician 
of the day. Unfortunately his party did not share his views and he had to 
struggle almost single handed to steer his Town Planning and Development 
Bill through Parliament against opposition from all directions (within his 
party, from the Upper House, from the Adelaide City Council, Surveyors and 
Architects Institutes, to name but a few.)
A significant feature of the planning movement in these enthusiastic 
early years was its emphasis on the social benefits accruing from town 
planning, especially for children. In 1916 , as part of a Child Welfare 
Exhibition, the Town Planning Association had prepared an exhibit and 
declared that 'the welfare of the child demands a Town Planning Act without 
delay'. Reade delivered a lecture on 'Playgrounds and Recreation in Garden 
Cities' arguing that 'it was now recognised that by providing for the 
welfare of the child they were providing for the welfare of the future 
citizen', and he gave an account of the playground movement in the US, UK 
and Canada. He was a strong believer, as were most reformers of the day, 
in environmental or physical determinism, as he continued to argue that
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when slums had been replaced by properly planned suburbs 
equipped with well designed playgrounds there had been 
a remarkable decrease in infant mortality and in 
various diseases, convictions for crime had diminished, 
and drunkenness had decreased. [Advertiser 3 2 November
1916) .1
The town planning movement reached its zenith in 1920 with the 
passing of the Town Planning and Development Act and with the publication 
of its official journal, The Light Journal of Town Planning and Housing.
The first (and last) issue appeared in June 1920 at the high point of 
public debate over the planning legislation then before Parliament, and 
much of it was devoted to supporting 'the bill, the whole Bill, and nothing 
but the Bill' [The Light Journal.... 3 p.3). Its editorial announced that 
the purpose of the new journal was to give detailed publicity to town 
planning and housing and kindred activities. It ran a feature, 'Subdividing 
versus Town Planning', supporting Reade's work in drawing up garden suburbs. 
It printed a letter from Ebenezer Howard to a 'prominent Adelaide citizen' 
(probably Reade) which referred to the concentration of half of Australia's 
population in five cities and argued that the best corrective was
decentralisation in properly planned rural garden towns.
I can see no way of correcting the current over­
population of big cities, interesting people in 
the productive enterprises of the soil, except
In 1918 the daily Register (19 February) carried a 2000 word article by 
H.W. Uffindell (President of the Town Planning Association) on 
'Children's Playgrounds' emphasising the social benefits to the 
health and welfare of children. And the importance of the child 
in the thoughts of those involved in planning was revealed in an 
editorial in the Advertiser of the same year which praised 
Adelaide as one of the healthiest cities in the world due to 
its 'open spaces, broad streets, excellent climate, good sanitary 
arrangements... the movement to conserve and strengthen infant life 
is meeting with increased success...Adelaide boasts the world's 
record in respect of the low rate of child mortality'.
[Advertiser3 26 November 1918).
48
by taking to the country all the advantages of the 
modern town or city', Howard had written (Light 
Journal, p. 9-10).
This solitary issue of the Journal was funded from donations of 
members of the Town Planning Association which itself appears to have been 
shortlived. There is no evidence of its survival after 1923. But in the 
early days of the planning movement (1914-20) when Reade had given it 
direction, inspiration, energy and intellectual substance, what had been 
achieved? Outside the legislative sphere (in which the reformers had no 
direct power and only a little indirect influence, but nevertheless where 
their major goals lay), on a smaller, piecemeal scale, their efforts were 
not negligible.
The Adelaide City Council's Annual Report of 1918 mentioned that
during the year notices were served to remove 5,334 
unsanitary conditions. Twenty houses were condemned 
as unfit for human habitation and five ordered to be 
demolished. Vigilance in this direction is fostered 
by the town planning movement, whose enthusiastic 
devotees have certainly aroused the public to a sense 
of the shame which attaches to the city from wretched 
and unhealthy housing conditions.
{Daily Herald, 28 November 1918)
To keep the Adelaide City Council on its toes, even if only on the issue of 
its 'parish' duties, was no mean feat.
Reade, in his position as Government Town Planner, drew up many 
subdivision plans for private land owners on 'model garden suburb lines', 
the first of which, for Mr H. Allchurch at Kurralta Park, proved such a
And to show that planning activities in South Australia were drawing 
attention the world over it noted that Lord Leverhulme (founder of 
Port Sunlight) intended to present to the South Australian Town 
Planning Department a complete set of moving pictures illustrating 
industrial housing and activities at Letchworth Garden City and various 
garden suburbs (Light Journal, p.14).
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success that the owner donated €5 to the Town Planning Association's 
Publicity Education Fund. Reade's plan had deducted five acres from the 
total area (120 acres) for parks and open spaces, but still provided 1,500 
feet more in saleable frontages than had been originally proposed. A 
similar model suburb of 120 acres adjacent to the Port Road, in which ten 
acres were devoted to open spaces and public buildings, also pleased its 
owners {Advertiser13 September 1919) . So in some cases Reade was able to 
convince private enterprise that there was no conflict between good planning 
and private profit-making.
Other marks left on the suburban landscape by Reade were parks and 
recreation ovals at Thebarton and Prospect, South Australia's first 'garden 
suburb' at Colonel Light Gardens, the West Terrace children's playground; 
and many plans of subdivision for private owners. Outside the metropolitan 
area he was responsible for a major community effort in Port Pirie to 
build a children's playground, for the Victor Harbour foreshore improve­
ment scheme, and for civic 'beautifications' (parklands, recreation ovals, 
playgrounds and the like) in Jamestown, Kadina, Kapunda, Goolwa and Victor 
Harbour {The Mait3 28 September 1919).
All better than haphazard development and private enterprise 
exploitation, these achievements nevertheless were small scale, piecemeal 
and remedial, and came nowhere near the comprehensive, anticipatory planning 
that Reade had tirelessly advocated. For that, legislative action was 
necessary. And that legislation was the major ambition of Reade and of the 
Town Planning and Housing Association. But it was in the parliamentary 
arena that the town planning movement first foundered.
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For the State's first planning legislation the Town Planning and 
Housing Bill introduced by the Labor Party in 1916 showed an encouraging 
directness and lack of modesty in its appreciation of what was wrong and 
what needed to be done. Perhaps it was an indirect compliment to the impact 
that Reade had already made that the Labor Party felt confident about 
introducing such radical proposals, though in retrospect it looks more 
like a case of political naivety. For within a week the Bill had raised some, 
and within six months most, of the dilemmas which have dogged the progress 
of planning since then, questions of the relative distribution of power 
between local councils and a central authority; struggles within and between 
government departments over responsibility in this new field of government 
activity; debates over how much 'planning' is compatible with 'democratic 
rights' and how much power ought to be vested in one man, the planner; 
rival concepts of 'community welfare', and widely differing judgments as to 
the extent of State responsibility for underprivileged groups.
The second reading speech of the Bill (behind every word of which 
can be detected the breath of Reade) provided an extensive analysis of the 
role, powers and weakness of local government. Criticism ranged from the 
inability of local governments to secure adequate street widths, directions 
and uses, to their inability to prevent overcrowding of small houses in new 
suburban areas, or to regulate building, or to provide special areas 
suitable for industry and commerce. But the two most crucial inadequacies 
in local government powers were seen as their inability to provide low cost 
housing and the fact that there existed no means of co-ordinating the various 
functions of municipal and statutory authorities in the development of
4 .
extensions to city and suburbs (SAPD 1916: 878)
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To remedy this the Bill proposed a Town Planning Commission of 
three experts (a town planner, an engineer or architect, and a financial man) , 
with executive control to be exercised through the Treasurer, whose functions 
would be to control all town planning works throughout the State, to prepare 
town planning schemes in co-operation with local councils within the 
metropolitan area, and to prepare model town planning by-laws for appli­
cation outside the metropolitan area. There were also enlightened provisions 
for co-operation with the State Bank to finance workers' homes and Daceyville,. 
the New South Wales Government's Garden suburb, was seen as exemplary. The 
Commissioners were, if necessary, to override existing by-laws and local 
government objections in order to execute town planning schemes. It was 
understood, again through Reade's reports, that 'a central authority is 
essential to carry out a town planning scheme' (SAPD 1916 2r speech:
880-881).
The Bill was received surprisingly well in the press, the 
Advertiser editorial following the second reading speech seeing its object 
to
remove the evil of slums and congested districts, 
provide open spaces in populous areas, and render the 
development of cities and towns something other than 
the haphazard affair it has always been...no time should 
be lost in providing the machinery whereby the growth 
and improvement of populous centres will be regulated 
for the first time on scientific principles...Mr Vaughan 
rests the case for the Bill in great part on its 
hygienic value, as being likely to recommend it to the 
more utilitarian of its critics...A town planning scheme 
on liberal lines might go far to solve more than one 
social problem and might be the means of introducing 
a little brightness into the lives of the poorer 
sections of the community.
{Advertiser3 23 August 1916)
But there was no such benign reception by the Adelaide City Council. 
As we have seen, Reade had already aroused the wrath of city councillors by 
his references to Adelaide slums. For this Bill, Reade had prepared slides 
and an exhibition to accompany the second reading speech to prove beyond 
doubt that slums did exist. {Register 3 23 August 1916). The City Council
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was duly outraged. Within a fortnight the Mayor, Isaac Isaacs1 had called 
a meeting to draw attention to the 'drastic conditions in the Bill' and to 
recommend that strong action be taken by the City Council to oppose this 
measure 'which would take away many of the privileges and powers now 
enjoyed'. The Mayor also thought it the duty of the Council to warn local 
councils of the dangers, and to assist them in protecting their interests 
(Register12 September 1916). The same meeting attacked Reade's motives. 
Councillor Forwood thought this seemed 'to be a Bill for the benefit of Mr 
Reade' and that 'in (his) opinion the organiser of the town planning move­
ment had been in Adelaide for two years planning to make a job for himself' 
(Advertiser3 13 September 1916).
The City Council's reaction in turn provoked a bitter counter 
attack the following day in the Daily Herald (13 September 1916) editorial:
The City Council is going to fight against the Town 
Planning and Housing Bill because it is afraid that 
some of the slum areas and overcrowded residential 
districts may be brought into more prominence than 
hitherto...It is a well known fact that enormous 
profits are reaped by slum landlords...It is sheer 
nonsense on the part of the City Council to pretend 
that 'there are no slums in this fair queen city'.
When the Premier introduced the Bill he quoted 
instances of overcrowding in city areas...These 
cases...are in themselves an indictment of the City 
Council as a representative public body that has not 
only failed to do its duty, but is now trying to block 
urgent and practical reforms...The City Council... 
seems to want slum owners left untouched so that the 
landlords may reap their harvest of gold while the 
poor of this city reap their harvest of suffering, 
disease and other ills associated with bad housing.
These sentiments had been voiced in the House by the Labor member
for Adelaide (J. Gunn, SAPD 1915: 275) who argued that 'town planning ought
Isaac Isaacs 1858-1933. Mayor of Adel 1915-1917. Chairman of the 
Adelaide branch of the Liberal and Country League from 1913.
An advertisement in the Register 9 Oct 1919, indicates where his 
interests lay. Under 'Properties for Sale', on behalf of I. Isaacs, 
land agent, was offered 'to investors, speculators, and others the 
undermentioned very valuable city, suburban and country properties' 
Prices being asked for each property were listed. For the City of 
Adelaide alone they totalled €35,175.
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to be taken out of the hands of landlords and their agents, who desired 
mainly to see how many houses can be got on to a given space'.
The Advertiser, while not going so far as to accuse City Councillors 
of self-interest, continued to support the measure despite their hostility:
An attitude of unqualified hostility toward the 
measure is wholly unjustified. It is far too late in 
the day to sneer at town planning as though it were a 
mere sentimental fad...Even in Adelaide the reformer 
is far from being unnecessary...There must be, as Mr 
Reade contends, a central authority, competent to 
design and coordinate schemes for the whole area in 
cooperation with the local councils...The town planning 
question, and the measures necessary for its satis­
factory solution, emphasise the long acknowledged 
defects in the present system of city and suburban 
administration. These afford the ground for the 
motion submitted by Mr Gunn and carried by the House 
of Assembly yesterday, declaring that the time has 
arrived for the establishment of a Greater Adelaide... 
but parochial jealousies, as well as a difference of 
opinion on the question whether the municipalities 
should be unified or simply federated, have hitherto 
prevented any serious action toward the accomplishment 
of the reform...
(Advertiser, 14 September 1916)
That the local councils were not unduly worried by or opposed to 
the Bill at first is indicated by a meeting in October 1916 of the 
Suburban Areas Municipal Association, which had appointed a sub-committee 
to consider and report on the Bill. This committee recommended to the 
meeting that the Association express its approval and endorsement of the 
general principles of the Bill. Their recommendations were adopted, as was 
a further recommendation in favour of notifying the Legislative Council that 
the Association hoped that the Bill would be passed without delay 
(Advertiser, 6 October 1916).
It was not. The Legislative Council held up the Bill while the 
Adelaide City Council set out to undermine it, and by June of 1917 they had 
generated sufficient discontent for the Legislative Council to feel 
justified in allowing the Bill to lapse. The tactics adopted by the City
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Council were to call a conference of representatives from each metropolitan 
council to discuss amendments to the Bill. The proposed amendments were to 
eliminate entirely the proposed central Town Planning Commission, to strike 
out more than half of the Bill including those sections related to the 
provision of housing by the State, to make town planning solely a function 
of counoils vested with absolute authority to plan, and to strike out all 
clauses relating to powers compelling a council to observe or carry out a 
scheme authorised by Parliament. Clauses relating to compulsory land 
purchase and compensation (which under the Bill were similar to those 
already possessed by the South Australia Harbours Board and the Commonwealth 
Government) were stated to be 'unnecessarily drastic and may possibly work 
hardship on owners'. (Register, 30 June 1917). In conclusion the 
conference proposed a reversion to earlier Acts and, accordingly, the 
Legislative Council allowed the Bill to lapse at prorogation.
In February 1917 the Labor Party had split on the conscription 
issue. When Parliament first met for the year in July, Liberal Opposition 
Leader A.H. Peake proposed an adjournment motion. It was carried. The 
Labor Premier then resigned and Peake formed a Ministry which included 
three ex-Labor Nationalists. The new Liberal administration did not take 
up the Town Planning and Housing Bill.
Reade's own retrospective comments on his Bill are interesting.
In 1920, giving evidence to the Select Committee of the Legislative Council 
on the Town Planning and Development Bill, he explained that :
I quite realised that we were not going to get that 
Bill through Parliament. Frankly, it was a propaganda 
measure, and it had the desired effect. It secured 
the interest of the local governing bodies and made 
them think more about town planning. It brought them 
into contact with ourselves, and it resulted in 
numerous lectures and discussions, and considerably 
widened the outlook on the whole question of town 
planning practice and ideas.
(South Australian Parliamentary Papers
1920: 1-2)
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Whether or not this was the intention of the 1916 Bill, its effect was 
certainly more ambivalent than Reade cared to acknowledge. It may, as he 
argued, have stimulated discussion and understanding. But it also 
brought his enemies out into the open, particularly those in the Adelaide 
City Council and their allies in the Upper House, and started an active 
campaign against his proposals. As a political strategist then, Reade may 
have been an amateur out of his depth. The reactions to and tremors after 
this Bill set the tone and the parameters for the much more cautious Town 
Planning and Development Bill introduced in 1919.
In the meantime a Control of Subdivision of Land Act passed in 1917 
gave the Surveyor-General wider discretionary powers to refuse approval of 
unsatisfactory subdivisions, particularly with regard to the width of roads, 
the suitability of the site and the orientation of any buildings to be 
erected on the land, a tacit admission of the validity of some of Reade's 
criticisms. But Reade himself commented on the passage of this Act:
It is one of those temporary expedients which, 
while removing some of the glaring anomalies of the 
Surveyor-General's position, cannot effect any step 
towards town planning...You cannot provide for the 
proper planning of town extensions (including arterial 
roads, open spaces, factory areas, limiting the number 
of houses to the acre, etc.) merely by increasing the 
powers of an executive officer to refuse his sanction 
to plans for the subdivision of a particular block of 
land...The new law is merely the continuation of an 
obsolete method of regulating town development which 
has been tried and failed in other countries. The 
remedy is town planning.
(.Daily Herald3 14 November 1917)
Reade was here making a clear distinction between the limits of 
mere regulatory planning and the possibilities of what is today known as 
'development planning'. He was correct in his belief that most of his 
'reformist' ambitions (e.g. better designed, low cost, worker housing and 
more equality of access to the good things of life) could only be achieved
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through development planning.
More to his liking therefore was the Garden Suburb Act of 1919 
which provided for 300 acres of State-owned land to be developed as a 
garden suburb and for 600 homes to be provided by the State Sank.
M.F. McNamara, (Acting Inspector-General of the State Bank and Treasurer 
of the Town Planning and Housing Association and of the South Australian 
executive of the Australasian Town Planning Conferences in Adelaide in 1917 
and Brisbane in 1918) , was appointed Garden Suburbs Commissioner and Reade 
subsequently prepared plans for what was to become Colonel Light Gardens 
{Advertiser> 20 May 1920). But even this was only a miniscule portion of 
the city and Reade1s real aspiration was for comprehensive planning legis­
lation embracing the whole metropolis. The Town Planning and Development 
Act which was finally passed late in 1920 came some small way toward meeting 
this aspiration.
* * *
How intractable were the problems facing town planning as raised 
in 1916 and 1917? Did the intervening four years change the nature of the 
problems, or of attitudes toward them, or neither?
According to the Attorney-General (H.N. Barwell) introducing the 
Town Planning and Development Bill into Parliament in September 1919 every­
thing had changed for the better. He believed that the three Australasian 
Town Planning Conferences of 1917, 1918 and 1919 had led to a widespread 
appreciation of the benefits of town planning and that many who had formerly
1 The difference is evident today between an authority like the National 
Capital Development Commission which actually develops virgin land, 
compared with most of the work of the state planning authorities, which 
have only regulatory powers of zoning and subdivision control.
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opposed the idea had been won over. But he, as noted earlier, was a convert 
to the cause of town planning and this may well have clouded his political 
judgment of the real strength of the opposition to it. For in retrospect 
the events of 1916-17 appear as a mere dress rehearsal for the real drama 
that took place following the introduction of the 1919 Bill. Yet that Bill 
was far more cautious and circumspect than its predecessor.
Two lessons had been derived by the new Government from the 
experience of the 1916 Bill: that no town planning measure could survive if 
it threatened either the limited autonomy of local government or the 
independence of the Adelaide City Council. Accordingly Barwell's intro­
duction of the Bill explained that a new Bill had been drafted, based on 
the conclusions of the second Australasian Town Planning Conference 
(Brisbane 1918), which had unanimously decided that 'Councils, public bodies 
and central Government Departments should act in cooperation, the council 
to be responsible for initiating and carrying out proposals in its own 
area'. He emphasised that the autonomy of local governments had been 
adequately protected from 'autocratic extremism' by the central department. 
(In practical terms this meant that, compared with the 1916 proposals, the 
central authority no longer had the power to initiate and control town 
planning schemes. Local governments could initiate planning if they chose 
to but it was not mandatory, and they could not be overridden by the central 
authority). And he explained that the City of Adelaide would be excluded 
from the provisions of the Bill until a resolution of both Houses of 
Parliament directed that it should apply to the Council. (SAPD 1919: 
970-982). Other departures from the earlier Bill included the omission of 
housing sections, the creation of a Minister for the Department of Town 
Planning, to be the central administrative and technical authority, the 
provision for proper planning of all new towns or extensions laid out by 
the State, and the consolidation of all existing laws relating to sub­
division. Unlike the Labor Government, which had emphasised the radical
58
reforming possibilities of planning, the Liberal Government adopted a low 
key, cautious approach and stressed that everything would be gradual and 
mild, that inquiries and conferences between public authorities and private 
owners would precede action, and that precipitate action would be most 
unlikely. Yet despite reduced aims, tactics of appeasement, and cautious 
language there was public outcry from various groups within a week, and the 
course of the Bill through the Upper House was long and arduous.
First to move against the Bill was the Licensed Landbrokers and 
Auctioneers Association, who requested that the Attorney-General appoint a 
Parliamentary Committee to take evidence from experts and then amend the 
Bill in view of the costs it would impose on land owners wanting to subdivide 
their land (Advertiser3 3 October 1919). They were supported by the 
Surveyors' Institute, which objected to the delay in business that would be 
caused by the new regulations. Their actions drew strong words from the 
Town Planning and Housing Association:
This move to refer the Bill to a Select Committee will 
mean a delay of another 12 months. It is made evidently 
in the interests of those who primarily are responsible 
for the subdivisional methods which...have resulted in 
houses and gardens being crowded onto small allotments 
in new areas and numerous other evils... Public interest 
and welfare demand that any further delay in making the 
proposed town planning powers operative be not entertained 
by Parliament (and that the Bill be passed) without 
recourse to amendments proposed by those either opposed 
to town planning or responsible for the exploitation and 
spoiliations of our cities.
(Register3 7 October 1919)
The following week the Advertiser (14 October 1919) ran an 
editorial claiming that the Town Planning Association's protest against the 
action of the Surveyors Institute, the Licensed Landbrokers and the Real 
Estate Agents Institutes had been reinforced by vigorous support from local
councils in both town and country.
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The West Torrens district council in particular 
points out that a further subdivision of their 
district has been made without the Council being 
consulted or a plan submitted to the Surveyor- 
General. They state that land was being offered 
for sale through a leading firm, one of whose 
principals was simultaneously active in publicly 
denouncing the proposed legislation.
Labor members of the House were outraged at the exclusion of the 
Adelaide City Council from the Bill. Accordingly when the Bill reached the 
Committee stage A.A. Edwards (ALP member for Adelaide) made revelations 
about Adelaide's slums which were so grave that the Attorney-General decided 
that the clause dealing with the omission of the City of Adelaide should be 
struck out.'*' (SAPD 1920: 662-3)
Each year the City of Adelaide health inspectors visited half the 
houses in the city. Every year the Medical Officer of Health submitted 
a Report, published in the City of Adelaide Annual Reports. The 
following table gives some of the results:
1912/13 1913/14 1914/15 1915/16 1916/17 1917/18
Houses condemned as unfit 
for human habitation & 
to be renovated 5 3 6 32 15
Houses condemned and 
demolished 18 15 4 2 18 5
Houses to be cleansed 
ventilated and repaired 1,187 897 789 878 903 1066
Water closets and urinals 
to be removed or cleansed 
& repaired 737 658 580 604 468 1131
What is one to make of these statistics? Either the repairs made were 
very slight, or were ordered but not carried out, or much of Adelaide's 
stock of housing was in a chronic state of rapid decay. The Rieport of the 
Building Act Enquiry Committee (SAPP 1940, vol 2) which claimed that 7,400 
people in the City of Adelaide and a few of the older suburbs were living 
in undesirable housing conditions supports the last interpretation. The 
claim by members of the A.C.C. that Adelaide had no slums in 1914 or 1916 
on the face of these figures seems absurd. Note that houses in the first 
two categories increased sharply in 1916-17, the year Reade's first 
T.P. Bill was being debated. (Tregenza 1973: 21-22)
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In response to the protests of opposition groups the Legislative 
Council set up a Select Committee (SAPD 1920: 1471) which heard evidence 
from the town planner, from architects, surveyors, landbrokers, local 
councillors, the head of the Municipal Tramways Trust, and the City Council. 
Reade found himself bitterly opposed by the professional institutes 
(surveyors, architects, engineers, etc.) who protested against the wide 
powers he was to be given as head of the proposed Town Planning Department 
and argued that the Town Planning Act should not be administered by one 
man but by a Board of professional men {Advertiser3 8 September 1920).
These protests were opposed by the Town Planning and Housing Association in 
an urgent memorial sent to members of the Legislative Council. They argued 
that the petition by the landbrokers, surveyors and architects was an 
unjustifiable attempt to secure a central controlling Board representative 
of their own professions. The effect of such a move, the Town Planning 
Association argued, would be to render the Government town planner sub­
servient to the Board and to destroy all individual initiative and 
responsibility. 'It might be very difficult for the Government in the 
circumstances to secure the services of an experienced and competent town 
planner to administer the Act under such conditions,' they warned, and 
their memorial continued,
The petition presented to the Legislative Council in 
favour of the proposed Board is signed by numerous 
persons dealing in land and building operations, who, 
in recent years, have been the principal agency for 
the wholesale subdivision and cutting up of suburban 
areas...as well as precipitating overbuilding and 
other conditions, which town planning now seeks to 
remedy. Whilst the repetition of old errors in new 
areas have been in course of perpetration by these 
petitioners they have been the chief factor in 
opposing and delaying the Town Planning Bill, not­
withstanding repeated protests from councils, public 
societies and others interested in maintaining the 
highest welfare and efficiency of our towns and 
cities.
(South Australian Town Planning and Housing 
Association pamphlet 1920: 2)
Reade took a similar view of their self-interested motives in a 
letter to the Minister in charge of Town Planning.
It is to be hoped that Mr Blakeway is not incensed 
by the fact that this Department refused to agree 
to a plan of subdivision surveyed by him in the 
district of West Torrens, which sought to evade the 
Control of Subdivision of Land Act 1917.1
The principal issue which emerged from the Select Committee inquiry
was disagreement about which department and with whom ultimate power would
lie, and the extent of these powers. The surveyors argued that there was no
need for a Town Planning Department at all. Planning duties could be
carried out quite adequately by the Surveyor-General. Exponents of this
view showed no understanding that town planning meant anything beyond control
of subdivision. Only one witness supported strong powers for the town
planner - the President of the Federal Council of the Australian Institutes
of Architects and of the South Australian Institute of Architects
2(L. Laybourne-Smith). He criticised the Bill for being neither comprehen­
sive nop powerful enough and thought its great imperfection was
that there is no comprehensive scheme for dealing with 
town planning as a whole. It is absolutely fundamental 
that a scheme should be prepared for zoning and dist­
ricting the whole of the municipalities. Provisions 
should be made for the appointment of a Commission to 
set out the future development of the metropolitan area 
...The Town Planning Department is not given power to 
do what I am suggesting. The little municipal councils 
are given power to do it in their own districts, but it is 
absolutely fatal to town planning that they should do what 
the Bill contemplates - i.e. that each of them should set 
out a town planning scheme for its own little district.
Reade to the Minister, 9 September 1920. Town Planning Department 
papers, South Australia Archives, GRG 73, 1920/51-97, no. 64.
2 The Federal Council was the forerunner of the Royal Australian Institute 
of Architects (R.A.I.A.), established in 1930. Laybourne Smith was 
President of the Council 1919-22 and of the R.A.I.A. in 1937-38.
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He went on to criticise the omission of the City of Adelaide from 
the Bill's provisions,
The most important parts of town planning would be 
the regulation of traffic and transportation and 
those are the very things whi ch would affect the 
City of Adelaide more than any other district.
and to argue for a Greater Adelaide scheme. (Minutes of Evidence in Report 
of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council on the Town Planning and 
Development Bill, 25 November 1920, 67-8).
The outcome of the Committee's report was verbal support for 'the 
need of town planning legislation' and the recommendation that an Advisory 
Board be created to administer the Act rather than the town planner.
Opposition to Reade and to the Bill was not confined to South 
Australia. George Taylor, Secretary of the Town Planning Association of 
New South Wales wrote in his paper Building that the South Australian 
Government should strongly reconsider the Bill in the light of reviews from 
several Australian planners and architects. He argued that the Bill was 
'too autocratic in giving to one person too much power' and emphasised that 
the new department would be able to deal with 'the demolition, erection, 
construction, alteration, etc. of buildings'. Thus there would be 'a 
great possibility of its interference with legitimate private enterprise 
in architecture and building, thus superseding architects and builders in 
private practice as well as seriously interfering with existing govern­
ment departments' {Register3 2 November 1920). And Taylor was probably 
behind a mysterious eleventh hour effort to sabotage the Bill late in November 
1920. On November 24, when the Bill was in 'a critical period before the Legis­
lative Council owing to severe destructive criticism and opposition by vested
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interests and others',^ the Register published a telegraphic message,
2ostensibly supplied by Dr J.J.C. Bradfield, condemning the Bill outright. 
After a letter from Reade expressing his disappointment in an old colleague, 
Bradfield wired denying any knowledge and disclaiming authorisation of 
publication of such an article. In a personal letter to Reade, Bradfield 
explained that he could not discover who had deliberately misrepresented him 
(by quoting out of context from a speech he had given to the Town Planning 
Association) but hinted that he suspected it was Taylor, since he was the 
only person to have a copy of the speech (Bradfield to Reade, 30 November 
1920).
In a personal letter to Bradfield of 3 December 1920, Reade's 
feelings about the long ordeal of bringing legislation to fruition are 
revealed.
Our Bill was passed in the closing hours of the session 
last week, thanks to very strenuous effort and fighting, 
and despite the determined efforts of certain interests 
both in Adelaide and Sydney to kill it.
We did not get the whole measure but all the pro­
visions of immediate importance were approved, including 
the permanent establishment of the Government town 
planner and his department, independent of the Board 
which will be advisory on certain matters only instead 
of administrative...The mischief and misrepresentation 
that time and again have come from Sydney apparently 
are very deep seated...and without any justification 
whatever. That decent people cannot attempt to do 
decent work for the good of Australia without personal 
malice and misrepresentation to hinder them is a 
disgrace to the democracy of this country...
This goes some way towards explaining why, within a month of the 
passing of the Town Planning and Development Act, Reade had left Australia
Memo by Reade. Town Planning Department papers, GRG 73, 1920/51-97. 
Paper no. 87 contains all the documents pertaining to this episode.
J.J.C. Bradfield, Chief Engineer, Metropolitan Railways, NSW, and a 
key figure in planning movement in Sydney.
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to become town planner for the Federated Malay States, never to return.
Although his services had been in demand in a good many places he was being 
paid only £700 a year by the South Australian Government. The Malay States 
offered £2,000. But if money had been of major interest to him it is 
unlikely that he would have accepted the position in South Australia in 
the first place. Rather it seems that he regarded Adelaide, with its 
heritage of Colonel Light's layout, as the most fertile opportunity to 
achieve modern town planning legislation, but in the process of the struggle 
was disillusioned and finally turned away by the grip which he came to 
realise 'certain vested interests' had over the city.
Nevertheless his legacy of planning legislation was remarkable for 
its time. The Town Planning and Development Act of 1920 created a Town 
Planning Department with the Government Town Planner as its permanent head.
His main duties were to prepare plans and reports for new towns and exten­
sions to existing towns, including garden cities and suburbs and industrial 
areas; to replan or improve existing towns including land subdivisions; to 
plan public open spaces, reserves and so on. Expenses were to be met out 
of moneys provided by Parliament for the purpose. A central Advisory Board 
was created, comprising the Government Planner, the Surveyor-General, a 
civil engineer, an architect, and two people nominated by the Municipal 
Association and the Local Government Association. Its duty was to advise 
and assist the Government Planner according to the Minister's directions.
There were also provisions for local councils to form town planning committees, 
comprising the Mayor and as many other members as were necessary, to which 
the Council could, if it chose, add two people with professional qualifi­
cations. The town planner was given complete control over subdivision 
approvals (but control of re-subdivisions remained with the local council) 
and subdivision procedures were specified. Applications had to be approved 
by the Registrar-General of Deeds, the Surveyor-General, the Council, any 
public body whose powers or functions were involved, and by the Town
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Planner. In addition, approval was conditional on the decision of the 
Commissioner of Sewers as to whether allotments could be economically and 
advantageously sewered.^
That this enlightened Act was not to survive beyond the end of the 
decade Reade himself could probably have predicted. The next section 
explores this demise of town planning in South Australia in the 1920s.
5.
Given the extent of Reade1s influence from 1914-20 it may seem 
logical to conclude that his departure was the major cause of the decline 
and fall of town planning in the 1920s. But the individual is rarely the 
sole mainspring of history and to focus on the individual is to ignore the 
social forces at work around him. The quality of Reade*s successors was 
reasonable, as can be seen from the Annual Reports which they produced from 
1921-29. But some of their statements indicate some of the wider forces at 
work which were to thoroughly undermine town planning by 1929.
2The 1921 Report by Reade's first successor, Captain W.J. Earle, 
emphasised the need that 'a unified plan be prepared immediately providing 
a scheme for the future extension of the metropolitan area and anticipation 
of future growth' (SAPD No. 67, 1921: 7), and in his conclusion he drew 
attention to the principal weakness of the 1920 Act:
An enlightened provision, which was deleted in the superseding Act of 
1929 and not reinstated until 1955.
W.J. Earle, M.C., M.I.M.C.E. (lond.), A.M.T.P.I. (Hons.). He worked 
before the war as an engineer with the New South Wales Public Works 
Dept, and after the war as Deputy Commissioner for Tasmania under the 
Federal War Service Homes Act (Advertiser3 29 October 1920).
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[There is aj lack of any method of making the principal 
features of any plan binding upon the land included 
within it. The main purpose of a unified metropolitan 
plan for Adelaide is to correlate the public works 
undertaken within the city and suburbs so that, with­
out duplication or waste, each of them may form part 
of a scheme adapted to the fulfilment of the needs of 
the next 30 to 50 years. Useful as a plan without 
binding force is, it inevitably fails in many particulars 
unless the observance of it is made obligatory.
Those were large, clear thoughts to be written in 1921, and more 
followed (all of which were to be repeated in the late 1950s). W. Scott- 
Griffiths' Town Planner's Report for 1922-23 reinforced his predecessor's 
plea for a unified plan of metropolitan Adelaide. He also discussed the 
relationship between population distribution, housing conditions and 
distribution of parklands. He saw congestion of population in certain 
areas as a basic cause of both traffic and public health problems. High 
densities in some districts led to increased rents and land costs, and thus 
to mean houses, small allotments and unsanitary conditions 'which can only 
be checked and remedied by redistributing and directing the increased 
population to open spaces' (SAPD No.20, 1923:8).
Chief emphasis of his 1924 Report was the need for Parliament to 
pass the amendment to the Town Planning Act before it, 'as it is difficult 
for me to check, under existing conditions, the practice of defeating the 
main effects and intentions of the Act, which is entirely due to the divided 
control in regard to resubdivisions' (SAPD No. 20, 1924: 3). This remark 
points to the main practical problem of the planners in the early 1920s 
that of controlling the subdivision and speculative boom that was taking 
place in these prosperous years following the initial recession that had 
set in immediately after the war. It also indicates where the most deter­
mined sources of opposition to planning were likely to arise. No surveyor, 
land agent or land owner making quick profits from this subdivision boom 
would look kindly on the detailed subdivision application procedures laid
down in the 1920 Act.
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Scott-Griffiths' 1924 Report also contained an intelligent 
discussion about the costs and benefits, social, economic, psychological 
and so on, of housing people close to or distant from the industrial centres. 
His 1925 Report worried about the relation between building density and 
traffic and cited Raymond Unwin's paper to the International Planning 
Conference in Amsterdam in 1924 to support its warning of 'the difficulties 
in street space if extensive high buildings are to be erected in the City 
of Adelaide over a wide area' (SAPD No. 20, 1925: 6).
This was the last Report which contained intelligent discussion 
of major planning issues and problems and, significantly, it coincided with 
the parliamentary 'beginning of the end' for planning. Reports for the last 
three years of the Town Planning Department's existence (1926-29) were 
reduced to a bare three pages dealing only with statistics of subdivision 
applications, indicating the precariousness with which Scott-Griffiths now 
regarded his position.
His perception of the hostile opposition to planning is more fully
revealed in a private letter dated January 1925, though its optimism about
the future was, in retrospect, misplaced -
My two years administration of this Department has 
convinced me that it could be much improved...but one 
has to be exceedingly discreet and exercise much care 
and 'hasten slowly'...just prior to my entering upon 
my position here there was a very strong agitation by 
several bodies to annihilate this Department and it has 
only been with the greatest care and discretion that all 
opposition has been caused to vanish and I am pleased to 
state this Department is now working smoothly with all 
classes and my relations with the surveyors and land 
agents etc. are most pleasant.
Enclosed is a copy of my amending Bill which has 
only been trimmed and a few additional powers inserted 
as I don't desire to raise another rumpus, because after 
all, we are still in the educative stage and any shatter­
ing of this, the only Department administering town
68
planning in Australia, would seriously affect the 
chances of similar legislation contemplated in the 
other states. . . 1
Who were these bodies agitating to annihilate the Town Planning 
Department? Scott-Griffiths here identified the surveyors and land agents, 
but felt that the major difficulties were now easing. He was wrong. This 
period was only the calm before the storm, temporary shelter being provided 
by a sympathetic Labor Government from April 1924 - April 1927. Soon after 
its defeat by an alliance of the Liberal and Country parties the ship of 
town planning was wrecked on the rocks of the Adelaide power structure's 
receptivity to the interests of land agents and land owners.
* * *
In July of 1922 the Institute of Surveyors wrote to the government 
suggesting that no town planner be appointed in charge of a separate depart­
ment after Earle's term expired. They advised that the Town Planning 
Department be abolished and that administration of the Town Planning Act be 
vested in the Surveyor-General.
The Surveyors Institute regards the Surveyor-General 
as the head of the surveying profession - and town 
planning as only a part of the surveying profession 
- consequently a part which should be controlled by 
the Surveyor-General.
The reasoning advanced for this drastic move was that it would mean one 
less department for the general public, and for the surveyors, to deal with,
Scott-Griffiths' reply to a letter from E.C. Rigby on the Melbourne Town 
Planning Commission (Town Planning Department papers, South Australian 
Archives, GRG 73, 1925/1-119, paper no.11). Similar fears are expressed 
in another letter by him dated 3 June 1925 to the Mayor of Brisbane 
(paper No.51).
In any action taken to amend the (1920) Act I am 
careful to avoid any serious opposition for the reason that 
this is the only Town Planning Department in Australia, 
established after strenuous agitation, and I feel a certain 
responsibility to all other States whose public-spirited 
citizens are endeavouring to bring about similar legislation.
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hence 'facilitating business' [Register, 7 July 1922).
This was both a professionally and materially motivated challenge 
to town planning. The Town Planning Association answered the professional 
threat in a letter by its President (H.W. Uffindell) asserting that 
•indeed surveying is but a branch of town planning' and accusing the 
Surveyors Institute of wanting to get for their profession a monopoly of 
town planning {Register 3 13 July 1922).
The material challenge was countered by a plea from some of the 
victims of the profit-oriented subdividers. During 1922 the Town Planning 
Department received letters from the district councils of Mitcham, Walker- 
ville, Yatala South, Campbelltown and Woodville (all areas at different 
points on the periphery of the urban expansion of that time) requesting 
amendment to the Town Planning and Development Act to provide for the 
formation and construction of new roadways in subdivisions being made by 
the owners of the land being subdivided before it could be offered for sale. 
The request from the Town Clerk of Yatala South put the issue concisely:
It is felt by the Council that as most of the sub­
divisions now being made are for speculative purposes, 
and that large profits are being made by the vendors, 
the Councils should not be called upon to make the 
roads, involving as it does a very large expenditure 
from the district funds.1
In response then to pressure from some local councils, from the 
Town Planning and Housing Association, and from the Town Planning Depart­
ment, the Liberal Government introduced into Parliament late in 1923 the 
Town Planning Act Amendment Bill. It contained three main provisions, the 
most important of which was designed to curb excessive and undesirable 
subdivisions,
1 Town Planning Department papers, South Australian archives, GRG 73, 
1922/444-79, paper no.479 contains all these letters of request.
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to remedy the present position whereby plans of resub­
division may or may not be presented to local governing 
bodies [which means that] where a person wants to avoid 
resubdivision being turned down by a local governing 
body he usually goes over their heads to the lands 
Titles Office - which can and does pass resubdivision 
plans without the knowledge of either the Town Planner 
or the local governing body concerned. (SAPD 1924: 1729).
The Bill proposed therefore to give all subdivision and resubdivision 
control to the town planner. Secondly, it provided for any council to apply 
to the government for the issue of a proclamation declaring that Council's 
area, or part of it, to be residential. And the third provision aimed to 
compel subdividers to construct or provide for the construction of roads 
before blocks were sold.
The Bill provoked immediate and hostile reactions from those whose 
operations it sought to curb, but found an unexpected ally in the 
Institute of Surveyors.
It has been brought under our notice that certain 
land agents and autioneers in the city have been 
instrumental in getting the Landbrokers and Auction­
eers Association to use its influence with members 
of Parliament to secure the defeat of the Town 
Planning Bill now before Parliament...
The Bill is the outcome of long conferences with 
the Institute of Surveyors, the town planner, Lands 
Titles Office and Town Planning Advisory Board, and 
is supported by the Town Planning Association...
The Landbrokers Association's protest to clause 25 
sums up the whole trouble in a nutshell. To give 
councils the right to call upon owners of land to 
make the streets when subdividing will undoubtedly 
check the promiscuous cutting of land into allotments 
all over the metropolitan area irrespective of need 
or of likelihood of it being built on...
(Statement by A.J. BlaJceway, Secretary of South 
Australian Institute of Surveyors, Register 3 
29 November 1923)
The Bill had not been passed by the Lower House before the elections 
of 1924 brought the Labor Party into office. The new government then 
restored the Bill to the House, adding to it a further provision for the
government to control advertisements relating to new subdivision to prevent
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'misrepresentations and omissions', that is, dishonest advertising (SAPD 
1924: 1313).
The Bill was heavily amended in the committee stage in the Assembly. 
The clause relating to control of advertising was removed and clauses giving 
all subdivision and resubdivision control to the town planner were amended 
to provide that local governing bodies be consulted (SAPD 1924: 2362).
After lapsing at prorogation the Bill was restored to notice in 
the Council in 1925, where it provoked drastic reactions. The Upper House 
not only sought to amend most of the Bill in ways that would render its 
provisions quite ineffective, but sought also to abolish the post of town 
planner and to merge the Town Planning Department with that of the Registrar- 
General. When the Labor majority in the Assembly refused to agree to these 
amendments the Bill lapsed. But the forces of reaction to town planning had 
served notice that they meant to put an end to the Town Planning Department 
when they could, 'for causing confusion, delay, and irritation to people, 
and hindering the development of the State' (SAPD 1925: 771). And when the 
Liberal and Country Party alliance won the election of 1927 there was nothing 
to stop them doing just that.
The Town Planning Act of 1929 was the culmination of thirteen 
years of mounting opposition to the rising movement in favour of town 
planning, which amongst other things, sometimes threatened people's 'rights' 
to profit from their properties.
In the Debates of 1929 town planning was discussed as though it 
was synonymous with control of subdivision (for this was the aspect of 
planning that the new Town Planning Department had been most occupied with) 
and the 1929 Act was little more than a Control of Subdivision Act, 
enumerating (and diluting, compared with the provisions of 1920) details
for the minimum size of allotments and width of roads.
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It is now possible in the light of 10 years experience, 
to state the rules about town planning in much 
simpler form...The government has taken the oppor­
tunity to simplify town planning legislation and 
clear up difficulties which arose under the old 
Act“ (SAPD 1929: 2355).
'Simplify' was the understatement of the decade. The principal 'reform' 
proposed by the Bill was the amalgamation of the Town Planning Department 
with the Lands Titles Office. This had been recommended by the Classification 
and Efficiency Board (in a report initiated by the debates of 1925) for 
three main reasons; there had been a reduction in the volume of work 
connected with town planning due to the subsiding of the subdivision boom; 
considerable economy would be effected by transferring the town planner to 
the Lands Titles Office (the expenses of the Town Planning Department had 
averaged € 1,000 per year) ; and it would be much more convenient for the 
public. One rather obvious reason did not get a mention: that it would be 
much more convenient and profitable for landowners if the teeth were 
extracted from town planning legislation.
An appropriate epitaph to this period was provided by the News 
Pictorialj (27 November 1929):-
Adelaide was the first city to have a town planning Act 
but here alas we are content to rest on past laurels. 
There is so much in this line still to be done, and the 
surge of enthusiasm that brought the Act into being has 
gone. Except for control of local subdivisions we are 
doing nothing to govern, in a broad general way....the 
growth of this wonderful city.
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6.
From the gloom of the 1929 Town Planning Act South Australia 
plunged into the darkness of world-wide economic depression. Her rulers 
emerged from it in the early 1930s with one very general observation and 
one single minded goal. The observation was that the depression had revealed 
starkly and tragically the great dependence of the South Australian 
economy on commodity prices in the world market because of her over­
dependence on primary industry. The goal therefore was the encouragement 
of manufacturing. South Australia became the first of the Australian States, 
with the possible exception of Victoria, consciously to undertake the 
transformation of its economic structure by shifting its base from primary 
to secondary industry (Mitchell 1962: 27-40).
How they proceeded to do this is a story which has been well told 
elsewhere (Stretton 1970: 142-154; R.F.I. Smith 1964: chapter 4; M.L. 
Macintosh 1969). The theory was that:
The state should re-assert the economic sovereignty 
it appeared to have surrendered to some mixture of 
misguided federalism and misunderstood individualism.
Then (1) government should supply industry with suit­
able land, docile labour, cheap credit, physical 
services and various planning and advisory services; 
and (2) it should use political power to limit local 
costs of living and therefore costs of production, 
in order to make its territory an advantageous one 
from which to export manufactures to the rest of the 
country.
(Stretton 1970: 147)
Some of the means, especially state housing, and some of the 
effects of this programme reshaped the city, and'though seldom thought of 
then or since as a method of metropolitan planning' it was in fact a 
'practical and powerful one, adaptable to other places and purposes'
(Stretton 1970: 142).
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The establishment in 1936 of the South Australian Housing Trust 
('while the rest of the world was founding conscience-stricken Housing 
Commissions to clear slums and shelter the suffering poor' Stretton 1970: 
148) was an essential part of the industrialisation of the State. The 
rationale behind this is clear in the Report of the Auditor-General, J.W. 
Wainright, quoted extensively in the Debates on the South Australian 
Housing Trust Bill (SAPD 1936: 2313).
With the recovery from the depression rents have been 
rising, and with rents, wage costs. If, however, the 
industrial expansion so vital to South Australia is to 
continue, rents must be prevented from rising...
It is fundamental that any policy of fostering secondary 
industries in this State must be based on a lower cost 
of living than Melbourne or Sydney. There is very little 
the State can do to prevent rises in prices of food, 
groceries and clothing, without autocratic and arbitrary 
control...The item of cost which can be most easily and 
equitably kept at a reasonable level is rent, and rent 
forms at present about 25 per cent of the total cost of 
living of families with low incomes.
Realising the disadvantages facing manufacturers in South Australia 
the government granted concessions to industry in the fields of company 
taxation, freight rates, port charges, assisted in securing factory sites, 
essential services (water, drainage, electricity etc.), and provided 
technical advice. To assist local enterprises the Industries Assistance 
Corporation was formed in 1937 to advise and provide funds for progressive 
local enterprise, the growth of which might be impeded if it had to rely on 
orthodox channels of securing capital.
The rapid industrial development which then took place, and was 
stimulated by the second world war, brought marked changes in the social 
and urban fabric. More women joined the workforce and there was an increase 
in the number of skilled workers. Manufacturing in the immediate post-war 
years accounted for 29.2 per cent of the workforce, an increase of 7 per 
cent from prewar years, while farming and domestic services declined. The 
social pattern also changed in another important way. As real investment
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was undertaken almost without exception in the metropolitan area job 
opportunities drew people from country areas. Consequently from 1935-45, 
for the first inter-censal period in South Australian history, country 
population decreased and the ratio of metropolitan to total population 
increased from 54 per cent pre-war to 59 per cent in 1945 (Hirst: 1948-9) .
In the seven years from 1939-46 the metropolitan area gained 
70,000 people, half of them 'rural immigrants'. And while the Housing Trust 
battled to accommodate the influx, it was rapidly changing the nature and 
degree of urban problems.
The more conventional forms of town planning might have stood 
still, indeed retrogressed, from 1920-50, but the State's development had 
not, and by the end of the war the State's encouragement of industrial growth 
meant that a whole new set of conditions arose. In effect the government's 
industrialisation policy meant that its contribution to and participation 
in the growth of Adelaide was vastly more significant than in any other 
city except Canberra.
This dramatic expansion was scarcely a triumph of private
enterprise. The fast-growing wealth of local entrepreneurs was brought
about by State political power and encouraged an intimacy between business,
politics and administration that proved to be a major obstacle to the
progress of planning after the war. How it did is part of the story of
chapter six. For no matter how Playford^
might deal with occasional predators, the State power 
still belonged to the farmers and old oligarchs so it 
had to be used without general damage to their interests, 
a condition which did not hinder industrialisation on 
public land, but would presently cripple any town 
planning of private freeholds. (Stretton 1970: 154).
1 Sir Thomas Playford, b.1896. Leader of Liberal Country League and 
Premier of South Australia for a record term of 27 years from 1938-1965. 
Orchardist.
CHAPTER THREE
MELBOURNE:
'Bureaucracy tempered by anarchy'
'It is not to be expected, however, that the proposals of town 
planners will meet with universal and ready assent. No reform is ever 
popular at first, and no far-sighted movement is ever widely understood. 
The inertia of habit and custom is always slow to move, and the opposition 
of those whose interests or prejudices are affected is always bitter'.
Councillor E C Rigby, Vice-President 
of Victorian Town Planning and Parks 
Association, in address to 1917 
Australasian Town Planning Conference 
in Adelaide.
'An English visitor recently described the Australian system of 
government as 'anarchy tempered by bureaucracy', and it is tempting for an 
epitome of the politics of Victoria simply to reverse the terms' .
A F Davies (1960: 175)
'The problems which arose in 1874 remain substantially unsolved... 
One of the consequences of failure to reach agreement in the past has been 
that piecemeal legislation has been enacted'.
Sir Thomas Maltby, Liberal Minister 
for Public Works, introducing the 
MMBW Bill, 1956. (VPD: 1956, 
vol.248, 2456-2458).
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Although Victoria shared with other states the enthusiasm and 
reforming zeal of the early town planning movement it has been more tardy 
than most in giving legislative support to planning ideas. Victoria waited 
until 1944 for its first planning legislation, until 1954 for its first 
plan, and until 1968 for this plan to be given statutory force.
For a hundred years now some of Victoria's urban problems have 
been identified, yet despite recurrent, comprehensive enquiries into and 
reports on them, attempts to solve them have been half-hearted and piece­
meal. The Victorian approach has been to deal with each problem separately, 
without considering their interrelationship, and with no overall vision of 
the city as a single organism. The efforts that have been made to bring 
some order to the process of urban development have been few and relatively 
unsuccessful. Some explanations of this are offered in the structure of 
political power, in the failure of the Labor Party to achieve office and 
power and the rift between practical town planning and the politics of the 
Left, in the social values of the bureaucracy and its relatively weak role 
in state economic planning (compared with SA for example) and, later, in 
the style and ideology of Bolte's leadership. The relative importance of 
each of these factors through time can best be discerned through historical
1 .
narrative.
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2.
Planning has suffered in the past from the political naivety of its 
more idealistic advocates. The political obstacles confronting attempts to 
implement planning, particularly planning which emphasises social equity 
considerations, are, as we have seen in South Australia, formidable. The 
structure of political power in both SA and Victoria has been such as to 
protect property owners' and pamper rural interests while excluding any 
serious debate on the structure and goals of our cities or encouraging any 
far-sighted policy of urban development.
This rural and conservative bias - so antipathetic to planning - is 
built into the very political institutions and processes through which 
efforts have been made to implement planning: Lower Houses dominated by
coalitions of country and city rich, Upper Houses at the mercy of rural 
conservatives, City Councils whose members have a vested interest in 
protecting existing property and privilege or in real estate and land 
speculation, and a Liberal Party organisation dependent on the support of 
the financial 'establishment'.
Davies (1960: 217) has written of the Legislative Council:
While discussion of major Bills in the Assembly 
brings them into public focus few Cabinets in Victoria 
have been permitted to feel that this was their 
proposal's main hurdle... Always in the background 
like a malicious, mechanical anti-coconut shy has stood 
the unreformable Legislative Council, pitching back 
bills and bits of bills... Until recent years this 
veto worked by a sort of compulsive shudder of the 
property instinct from which even the moderate pro­
posals of conservative Cabinets were not always immune.
Until 1950 rural interests made up about half of the Council's
membership, a predominance maintained by the extraordinary weighting to
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rural areas in the distribution of seats. Its rurally-biased conservatism
2was evident in the four years of the Hogan (Labor) Ministries during which
twenty-nine Government Bills were rejected by the Council, including in
December 1930 a Town Planning Bill (introduced into the Council by J.P. Jones,
3Labor Minister for Public Works). It was evident again in 1947 when the 
Council dramatically dismissed the Cain Labor Government from office on the 
issue of bank nationalisation (Crisp: 1960, 332-333). And the class 
character of the Council was apparent in its rejection of Bills attempting 
to cope with unemployment in 1928, 1929 and 1930. In specifically town 
planning matters the Council rejected legislation in 1913, 1915, 1930, 1936, 
1937 and 1952-3.
The Lower House has had a similar record of conservative and rural 
bias. A significant over-representation of farmers (26 - 30 per cent in 
the House, only 8 per cent in the population. Davies: 1960, 226) has meant 
that since the formation of the Country Party in the 1920s, that Party has 
always held the balance of power. Electoral distribution has thus allowed 
the Country Party ('the only political group...without any ideas at all 
beyond the make-believe of rural-urban jealousy'. Davies 1960: 175) to 
stamp its mould on a whole generation of State politics. Redistribution at 
the end of the nineteenth century had set the city vote at a firm discount
In 1881 there was a ratio of 100 metropolitan votes to 61 rural, in 
1936 it was 100:49 and in 1950 still 100:55. The ratio of metropolitan 
to rural voters makes it impossible for the Labor Party to gain a 
majority of seats. (Serie: 1954, 192, 202-3).
May 1927-December 1928, December 1929-May 1932: the crucial period
when the Report of the Metropolitan Town Planning Commission was 
submitted and action was being urged.
Providing for a Town Planning Board of three members to act as the town 
planning authority for the State. Planning schemes were to be prepared 
by the local authorities. The session closed without the Bill being 
passed. The 1944 Bill was broadly similar to this unsuccessful 1930
one.
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which, through neglect and manipulation over sixty years, has hardened into 
deprivation of a growing metropolis.1 By 1942 the Country Party had doubled 
its 1920 parliamentary representation with more than a third of Assembly 
seats. Instability of ministries became endemic from the early 1920s till 
1955 and in consequence, the sort of men who rose to the top were wire­
pullers, horse-traders and wheeler-dealers of the most unscrupulous kind.
(Blazey 1972: 41). Davies characterises two main moods of party relations
2in this period, both corrupting: depressive, as when A.A. Dunstan
succeeded in imposing, with the catchwords 'economy and careful management', 
a seven year stasis on the government of the State during which time 'there 
was little long term planning, particularly of Melbourne', (Blazey 1972:
41) and manic, as in the pre- and post-Dunstan years when 'changes of 
alliance rang like chimes'. (Davies 1960: 224).
Over the period 1922 to 1929, when the Metropolitan Town Planning 
Commission prepared its Report, there were twelve changes of Ministry. In 
the ten years from 1945-55, from the passing of the first Town Planning Act 
to the production of the first plan, government changed hands ten times.
As a sustained mode this created a politics drained 
of ideas and left deep scars on the outlook of political 
groups. We have already noted the mean-spirited,
'shrewdie' tone of the Assembly: difficulties of 
recruitment to political machines so unrewarding as 
the state Labor and Liberal Parties have helped make 
the circle vicious. (Davies 1960: 224).
A further element distorting the political structure concerns the 
Liberal Party. There are historical, social and some writers claim, 
climatic reasons for Victoria's conservatism, but perhaps the most influential
In 1926, 100 city votes were worth 47 country, 1943 it was 100:39 and 
in 1945, 100:57 (Davies: 1960, 223).
A.A. Dunstan: Leader of the Country Party, Premier 1935-43 although the
Party only polled 13.7 per cent of the vote in 1935, 11.3 per cent in 
1937 and 16.5 per cent in 1940. (Blazey: 1972, 41).
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factor is the historical development of Melbourne as the financial capital 
of Australia. The political consequences that flow from this impinge 
strongly on the possibilities of reformist planning. Australia's largest 
company, Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd, has its head offices in Melbourne 
along with the Collins House Group comprising Western Mining, North Broken 
Hill, Broken Hill South, etc. The country's largest oil company, Shell, 
is based there, together with Imperial Chemical Industries, General Motors 
Holdens and Ford Australia. Melbourne is the home of the Commercial Bank, 
the National Bank and the ANZ Banking Group, the headquarters of the nation's 
largest private airline and one of the largest sharebroking and investment 
houses, Ian Potter & Co. The Victorian Liberal Party, through its state 
finance committee, has been very successful in raising funds from commerce 
and business houses. Every three years a fund-raising committee appointed 
by the state executive includes as many as twenty men prominent in 
Victorian business and primary production. (Blazey: 1972, 102).
The membership of the finance committee suggests the close links 
between the Liberal Party and the Collins Street conservative financial 
establishment, links that are not especially compatible with a style of city 
planning concerned with social equity and redistribution.^
It seems reasonable to suggest that these economic forces behind 
the Liberal Party, with their laissez-faire ideology and profit-oriented 
interest in politics, must have been especially influential since 1955,
(the year after the MMBW produced its metropolitan plan) when the Liberal 
Party under Bolte won office.
Trustees of the finance committee have included Sir Ian Potter (rated 
by the Financial Review as 'the monarch of Melbourne finance') and 
Sir Maurice Nathan, former Chairman of Patterson's Aust Ltd and Lord 
Mayor of Melbourne. He made an investment-seeking overseas trip with 
Bolte early in his premiership. (Blazey: 1972, 103).
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Such is the conservative political structure within which those 
advocating a reformist approach to town planning have had to work. One 
offshoot of this imbalance, highly significant to the fortunes of town 
planning, has been the bleak history of the State Labor Party, particularly 
in the inter-war period. As Rawson (1954: chapters 4, 8, 9) has shown, 
the apparent impossibility of attaining office and power, far from promoting 
a doctrinaire intransigence, bred a characterless and dispiriting respect­
ability. The Party was not, in this period, an advocate for the social 
benefits of city planning, and its political weakness may have discouraged 
those who were interested in town planning from allying themselves with and 
working through the Labor Party. Between the wars then, the town planning 
issue was in the hands of middle class reformers and professional men. This 
gap between the politics of the Left and planning advocates, noticeable 
after the first world war,has encouraged the development of a purely 
'technical' approach, a class of planners (and civil servants) who espouse 
an 'apolitical' approach which places maximum emphasis on efficiency 
considerations. And however independent this 'technical' activity might 
appear to be, in fact it has made planning conservative.
These political constraints have naturally affected the kind of 
planning that has been done. There has been no attempt to initiate or control 
urban development. Planning has simply aimed to improve the efficiency of 
that development.
The next sections will explore the development of thinking about 
and inquiries into urban problems and the response, or lack of response, to 
these developments in the political sphere.
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It was in the 1870s that the 'drift to the cities' first became 
marked. People left decaying mining towns and hopeless selections and made 
their way to Melbourne. In 1881 32 per cent of Victoria's population 
lived there, and in 1891 43 per cent. In 1871 three-quarters of Melbourne's 
population was concentrated in the city and inner suburbs of Carlton, 
Collingwood, Fitzroy, Richmond, Prahran and North and South Melbourne.
There was little suburban expansion until railways were built in the late 
1870s. The collapse of gold mining in the seventies had closed the main 
avenue of speculative investment and, to a great extent, suburban land 
speculation now took its place. Transport was essential if land values 
were to be inflated to the point where subdivision yielded spectacular 
returns. Hence the importance of political influence. Before, and even 
after, the passing of the Act of 1884 transferring railways from ministerial 
control to a Board of Commissioners, lobbying on the construction of sub­
urban railways was notorious. (Cannon 1966)
As subdivision activity spread, original suburban townships were 
swallowed up. In 1874 local government was given wide borrowing powers, 
which many used to build pretentious town halls while ignoring other needs 
of their areas. As subdivision continued, provision for future parklands 
was almost entirely neglected. Sewerage and responsibility for public 
health were in the hands of individual councils, with varying results.
Local inspectors often tolerated great abuses. But the shortcomings of the 
water supply and sewerage arrangements were beyond remedy by any single 
municipality. (Grant and Serie 1957: 137-40).
In 1874 a municipal conference proposed a scheme for the appoint­
ment of a Board of Works to deal with the problems of water, sewerage, gas, 
trams, river control, noxious trades, parks and hackney carriages within a
3 .
radius of ten miles of Melbourne. Finally, following the recommendations
83
of a Royal Commission on the Sanitary Condition of Melbourne (VPP 1889, 
vol. ii) an Act was passed in 1890 to provide for better management of the 
metropolis by the creation of the Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works 
(MMBW), which was given responsibility for water supply and sewerage. Its 
formation and subsequent gradual accumulation of other responsibilities 
illustrates the process of extension of powers, ad hoc institutional 
development and subsequent rationalisation, which have been a major source 
of planning difficulties in the 'naturally' growing cities.
Legislation for the Board was modelled on that for the shortlived 
London and Metropolitan Board of Works. Briggs (1963, 322-5) claims that 
the London Board failed because its two-stage election process - aldermen 
to councils, then from councils to the Board - was not a sufficiently 
democratic process. This criticism is still made of the Melbourne Board 
today, and as an issue it has been crucial in determining the fate of 
various efforts at metropolitan co-ordination.'*'
The formation of the Board was the first step in the progress of 
one aspect of planning thought - that concerned with the more efficient 
provision and administration of essential services to the metropolitan 
area by means of central co-ordination of activities. From 1890 to the 
first world war there was lively interest in this 'Greater Melbourne' 
issue, with strong campaigning by the Australian Natives Association. 
(Davies: 1951, 72) A 1902 Royal Commission investigated the question of 
unification or federation of municipalities but recommended that the time 
was inopportune to attempt either.
As created the Board had considerable autonomy. It was subject to 
Parliament but not to any one Minister. Through the years the basis 
of the constituent councils' representation on the Board has been 
changed from simple rateable value to give some weight to population, 
and the number of commissioners has increased to accommodate new local 
government areas. Since the MMBW (Reconstitution) Act, 1972, 52 
councils each elect one commissioner, except for Melbourne which, 
because of its importance measured by rateable value, elects three.
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One of the problems which prompted legislative efforts for a 
Greater Melbourne was the existence of several bodies controlling separate 
tramway systems. The 1911 Royal Commission on the Railway and Tramway 
system of Melbourne and suburbs (VPP, 1911, Vol.ii) recommended that 
metropolitan tramways should be vested in and controlled by a Greater 
Melbourne Council. In 1912 the MMBW proposed an enlargement of its functions 
to include fire brigades, Yarra River improvements and others. And in the 
same year a conference of municipalities recommended the formation of a 
metropolitan municipal authority to be known as a Greater Melbourne Council.
If ever a policy seemed to have widespread support, it was this. 
Accordingly the Liberal Premier, W.A. Watt, introduced the Metropolitan 
Council Bill in 1913, to establish a metropolitan council of thirty to 
forty members, directly elected by constituencies similar to the existing 
municipal districts. The Bill lapsed, but was re-introduced in 1915 by the 
Peacock Liberal Government. It provided for the 'federal control of 
Melbourne's general utilites', including transport, gas, electricity, 
lighting, water, sewerage, drains, fire protection, rivers, creeks, parks 
and gardens, markets, abattoirs, noxious trades, hackney carriages, and 
regulation of buildings. (VPD: 1915, 845-7).
Since the government had the numbers the Bill did pass the Assembly,
but not without opposition. The case argued in an Argus editorial was
typical of all future opposition which foiled the Greater Melbourne issue.
The Argus (22 March 1915) attacked 'three fundamental defects' of the Bill -
It proposes to depart from the long established and 
essentially just municipal franchise, which gives 
property holders one, two or three votes according 
to the value of the property for which they are 
assessed, in favour of the system of one ratepayer 
one vote. It also proposes to abolish the MMBW and 
to laboriously build up another representative body, 
merely...for the sake of change. Thirdly the Bill 
proposes to vest in this new body the very difficult 
and highly specialised work of managing the tramways...
The Labor opposition will have difficulty dissembling 
its delight when a measure is presented which will...
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inevitably hand over the municipal control of the 
metropolis to Labor...No necessity exists for the 
adoption of revolutionary proposals. The Ministry 
has ready to hand the MMBW [whose powers] can be 
amended and extended to suit the growing needs of 
the city...It is amazing that they [the Government] 
should attempt to introduce a municipal franchise which 
would make Melbourne an arena for socialistic experi­
ments carried out at the expense of the defeated 
property holders.
A meeting of the Victorian Employers Federation condemned the new 
franchise (Argus3 24 March 1915) as did the Prahran Council, which urged 
other councils to oppose the Bill and 'protect the interests of the people 
who will be called upon to find the money to finance the Council, and whose 
property will be mortgaged in consequence'. (Arguss 9 April 1915).
Clearly there was some agreement on the need for a metropolitan 
authority, but the issue was submerged by the fear that this
would mean the handing over of the Metropolis to the 
Labor Party... Immediately it gained control the Labor 
Party would never rest till it made its grip secure. 
We should have such insistent demands for the 
broadening of the franchise that Parliament could 
not long resist altering one ratepayer one vote to 
the lodger vote, and from that it would be a short 
step to one adult one vote.
(Argus, 17 June 1915)
The Labor Party's attitude throughout its opposition to the Greater 
Melbourne Bills was uncompromising. It demanded unification, adult 
franchise, and payment of members. Since, in the Lower House, Labor was 
able to defeat the Government on any question on which the latter could not 
count on the support of the opposition 'corner party', the cards were 
effectively stacked against 'federationists' in successive ministries.
We may wonder though at Labor's tactics. They wanted unification, 
they said, knowing that they had no chance of squeezing it from Liberal 
governments, and that they would have to wait until they won a parliamentary 
majority, a remote possibility. They wanted adult suffrage, they knew
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the Liberals would not grant it, and that they had been generously treated 
in having the Watt proposals broadened in the Peacock Bill to one rate­
payer one vote. Further, they had beaten the Liberals down from an 
electoral map weighted against them to one which was equitable. These would 
seem to be good grounds for compromise.
But what appears to have been the decisive factor in the Labor 
Party's attitude (Davies 1951: 78) was their experience of the delights of 
office, albeit brief and freakish, for thirteen days in 1914 when they had 
allied with the 'corner' party and won a division on a major issue. Their 
expectation that the manoeuvre could be repeated with the same result on 
this Bill, together with a general lack of interest in municipal affairs, 
may explain their hostility to the Bill.
A different kind of hostility came from property-owners. Not 
surprisingly then, the Bill was shelved by the Legislative Council and there 
was little interest in the question of a metropolitan authority for the 
next ten years. A separate Metropolitan Tramways Board was created in 1918 
and the same arrangement was made for Fire Brigades.
4.
The years 1900 to 1930 saw the beginnings of significant changes 
in the pattern of urban growth. The old core of the metropolis was becoming 
less important as a residential area as secondary industry expanded rapidly 
during the war and needed more space close to transport outlets.
Population declined in the heart of the metropolis as industry bought 
former residential property and some of the displaced population moved 
outward in all directions, a movement made possible by the suburban railways
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which had been lying waiting since the 1890s. 1
The 1920s were one of the minor boom periods of Australian development.
Melbourne's population increased from 750,000 in 1920 to one million in
1929. Suburban development to the north and west was limited by surface 
2basalt but to the south and east Melbourne sprawled while the old inner 
suburbs declined slowly in population (Grant and Serie 1957: 250-1). 
Suburban expansion and increased road traffic increased the urgency of the 
need for metropolitan planning.
Yet up to the Second World War efforts to introduce centralisation 
or coordination of controls over metropolitan growth were unsuccessful.
There was more success, albeit piecemeal and decentralised, in attempts to 
regulate some of the worst abuses associated with a growing city. The 
control of development through municipal regulation began to be established 
around the turn of the century. The Health Act of 1890 made provisions 
concerning the width of streets in new subdivisions, and the Local Government 
Acts of 1903 and 1914 concerned the regulation of buildings and sites.
The 1914 Act empowered local councils to prescribe minimum area, depth, and 
width of frontage, and spaces around dwellings, and to regulate the height,
The electrification of the tramway system was virtually completed by 
1919 and electrification of railways was carried out between 1919 and 
1923. Since almost all urban passenger traffic was at this time 
carried by public transport, the spread of the metropolis was along the 
tram and train lines. (Turner 1966: 37).
'These physical characteristics have exerted a considerable influence on 
the trend of Melbourne's urban development. Proximity to the pleasant 
hill country to the east, and to the beaches of Port Phillip Bay on the 
south, together with the more favourable topographical, climatic and 
soil characteristics, have made the suburbs to the east and south 
attractive for residential purposes and in consequence they have devel­
oped more rapidly than those in the west and north'. Melb. Metropolitan 
Planning Scheme 1954, Vol. 1, p.19.
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Ventilation and lighting of buildings, to reclaim insanitary, low-lying or 
overcrowded areas, and to regulate subdivision proposals according to 
specified standards. In the metropolitan area plans of subdivision could 
be refused if the area could not be economically and advantageously sewered 
(section 63, Local Government Act 1914, no. 2557) but the discretionary 
nature of this power was of vital significance. It meant that Victoria had 
no control over subdivision comparable with that in SA since the 1920 Town 
Planning Act.
However in Victoria even these few regulatory powers that did exist 
were used reluctantly and sparingly, if at all, according to the Final 
Report of the 1914-18 Royal Commission on Housing. The same was probably 
true of the earliest land use controls, given to local councils by the Local 
Government Act of 1921. These enabled local councils to make by-laws 
'prescribing areas within their districts as residential areas' and prohi­
biting from these areas any other uses that the by-laws specified (section 
10, Local Government Act 1921, no. 3167).
It has been said of American cities that 'most graft in American 
local government today arises from the administration of zoning controls' 
(Mathews 1967: 210). Zoning has traditionally been the responsibility of 
local governments but Mathews (1967:211) argues that
although they may be safely left with the responsibility 
for administering detailed zoning ordinances in accordance 
with a metropolitan-wide plan, it is dangerous to entrust 
them with the task of planning land-use. This is because 
they are likely to be more concerned with maintaining or 
enhancing private property values, which are the basis of 
the bulk of their revenues, than with promoting community 
welfare in a wider sense... Zoning needs to have regard to 
such matters as aesthetic considerations, the need for 
recreational areas and the planning of housing and other 
development in such a way as to make effective use of 
public service facilities. A metropolitan authority is 
more likely to give due weight to such matters than local 
councils elected by private property owners. When this 
is permitted to be undertaken for private gain without 
regard to public interest, it may result in disorderly 
development and throw unnecessary burdens on public
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authorities responsible for providing roads, sewerage, 
water supply and other urban services.
Hindsight has shown us that zoning, one of the 'conventional 
wisdoms' of the early planning movement, is not the wholesale remedy for 
urban problems that it was once thought to be. Zoning could be used in a 
conservative way by middle and upper class areas to protect themselves from 
'undesirable land uses' - which could cover anything from industrial 
encroachment to working class housing. Until empirical research has been 
done on the matter we can only guess at the extent to which zoning has been 
used as a conservative tool by local governments in Australian cities. One 
local history (Bate 1952) records that local councils were tardy in exer­
cising the few powers they did possess. Bate argues, in the case of 
Brighton, that in the period of rapid growth and material advance of the 
1920s local councils were ill-prepared and no-one clearly saw what was at 
stake.
The challenge to local government was to make planning pre­
cede rather than follow development. But what was Town 
Planning? In the eyes of many men in the twenties it 
seems to have had mainly negative implications. The 
councillors were united in their determination to resist 
the evil effects of growth by imposing conditions upon 
the subdivider or builder, to the effect that his roads 
should be a certain width, his blocks a minimum area and 
frontage, his drainage adequate, his houses approved in 
material and design. But that was usually all. The 
knowledge upon which a constructive overall plan might 
have been based...was rare in Melbourne... But there was 
in progressive municipalities a significant emphasis on 
the provision of playgrounds and reserves. When the word 
planning was used in general conversation in the twenties 
...that was what was meant...
(Bate: 1962, 381-2)
From this study it seems that planning at the local council level 
was not a going concern before the Second World War,  ^but until case studies
Atkins (1959: 181-2) argues that the factors which decide whether any of 
these powers will be used and whether the local authority will become 
something more than a local provider of roads, pavements and drainage 
are: how far the area has already been 'developed' (i.e. how much really 
costly new work in street-making etc. has to be done); how acceptable
....(cont.d)
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are made of actual uses by councils of zoning powers we can only speculate 
about the probable conservative impact of local zoning. But Robin Boyd 
has made the following observation in his detailed work on the development 
of the Australian home and garden:
In the early 1920s many municipal councils in Sydney 
and Melbourne began to ordain Brick Areas, insurance 
companies noting with satisfaction that no timber 
houses were approved in such areas...Weatherboards 
never appeared in rich streets, bricks seldom in poor 
streets. The brick areas were created for snobbish 
reasons...
(Boyd: 1952, 114)
Discretionary local zoning powers though were a far-cry from the 
prescriptive land use control of the whole metropolis that those active in 
the planning movement advocated. These shortcomings were recognised by the 
authors of the 1929 Metropolitan Town Planning Commission Report, itself a 
product of the early enthusiasm for planning that Victoria shared with other 
states during the First World War.
5.
As in other states a town planning movement emerged in response to 
the enthusiasm aroused by the 1914 lecture tour by Reade and Davidge.
The Town Planning Association was formed after their final lecture in 
October 1914, incorporating the Anti-Slum Committee and the National Parks 
Association. The concerns of the movement were with housing, pre-design of 
virgin land for new cities, and preservation of parks, open spaces and 
native wildlife. (Argus 6 Oct. 1914)
1 (contd. from previous page)
their policies are to local ratepayers; how much money they can raise. 
Money and local support are the crucial factors. The nominal powers of 
councils may be fairly wide and there may seem considerable opportunities 
for councils with initiative and energy, "but the actuality is often 
different, as few councils feel that they can finance large expansions 
into new fields without increased aid from State governments". This is 
of course especially true for councils in poorer areas.
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Its intellectual ancestry in the thinking of Ebenezer Howard and 
the Garden City Movement is evident from the remarks of its first President, 
the man who seems to have run the organisation for at least twenty years,
Dr. J.W. Barrett^ who said that the objects of the new Association were 
'to give the town a bit of the country and the country a bit of the town' 
{Argus 3 27 October 1914) and in their first exhibition, which included a 
plan for a garden suburb at Heidelberg designed by Walter Burley Griffin.
It was in this initial period of enthusiasm that J.C. Morrell was 
sent overseas by the Department of Public Works. He reported to the Govern­
ment in 1915 on overseas planning developments, urging planning legislation 
to provide for slum clearance and for the future development of the metro­
polis. In 1913 a Joint Select Committee appointed by the Watt Liberal 
Government had investigated slums and reported that 'the housing of the 
people in portions of the metropolis is most disgraceful and that the 
conditions under which the unfortunate residents of some of the slum areas
exist are a menace not only to themselves but to the health of the community
, , 2 at large.
Lieutenant-Col Sir James Barrett, KBE, CB, CMG, MD, MS Melbourne,
FRCS England, born Victoria 1862. Defeated for Toorak State election 
1920; member of the Melbourne Club; succeeded Sir John Monash as 
Vice-Chancellor of Melbourne University 1931. (Who's Who in Australia 
1922, 1929, 1935) .
Members of this Select Committee were:
M. Baird: Liberal MLA (Ballarat). Minister of Public Instruction in 
Bowser (National) Govt., 1917-18; Minister of Public Health and 
Minister of Labour in Lawson (National) Government 1918-23.
All belonged to the 'Economy' faction of the Liberal Party from 1916. 
E.J. Cotter: MLA (Richmond)
J. Keast: MLA (Dande.nong)
J. Menzies: Liberal MLA (Lowan)
R.H. Solly: Labor MLA (Carlton)
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This led to the establishment of a Royal Commission to enquire 
into the Housing Conditions of the People in the Metropolisthe first 
systematic investigation of working class housing in Victoria. It presented 
some remarkable findings in its Reports over four years (First Progress 
Report, VPP, 1915 Vol.II p .1481-1514, Second Progress Report, VPP, 1917 
Vol.II, p.163-203 and Minutes of Evidence, pp.203-713, Final Report VPP,
1918 Vol.II p.305-17).
The chief purpose of the First Report was 'to illustrate the 
inability of the Board of Public Health to enforce... rectification of 
insanitary conditions'. (VPP 1915: 1486) It contained a study of conditions 
in the Dandenong ShireCouncil, which the Report described as 'a history of 
the struggle of the Board of Health for a number of years to constrain a 
small shire council to abate flagrant insanitary conditions, which led to 
the absolute defeat of the Board by the calculated inertia of the Council' 
(VPP 1915:1486). The case study was intended to illustrate the Board's 
difficulty in coping with 'local inertia and ignorance'. The second part of 
the Report dealing with subdivision of landed estates was subtitled 'The 
evils resulting from faulty planning through municipal neglect'. Its 
criticism was twofold. Local councils were attacked for their failure to 
make the necessary by-laws to enable them to exercise proper control over 
subdivision of estates. But it went on to criticise 'the meanly avaricious 
spirit displayed by certain owners of large estates or their agents...in 
thwarting, in the absence of local enactment of legal obligations and in the 
presence of moral obligations to the community, attempts made at the
There were seven Commissioners. Four of them, Solly (Chairman), Cotter,
Menzies and Biard, had sat on the 1913 Select Committee. The others were
H.F. Richardson: Liberal MLC (Geelong)
b. 1854. Businessman. Minister without Portfolio in Bowser (National) 
Govt. (1917-18). Also belonged to the Economy faction of the Party 
from 1916.
J. Sternberg: Liberal MLC (Bendigo)
b. 1855. Mining Company Director. Member of Royal Commissions on Old 
Age Pensions, Shops & Factories Acts, Member of first Council of 
Education in Vic., connected with many friendly societies and 
benevolent institutions.
J.G. Aikman: Liberal MLC, Member of Metropolitan Fire Brigade Board,
Lord Mayor 1919-20.
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beginning of settlement to establish reasonably necessary conditions of 
subdivision'. (VPP, 1915:1503)
The Second Progress Report emphasised the 'need for State purchase 
of lands and State provision of dwellings and traffic facilities, as 
complementary to private enterprise in reducing the shortage of proper 
housing accommodation and so encouraging exodus from overcrowded areas'.
(VPP 1917 Vol.II: 163). This was the conclusion drawn by the Commissioners 
from very probing questions to hundreds of witnesses, in particular in 
relation to the adequacy of the free market system in providing decent 
accommodation for the poor.
The minutes of evidence (which ran to 510 pages before printing was 
given up because of the cost) reveal the breadth and depth of this inquiry. 
Among those consulted were twenty-two police from different municipalities, 
twenty eight 'social workers', (mostly ministers and church workers) 
notable among them the veteran campaigner against Sydney's slums, arch­
deacon F.B. Boyce, whose answer to the housing problem was Garden Suburbs 
(VPP 1917: 552); seven representatives of health authorities, fourteen 
men interested in 'housing' (as diverse in background as Sir Allen Taylor, 
MLC, Sydney and T.H. Thomas, Secretary of the Workers Homes Board, WA) and 
nine 'Town Planning' representatives, who were all asked to prepare a 
statement on the question of the housing of the people. The nine were 
Davidge and Reade, J.D. Fitzgerald, Prof. R.F. Irvine, John Sulman, George 
Taylor, J.C. Morrell, R. Stanton and E. Milner Stephen (lawyer, member of 
Sydney City Council, foundation member Town Planning Association, NSW).
Sulman recommended that urban growth should be on garden city lines, 
the essential feature being the limitation of the number of houses or people 
per acre. He favoured private control of Garden Suburb development rather 
than government or municipal control, but within strictly limited conditions 
as to layout, upkeep, no speculation in land values, and the devotion of
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profits beyond five per cent to the benefit of the estate (VPP 1917: 300).
His model obviously was Letchworth Garden City.
The wide-ranging and radical concerns of the Commission are evi­
dent in the kinds of questions it posed to witnesses. Sulman, for example, 
was asked by the Chairman (J.H. Solly) 'What are the principal advantages 
to the community of Town Planning?', 'In connection with any reform move­
ment, who do you think are the proper persons to take control...individual 
municipalities...or a Greater Melbourne Scheme adopted to absorb the 
municipalities...and with power over all public utilities?', 'Are you 
likely to get a Town Planning system such as we advocate under private 
enterprise?' Chairman Solly suggested to Sulman that the slums of Sydney 
were indicative of the failure of private enterprise, and when Sulman rose 
to the defence of the work of private enterprise in the suburbs the 
Commissioner replied that 'the better class dwelling in a suburb is the 
result of a demand by a certain class in the community who have the means to 
pay for it' . To which Sulman could only agree. (VPP 1917: 300-302)
Irvine, who was asked for his views 'with regard to the man who 
really cannot help himself - the man who is forced into the slum area 
through being only able to obtain casual employment at very poor wages', 
said that the problem could not be solved unless rents were brought within 
the limits of the wages paid to that class of man, and added that from this 
point of view he considered Daceyville Garden Suburb a failure. 'The 
ordinary worker cannot afford rent up to 17/6d. a week...Daceyville is really 
a suburb for the moderately well-to-do.' (VPD 1917: 310)
Charles Reade's fifty-page contribution discussed housing and 
speculation in Europe, the garden city movement in Britain, the 1909 Housing 
and Town Planning Act, slums and replanning of overcrowded areas, 
constructive aspects of continental town planning for Australia, cheap 
transit in Belgium, problems of Australian cities, and tentative recommen­
dations for a Town Planning Act and its administration.
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Each of these 'town planning' advocates, without exception, 
recommended the Garden Suburb as the answer to housing problems. Yet 
simultaneously in Britain criticism was emerging of the 'betrayal' or 
distortion of Howard's Garden City theory. The application of Howard's 
garden city idea which Raymond Unwin had proposed was the creation of well- 
planned suburbs rather than economically associated but distinct towns. And 
it was town planning of this kind which established itself as town 
planning in practice. In fact its influence went far beyond the field 
formally designated as town planning. Low density housing with gardens in 
front and rear became normal for new suburban estates whether developed 
under town planning control or not.
English critics were doubtful whether the proliferation of garden 
suburbs was what they understood by town planning. The most clear-sighted 
'Garden City' supporters realised that one of the essential characteristics 
of Howard's 'Garden City' was its completeness: it was designed from the
beginning as substantially self-contained providing its own social and 
economic resources. So to them, planning which was concerned only with 
adding suburbs to existing cities was not town planning at all; a garden 
suburb was not a garden city. C.B. Purdom declared in 1914 that the Garden 
City Association ought not to support the extension of large towns and 
the multiplication of suburbs. Another line of attack was directed against 
the uncritical adoption of low density, which was characteristic of 
statutory town planning and of private estate development. Mr. T. Edwards 
in 1913 denounced the garden suburb as possessing neither the crowded 
interest of the town nor the quiet charm of the country, and as involving 
much inconvenient and unwanted travel. (Ashworth 1954: ch.VIII). Those 
involved in the town planning movement in Australia seemed to be completely 
unaware of these developments or that the most important element in 
Howard's theory was municipal ownership.
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In 1918 the Royal Commission delivered its Final Report. It was 
highly critical of municipalities for not using powers given them in the 
Workers Dwellings Act (1914) to acquire land and borrow for construction of 
low-rent workers homes.
In searching for an adequate explanation of the councils' 
aloofness...it is evident that a constant hindrance to 
initiative on their part is the influence of persistent 
demands by ratepayers to cut down expenditure, to say 
nothing of the probable opposition of vested interests 
in small house properties. But...such explanations 
cannot be regarded as justifications.
(VPP 1918:314)
The Commission therefore recommended the introduction of measures 'to 
enable either the Government, or associations under Government control, 
to take up the work of reform, instead of leaving such work to be 
developed by the uncertain operation of an adoptive section of local 
government powers'. It urged government intervention to enforce control of 
subdivision, uniform building regulations and health regulations, and to 
proceed with slum clearance and low rent housing.
Nothing ever came of this four year undertaking.
Some explanation for this failure to act may be found in the 
altered political and economic circumstances by the time the Final Report 
was submitted in 1918. The Royal Commission had been set up by the Peacock 
Liberal Government in 1914. In 1916 a faction under the leadership of 
Bowser attacked the Ministry for its failure to economise in public 
expenditure. This 'Economy Party' contested the November 1917 election as 
a separate group and won widespread support. The Liberal Party became 
known as the Nationalist Party following the formation of the Federal 
Nationalist Party, and 27 of the 39 Nationalists returned to the new 
Assembly were 'Economy" members. Bowser thus formed a Cabinet, choosing 
his ministers from the ranks of the 'Economy' faction. (Hughes & Graham 
1968:113-120) Significantly, two of them (Baird and Richardson) were
members of the Royal Commission. Although the Reports were signed by all
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Commissioners, 
most notable, 
was delivered,
the influence of the Labor Party Chairman (J.H.Solly) was 
But the Labor Party was not in office when the Final Report 
nor in the years immediately following.
6.
During the first world war there was considerable interchange of 
ideas between states, notably in the first and second Australasian Town 
Planning Conferences in Adelaide (1917) and Brisbane (1918) \  Neither the 
nation-wide exchange of ideas, nor the reformist emphasis of the movement, 
survived long after the end of the war. After 1918 each state became pre­
occupied with its own problems and, since the twenties were a boom period, 
these 'problems' tended to be directed to facilitating 'growth' rather than 
concern for its social consequences. Between 1920 and 1930 Melbourne's 
population increased by 195,000 and 70,000 houses were built in the 
metropolitan area.
Land speculators were operating again, more concerned with 
attaining a maximum frontage to sell than with providing 
open space and other amenities, or with co-ordinating 
one subdivision to another. The areas subdivided were far 
beyond the needs of the day. With a population near the 
one million mark Melbourne had begun to sprawl, although 
for some time various organisations had been advocating 
legislation to prevent this.
(Melbourne & Metropolitan Board of Works 1954:10-12)
From its foundation the Town Planning Association had stressed
2the need for planning legislation. Its President, Councillor Stapley, 
addressed the first Victorian planning conference in November 1919 on that
To which Victoria sent strong delegations, including members of the 
Royal Commission on Housing, officers from the Departments of Public 
Works (eg Morrell), Lands, the Melbourne Harbour Trust, MMBW and 
municipal representatives.
F.Stapley, Architect, FRVIA, President, RVIA, 1919-1920, Pres. Town 
Planning Association 1919-20, Chairman Metropolitan Town Planning 
Commission 1922-29, member Health Commission, senior member MMBW, 
Lord Mayor of Melbourne 1917-18, councillor for MCC for 27 years. 
(Who's Who in Australia 1929, p.1314).
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need. (Argus 14 Nov. 1919) The Conference concluded that
the want of control in the development and growth of 
our cities is detrimental to their best interest and 
the neglect to provide Town Planning Acts is to be 
deplored; and this conference recommends that the 
Victorian Town Planning Association take immediate 
steps to make representations to the Government urging 
the introduction of a Town Planning Bill on the lines 
of the latest Canadian legislation.
{Arguss 19 November 1919)
At a meeting of the Melbourne City Council in July of 1920
Stapley followed up his concern with the motion that
this Council considers that the rapid growth of the 
city and the metropolis is creating unsatisfactory 
conditions which require immediate attention... and 
that the Lord Mayor be requested to call a conference 
of representatives of the metropolitan municipalities 
to consider the best means of carrying out this 
proposal.
(Metropolitan Town Planning Commission Report 1929:1-5)
A conference of the municipalities on 1 October 1920 approved the Council's 
resolution and appointed a Committee, with Stapley as Chairman, to suggest 
appropriate action. They recommended the immediate appointment of a City 
Planning Commission and suggested its composition and sources of finance.
These recommendations were submitted to the Government and a Bill 
was presented to Parliament by the Minister for Public Works (F.G.Clarke, 
MLC) which was passed in December 1922. The Metropolitan Town Planning 
Commission Act provided for the appointment of an advisory and honorary 
Commission of nine members, one from the Melbourne City Council, four 
municipal councillors, and four members to be appointed for their business, 
technical and professional qualifications. The Commission was to be 
financed by the 26 municipalities in proportion to their rateable values. 
(From 1925-28 the principal public authorities also contributed.) Stapley 
was appointed Chairman.^
The 'professional experts' on the Commission were E.Evan Smith: Chief
Architect, Public Works Department, H.E.Morton: City Engineer,
Melbourne City Council, Sydney Civic Commissioner 1928-30,
T.P.Strickland: Chief Engineer, MMTB, S.Tuxen: Surveyor and engineer.
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(The Commission was the first of its kind to be appointed in 
Australia and was probably influenced by the contemporary American 
enthusiasm for City Planning Commissions. South Australia had a Government 
Town Planner from 1916 and a Town Planning Department from 1920-1929.
There was a Town Planner associated with the Greater Brisbane Council 
established in 1924. In 1928 a Metropolitan Town Planning Commission was 
appointed in Perth by an Act almost identical with the original Melbourne 
Act) .
The Commission's terms of reference were to 'inquire into and 
report on the present conditions and tendencies of urban development in the 
metropolitan area' and to set out 'general plans and recommendations with 
respect to the better guidance and control of such development, and esti­
mates of the cost involved in the construction, maintenance and admini­
stration of the recommendations'. (TP Commission 1929:7) It had to consult 
with all municipalities, and with every public authority on any of its 
enquiries that affected the powers of these bodies, their sheer multiplicity 
indicating likely difficulty in reaching agreements.
In March 1925 the First Progress Report was published. It dealt 
with urgent proposals designed to facilitate the movement of traffic and 
contained a review of the public transport system and recommendations for a 
single transport authority. A harbour scheme for future development was 
included, a new highway scheme, and a comprehensive plan for the develop­
ment of the Fishermans Bend vacant lands. The scattered outer suburban 
development occasioned by unrestricted land subdivisions was condemned and 
remedies suggested. There were recommendations regarding the preservation 
of the foreshore, river, sports and other reserves. And proposals were 
made for the constitution of a metropolitan authority to carry out the
recommendations.
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The Commission presented its Final Report in January 1928. In 
March 1928 the Commissioners met with the Minister for Public Works (J.P. 
Jones, MLC, Labor) and urged the introduction of a Town Planning Bill. It 
was agreed that the Commission confer with the Parliamentary draughtsman, 
with the result that a Town Planning Bill was prepared to enable implemen­
tation of the recommendations of the Report. The legislation advocated by 
the Commission provided for local authorities to prepare or adopt town 
planning schemes and made it mandatory for every municipality with a 
population greater than 2,000 to do so. Schemes had to be approved by the 
Minister, who could modify or reject them. The Minister was to be empowered 
to order a local authority to prepare a scheme and, after approval, to 
enforce it, though there were no penal provisions included. A central 
expert authority (either a Board of three town planning experts or one 
experienced town planner) would administer the Act. Municipalities were to 
have the power to resume land, prevent development contrary to the scheme, 
pay compensation to those injuriously affected, and collect betterment from 
those who benefitted from schemes.
To finance schemes municipalities were to be given power to borrow 
over and above the amounts authorised by the Local Government Act, such 
loans could be extended up to 60 years and relevant public authorities 
would be expected to contribute.
In July 1928 a first Draft of a Town Planning Bill was submitted 
to the Commission for comment. A revised Bill was then prepared which, 
owing to a change of Government, (a National Ministry taking over from the 
Hogan Labor Ministry) was not submitted to Parliament.^
1 The reason given in the published Report of the Commission in 1929.
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A further revised Town Planning Bill was prepared by the new 
Government. It was not forwarded to the Commission for comment, nor was if 
submitted to Parliament before dissolution. (Nov. 1929). The authors of 
the 1954 Planning Scheme attributed this to the depression.
The presentation of the Report coincided with the 
first rumblings of the world-wide depression. The 
thoughts of politicians turned to what they considered 
more realistic things than town planning with the 
unfortunate result that no legislation ^as ever passed 
to enable the recommendations of the Commission to be 
put into effect. Nothing was done...
(MMBW 1954:12)
But the Report had actually been delivered to the Government in 
January 1928, at least 18 months before the depression was felt. Two 
further explanations for this failure to act may therefore be suggested.
In April 1930 the Chairman of the Commission remarked that since 
the Commission had been established there had been twelve changes of 
Ministry, with consequent changes in the portfolio for Public Works (Argus, 
12 April, 1930). Such political instability would hardly have been 
conducive to any sustained legislative achievement, let alone one so 
controversial as a Town Planning Act. Inactivity seemed to characterise 
each Ministry formed, irrespective of party: perhaps because of the pre­
carious nature of political power within the highly unstable three-party 
situation that existed throughout the 1920s and 1930s when no party was able 
to establish an absolute majority. During the crucial years of the 
presentation of the Report and immediately after, a Labor Government held 
power (May 1927 - Nov. 1928, then Dec. 1929 - May 1932) but only with 
Country Party support; it was succeeded by the Arglye-Allan Ministry, a 
UAP-Country Party coalition (May 1932 - April 1935). While the period 
from 1929 to 1939 thus appears more stable in terms of duration of 
ministries (c.f. 1922-29) its political complexion was not conducive to the 
cause of town planning since it was dominated by the Country Party, which
formed the Government, with Labor support, from 1935-43.
102
The second impediment to the passage of Town Planning legislation 
was the hostility of country interests in State Parliament to any money 
spent on the city. A deputation from the Metropolitan Town Planning 
Conference (comprising representatives of municipalities, the Melbourne 
City Council, and Town Planning Association) to the Minister for Public 
Works in August 1931, urging action on a Town Planning Act, maintained that 
the Bill submitted to Parliament in 1930 had failed because of the 
opposition of country representatives in Parliament. (Argus 6 August 1931).
So much for the politics of the Report. What of its policies?
This Report was the first general stocktaking of the urban system in the 
ninety years since its establishment. It focussed on three main areas; the 
planning of a metropolitan main road network, the introduction of a system 
of land use zoning, and a program to increase the amount of open space.
But, as with thinking about planning in NSW at this time, the major pre­
occupation was with the traffic congestion arising from the rapid increase 
in road traffic. (120 of the 300 pages of the Report were devoted to 
analysis of traffic problems). That there was some substance to these 
fears was confirmed by their own traffic surveys and census which showed 
that city traffic had increased by 31 per cent between 1924 and 1926 (TP 
Commission 1929:37). The number of cars had multiplied eight times, from 
21,152 in 1917 to 158,468 in 1928 (TP Commission 1929:44).
Of social reform the Report had little to say. In line with the 
mainstream of concern in NSW at the time, its chief emphasis was on the 
financial benefits and sound business principles of planning - '...a city 
must be planned with two objects in view - that of conducting its business 
in the most efficient manner, and that of conferring the greatest benefits 
on the greatest number. City planning aims to bring about order in urban 
physical development... and to provide for the requirements of commerce and
industries'. (TP Commission 1929:19-20).
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All of its subsequent proposals - for zoning, public recreation, 
open spaces, and housing, were justified in economic terms. The Commission 
commended the Local Government Amending Act of 1921 (which had empowered 
municipalities to declare residential areas within their boundaries and to 
prohibit the use of land for non-residential purposes) because it 'has had 
the effect of stabilising values' and preventing undesirable conditions in 
residential neighbourhoods. (TP Commission 1929: 155). The Commission thus 
proposed a metropolitan zoning system which 'would have a very beneficial 
effect by stabilising the value of property. Each particular zone would be 
regulated in accordance with the probable future demand for space within the 
district. Under such regulation a wasteful allocation of land would be 
prevented, and a greater value would accrue to the lands set aside'.
The Report's zoning proposals would have made any form of new 
housing other than detached units of one or two storeys virtually impossible 
to build. These zoning and building regulations were further justified in 
terms of their ability to 'ensure that the principal housing districts of 
the metropolis would be of character consistent with the Australian ideals 
of housing, and in accordance with the standard which has generally been 
maintained in recent years'. (TP Commission 1929: 170). It would appear 
from this that the pattern of suburban development which had emerged in the 
1870s and 1880s had come to be regarded as characteristically 'Australian' 
and unquestionably desirable. The final reason advanced to justify a 
metropolitan system of zoning was that it would reduce service costs. It 
was proposed that 123,713 acres be zoned as residential (an area which it 
was estimated could accommodate 3.7 million). Elsewhere in the Report the 
Commission lamented the fact that 'there are few, if any, cities of a 
population of one million which occupy such a large area as does Melbourne 
to its suburbs. The relatively low average density of population in 
Melbourne...has presented many problems to those charged with the responsi­
bility of supplying the various public services' (p.241). Yet there was no
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suggestion that the sequence of development should be controlled, a 
necessity if service capacity was to be used efficiently. Yet adequate 
and efficient provision of services was one of the Report's stated aims. It 
seems that the Commission was too aware of the vested interests who would be 
quick to oppose any curbs on development, to attempt to resolve this 
contradiction, which is still a dilemma for today's planners.
The Commission's findings on housing were less substantial than 
those of the earlier Royal Commission on Housing. That a housing problem 
existed was barely acknowledged.
The problem of providing for those of small means,... 
has received attention...in the Housing and Reclamation 
Act 1920 which empowers the State Savings Bank Commissioners 
to buy land and build houses, borrow money for such 
purposes, and to sell the houses to purchasers on 
extended terms... Councils are also given authority under 
this Act to carry out housing schemes for persons of 
small means and they may borrow up to €100,000 in excess 
of the amount authorised by the Local Government Acts 
for general purposes...No council has availed itself of 
the powers granted.
(TP Commission 1929: 248)
The Commission was not curious as to why this was so; made no 
suggestions for housing low income earners; and clearly had no intention of 
suggesting interference with the private enterprise system. Its values are 
implicit in the title of one section, 'Encouragement of Home Ownership'. 
Unlike the earlier Royal Commission, the 1929 Report gave no attention to 
sociological variables, such as income distribution.
Places of work remained centrally focussed, yet new working class
residential development was occurring mainly in the outer Western suburbs.
The Commission regretted that the rate of residential growth in the Eastern
and South Eastern suburbs was greater than that to the West and attributed
this to the poor transport facilities between central areas and the newer
Western development in Footscray, Williamstown and beyond. There was no
weight attached to the isolation and inferior provision of services in 
those areas.
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The Commission was equally pragmatic in its recommendations 
regarding open spaces and public recreation. It believed that proper 
outdoor recreation was not only good for the health but also for the 'morals 
and business efficiency of communities... There is a material aspect to the 
provision of reserves in that they invariably increase land and property 
values in their vicinity, thus improving local government finances'.
(TP Commission 1929: 187).
It stressed the 'greater productive capacity of a person of 
vigorous mind and physique' compared with that of a 'flabby individual who 
has no opportunity for reinvigoration in the open air'. And, 'if it's good 
for industry it must also be good for the State to ensure that adequate 
recreational facilities are provided...Remember the high percentage of 
unfit men who were rejected for service during the Great War'. (TP 
Commission 1929: 233).
The Commission recognised the need to improve on the 'present 
chaotic system of metropolitan municipal government' with some form of 
centralised control in a metropolitan constructing authority. It suggested 
three ways of constituting such a body; a Greater Melbourne Council to take 
over the duties of the existing municipalities, a Greater Melbourne Council 
to carry out works common to more than one municipality but leaving 
existing councils to deal with local matters, or the granting of additional 
powers to the MMBW to enable it to undertake road construction and general 
metropolitan improvement schemes (TP Commission 1929: 152). It did not 
make its own preference clear, perhaps because it appreciated the political 
complexities of this long-debated issue.
The 1929 Report was a comprehensive effort to formulate planning 
proposals on a metropolitan scale, but it was hardly a radical social or 
political document. Yet nothing ever came of it. So the city's growth 
continued under the system of laissez-faire which had prevailed in the
nineteenth century.
106
Statutory land-use planning of the kind advocated in the 1929 
Report was not an issue in Victoria in the 1930s, despite repeated efforts 
by the professional institutes, the Town Planning Association, and municipal 
councils to persuade successive Governments to pass a Town Planning Act.''’
But that more humane strain of thinking which had characterised 
some of those prominent in the early movement and which placed social 
issues like housing of low-income workers and slum abolition in the fore­
ground, and went from there to town planning in general, enjoyed a revival 
in the 1930s. For while the Victorian record of action in these years is
rather bleak, they seem to have had a special talent for producing
2enlightened reports on the ever-worsening situation.
Suasive action was taken in 1930 by the Royal Victorian Institute of 
Architects (Argus 24 April); in 1931 by the TP Association (Argus 6 May) 
and by local councillors {Argus 29 May, 6 Aug.); and in 1932 by the 
conference of metropolitan municipalities. All urged the Government 
to act on the 1929 Report. From 1934 to 1939 the TP Association 
annually sent a similar request to the Premier.
Morrell's report to the Government in 1915; the findings of the Royal 
Commission into Housing 1914-18; and the report by the Select Committee 
of 1918 on the Drift of Population from the country to the city. (VPP 
1918: 641-7) This Committee argued that
the continuous drain from country districts must no longer be 
looked upon as inevitable or impossible of check ...
The situation demands concerted action by state authorities 
... It is equally a matter for concern by businessmen's 
organisations in the city as for country residents that the 
townward tendency be checked. Unless it is it will 
ultimately produce serious results in the city and effect 
our civilisation.
107
After another decade of neglect yet another probing investigation 
into the housing problem was produced. It was initiated by concerned 
individuals who eventually forced the government, through the creation of 
the Housing Investigation and Slum Abolition Board, to reconsider thirty 
years of apathy. The establishment of this Board by the Dunstan Country
Party Government in 1936 was the result of persistent agitation throughout
1 2the decade. The Deputy Chairman of the Board, F.Oswald Barnett, led this 
public campaign. During the depression he had done two years research into 
slum conditions and presented the original findings to the Faculty of 
Commerce, Melbourne University, as a thesis entitled 'The Economics of the 
Slums'. It was then published as a book, The Unsuspected Slums3 by the 
Herald Press in 1933. He argued that slums were 'the inevitable result of 
the growth of large cities. Their origin is economic and is bound up in 
the development of the industrial system'. (Barnett 1933: 6) In his 
investigation he found that eighty-three per cent of adult male inhabitants 
of slums were unskilled labourers. (Barnett 1933: 7) In the survey carried 
out by Barnett and social workers in Footscray, questions included 'Is he a 
unionist?', 'Drinker?', 'Dissolute?', 'Derelict?'. (Barnett 1933: 8-9)
'Love and care for children?' The answer to this question disclosed that 
fifteen per cent of mothers had no love for their children and eighteen
7.
Its Chairman was Henry Pye, Country Party MLC, Minister in Dunstan 
Government.
F.O.Barnett, M.Com., Melb., FCA, Aust., Accountant, Member Victorian 
Housing Board 1938 onward, State school teacher 1902-20. Author of 
three works - The Unsuspected Slums (Herald Press, Melbourne, 1933),
The Making of a Criminal (Stuart Taylor, Melbourne, 1940) with W.O.Burt, 
also a member of the 1936 National Board, Housing the Australian Nation 
(Research Group of the Left Book Club, Melbourne, 1942).
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per cent were quite incapable of looking after them. (Barnett 1933: 17)
But his conclusion was radical. Rather than dismissing these people as 
'incorrigibles' or 'hopeless idlers' who were too lazy to help themselves 
he put the blame squarely on 'the industrial system'.
His findings provided the framework for the social survey 
conducted by the 1936 Board of Inquiry, which asked of husbands in slum 
households; 'Average weekly wage, Unionist, member of any Friendly Society, 
Drinker, Dissolute, Derelict, Criminal, were parents of same type?' And 
of wives; 'Wage, Drinker, Dissolute, Slovenly, Criminal, Love and care for 
children, were parents of same type?' It also compiled statistics on the 
conditions of homes, the incomes of slum occupiers, the number of family 
units and the total number of people occupying slum houses, details relating 
to children in houses inspected (they comprised 43.5 per cent of inhabitants 
of all houses inspected, and 21.8 per cent of those over fourteen years were 
unemployed), classification of male occupiers (64.7 per cent were unskilled 
workers) and rental summaries of all houses.^"
The Board had set out to formulate both a short term policy of 
rehousing and slum reclamation in those areas needing immediate treatment, 
and a long-term policy covering a much wider area and involving conside­
rations of town planning, co-ordination of transport and other services.
(VPP 1937: 93)
It found, to its 'horror and amazement', that the passage of 
twenty-five years since the 1913 Select Committee Report on housing had 
'aggravated almost beyond description the appalling conditions of the same 
slum areas and of the inhabitants'; that land had been used 'so avariciously 
in some instances that two or three houses have been erected on area which
See Appendices (pp. 93-135) of First Progress Report of Housing 
Investigation and Slum Abolition Board, VPP 1937, 134 pp., on 'Slum 
Reclamation; Housing for the Lower paid Worker'.
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was originally intended to be a backyard'; that rents were so extortionate 
'that many families...have been reduced to a state of semi-starvation. In 
some areas, children are fed by church organisations' - that industrial 
encroachment had accentuated overcrowding, 'the displaced occupants (of 
demolished inner suburban homes) crowding in upon the already overcrowded 
houses in the same neighbourhoods' - and that thousands of men, women and 
children were living in what could only be described as 'miserable hovels'.'*'
The burden falls most heavily on those least able to 
bear it. The women, who are unable to escape from their 
sordid surroundings ... and the children, suffer most ... 
thousands of children are condemned by the circumstances 
of their environment to worse than physical death - to slow- 
warping influences of poverty ... If slum reclamation by 
and through the State achieves no more than the physical 
and moral salvation of these children it will have more 
than justified any financial sacrifice involved. A 
Christian system cannot be reconciled with a society that 
continues to tolerate these appalling conditions. The 
housing of the poor in the Metropolitan area is a standing 
reproach to this State.' (VPP 1937: 98)
The Report argued in effect that a direct cause and effect 
relationship existed between inadequate housing and a variety of social 
ills. Statistics on infant mortality, general ill-health, delinquency, 
crime, the disproportionate use of social security and social welfare 
services in slum areas, were used in a way that inferred or claimed a 
cause and effect relationship.
Authors of the Report were aware, too, of the revolutionary 
potential of such impoverished surroundings which could 'engender a hatred 
of and revolt against a social system which permits such housing conditions 
to exist' and which were 'breeding an anti-social outlook and an instinctive 
resentment at what is regarded as inescapable'. (VPP 1937: 128)
With 'small rooms, low and water stained ceilings, damp and decaying 
walls, leaking roofs and rotten floors ... badly lighted, rat and vermin 
infested, without proper ventilation ... Inadequate sunlight, dampness 
and lack of drainage ... render them ... veritable plague spots ...'
(VPP 1937: 93-98)
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These arguments put forward by reformers influenced by a Christian 
humanism provided the political impetus for the establishment of a public 
housing programme. Their arguments appealed both to humanitarian impulse 
and to economic reason, for the cost of slums could be calculated in terms 
of the additional charges on health and welfare appropriations generated 
by the needs arising from substandard housing.
More recently sociologists and social workers have discounted 
many of these earlier propositions. There is certainly still a coincidence 
between, on the one hand some kinds of social pathology and, on the other, 
bad housing and certain poorer residential areas, but the causal link is 
difficult to sustain. In fact, a deeper understanding of different ways of 
life and the importance of social relationships has led to an acknowledgment 
of real strengths in some areas of poor housing. In many respects the 
pendulum has swung to another extreme. Some conservationists, sociologists, 
social and community workers who are impressed with the network of relation­
ships and the richer and more varied community life in areas of poor 
housing give the impression that everything should be preserved as it is 
now, in perpetuity, regardless of the physical standard of the accommodation 
or the merits of rival land-use.
However it makes little difference to its victims whether bad 
housing is a result or a cause of poverty. It is an integral part of being 
poor. And this economic reality was squarely faced by the 1937 enquiry.
The problem of the slums is essentially the problem of 
poverty ... the problem of the tenant who, by reason of 
his low wage-earning or the number of his dependants, 
is unable to pay the full economic rent of a dwelling 
of reasonable standards ... Economically, the slum 
problem is the wage problem and a solution must be found 
by either increasing the earnings of the persons 
concerned and/or by providing lower rental dwellings ...
The slum dwelling has been and still is being used as an 
instrument for the shameful exploitation of the poor.
(p. 44)
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The Report's recommendations were strong medicine to an 
essentially laissez-faire society, arguing that private enterprise had 
failed to provide decent accommodation for the poor. The nature and 
urgency of the situation therefore called for an appropriate State social 
service (which, the Board stated, could not be self-supporting) planned to 
that end. Until a solution of the problem through the channels of 
increased earnings was found, it was 'futile to attempt to deal with the 
problem as a cold commercial proposition'. (VPP 1937: 139) The Board 
thus advocated the establishment of a Statutory Slum Reclamation and 
Housing Authority which would take over municipal powers relating to health, 
building and subdivision regulations, proclaim and treat reclamation areas, 
condemn and demolish insanitary buildings, acquire lands compulsorily to 
replan and rebuild areas, and act as landlord and let houses of the 
Authority to tenants.
It recommended legislation to deal with overcrowding in houses 
and on sites; with zoning and planning; and to create the power for the 
Authority to introduce differential rental scales for tenants of State 
housing, to control the activities of public utilities and private trusts 
for building, to make and enter into 'treaties' with constituents of the 
building industry, and to make building by-laws. (VPP 1937: 151, 170)
This extensive investigation into the plight of low income earners' 
living standards, and its findings, was different in only one significant 
respect from its predecessor of 1914-18. Something did come of it. The 
Housing Commission of Victoria was established in 1938 as the outcome of 
the 1936-7 Board of Inquiry.
The Premier and Country Party leader, A.A.Dunstan, explained in 
his second reading speech that a Housing Commission would be established to 
'improve existing housing conditions and provide adequate and suitable
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housing accommodation for persons of limited means, that is, persons with 
an income up to £260 p.a. or £5 p.wk.' (VPD 1937: 1173)
The Commission was to have four members, each with a general 
knowledge of housing problems, but one with special knowledge of the 
planning aspects, another with the financial and economic aspects, and a 
third with experience in social services. It would investigate and report 
on methods with respect to reclamation and replanning of insanitary areas; 
imposition of building conditions and restrictions in relation to land and 
houses; prescribing of suitable drainage, sanitation, ventilation, lighting 
and room density standards; inspection of houses; prevention of overcrowding 
within houses and within areas; and the implementation of housing schemes, 
including acquisition of land, erection of homes, and the classes of people 
for whom homes should be provided. £500,000 was allocated to the Commission 
for its first year, and provision made for future allocations from consoli­
dated revenue.
The important consensus that emerged from the debate was the 
acceptance of the principle that the State must intervene, even at 
financial loss, in the provision of the basic 'social service' of housing.
Some people may hold that the proposal is not a business 
proposition, and that the State will lose money thereby; 
but, even though we do lose some money as a result of the 
passage of legislation of this kind, indirect benefits of 
a substantial nature that cannot be measured in terms of 
pounds shillings and pence will be achieved.'
(A.A. Dunstan, VPD 1937: 1175)
On the other hand, significantly absent from the debate was any 
discussion of planning issues or of the connection between planning and 
housing that the Housing Investigation and Slum Abolition Board had 
insisted on. This Board had set out to formulate a short-term policy of 
rehousing and slum reclamation for the immediate future, and a long-term 
policy covering a much wider area and involving considerations of town
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planning, co-ordination of transport and other services. It had recommended 
legislation to deal with zoning and planning and to control the activities 
of public utilities and private trusts for building. None of these 
suggestions or concerns were dealt with in the Housing Act.
8 .
The Melbourne Metropolitan Council Bill of 1936, presented by 
H.S. Bailey, Chief Secretary in the Dunstan Country Party Government, as an 
attempt to implement the recommendations of the 1929 Town Planning Commission 
Report, met a similar fate, for similar reasons, to its precursors of 1913 
and 1915. It made provision for control of water supply, sewerage, tram­
ways, buses, bridges, highways, fire brigades, for the taking over of local 
councils' powers under the Health Act and of housing, reclamation and 
regulation of buildings, as well as creating new powers to zone the whole 
metropolis and to purchase land for the provision of parks and gardens.
The proposed Council was to have thirty members directly elected on a
population basis, and was to be financed by property rating powers. (VPD 
1936: 1128-1142)
Some of the complexity of the politics involved in creating a 
metropolitan authority with co-ordinating powers emerges from the lengthy 
debates on this Bill. There was immediate opposition from the United 
Australia Party (UAP) on the grounds that it would create 'a much too 
powerful new authority which would eventually rival Parliament' and would 
be 'another taxing body ... placing increasing demands on the Government 
for heavier rating and extended borrowing powers'. (VPD 1936: 1559-1561)
Both inner and outer municipalities opposed the Bill, the former afraid that 
their rates would be used to finance development in the outer areas, and the 
latter afraid that their interests would be swamped on such a council 
because their lesser population would give them less representation. (VPD
1936: 1561-68)
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While the Bill was being debated in Parliament a conference of 
municipalities decided to oppose it. The conference concluded that 
although a metropolitan wide authority was necessary, the MMBW was the 
appropriate body to handle the proposed new functions. Local councils 
found it impossible to agree on these issues but were unanimous in their 
fear that any new central authority would eventually supersede them. (VPD 
1936: 1573)
Faced with such many-sided opposition the Government introduced 
amendments excising from the Bill control of tramways, cemeteries, fire 
brigades, metropolitan gas undertakings, transfer of local council powers 
under the Health Act and their power to make building by-laws, and the 
transfer of municipal abattoirs, thus emasculating the original conception. 
(VPD 1936: 3023-4) Yet the same objections were again raised (VPD 1936: 
3220, 3250)
The constitution of any metropolitan authority was a seminal issue. 
Should it be elected or nominated? And if elected, what should the 
franchise be? Should members be paid? (VPD 1936: 3251-67) The Labor 
Party supported an elected body returned on the basis of one ratepayer one 
vote and one member from each municipality. (The boundaries were to be 
redefined to get electorates of approximately equal area). To which the 
UAP replied that the Bill was 'undoubtedly in conformity with the socialis­
tic policy of the Labor Party, which wants a municipal franchise based on 
the principle of one adult one vote.' (Lieutenant Colonel Knox, Upper 
Yarra, VPD 1936: 3330)
Councils sent letters of protest 'against such an unnecessary and 
revolutionary change in the municipal government of Melbourne' (letter from 
Prahran City Council, 25 November, cited by Ellis, VPD 1936: 3319) and in 
support of increased local council powers 'rather than relegate these 
councils to the subservience of a coterie of central administrators'.
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(Letter from Malvern Council, 18 November, cited by Sir Stanley Argyle, 
VPD 1936: 3268)
Given that there was so little agreement on the need for a Bill 
of this kind, let alone for its specific mechanisms, why did the Country 
Party, traditionally little interested in city affairs, bother to introduce 
it? The accusations of one UAP Member (Michaelis, St Kilda) were probably 
accurate -
The Government has obviously brought down the Bill at 
the dictation of the Ministerial corner party. The 
action of the Government would appear to have justified 
the boast of Mr Kennelly, organising secretary of the 
Labor Party, when he said - We are not keeping this 
Country Party Government in power for nothing. We are 
getting while the getting is good.
(VPD 1936: 3326)
With Labor Party support the amended Bill did pass in the
Assembly but was shelved by the Legislative Council, member of which saw
1 2themselves as defenders both of local councils and of property owners. 
The only point of agreement to emerge was that the MMBW was doing a 
splendid job and should not be dissolved in favor of any new metropolitan 
authority.3
Not surprisingly therefore, a Bill for the reconstitution of the 
MMBW was introduced by the same Government in 1937. From the beginning 
members of the Opposition (UAP) accused it of being the 1936 Bill in 
disguise. They believed that to extend the powers of the MMBW was just as 
obnoxious as the creation of a new metropolitan authority.
It was emphasised that twenty-four councils had 'washed their hands of 
the Bill.' (VPD 1936: 3733)
'It is necessary that we should protect our ratepayers and help in every 
way we can the owners of property'. (VPD 1936: 3743)
See VPD 1936: 3319, 3220, 3267, 1561, 1572 for praise of MMBW.
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This Bill proposed to expand the powers of the MMBW to include 
town planning, roads and bridges, parks and gardens, foreshores, housing 
and reclamation. To finance its new responsibilities there was to be an 
increase in its rating power of 2d. in the pound, and, most significantly 
for the final fate of the Bill, the election and representation system for 
the MMBW was to be changed. Each municipality was to be represented on a 
population basis, one member for areas with a population between 20,000 and 
52,000, two members for areas from 52,000 to 85,000 and three members for 
areas from 85,000 to 117,000. The franchise was confined to ratepayers, 
but plural voting was to be abolished. (VPD 1937: 92-102) Opposition to 
the Bill was similar to that voiced against the Melbourne Metropolitan 
Council Bill of 1936.^
2Sir Stanley Argyle delineated the four 'objectionable features' 
of the Bill; one ratepayer one vote, ratepayer franchise, payment of 
members and the financial effect on the metropolitan ratepayers. He argued 
that the whole proposal was 'the thin end of the wedge for the accomplish­
ment of the clearly avowed policy of the Labor Party, to obtain by 
constitutional means complete control of the government not only of this 
state, but also of this great city'. (VPD 1937: 476)
Clearly the issue was no longer whether there was a need for 
reform in metropolitan adiministration - the original intention of the Bill 
- but centred around the political implications of any such reform. Both 
the UAP and the Country Party feared the consequences if, having created a 
centralised body with wide-ranging powers over the growth and development
Holland (UAP) thought the Bill 'simply a means for whipping up a large 
Labor vote in the metropolitan area, to flood the proposed Board with 
Labor members, and in that way implement the policy of the Labor 
Party'. (VPD 1937: 444-6)
Stanley Argyle, 1867-1940. Doctor. MLA (Toorak) 1920-40. Leader of 
UAP 1930-40. Premier, Treasurer and Minister for Public Health 
1932-5.
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of the metropolis, Labor were to 'capture' control of it. The matter was 
put bluntly by W. Kent Hughes,1 deputy leader of the UAP - 'Cut out the 
provisions relating to elections and we will support it'. (VPD 1937: 477) 
The Bill reached the Committee stage then lapsed. The real issue, concern­
ing the need for an authority with co-ordinating powers over the metropoli­
tan area, had been obscured by 'sovereignty' fears, from members of 
Parliament to local councils, property owners, and existing statutory 
bodies, that their traditional power bases were to be undermined. The only 
real support for the Bill, introduced by the Country Party, came from Labor. 
That the Bill was introduced as a political manoeuvre by the Country Party 
to appease Labor, without whose support it could not remain in office, is 
evident by the lack of enthsiasm with which the Country Party defended the 
measure. The press was quick to pick up the observation of Hollway, UAP, 
Ballarat, that not one Country Party member had spoken in support of the 
Bill. (Argus 11 August 1937) And their lack of committment was painfully
obvious in the speed with which they dropped it as soon as it proved 
controversial.
Within Parliament little enthusiasm for the measure could be 
heard, but public attention was being focussed on the matter through the 
backing it received by The Age. In its reporting of the debates, The Age 
used pejorative adjectives to describe the speeches of the Opposition - 
feeble, floundering, footling, petulant, parochial, petty, plaintive, 
irrelevant, lamentable, soured, vague, uncertain, unconvincing, rambling - 
while referring to those speeches in favour of the Bill as - reasoned, 
progressive, prompt, more effective, improved, and vigorous. (The Agey 
5 August 1937)
1 W. Kent Hughes. 1895-1970. MLA (Kew) 1927-49. Minister for Labor 
and Transport 1934-5; MHR (Chisholm) 1949-70.
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The support of The Age for this issue is analogous to the support 
of the Sydney Morning Herald in the same period for 'town planning'. Both 
issues were popular when discussed at the level of general principle, but 
met vigorous opposition once decisions had to be made about means and 
methods and powers.
9.
Melbourne had suffered a slight decline in population from 1929-32 
and only exceeded the 1929 level again in 1935. By 1939 the population was 
only 41,000 above the level of a decade before. In the recession of the 
1930s the issues of traffic congestion, industrial encroachment and the 
need to plan for expansion, all of which had loomed large in the twenties, 
seemed less pressing.
Thinking about planning from the turn of the century until the 
Second World War seems to have followed a cyclical pattern that was 
primarily a reflection of prevailing economic conditions. In the period 
of growth of the 1920s planning thought focussed on providing the 
facilities to enhance and encourage expansion (e.g. the 1929 Town Planning 
Commission Report) 'to bring about order in urban physical development' 
particularly through improved transport and communication services.
'Growth' was not only believed to be a good thing, but regarded as 
essential to the nation's survival. Thus there was never any suggestion 
that it should be restrained in any way; at most it should be rationally 
supervised. In such a period the social reform side of the planning 
movement was submerged. The social welfare aspects of planning thought 
came to the fore in times of hardship, at the turn of the century following 
the effects of the 1890s depression, during the first world war (when 
significant numbers of men were classified unfit for service and startling 
revelations were being made about housing conditions) and in the 1930s
119
following the traumas of the depression and the cumulative worsening and 
shortage of facilities (like housing for the poor) resulting from decades 
of neglect.
Action on planning issues was more dependent on the state of 
politics, and suffered accordingly, both from the short-term instability 
of Victorian politics and from the more enduring inbuilt rural and 
conservative bias of its political institutions.
By the second world war then, advance had been made in the 
direction of social reform through housing, but the planning advocates' 
insistence on the vital interconnection between planning and housing had 
been ignored. No progress had been made with the other major concern of 
the planning movement, reform of urban administration through the creation 
of a metropolitan-wide organisation with planning and co-ordinating powers, 
although this issue had been revived in the 1920's and brought to a 
political head in the 1930's. The issues on and method by which this 
legislation was defeated in the late 1930s are illustrative of all the 
minor and major squabbles that have beleaguered efforts to introduce 
rational planning in Victoria. Rivalry between local government and the 
state government, between the MMBW and the state government, jealousies 
between inner and outer municipalities, all presented fundamental 
organisational problems when it came to establishing any planning authority; 
the tripartite parliamentary situation (caused by the electoral gerrymander) 
and the dominance of the Country Party and the conservative composition of 
the Upper House presented ideological problems when it came to passing any
planning legislation.
CHAPTER FOUR
HOUSE, LAND AND CAR: the consolidation of "the first suburban nation".
Ironically it was in the 1920s that the trend of investment moved 
clearly in favour of the cities. At the very time when governments gave 
renewed emphasis to rural areas, Australia was taking off as a manufacturing 
power - without anyone noticing.
(Horne 1972: 198)
Is it the desire for a house, the search for status or the 
'quest for community' that takes people to the suburbs?
(Martin 1970: 307)
It was strange to visitors [to Australia in the late nineteenth 
century] that a manual worker should be 'a petty suburban proprietor' ...
A French visitor said: 'If the forward march, for the working class,
consists of attaining the exact level of the bourgeoisie, the manual worker 
has become a gentleman. He dresses himself after his work, he is housed, 
and he behaves like a person of good society' ...
(Horne 1972: 133-34)
The sanctity of the Australian home as the Australian's castle 
was the original unquestioned plank in the platforms of all political parties.
(Boyd 1952: 258)
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1.
The structure of political power in a city is basic to any explan­
ation of the allocation of resources between different parts of the urban 
community. In Australian cities the matter is complicated by divided sets 
of responsibilities for resource allocation between local, state and federal 
governments, but analysis of the power structure at state government level 
gives some indication of the constraints operating against a redistributive 
approach to city government and planning.
The two previous chapters have outlined some of the constraints 
operating in relation to city planning in Adelaide and Melbourne - Lower 
Houses dominated by coalitions of country and city rich; Upper Houses at 
the mercy of rural conservatives; City Councils whose members have a 
vested inter est in protecting existing property and privilege or in real 
estate and land speculation; and Liberal Party organisations, dependent on 
the support of the financial 'Establishment'.
The broad contours of power in Sydney (with the exception of a 
more manoeuverable City Council) fall into the same general pattern in the 
period between the two World Wars with which this chapter deals. The Legis­
lative Council, nominee till 1934, has been described as
conservative in purpose, and generally in political 
complexion and action ... With life tenure, unpaid 
membership and a convention ... against wholesale 
swamping, half a century of nominations by middle 
class governments produced a House that could be 
trusted to insist on two or more bites at measures 
to extend the franchise, steeper income tax, break 
up pastoral holdings for closer settlement, or 
promote government enterprises and social services. 
(Parker 1960: 115)
As in Victoria, Country Party influence began to play a major 
role in the Legislative Assembly by the mid-1920s. In 1928 the state was 
divided for the first time into three zones - Sydney, Newcastle and Country.
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Seats in the Sydney zone had a larger average number of electors than those
in the Newcastle zone, while the numbers for the country seats were smaller
still, with only two-thirds the electoral population of an average Sydney
seat. (Aitkin 1969: 126) And Bruxner,'*' Country Party Minister for Local
2Government from 1927-30 and Deputy Premier in the Stevens -Bruxner United 
Australia Party (UAP) - Country Party coalition government from 1932-41 
'revelled in the opportunity to use his powers ... in the interests of
3country people'. (Aitkin 1969: 104) As Minister of Transport for 1932 he
virtually stopped railway construction in the city and diverted funds to
country roads. In the first full year of the Stevens-Bruxner government the
expenditure of the new Department of Main Roads (DMR) on country roads
increased four-fold to 645,000, and when Bruxner left office in 1941 the 
DMR was spending £2 million a year on country roads alone.
As the years went on the Department took over 
more functions and more responsibilities ... More 
roads were classified as state highways, including 
one which ran past Bruxner1 234s property ... This 
empire building proceeded with Bruxner's full 
support and encouragement. (Aitkin 1969: 199-200)
By the late 1930s Premier Stevens could not escape the charge
4that his government was dominated by the Country Party, and this dominance,
Lieut-Col. M.F. Bruxner: 1882-1969, grazier, Member of House of Repres­
entatives (MLA) from 1920. Minister for Local Government 1927-30.
Leader of N.S.W. Country Party from 1932. Deputy Premier and Minister 
of Transport 1932-41.
2 B.S. Stevens, born 1889: Accountant. MLA from 1927. Treasurer and 
Minister for Railways 1929-30. Premier 1932-39.
3 Aborigines, poor whites, miners etc. did not noticeably benefit from this 
Country Party generosity.
4 'The main achievements of his administration were in the country and had 
been the work of Country Party Ministers. Capital works in Sydney itself, 
apart from road building ... had not been noticeable.'
(Aitkin 1969: 225)
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as Florence Taylor1 observed, thwarted implementation of planning measures 
in this period -
If anything costs money in Sydney it doesn't get 
done, no matter how vital or urgent it may be.
If it did, the Country Party would have something 
to say about it, and that might lose votes 
for our administrators when elections come round. 
Everything, it seems, must be spent in the country, 
and nothing in the city. (Sydney Morning Herald
[SMR] 22 February 1930)
The UAP received the bulk of its funds through a body of trustees 
outside the party organisation who, on the evidence of Sydney's leading 
conservative newspaper
controlled and influenced a great part of the industrial, 
commercial and financial companies in the state - that 
is to say, the largest of them ... They were, naturally, 
in close touch with the party leaders, with whom they 
discussed party policy. Not unnaturally, party leaders 
paid a good deal of heed to their views. (Parker 1960: 89)
On the surface then the structure of power in Sydney was as 
weighted against the concerns of the city, particularly redistributive or 
reformist planning concerns, as it was in Adelaide and Melbourne. But 
efforts to introduce planning legislation to coordinate the city's haphazard 
growth and management were presented as non-party measures perceived by all 
parties to be for the general advantage of the city. They were defeated by 
opposition to widening the franchise rather than by opposition to the town 
planning powers embodied in the Greater Sydney Bills. (Harrison 1972:
62-3, Spearritt 1972: 52)
So we need to go beyond a simple bi-partisan dichotomy of 
interests to understand the nature of planning concerns and actions in the
Mrs F.M. Taylor: b. 1879, first woman architect and structural engineer 
in Australia. Editor of Building3 and Australasian Engineer and 
Construction with husband George Taylor. Life member of NSW Town 
Planning Association.
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1920s and 1930s, and to account for the actual development that took place. 
For, as Spearritt (1972) has shown, there was considerable agreement between 
parties in this period on the principle of physical planning. And this 
consensus, it will be argued, was based on certain social values or 
preferences for a certain way of life that had historical roots in the late 
nineteenth century - values and aspirations shared by middle class and 
working class alike.
Since the 1913 Royal Commission in N.S.W. into Workingmens
Housing the exodus to the wider suburbs (by the inner-city working class)
'became confirmed as part of the great Australian dream'.^ (Jakubowicz
1972: 340) Horne argues that, except for the 1890s depression, the chronic
scarcity of labour for most of the nineteenth century had given manual
workers both status and prosperity. And in an expanding economy with an
apparent abundance of land and resources it was not surprising that the
Australian working class developed expectations of property ownership far
2in excess of that hoped for by their European counterparts. By the late 
nineteenth century the colonists' fundamental belief in 'human betterment' 
(Horne 1972: 248) found concrete ex pression in the access of the common man 
to the home ownership, the privacy and the leisure pursuits of the rich, and 
that trend continued.
Developments both in thinking and in the physical fabric of the 
city in the 1920s and 1930s can only be understood in this context of shared 
values about the most desirable way of life. The suburban 'booms' of the 
1880s and 1920s 'preceded any pressing need to escape urban industrial
The Daceyville Garden Suburb, begun in 1913, was the first governmental 
attempt to put into practice the concept of workers housing embodied in 
the Royal Commission Report.
'It was estimated that one out of every four male adults [in the early 
1900s in Australia] was the possessor of some property, compared with 
about one in eleven in Great Britain.' (Horne 1972: 132)
2
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squalor, preceded the building of proper roads, preceded the provision of 
essential public transport and preceded anything so fancy as public utility 
services of water, sewerage, drainage or power'. Historically, and through 
to the present day, Australian 'suburbanisation' has grown in advance of the 
transportation facilities and especially the public services that are usually 
believed to be fundamental prerequisites or motivating forces of low density 
sprawl. Australian suburbanisation, unlike that of Europe or America, has 
not been the 'camp follower of technocratic culture'. The converse is more 
equally true. (Clarke 1970: 82)
A flourishing economy in the 1920s facilitated such a 'boom' at 
the same time as it drew the attention of those involved in the Town Planning 
movement away from earlier social reformist concerns and towards a pre­
occupation with equipping the city to cope with its rapid expansion. For 
this purpose they advocated Town Planning and Transport legislation to give 
some co-ordination to the direction and servicing of city growth and 
promoted 'beautification' to make this growth aesthetically palatable.
Changed economic circumstances changed the central concerns of 
the Town Planning movement in the 1930s - but again the shared values embra­
cing the suburban house and garden were basic to the consensus that emerged 
among all parties concerning the need to eradicate inner city slum housing. 
Obviously working class and middle class politicians each had different 
reasons for promoting 'suburbia' and denigrating 'slum' life. The rich 
believed that slums threatened their cities physically (by breeding crime, 
violence and disease) and politically (by breeding discontent). As well, 
they, as land owners, real estate agents, builders and so on, stood to make 
a handsome profit from the replacement of slums by detached housing for all. 
But the end result was desired by most of the community.
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This consensus infused and permeated the aims of physical (town) 
planning and was to have important consequences for the nature of post-war 
planning. So this chapter explores these values and aspirations and suggests 
some reasons for the meagreness of achievement (in contrast to the magnitude 
of the consensus) in planning in the inter-war years.
The Twenties
By 1921 forty three percent of the N.S.W. population was living 
in the metropolis, 816,000 of them in the suburbs and 110,000 in the City 
of Sydney. (N.S.W. Statistical Register 1930-31: 513-515) Since the turn 
of the century the suburbs had expanded rapidly while the population of the 
inner city slowly declined. The following table indicates the extent of 
1 suburbanisation'.
City of Sydney________ Suburbs
1901 118,211 369,721
1911 119,774 516,614
1921 110,430 816,170
1924 109,180 902,890
1927 109,640 991,550
1930 109,500 1,144,060
Source: N.S.W. Statistical Register 1930-31: 513-515
The decades 1911-21 and 1921-31 each added 300,000 people to the 
suburban population of the metropolis. While the metropolitan population 
thus increased by 30% in the 1920s the number of cars registered increased
almost 600% between 1921 and 1930.
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Car Registration
1911 3,976 1927 129,985
1916 14,175 1928 155,403
1921 28,665 1930 171,492
1926 104,675 Dec. 1931 147,331
Source: N.S.W. Year Book 1930-31: 175
Not surprisingly then, by the mid-1920s interest in the Town
Planning movement centred less on low income housing and slum abolition and
more on traffic congestion than had been the case before 1918, and stress on
an apolitical approach to planning was prominent. The withdrawal of the
2two most social welfare-oriented of the early members contributed to this 
re-direction of concern. Sulman, Bradfield, Garlick and Taylor became the 
most prominent of the Town Planning advocates in the 1920s.
Taylor, who worked from a very conservative social theory, was 
active in the movement until his death in 1928, after which his wife carried 
on the tradition. Taylor's pre-occupation was with 'the imperative need for 
immediate consideration of the handicaps of transport in Australia' and he 
advocated a Royal Commission on transport, which he thought should recommend 
the appointment of one Commonwealth authority to control all transport in 
Australia. (SMH 23 March, 13 April 1927) Garlick, who, like Bradfield, had 
been a foundation member of the Town Planning Association, was pre-occupied 
with transport co-ordination (he was a member of the Main Roads Board, 
established in 1925) and later with city administration (as one of the 
three commissioners who administered the city of Sydney's affairs from
1 This may have been partly the result of the alleged 'materialism' of the 
1920s, but interest in 'beautification' increased in this decade. It 
could be argued though that interest in beautification was motivated by 
the desire for higher land values in particular areas.
2 J.D. Fitzgerald had died in 1922. Professor Irvine had lost interest in 
the planning movement by 1918, no doubt because the movement's member­
ship, and its intention of working from within existing institutions, 
lessened its appeal to his more radical leanings.
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1928-30 after Bavin had dismissed the Sydney City Council). Bradfield, 
whose concern had always been with the city's transit problems, struggled 
through the 1920s trying to get his plans implemented, with some success.
In 1914 he had been sent abroad by the NSW Government to look at underground 
railways and to report on Sydney's transport problems.'*' In an address to the 
NSW Institute of Architects in 1926 on 'The Construction of the City Rail­
way' Bradfield claimed that the distinctive features recommended in his 
report had been adopted. These included the electrification of suburban 
railways; the widening of the structure gauge to add to the carrying 
capacity of suburban railways; a City Railway partly above and partly under­
ground, with a bridge connection to North Sydney; a system of fly-over 
crossings on the City Railway near its junction with suburban railways, 
whereby its train capacity would be increased by 30 per cent; and a system 
of suburban railways to serve all suburbs in the metropolitan area.
(Architecbujp.e Sept. 1926: 16)
One of the new members of the Town Planning Association was Norman
2Weekes, who had come from England in 1920 and was advisor to the Department 
of Local Government and City Engineer until he resigned in September 1924.
His interests were also predominantly transport-oriented. In 1925 he 
prepared a scheme for dealing with Sydney's traffic problems by getting the 
co-operation of all municipalities, which was published in the SMH (10th 
Feb 1925). He argued that Sydney's most important problem at that point in 
time was to open up main arterial roads.
But perhaps the single most influential figure in the planning 
movement in the 1920s was John Sulman. Prestigious (having been knighted in
 ^ Sending its members and servants abroad to observe developments has been 
a typically Australian technique for many years. It has meant that 
native research institutions concerned with our most important national 
problems have developed much later in the piece than would otherwise have 
been the case, e.g. in urban research, immigration.
N. Weekes - no further information available.2
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1924) and respected, he held positions on most important boards of inquiry 
dealing with urban problems in the 1920s. Sulman's role in one issue early 
in the decade which focussed planning thought is indicative and typical of the 
pattern that was to emerge. This was the protracted controversy over pro­
posed extensions of Moore St to Macquarie St (now Martin Place) - significant 
for the priorities it reveals. The main purpose of the extensions was 
purely 'ornamental' - it was to provide a setting for a (proposed) war 
memorial, a cenotaph. The estimated cost to the Sydney City Council of the 
extensions and resumptions was #1 million, 560,000 of which was fees to a 
private firm of architects. The priorities involved in a decision concerning 
so much money were disputed from many quarters. The lobby of Master 
Carriers objected to the non-utilitarian nature of the scheme. It would not 
ease traffic congestion, or facilitate the city's business transactions, 
whereas widenings of other streets or improved roads from the Quay to the 
city certainly would. There was general criticism of the necessity of such 
a scheme when money was dear, and also of the need for hiring private 
architects and paying them such a large retainer. Yet in spite of the fact 
that the Sydney City Council was at the time under a Labor Party majority, 
the only voice of social protest was that raised by the old campaigner 
agianst slums, Archdeacon Boyce,'*' who argued that it was
the first duty of the city to abolish the remaining 
slums. In the names of God and humanity let us 
make our city clean and honourable by removing its 
dark stain as the most urgent improvement, and as 
better and nobler than outward adornment.
( SMH3 29 July 1920)
Throughout the 1920s Boyce's was one of the few voices ever raised in 
social protest. In a letter to the SMH in 1925 he again urged reform 
of slums and criticised the rents charged by the City Council for 
council houses, arguing that rent payments should never be greater than 
1/5 of a man's income. (The basic wage was #4.10.0 and the council's 
rents were from 26/- to 29/- per week.) Boyce's memoirs devoted a 
whole chapter to 'Slum Evils'. F.B. Boyce Four score years & seven:
The Memoirs of Archdeacon Boyce} Angus & Robertson, Sydney 1934.
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During the Moore St extensions controversy, the Institute of 
Architects strongly opposed the scheme, not because they thought it involved 
misguided social priorities but because they didn't want anything done to the 
City of Sydney until an 'expert commission' had been set up and had developed 
an overall plan for the improvement of Sydney.
G. Sydn ey Jones, President of the Institute of Architects, 
explained their position in a letter to the SMH on the same day as that of 
Archdeacon Boyce. The architects were concerned that Sydney be developed 
on the lines of the great European cities, especially Paris, with boule­
vards and vistas and architectural grandeur. Like sending Bradfield abroad, 
this was part of the 'cultural cringe' that inhibited native initiative.
When they talked about town planning it was with these notions in mind, 
rather than with any concern about the living standards of the city's inhab­
itants .
Sulman, representing the Town Planning Association, also argued 
for an 'expert inquiry' into the city's improvements, town planning being 
'a non-contentious matter'. (daily Telegraph 12 June 1920) For him such 
matters were not decisions resting on social priorities, as Boyce had 
implied, but objective evaluations by technical experts.
This indicates fairly clearly the ideology of the professionals 
involved in planning in the 1920s. Already 'apolitical' and concerned with 
the grander, essentially ornamental or 'civic embellishment' aspects of 
planning rather than with its possibilities for social reform, the Institute 
of Architects' interest in things urban was to decline as the decade 
progressed. From a reading of Architecture from 1924-30, the journal of 
the proceedings of the NSW Institute of Architects, it can be seen that this 
body became more and more engrossed in the aesthetic aspects of city growth 
and less and less interested in the broader town planning issues that had 
pre-occupied some architects in the pre-war period. In this (monthly)
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journal between 1924 and 1930 there was only one article on town planning.
This was by Sulman, and was entitled 'The Realisation of Town Planning and 
its cost'. {Architecture3 Sept. 1926) It dealt with planning advances in
European countries and praised the South Australian Town Planning Act of 
1920. Significantly Sulman concluded that
Although the cost of Town Planning may be considerable 
it pays financially in the better health, more econ­
omically conducted business, and the amenities of life 
experienced by town dwellers, resulting in a net saving 
of money when the amounts now lost owing to wasted 
labour, illness, loss of life, crime and other evils 
of city life under present conditions are taken into 
account.
The theme is reminiscent of the stress on the financial profit­
ability of planning that had characterised the 1918 Australian Town Planning 
Conference (discussed in chapter One). Sulman's own priorities were clear. 
Never 'a man of the people'"*’ he saw town planning as a means of reducing waste 
and inefficiency, helping the city to run more smoothly and thus increasing 
the profits of its businesses.
One area that planning thought could, and did, influence in the 
1920s was that of local government. The Town Planning provisions of the 1919 
Local Government Act concerned mainly zoning, the control of subdivisions, 
the proper construction of new roads, and the provision of recreation space. 
(Winston. 1957: appendix 7) In this respect the provisions seem to tally 
with the interests of planners in the United States in the 1920s where,
Giving evidence before the Royal Commission on Housing in Victoria 23.3.1915, 
Sulman revealed himself to be an advocate of eugenics. Talking of what 
he called 'the undeserving poor' he said that 'the old idea was that 
they are innately wicked, the modern that they are physically or men­
tally defective, and should be treated as ... diseased and irresponsible 
. . . But the ultimate aim of social reformers should be their elimination 
by non-propagation. This is a question of eugenics and is commanding 
more and more attention among thoughtful people.' (VPP 1917 vol.2 
p. 299 of Royal Commission Report.)
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according to Scott, the major pre-occupations were with traffic analysis, 
street planning, zoning and subdivision control. (Scott 1969: 252) In 1921 
Sulman reported of the application of the Act that -
some councils have already begun to make use of its 
clauses, especially in connection with the pro­
clamation of residential districts. (Sulman 1921: 204)'*'
Local councils had one other preoccupation besides zoning and 
road building and this was the provision of parks and reserves. In 1925 the 
SMH reported that the Mosman Council was to 'beautify' ten acres near 
Taronga Zoo and to reclaim and beautify another five at the Spit. ( SMH 
4 June 1925) Mosman was better placed than most suburbs in this regard 
for, as Sulman pointed out in a table in his 1921 book, 11.4 per cent of 
its area was parkland. The stress on beautification was not confined to 
the North Shore. Even a suburb such as Botany, with only 1.6 per cent of 
its area parkland, had a council keen on such improvements. (Sulman 1921: 
124) At the town planning Conference of 1918 Sulman and others had pushed 
for at least 10 per cent of the area of every subdivision for park and 
playground purposes, and it seems likely that their efforts were responsible 
for the trends toward natural beautification.
But not all councils concerned themselves with beautifying their 
municipalities. Two letters to the Herald in March 1924 in support of an 
article on 'Sydney's Lost Beauty' bemoaned the fact that while councils had 
the power to curb land speculators and 'other vandals', 'they would not use 
them'. {SMH 1 March 1924)
The relative disadvantage of the inner working-class suburbs when 
compared with the wealthier municipalities in terms of access to open space 
and residential amenity is obvious from the following figures which show the 
number of acres of parks and reserves in different municipalities in 1931.
1 This preoccupation with zoning is confirmed by Bate's assessment of the 
impact of town planning on Brighton, Melbourne (Bate 1962: 381-2)
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Inner working class suburbs Eastern & North Shore suburbs
Alexandria 27 Mosman 272
Annandale 11 Vaucluse 116
Waterloo 13 Manly 605
Newtown 1 Lane Cove 88
Redfern 11 Willoughby 267
Paddington 14 Woollahra 122
Source: NSW Statistical Register 1930-31: 310
The chief concern of local government in the 1920s, if the report 
of Bluett, Secretary of the Local Government Association, can be taken as 
representative, was with 'local development', especially with roads. He 
complained that NSW and WA were the only states that did not have a Roads 
Board. (Evening News Yearbook 1924: 223)
Maiden is probably accurate therefore in his overall assessment 
of the 1920s that
the opportunity which this period could have afforded 
(because of 'prosperity' and 'increasing land values' 
and rates) for vigorous imaginative civic enterprise 
('including town planning for the improvement and 
embellishment of their areas') was lost over a rather 
colourless span of municipal activity. (Maiden 1966: 128)
Certainly much of the local and even state government activity of 
this period was colourless, but it was none-the-less broad in extent, as 
Schedvin has shown in his calculations of the high ratio of social to pro­
ductive investment in the 1920s, of which urban services were a part. He 
points to water, sewerage, telephone and telegraph installations, as well 
as the electrification of railways and road improvements as key sources of
expenditure in urban areas. (Schedvin 1970: 69-71)
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Not all of these areas were of equal interest to those prominent 
in the town planning movement and in the 1920s most interest centered on 
railways and roads because developments in both these areas were influenced 
by men who had been active members in the Town Planning Association since 
its formation. That a stress on transport provision dominated most planning 
thought in the 1920s is confirmed by the interests of the non-government 
Sydney Regional Plan Convention, inaugurated on 29 November 1922.
The aims of this movement were to study the general scheme of 
traffic and transport (city, suburban and inter-suburban) and to decide on a 
definite design for the main traffic arteries which would relieve congestion 
and provide easy and efficient communication; to study the location of bus­
inesses and trades and to place them in definite districts where they can be 
more efficiently and economically carried on; and to devise a practical 
scheme to obtain statutory authority to bring the design into effect.
(SMH 10 Feb. 1923)
The members of the Convention, delegates from the Institutes of 
Architects, Surveyors and Engineers, and other organisations 'interested in 
the better planning of Sydney', all gave their services voluntarily. They 
claimed that their scheme was no mere dream of a city beautiful but a prac­
tical aim to solve Sydney's big problems of transport3 growth and efficiency. 
(SMH 10 Feb. 1923)
Town planning here seems to be subservient to the aims of business 
rather than an instrument of social improvement, although the two were not 
necessarily seen as incompatible. Sulman's writing, for example, was 
concerned with both aspects and there is no indication that he saw a conflict 
of priorities. Nevertheless there was a definite change of emphasis in the
concerns of the planning movement.
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In March 1925 it was reported that the Convention was folding due 
to lack of financial resources to carry out the necessary research and 
collection of data ( SMH 14 March 1925) It had been unable to deal with all 
the complex problems and draw up a plan on the basis of voluntary effort, 
and it urged that the only effective way in which those far-reaching 
questions of traffic and city improvement could be dealt with was by the 
appointment of a committee of experts to prepare a comprehensive scheme for 
the whole of the metropolitan area. (SMH 2 April 1925)
A concomitant of the stress in the 1920s on the apolitical nature 
of planning was the belief in the technical expertise of planners.
Indirectly this meant that although city planning was concerned with 
improving the physical environment it was also planning for certain people. 
These people were the planner himself, his political supporters, and the 
middle class citizen in general. Insofar as the planner was seeking to 
create the kind of city he himself liked, he was planning for himself and 
his professional peers. He was also working on behalf of his political 
supporters, businessmen and civic leaders. The planner's ideal city was 
good for business and for property ownership. Finally the planner planned 
for peop le of his own class-culture, for other middle and upper middle 
class professionals who wanted solid single family house neighbourhoods 
and who used theatres, museums, civic centres and other cultural facilities 
that are part of middle class life style.
These reformers were not consciously planning for themselves, their 
supporters and people of their own class. They thought that by focussing on 
what they felt to be desirable types of housing, business and industry they 
were planning for 'the community'. They believed that they had the exper­
tise to change the community and the knowledge necessary to change people's 
lives according to the traditional dictates of the old reform movements.
And because they were descendants of a missionary reform cause they never
questioned their aims or their activities.
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These reformist planners were not conspirators who intentionally 
allie d thems elves with conservative political reformers and then with 
businessmen and property owners in order to enrich themselves and their 
profession. In fact, until recently, most planners were not aware of the 
political implications of their theory and their practice,1 and whatever 
they did was with the best intentions - which is, of course, part of the 
problem. Moreover, their plans have by no means been entirely undesirable. 
Even if they are often peripheral to the city's problems they have helped 
to create more orderly, efficient and attractive communities, at least for 
the affluent. Their ideas and site plans for low density neighbourhoods 
were adopted by builders after the second world war, particularly in 
Canberra, resulting in better designed suburbs for the newly affluent.
Even so, planning might have contributed more to the solution of urban 
problems had it not been saddled with the history from which only now is it 
freeing itself.
Te chnological advances in transport added a revolutionary 
dimension to the process of urban development, confronting planners with a 
whole new set of problems which pre-occupied planning thought in the 1920s 
to the exclusion of just about everything else.
The problem of cars was linked with that other threatening 
phenomenon of the 1920s, the skyscraper. The capacity of buildings was not 
adjusted to the load limits of the streets. The problem was recognised by 
some, yet architects and laymen alike, not to mention businessmen and land 
speculators, tended to be exhilarated by visions of great structures 
thrusting heavenward. The city-in-the-making was for many a breathtaking 
prospect - as editorials in SMH throughout the 1920s revealed - and too often 
the concomitant problems were overlooked. Growing upward at the centre and 
outward at the circumference, the urban complex of Sydney was headed in all
1 Stretton (1970) was perhaps the first author in Australia to spell this 
out in any detail.
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directions at once. The greatest impetus for suburbanisation initially 
came les s from the private car than from the railways and the buses.^ 
Electrification of Bradfield's suburban rail system in 1928, and the 
opening of the Harbour Bridge in 1932, helped the process. Suburban 
residence was actively promoted by concession fares on railways (Workman's 
Weekly tickets). Thus the problems of making a large city function and of 
servicing a spreading metropolitan region were given more thought in the 
1920s than 'comprehensive planning' or the social problems connected with 
urban growth. The further into the decade, the more concern is expressed 
with traffic and transport problems at the expense of such issues as housing 
for low income groups, planning new garden cities or suburbs, eliminating 
slums and other social improvements.
Technological advances were overtaking what planned provision for 
transport there had been and new developments, especially the proliferation 
of privately owned vehicles, were much less susceptible to planning than 
the railways had been. Sulman was one 'expert' who had not foreseen this 
development when in 1921 he predicted that the proposed city railway and 
its co-ordination with trams would result in 'the elimination of waste by 
competing services' and free the city streets from 'a good deal of the 
present congestion'. (Sulman 1921: 188) In fact the opposite happened. 
Traffic congestion at peak hours was increasing and the growth of profitable 
private bus firms began to adversely affect tram and rail traffic, while 
also enabling settlement to expand more haphazardly.
By 1927 Sulman was writing a series of articles for the SMH on 
'The Traffic Problems of Sydney* stressing the ‘loss of time and money'
1 See Spearritt (1973) for a preliminary draft social history which describes 
the process of suburbanisation, the subdivision boom of the 1920s and 
their relation to transporation facilities.
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caused by the 'evils of congestion'. (SMH 23 June 1927) He was one of the 
first to emphasise the connection between the height of buildings and 
traffic congestion, urging reform of the Height of Buildings Act to reduce 
the maximum permissible height from 150 feet to 100 feet. (SMH 28 June 1927) 
Sulman expected a 'howl of protest from owners and speculators in city 
property ... if the height of buildings is reduced'. But he assured them 
that this would only be temporary, for 'as the city grows the competition 
for sites in th e limited central area will again operate and values will 
again commence their upward climb'. He also reassured the City Council 
(which he expected to 'strongly object to any limitation on height that 
would check soaring land prices and prevent corresponding increases of 
income from rates') by arguing that the continued erection of 150 foot 
buildings would be 'suicidal folly, as the inevitable result would be the 
nece ssity of widening all city streets'. (SMH 30 June 1927) Again he was 
arguing for change in terms of the financial benefits to those already well- 
provided for.
Editorials following up Sulman's articles all strongly criticised 
'the fooli shness of the present piecemeal method of remodelling the city ... 
and the lack of authoritative planning for future traffic needs.' (SMH 30 
June 1927) It was argued that the swelling number of cars had increased 
and ch anged the nature of transport problems and that 'altered conditions 
called for altered plans. The whole matter should be gone into thoroughly 
... and agreement reached which will place the carrying out of reforms on a 
plane above party politics ... City remodelling on adequate and economic 
lines does not mix well with partisan politics.'
An article on 'City Transport' in 1928 echoed identical sentiments:
It should be possible for a body of capable men ... 
to plan a policy for the modernisation of traffic 
facilities and city street improvements, a policy 
which should be free from political or financial 
interruption. The question must be freed from party 
politics . . . (SMH 25 July 1928)
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In December 1927 a Committee of three 'experts was appointed to 
inquire into city traffic problems and made recommendations. (SMH 16 Dec.
1927) It was to consider the major causes of congestion, the competition 
between trams and buses, the duplication of services, and to suggest whether 
more effective control would result from the creation of one central authority, 
a Transport Board. (SMH 22 Dec. 1927)
Th is Committee made its recommendations in 1928 but there was 
'no body with authority to carry them out'. [SMH 18 Jan. 1929) The 
Report found the economic wastage caused by traffic delays and inadequate 
means of transport 'astounding', it found congestion in Sydney 'alarming', 
the dangers of the streets 'rapidly increasing', and the prospect imminent 
of traffic paraly sis in the city. It found a multiplicity of public 
authori ties and local government executives carrying out quite independent 
activities all affecting transport. It found cars'*' competing with 
railways in a costly and wasteful manner because unregulated by any auth­
ority, and found most city streets too narrow. [SMH 19 March 1929) As a 
consequence of this Report a Transport Bill was brought before Parliament 
in 1929, yet its most important recommendations - those advocating a 
Transport Ministry and the co-ordination of railway administration 
with all other transport administration - were not provided for in the 
Bill, which perhaps indicates that the autonomy of these statutory bodies, 
and their vested interest in staying autonomous, was a powerful obstacle 
in the way of more rational planning.
Peter Harrison suggests that these were not private cars but * service 
cars' carrying fare-paying passengers in highly successful competition 
with the public transport system in the inner suburbs. They were a 
phenomenon of the late 1920s, preceding the taxi.
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Clearly Sydney's growth - in population, motor cars and buildings 
- was presenting unprecedented planning problems. The changing distri­
bution of population was as crucial as its rapid increase. While in 1901, 
118,000 people lived in the municipality of Sydney and 370,000 in the 
suburbs, in 1911 Sydney had increased by 2,000 to 120,000 compared with a 
147,00-0 increase in the suburbs to 517,000. In 1921 the city of Sydney's 
population had declined to 111,000 but the suburbs had soared to 795,000, 
and in the next five years this pattern was reinforced, the population of 
the inner area decreasing still further to 108,000 while the suburbs now 
housed 963,000. (SMH 6 Sept. 1927) Between 1919 and 1929, 103,233 new 
buildings had been erected in the metropolis, ninety percent of which were 
dwelling houses or flats.
Over the decade two attitudes to Sydney's growth emerged. On the 
one hand, exhilaration:
Although Sydney's octopus-like propensities are 
sometimes the subject of hostile comment, when we 
look back upon the amazing expansion that the last 
few years have seen we cannot but feel that we are 
citizens of a great city of which we are rightly 
proud. ( SMH editorial 5 July 1929)
This attitude, pervading all editorial comment on the state of 
Sydney and obviously typical of the business community, held that town 
planning might make the city more efficient but certainly should not be 
allowed to interfere with the basic process of growth. And most planners 
were sympathetic with this view.
The other attitude was more sobering, but not critical of the 
basic belief that growth was good. As the records of the Town Planning 
Association of NSW for the 1920s show, some planning advocates, critical 
of the boom, questioned not /progress' as represented by the boom, but only
its unsightly excesses.
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The Thirties
In the three years following the crash of 1929 the level of 
building in Sydney dropped eighty-five per cent (Schedvin 1961) and the 
suburban population increased by only 100,000 over the decade 1931-41.
(NSW Statistical Register 1940-41: 303) As happened in Victoria in this 
decade, changed economic and social circumstances changed the central 
concerns of planning thinking, though not the ideology behind the thinking. 
The aspiration for a house and garden in the suburbs was shared by middle 
class professionals, businessmen and real estate agents and the ALP. Boyd 
wrote in 1952 that 'the sancity of the Australian home as the Australian's 
castle was the original unquestioned plank in the platforms of all political 
parties ... Even the extreme Left had never questioned the right of private 
home ownership.' (Boyd 1952: 258-59) The continuous campaign throughout 
the decade for slum abolition provides a case study of this consensus of 
values.
The context in which planners would evaluate the slum problem 
of the thirties was indicated in Alfred Brown's address to the Institute 
of Architects in 1931, 'Garden Cities and Satellite Towns'. He argued that 
'the town planning movement would prove of more benefit to the social 
structure than anything else. In England town planning had always had a 
housing and welfare bias.' (Architecture Dec. 1931: 262-60) Brown, a 
New Zealand born architect, was an assistant town planner at Welwyn Garden 
City in the 1920s and came to Sydney in 1931. His Vernon Memorial Lectures 
in town planning at Sydney University showed him clearly as an exponent of 
the British tradition of middle class social reformers, a tradition which 
had its origins in the ideas of Ebenezer Howard and the philanthropic 
industrialists like Cadbury and Lever. The simple social theory behind 
their town planning actions and recommendations was that of a direct cause- 
effect relationship between the physical and social environment. (See
chapter One.)
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Brown became a member of the NSW Town Planning Association but in 
1934 was chiefly responsible for launching the Town and Country Planning 
Institute, whose membership was limited to 'professionals'; architects, 
engineers and surveyors. His role as the leading propagandist for 
'professional planning ideas' in the thirties is evident from the numerous 
articles he contributed - not only to the professional journal Architecture 
but also to the conservative newspaper, the SMH ~  on topics such as 'Town 
planners and statutory town planning', 'Provisions for state assistance in 
housing', 'Ribbon Development', and his Vernon Memorial Lectures on 
decentralisation, zoning, garden cities, planning legislation etc., which 
were extensively reported in the SMH each year.
With the onset of the depression the demand for public and 
private transport dropped rapidly and debate for the next few years focussed 
on unemployment and the radical reform policies of Premier J.T. Lang. The 
Greater Sydney movement was also revived in 1931 but again foundered on the 
franchise issue, as it had in 1915. By the mid-30s the most important 
issue being debated in public was the problem of housing low-income earners 
and removal of slums.
A SMH leader of February 1934 was typical of the rising level of 
concern. It advanced ideas similar to those of the Victorian campaigner 
Oswald Barnett (see chapter three), agreeing with 'the advocates of town 
planning' who argued that
The growth of congested, ill-planned suburbs, of which 
our cities contain samples, brings a sure burden of 
ill-health, stunted development, inefficiency and 
criminal and revolutionary activity much more costly 
than the direct cost of resumption. It is urged that 
whereas such evils can only be met by careful planning, 
housing and zoning, and by providing ample space for 
recreation, the opportunities for these measures are 
being lost. This is the case urged by the unselfish 
efforts of the Town Planning Association, the Parks and 
Playgrounds movement ... and similar bodies, and it is 
in our opinion a strong one.
(SMH 23 Feb. 1934)
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The SMH had clearly accepted the physical planning principles advanced by
the Town Planning Association and the Parks and Playgrounds movement.
C.E.W. Bean,"*" Florence Taylor and A.J. Small (all members of the Town
Planning Association) had launched the Parks and Playgrounds movement in 
2June 1930. Not surprisingly, it shared the same assumptions about the
causal connection between physical environment and societal harmony as the
Town Planning Association. Bean had been one of the leading advocates of
physical planning ideas since the late 1920s and, through his articles in
the SMH was one of the most articulate laymen to campaign for slum
abolition in the mid-30s. In July 1935 he declared that:
a slum is a city area in which ... citizens whose only 
crime is poverty have to bring up their families as 
best they can in surroundings of the underworld. To 
contend that we have no such areas in Sydney and 
Melbourne would be simple ignorance.
(SMH 12 July 1935)
This was followed by two articles 'Slums. The Shame of Sydney' 
by N.H. Dick (SMH 25 and 26 July 1935), advocating a commission with 
adequate powers and free from political interference, to deal with the 
question of slum clearance. Brown Contributed his knowledge of the 
'Housing Problem and Slum Clearance' (SMH 21 August 1935), quoting American 
findings that
slums cost money. They are the most expensive form of 
housing known, and it is the community that pays for 
them ... It is no gesture of charity to better the 
standard of housing of our poorer neighbours, for we all 
pay cash - in taxes for utilities, police and fire 
protection, in the depreciation of adjoining property 
values, and in social welfare work - for low standards of 
housing in any part of the community.
Bean C.E.W.: 1879-1968, MA, BCL (Oxon), LHD (Melb.) son of Church 
minister. Official war historian. Admitted to Bar 1904. Joined the 
SMH 1908. Author of On the Wool Track, Dreadnought of the Darling, 
Flagships Three. From mid-20s onward untiring propagandist for town 
planning.
See the official organ of the NSW Town Planning Association and the 
Real Estate Institute, The Commonwealth Home vol.37, July 1930, p.18.
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The outcome of this public agitation was the decision by the 
Stevens-Bruxner Government to form a committee to investigate slum 
clearance and housing reform, to survey the situation, suggest remedial 
methods and consider the financial obligations entailed (SMH 16 Oct. 1935) 
The Housing Conditions Investigation Committee was set up in January 1936, 
with the Minister for Social Services (H.M. Hawkins, UAP) as Chairman, and 
representatives from the Master Builders Association, RAIA, Institute of 
Surveyors, Real Estate Institute of NSW, Town Planning Association and 
Sydney City Council, A.J. Brown, and A.J. Dalziel (Secretary, Legion of 
Christian Youth) representing the concern of the churches with this 
problem.
Simultaneously with this Government step towards action, a group 
of concerned citizens, disenchanted with the promises of State and Federal 
Governments, formed the National Housing Council of NSW to work for the 
improvement of Sydney's poor housing conditions. Prominent in its member­
ship were Sir Frederick Stewart,1 N.H. Dick, and Brown, again the social 
reformer allying with the businessman, who said that the Council would be a 
permanent body and remain in existence 'as long as the housing of the lower 
paid worker was an urgent problem. That looked as if they would be working 
for a long time'. (SMH 21 April 1936) This organisation provided a forum 
for the many religious groups concerned with the housing problem, comprising 
among its members Anglicans, Methodists, Presbyterians, Roman Catholics, 
the Salvation Army, and Rabbi Levy.
In September the National Housing Council urged the Government to 
adopt a definite policy for the remodelling of congested and insanitary 
districts. It suggested a new Housing Act to establish a Housing Board
Stewart, Sir Frederick: (UAP) MHR (Parramatta) from December 1931.
Founder and Director Metropolitan Omnibus Co. Ltd., Australian National 
Airways Ltd. NSW Woollen and Felt Mills, Director Associated Newspapers 
Ltd., founder and Director 2CH, broadcasting station. Minister of 
Commerce 1932-34. Represented Australia at International Labour 
Conference, Geneva 1935.
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to act as a co-ordinating authority with a Director of Housing as Chairman, 
technical staff, and four honorary members (a town planner, an economist, 
a representative of local government, and of the Water Board). Its 
functions would be to collect evidence and recommend what areas should be 
acquired for housing purposes, to advise how these areas should be treated, 
to examine schemes and to supervise and enforce the execution of approved 
plans. The Council expressed the opinion that it was the function of the 
State to provide funds for rehousing in all congested areas where private 
enterprise had failed to meet the problem; that the basis of any scheme 
should be the regulation of future housing and urban development and the 
gradual remodelling of congested areas. OS'MH 11 September 1936) In
October it put these views before the Government's Housing Conditions 
Investigation Committee and was informed by the Premier that a definite 
start was to be made on plans for re-housing lower paid workers. (SMH 
17 November 1936)
The Premier was referring to the proposed Housing Bill, which he 
introduced into the Legislative Assembly in December. This Bill was to 
provide a permanent plan for housing improvement and slum clearance. But 
the scheme was to apply only to co-operative societies and a Housing 
Improvement Board was to investigate the housing problem and suggest further 
legislation. The Board was to consist of five members elected by the 
Governor and was to report in six months. The Report would also deal with 
town and regional planning. (SMH 16 December 1936) The most significant 
feature of the Bill was that the Government had not accepted responsibility 
for financing housing for low income earners. Predictably then, Labor was 
hostile to it. Baddeley (Labor MHR, Cessnock) said he would oppose it 
because he considered that 'the Government was shelving its responsibilities, 
when the only possible way it cogld deal with slum areas was by itself 
giving a lead. Some houses would be built, and it would be a fine thing for 
some of the builders on the Government benches. A housing scheme could be
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of no use unless workers were paid a decent wage'. (Quoted SMH 16 December.) 
Which is what reformers had been saying since Irvine's report of 1915.
At the other end of the political spectrum came opposition from 
the Country Party, indicating the political problems involved in even the 
mildest efforts at reform. Wade (Country Party, Barwon) opposed the Bill 
because '... it was not the job of the Government to introduce a Bill which 
induced people to come from the country to be housed and "wet nursed"'.
(SMH 16 December.) Intended to facilitate borrowing for co-operative 
societies, so that they could lend money to people to build their own 
homes, this Bill did not strike at the real problem, that poor housing was 
primarily caused by poverty and inability to pay economic rents. The 
values behind the Bill were made explicit in the Premier's stated aim,
'to turn the average Australian working man into a home owner'. (SMH 
2 February 1937)
But it was not only middle class social reformers, businessmen and 
their political allies in the UAP who believed that home ownership should 
be open to the working class. By 1935 the Labor press had taken up the 
issue of slum clearance. On 24 June the Labor Daily which claimed on its 
masthead to 'represent more than 500,000 electors in NSW', carried the 
front page headline, 'Sydney's Human Warrens and Slums'. In the following 
months the Labor Daily was joined by The Australian Worker in denunciations 
of the slums.
Labor parliamentarians were also moved by the campaign. Arthur
Tonge, the member for Canterbury, told the House in October 1935:
The difficulty [of the inner area slums] could be 
overcome if the Government introduced a system of 
zone payment of fares on the railways, with the 
object of inducing people to go and live in the 
outer suburbs ... If, for instance, the train fare 
were the same to Sutherland or Waterfall as it is 
to Sydenham, many people would go to those districts 
to live, which would benefit not only themselves, but 
the Government also.
(NSW PD 1935: 877)
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This statement suggests that Tonge accepted the physical planning advocates' 
argument that the congested inner city slums were bad. His solution was to 
utilise the possibilities of Bradfield's suburban electric railways.
Inherent in his argument was the old desire on the part of Labor for the 
working man and his family to have the same housing facilities as the 
middle classes.
Another Labor politician, W.J. McKell, who lived in the slum 
suburb of Redfern, supported the demolition and rebuilding of his own area. 
In November 1935 McKell gave an address on slums on the Labor radio station 
2KY. A report of his talk appeared in the Labor Daily headed 'Evils of 
Slum Areas' (Spearritt 1972: 65).
Premier Stevens, who had written a forty-eight page report on
Housing3 Slum Clearance and Abatement of Overcrowding in England told the 
House in the second reading debate on the Housing Bill that:
One half of our people already have their own 
homes. We aim to see that proportion increase ...
The average man aspires to his own home, particularly 
the man in poor circumstances. For the home is the 
cradle of our race ... the basis of family life.
(NSW PD 1937: 2392-94)
Yet the Bill in no way helped the poor with their housing problems.
The SMH (4 February) supported the idea of slum clearance;
Such areas are potential danger spots in sickness and 
disease ... they have a bad psychological effect on 
their inhabitants, tending to diminish self-respect 
and healthy moral habits. Socially they are likely 
to create discontent, and no better way of ensuring 
a stable community, immune to all types of violent 
doctrine, can be found than to build up a community of 
workers (who) ... own their own homes.
But it also supported the Government's Housing Bill on the grounds that 
the provision of housing through the co-operative societies was to be
preferred to any 'expensive socialism'.
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The National Housing Council criticised the new Housing Improvement
Act (passed February 1937) for failing to shoulder the responsibility for
slum clearance and rehousing (SMH 10 March 1937). But members of the
Council and the Town and Country Planning Institute were prominent on the
Housing Improvement Advisory Committee’*’ which was appointed to give 'expert'
2advice to the Housing Improvement Board created by the Act.
When this Board reported in April 1938 it concluded that the cost 
of rehabilitating substandard areas of the metropolitan area alone would be 
at least €30 million, and that slum clearance and housing of lower paid 
workers must inevitably be carried out at a loss. Their specific 
recommendations included a special tax of a penny in the pound on income to 
finance a housing programme; lapge scale operations by a central housing 
authority; the organisation of the building industry and its supplies; the 
standardisation of equipment and its supply in bulk; the planned use of 
housing funds so that the Board would be most active in times of depression; 
and the overall need for rational planning of cities and towns [SMH 21 April 
1938). The Board submitted a Housing Bill to the Minister for Social 
Services along the above lines. The Bill also dealt with town planning.
The Board had concluded that town planning powers could only be effectively 
and efficiently administered by an independent central authority such as a 
county council or Greater Sydney council. It argued that
Brown was Chairman. Other members of the Institute on this Committee 
were the Surveyor-General, the Valuer-General, the President of the 
Institute of Architects, and the City Engineer.
Chairman - Alderman Howie, Lord Mayor of the City of Sydney, Deputy 
Chairman - T. Armstrong, MLC, Chairman of Newcastle Chamber of Commerce, 
A.H. Moverly, MLA (formerly alderman on Randwick Council and member of 
Water Board), C.R. Chapman, former Under-Secretary of Treasury, and 
served on HQUsing Conditions Investigation Committee, Miss K. Ogilvie, 
almoner, Rachel forster Hospital. All five members were honorary.
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private enterprise is so constituted that it is 
incapable of viewing the growth of a city from a 
public or amenity point of view ... The individual 
investor, so far as property is concerned, is 
interested only in the number of buildings he can 
erect on the smallest space. He does not appreciate 
that the city is more than the mere mechanical 
extension of streets and services and it is necessary 
that there should be a full measure of industrial 
and residential decentralisation, a coordinated system 
of transportation, and zoning for land use which will 
adequately relate the various residential, commercial, 
industrial, financial, civic, educational and 
recreational areas of a city.
It is only when the public have, through legislation 
or concerted action demanded amenities, that private 
enterprise has seen fit to grant them. Under existing 
social circumstances it would seem that only by the 
displacement of materialism, coupled with a rational 
view of public welfare and aesthetic values, can a 
well-ordered system of city expansion and housing be 
evolved.
0SMH 26 April 1938)
Strong words. Too strong for the Government which had set up the 
Board in the first place. The reaction of the Minister of Social Services 
to this Report was to immediately dissociate himself from it. Mr Hawkins 
said that 'the Report embodied the views of the Board and it did not follow 
that they were the views of the Cabinet ... The Government had deliberately 
made the Board an entirely independent body, and even he, as Minister, was 
not a member'. {SMH 21 April 1938)
Having gone to the trouble of establishing the Board, the 
Government thus had a plausible excuse for totally ignoring its recommen­
dations, which it did for the remainder of its term of office. (The UAP- 
Country Party coalition survived until defeated by Labor in May 1941. The 
Labor Government established the NSW Housing Commission.)
What, then, had the planning advocates achieved since the world 
war? Although no government action followed their rehousing campaign, 
their influence was nevertheless pervasive, for their ideology had been 
attractive to Labor and non-Labor leaders. Those who were to have an 
influence on governmental town planning in Sydney in the post-war period
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had formed their basic ideas in the 1930s. They included Labor premiers 
McKell, Cahill and Heffron and physical planners Brown, Sherrard and 
Walter Bunning.^ The formation of the NSW Housing Commission in 1941-42 
and its subsequent policies reflected their influence.
Three areas of consensus between the major parties had emerged 
from the campaigns of the planning advocates in the inter-war period: an
almost universal endorsement of a house and garden for every family; respect 
for apolitical technical expertise; and the celebration of urban growth, 
under the guidance of physical planning principles, as a Good Thing. I will 
return to this third belief later, but first suggest some reasons why so 
little was actually achieved in the thirties when contrasted with the 
strength of agreement about what needed to be done.
Undoubtedly the combined effects of the depression and the 
influence of the Country Party were not conducive to large scale spending 
on city planning projects. The rehousing movement had a powerful and 
evocative symbol in the slum, and an attractive alternative, the suburban 
house and garden, symbol of space, light and health, the family and social 
harmony. But there was no agreement on the best solution of the practical 
problem of slum replacement. The ideal solution of individually owned 
homes for workers was impractical, as slum dwellers could not afford the 
payments unless subsidised. And since the government was not prepared to 
intervene in the housing market, stalemate was reached. Laissez-faire, 
for the time being, prevailed.
But unbridled growth was being questioned. To celebrate Sydney's 
150th anniversary in 1937 the SMH ran a series of articles on Sydney's
1 W. Bunning: b.1912. ARIBA, FRAIA, FRAPI, AASTC: Chairman NSW Town
& Country Planning Advisory Committee 1945-64: Commissioner for
Inquiry into Paddington area 1968: member Sydney Cove Redevelopment
Authority 1970. NSW Board of Architects travelling scholarship 
1937-39.
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growth in an effort to 'arouse interest in the subject of a planned city
and to suggest the lines on which it should grow'. The first article,
by Brown, diagnosed Sydney as suffering from
functional derangement of a serious nature. Shall we 
alleviate the symptons or attempt to cure the disease?
Shall we widen streets, round corners ... pull down a 
slum while the dispossessed create another; or shall 
we, regarding the city as a social and economic entity, 
attempt to restore the balance between population and 
industry, to remove the causes of traffic congestion, 
to correlate town and country, and to crown the work 
with beauty in architecture, sculpture and landscape 
architecture? It must be confessed that all our 
efforts in the past have been palliative and not 
truly remedial ...
He went on to argue that Sydney must be subjected to restriction in order 
to expand, that a limit must be set to the built-up area, and that this 
should take the form of a green belt of open land preserved in perpetuity 
from building operations. He saw the solution to Sydney's growth problems 
in 'satellite towns built as garden cities ... outside the green belt'. But 
he insisted that if the people were moved out, their work must be too. 
'Parallel with a migration of population there must be a corresponding 
movement in industry'. Drawing on his own practical experience at Welwyn 
Garden City, Brown was able to assert that this idea was no idle dream, 
for 'its practicability has been demonstrated with unqualified success...' 
(SMH 4 September 1937)
While Brown's article concentrated on ends, the second article, by 
Bean, focussed on the absence of any means or machinery, for controlling 
or supervising growth. He claimed that much of the worst developmental 
work in Sydney's history took place in the decade after the Great War 'when 
immense quantities of land, especially in the southern and western suburbs, 
were subdivided and sold without any provision of recreation space ...
This was due mainly to the fact that no authority existed with the duty of 
seeing that ground should be reserved; there was no plan, no policy, no
recognition even of the fact that there ought to be one. It was, and still
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is officially, nobody's business to review the needs, look into the future, 
and make timely provision ... It is, and always has been, the machinery, 
not the money, that we lack'. (SMH 18 September 1937) These sentiments 
were repeated in 'Our growing cities - Civic Planning. Need for Legislation,' 
(SMH 21 January 1938) and in 'A Greater Sydney. Long Struggle. Urgency of 
the Need', (SMH 11 February 1938), where Bean argued that Sydney was in one 
sense not a city at all, in the way that London, Berlin, New York, Paris, 
Manchester, Liverpool or Boston were single cities 'their main services and 
development being controlled by a single authority'.
The Town and Country Planning Institute submitted an article 
(written by its President, H.M. Sherrard1) on 'The Growth of Sydney - A 
city without a Plan. Wasted Opportunities.' (SMH 3 Sept. 1938) It 
criticised the lack of co-ordination between public authorities, the 
piecemeal method of dealing with problems without regard to the broader 
aspects of planning, the existence of suburbs where factories jostled 
with houses, the unnecessarily high infant mortality in such areas, flats 
with no surrounding open spaces and the lack of recreation areas and play­
grounds in many districts. Finally it stressed the importance of a Town 
Planning Act as the only way in which these problems could begin to be 
solved.
As was the case in 1920s, growth was not thought to be bad in 
itself, but physical planners were increasingly concerned with its 
unsightly excesses and social injustices and believed that the cure for 
these evils lay with new suburbs and new towns designed with due respect 
to good town planning principles. A better physical environment would 
ensure social harmony. Thus the retiring President of the Town and Country
Sherrard H.M.: b.1897 MCE (Melb.), AMICE, Commissioner for Main Roads
1953-62. Co-author with Brown of Australia's first town planning text,
Town and Country 'Planning 1951.
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Planning Institute in 1939, H.M. Sherrard, emphasised the sociological
benefits to be derived from planning legislation. These included
improved housing, which would tend to check crime, 
vice and delinquency, lead to better national health 
and a wider cultural life, and reduce infant mortality; 
a lessening of distinction between the surroundings 
of rich and poor houses, which would assist in securing 
national stability and contentment; and improved lay­
out of roads, which would tend to reduce traffic 
accidents.
(SMH 28 January 1939)
He argued elsewhere that advocates of planning had for too long been 
obsessed with the aesthetic, with central city improvements, to the 
exclusion of everything else, and that they should place stronger emphasis 
on the 'social gains' that planning could provide. (Architecture Nov. 1938: 
267-68) 'The benefits obtained are economic, sociological and aesthetic, 
and are closely related to national efficiency.'
The reference to 'national efficiency' is significant, for a 
concern with efficiency had been a pervasive theme of the planning movement 
since its early days. 'The ideology of national efficiency', as it has 
been called by a British historian, was a set of ideas which emerged in 
Britain around the turn of the century concerned with social organisation, 
with eliminating all elements of waste. It brought a new urgency to the 
work of social reform (Searle 1971: 60) In the view of the 'efficiency 
group', men and women formed the basic raw material out of which national 
greatness was constructed: hence, they argued, the statesman had a duty to
see that these priceless resources were not squandered. That much needed 
to be done was dramatically highlighted by the physical unfitness of the 
slum dwellers of the big cities who had come forward for recruitment during 
the Boer War. These revelations had given great impetus to the planning 
movement. Similarly in Australia the discovery that slums actually existed 
set otherwise conservative men on the war path of reform. The concept of
national efficiency was for them a ready-made ideology.
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Many of the 'reformers' in the Australian planning movement 
adopted the rationale of the British Conservative Lord Milner in arguing 
for the reform of slums and the introduction of planning legislation: 'the
attempt to raise the well-being and efficiency of the more backward of our 
people ... is not philanthropy, it is business'. (Searle 1971: 63)
The cult of the expert, a disparaging attitude towards party 
politics (because the real choice was not between ideologies but between 
competence and folly) and eugenics, were the natural offspring of the 
'efficiency movement'. On the assumption that the working classes were 
made up of people of weak physique and low intelligence, it logically 
followed that Britain was breeding a race of degenerates. In this mood of 
hysteria the eugenic movement made considerable headway and phrases like 
'the sterilisation of the unfit' found their way into general political 
controversy. Sulman subscribed to these views, as did others involved in 
slum reform in the 1930s.
But reformers have almost always had to use 'efficiency' arguments 
to persuade the more hard-headed to behave humanely. Most of the town 
planning and slum reformers were professional people from the social milieu 
of Sydney’s favoured who lived on the north shore or eastern suburbs. 
(Spearritt 1974) Basically conservative, they argued for the role of the 
objective expert, and attempted to keep town planning above or outside 
party politics. Their appeal to business-like values in their efforts to 
introduce planning legislation indicates their desire to avoid social 
conflict and to respect property rights. Unlike the more radical Labor 
politicians, they did not demand justice for a particular class and 
certainly did not see the situation in terms of 'class struggle'.
But they were moved by a broad humanitarian impulse, as the 
following comments by H.M. Sherrard indicate:
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I was influenced mainly by my own local observations 
of unnecessary suffering, of inconvenience and of lack 
of amenity, emphasised by the economic depression of the 
thirties ... While some views expressed at the time may 
appear to be conservative, it must be remembered that 
we had to be careful to avoid any charge of 'socialism', 
and thus being discredited.^
Private correspondence from H.M. Sherrard, 6 October 1972, commenting 
on a first draft of this chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE
The Limits of Reform : Federal Labor and 
Post war Reconstruction
" ... private enterprise will never again mean the comparative absence of 
planning and control than existed before this war. If I read right the 
attitudes of most plain Australians, private enterprise in future means, 
for us, a planned and controlled alternative to a more complete socialism 
on our own model.'
C.E.W. Bean 1943: 81
'There would be more room for private enterprise and business initiative 
after the war than ever before in Australian history. '
H.V. Evatt (S.M.H.
5 August 1943)
CHAPTER OUTLINE
1. Socialist Planners or State Capitalists?
2. New ideas, good intentions and conflicting ideologies.
3. Confusion within and hostility outside the Labor Party.
Defeat and Disintegration of the Dream.
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1.
Advanced capitalist countries now have a substantial 'public sector' 
through which the state owns and administers a wide range of industries and 
services, mainly but not exclusively of an 'infrastructural' kind. The 
state in all capitalist economies plays an increasing role in the economy 
by way of regulation, control, coordination and planning. It is one of the 
largest customers of the 'private sector' and some industries could not 
survive without that custom and without the credits, subsidies and bene­
factions which the state dispenses.'1'
This state intervention into many areas of economic life is nothing 
new in the history of capitalism. The crucial role of the state in the 
development of the Australian economy has long been a theme of Australian 
historians. W.K. Hancock's seminal history, Australia, published in 1930, 
devoted a whole chapter to what he called 'State Socialism' (Leftist 
scholars today prefer 'State capitalism', for reasons to be explained) and 
since then our historians have repeated the theme with almost monotonous 
regularity.
At no time has this planning and intervening role of the state been
more conspicuous or more controversial than it was under the Federal Labor
2 3Governments of John Curtin and Ben Chifley during and after the second
Galbraith (1967) has detailed this trend in the American economy since 
the second world war. Miliband (1969) treats it as the most important 
aspect in his analysis of the western system of power. Playford (1972) 
is one of the few Australian authors who has attempted a similar analysis 
of Australian society.
J. Curtin 1885-1945. Son of an Irish-Catholic policeman. Joined 
socialist league in Victoria in his youth. Elected leader of the 
Parliamentary Labor Party in 1935. Prime Minister 1941-45.
J.B. Chifley 1885-1951. Irish-Catholic family. Train driver for N.S.W. 
Railways and Union politician in his twenties. Elected to Federal 
Parliament 1928-31, 1940-51. Treasurer 1941-49. Minister for Post-War 
Reconstruction 1942-45. Prime Minister 1945-49.
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world war. During the war industry cooperated with the government in the 
task of economic planning and resource allocation and some of the notable 
'barons' of private enterprise like Essington Lewis’*' went into government 
departments and improvised an armaments industry. Also during the war the 
reformist Labor Government set up a Department of Post-War Reconstruction 
to produce a blueprint for a better wojrld when the fighting ended. The 
plans for the post-war period involved the continuation of war-time controls 
and regulations.
But once the war ended so too did the truce between business and 
industrial interests and the Labor Government. As the General Manager of 
the Bank of N.S.W., Sir Alfred Davidson, explained: 'We realise that [in
war] there have to be sacrifices, and that the sacrifices have to be spread. 
Hence we submit to a control which should not be tolerated in time of peace.' 
(Bean 1943: 17) So with peace came a resumption of the rhetorical attack 
by the forces of the right on state intervention in the economy. 'Planning' 
and 'socialism' became key emotive words from 1945 onwards, acquiring heavy 
ideological overtones in the late 1940s with the onset of the Cold War. The 
communist countries not only socialised property, which seemed not a strong 
likelihood in Australia with its entrenched tradition of property ownership, 
but they planned, which somehow seemed more of a danger. Since liberty and 
the untrammelled operation of the market were thereby circumscribed, it 
followed that planning was something that the libertarian society should 
avoid.2 since city planning was intimately connected with economic and
Essington Lewis. Chief General Manager of Broken Hill Propriety Co. Ltd. 
1938-50. Business Consultant to Defence Dept. 1939; Director General of 
Munitions 1940-45. Director-General of Aircraft Production and Chairman 
Aircraft Advisory Committee 1942-45. The list of his company director­
ships takes up a whole column of the 1950 Who's Who in Australia, covering 
the steel, aircraft, chemical, engineering, smelting and mining 
industries.
This reaction against the word planning could hardly have been worse 
timed for understanding the economy and policy of advanced industrial 
countries. It occurred when the increased use of technology and the 
accompanying committment of time and capital were forcing extensive 
planning on all industrial communities. (Galbraith 1967: 32-33)
2
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social planning in Labor's vision of the new social order, it suffered along 
with them from the pejorative overtones that had accumulated around 
'planning' by the end of the 1940s,
This was a seminal period in Australian history, particularly for 
the future of the cities, for Labor was full of the best intentions for 
city planning in place of haphazard growth and for decentralisation by 
regional development. None of their grandiose plans, except those for 
housing, eventuated before they were defeated in the 1949 elections and the 
plans were then forgotten for twenty-one years. Partly because the Federal 
Labor Government elected in December 1972 has again taken up the issue of 
the cities it is important to understand the nature of Labor's plans of the 
1940s, the nature of the opposition to them, and above all, the reasons 
for Labor's defeat. For the dilemmas of a reformist party, revealed by 
those years in power in the 1940s, exist today in much the same form.
Indeed they are endemic to all parties of the Left whose strategy, in a 
capitalist economy, is to attempt reform from within the system.
Given the degree of economic power which rests in the business 
community and the importance of its actions (or non-actions) for major 
aspects of economic policy, any government with serious pretensions to 
radical reform must either seek to appropriate that power or find its room 
for radical action rigidly circumscribed by the requirements of 'business 
confidence'.
So far, no government in any Western-type political 
system, whatever its rhetoric before assuming office, has 
taken up the first of these options. Instead, reform- 
minded governments have, sometimes reluctantly, sometimes 
not, curbed their reforming propensities ... or adapted 
their reforms to the purposes of business ... and turned 
themselves into the allies of the very forces they had 
promised, while in opposition, to counter and subdue.
(Miliband 1969: 137)
Politics, in this context, is certainly the art of the possible. And what
is possible is above all determined by what the business community finds 
acceptable.
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It is the argument of this chapter that there were two central and 
unresolved dilemmas of the Curtin and Chifley governments. The first was 
the extent to which the Labor Government was using economic planning as the 
prelude to the introduction of socialism. The second dilemma was the 
question whether Labor's reforms could be achieved without basic structural 
changes to the capitalist system.
The deeds, if not always the words of the Labor government, had the 
effect of strengthening and stabilising the existing economic system rather 
than challenging it. What they wanted was a continuation in peace time of 
the controls over economic life introduced during the war: that is, a more
and better regulated capitalist economy, together with a much wider system 
of welfare provisions. Curtin promised that in the post-war period 'No 
question of socialisation or any other fundamental alteration in the 
economic system arises'. (Playford 1972: 128) The Chifley and Curtin 
governments aimed to modernise and humanise rather than to overthrow 
capitalism. The system of controls through which they sought to regulate 
economic life did not constitute a threat to business and property.
Chifley's attempted nationalisation of the banks was strongly opposed by 
conservative forces and generated a concerted campaign against the govern­
ment by insurance companies and private banks. (Connell & Irving 1973)
'But it came after all other methods of regulation had failed and was in no 
sense part of an overall socialist plan.' (Playford 1972: 129) No doubt 
the Labor Government thought and spoke of 'a new social order'. But in 
terms of basic structures that new social order bore a very marked resem­
blance to the old.
From 1946 to 1949 the government extended and improved its welfare 
coverage. 'The victims of chance, economic vicissitudes, or other human 
misfortunes were protected. Humpty-Dumpty could still fall, but this time 
on to the cotton wool of the welfare state rather than the cold, hard 
bricks of a laissez-faire capitalist society.' (Clark 1963: 235)
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But by 1949 the Labor Government was presented with questions to 
which it had no answer. If it had no plans or intentions to move from a 
capitalist to a socialist society, then, it was argued, some of its 
controls imposed in the stress of war were impeding economic development. 
The bank nationalisation proposals, the fuel rationing, and the increasing 
regime of civil servants in Canberra created the suspicion that these men 
had become planners without any coherent social ideology.
In no area were these central dilemmas better revealed than in 
Labor's reformist plans for the cities.
2.
What is remarkable about the literature of post-war reconstruction 
is the unity of themes and recommendations, shared alike by Labor 
politicians, academics and popular writers."^ All were concerned with the 
need for a planned economy and full employment, city planning, population 
planning, decentralisation (that is, regional and participatory planning) 
and planning to ensure adequate housing for everyone, with special 
emphasis on the urgency of slum clearance.
Within the 'ideology of post-war reconstruction' city planning, for 
the first time, was conceived as a national problem that demanded a national 
strategy. It was seen less in terms of visual appearance, health and 
amenity and more in terms of social and economic function, and the problem 
of allocation of land among various uses was perceived as part of the 
general social policy problem of the allocation of resources.
1 Bean 1943, Penton 1941 and 1943, Marshall 1942, Bunning 1945, Barnett 
& Burt 1942.
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Housing and city planning were among the more dramatic issues and 
promises of the social reconstruction program because they raised all the 
general ideological issues of planning versus a free market. The recommen­
dations of the Commonwealth Housing Commission (1944) in particular proposed 
a revolution in public approach to social policy, announcing as it did that 
the housing program would depend on the ability of the state to dominate 
the market - to control the supply of materials, to fix prices and to 
purchase directly on its own account.
The period produced an abundance of intelligent research and ideas 
on social and economic problems and their political concomitants.'*' The war 
provided experience of the sort of government machinery needed to effect 
reform. And the government acquired vast economic competence by virtue 
of its control of so many of the basic processes of production and distri­
bution .
Why did this abundance of good ideas and intentions, great plans 
and preparations, come to so little? Specifically perhaps because of the 
failure of efforts to enlarge Federal Government powers. More fundamentally, 
the implications of the post-war reconstruction ideology conflicted with 
existing political, social and economic institutions. Between 1945 and 
1948 the banks, the judgments of the High Court, the oil companies, the 
medical profession, and states' Upper Houses resisted, with all the 
financial and institutional powers available to them, Labor's reconstruction 
program. As Miliband noted, the constraints on a reformist government in a 
capitalist system are formidable. Labor was told that to achieve its city
e.g. Evatt's 1942 report on the need for greater Federal powers; the 
Housing Commission Report of 1944; the Australian Institute of Political 
Science Conferences on post-war reconstruction (1944) and on decentrali­
sation (1948); and the Department of Post-War Reconstruction's Report 
on Regional Planning (1949); and the Full Employment White Paper by the 
Department of Post-War Reconstruction (1945).
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planning aims land nationalisation would be necessary. But this intention 
was never given concrete policy form, presumably because the government 
was aware of the torrent of opposition it would generate. So it never got 
beyond this rhetoric of good intentions. Perhaps, as Hancock wrote in 
1930, 'it is a weakness of democracies that, having willed an end, they try 
to shuffle out of willing the means'. (Hancock 1930: 105)
As early as June 1940 the Federal Conference of the ALP called for 
'an early outline of general principles of post-war reconstruction'. In 
November 1942 Federal Conference urged that post-war reconstruction be 
regarded as part of the war effort and sought the appointment of a Minister 
'whose sole duty it should be to proceed immediately with the preparation 
of a comprehensive scheme of post-war reconstruction'. (Crisp 1960: 183)
In December 1942 J.B. Chifley was appointed Minister for Post-war
2Reconstruction and Dr H.C. Coombs as the Permanent Head of the Department. 
Chifley's first major statement of his approach came in three articles 
published in leading newspapers in December 1943. He envisaged direction 
of full employment policies and continuance of war-time collaboration of 
Government and private enterprise in carrying them out. (Crisp 1960: 188)
Given his position as Treasurer and the experiential basis of his socialism, 
inspired by the Depression (Crisp 1960: 191-92) it is not surprising that 
Chifley emphasised the economic aspects of post-war reconstruction. Coombs 
and Dr Lloyd Ross (Director of Public Relations, Ministry of Post-War 
Reconstruction) were more articulate about the social content of the ideology.
This was the key conclusion to the 1944 Commonwealth Housing Commission 
Report, to be discussed later in this chapter.
H.C. Coombs: b.1905. Schoolteacher and wharf labourer during the 
Depression, then economist with Commonwealth Bank. Director of 
Rationing 1942. Post-War Reconstruction 1943-49. Governor of 
Commonwealth Bank 1949-68. (Encel 1970: 281)
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The choice before us is to go back or to go on, to 
attempt to rebuild the so-called 'free' economy based 
on individual choice, freedom of enterprise, unemployment 
and the alternation of booms and slumps; or to go on, 
by the use of the knowledge and experience we have built 
up during the war, to an economy still ’predominantly one 
of private ownership and enterprise, but with an increasing 
respor^sibility on the government for the allocation of 
resources, the prime purpose of which will be the achieve­
ment of social objectives of a high and stable level of 
employment, of rising standards of living for all people, 
of the development of our national resources and security 
and opportunity for the individual ... If we are clear 
upon the objectives we seek ... we have an opportunity to 
move consciously and intelligently towards a new social 
and economic system. (Coombs 1944: 98-99)
Ross was more explicit about potential conflict and more detailed in his
description of the 'new social order'.
There is real division to be found between those who 
would move forward to full employment and higher 
standards of living although these may mean some 
interference with private ownership of industry, and 
those who would make their test of judgment the pre­
servation of pre-war property rights and the sacredness 
of their freedom for their enterprise ... there cannot 
be any new social order if we return to the nineteenth 
century conception of either economics or freedom ... 
Freedom in slums is a farce; but building houses at the 
end of the war means either we perpetuate inequality or 
we continue controls; to build houses which will widen 
the freedom for thousands, we need to limit the rights 
of those with money3 with land and with building 
material; to redesign our cities so that they will 
recapture the ancient sense of beauty and majesty, a 
harmony of life that the modern city has largely lost, 
we need to control the expansion of cities, introduce 
zoning, alter street routes, and fit design into a 
general pattern. There could have been no Canberra 
garden city without a plan and a control ...
(Ross 1944: 208-209, 22-27)
But it is evident from their statements that neither of these key 
public servants believed it was necessary to go beyond a better-regulated 
capitalist economy to achieve the new social order.
Popular writers who took up these themes emphasised their moral 
content. For C.E.W. Bean, belonging to the Christian socialist tradition 
of the slum reformers like Barnett and Burt of the 1930s, decentralisation
was the key to the moral salvation of the nation:
163
... a people evenly distributed in small or medium sized 
towns tends to be stronger, morally and mentally as well 
as physically, than one concentrated in a few big cities. 
The development of the country towns can easily be fostered 
... if the nation determines to decentralise the manu­
facturing industries ... this would reduce by more than 
half the Australian problem of town planning and housing; 
the country towns, around which land is open and compara­
tively cheap, offer hardly any of the most serious 
difficulties presented by our sprawling cities, the pattern 
of whose outskirts is already made and whose lands are sold 
by the foot instead of by the acre. (Bean 1943: 120-1)
Bean also shared with Barnett and Burt and with another middle class 
housing reformer, Walter Bunning, what could be called a middle class 
paternalism toward those low socio-economic groups they were trying, 
morally as well as economically, to 'save'.
We want for our city folk housing conditions in which the 
'family system', that our bishops rightly estimate as the 
sound basis for our moral health, can rear its healthy 
youth; we want total clearance of slums and of the 
attendant moral and physical degradation ... we want ... 
community centres for both recreation and culture and ... 
self-help, to replace the hotel bars as the farmers' and 
workers' clubs and serve as a kind of peoples' university.
(Bean 1943: 20)
The simple cause-effect relationship between environment and 
morals was universally espoused by these Christian social reformers. 
Barnett and Burt's book Bousing the Australian Nation (1942) , itself 
derived from the official Victorian inquiry into slums (1937) on which 
both authors served (Chapter 3), had expressed this belief and claimed 
evidence for its validity: 'At least 98% of the families removed from
slum and substandard houses to the new houses of the Commission have 
satisfactorily responded to their new environment'. (Quoted in Bunning 
1945: 38) This book by Barnett and Burt seems to have been one of the 
most widely read and influential works of the decade. Its findings and
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recommendations were quoted at great length in Evatt's case for greater 
constitutional powers for the Commonwealth (Evatt 1942: 159-62), in the 
Commonwealth Housing Commission Report (1944), and it was cited as gospel 
by all of the 'amateur' reformers (Bean 1943, Penton 1943, Bunning 1945, 
Luscombe 1943, 1945, Marshall 1942). It clearly influenced the particular
prescriptions for housing reform in the 1940s. Barnett and Burt had con­
cluded that 'private enterprise had not and would never adequately house the 
poor'. They therefore advocated Commonwealth responsibility for and 
intervention in housing provision, favoured planned decentralisation and 
recommended legislation for a Commonwealth Post-war Housing Scheme, quoting 
Keynes' advice that 'no humbug of Finance should be allowed to stand in the 
way of our plans for reconstruction'. (Barnett & Burt 1942: 10, 76, 86)
In October 1942 the Curtin government made the first public move 
toward their post-war objectives. Evatt introduced a Bill for a referendum 
seeking approval for a far-reaching enlargement of the ordinary peace-time 
powers of the Commonwealth. The nature of the reconstruction plans and the 
means by which they could be put into operation would both depend on the 
Commonwealth's constitutional position. A convention of Commonwealth and 
State leaders met in November 1942 in an attempt to convince the states to 
refer agreed powers to the Commonwealth rather than distract the country by 
a war-time referendum. Curtin obtained agreement that powers should be 
granted to the Commonwealth for demobilisation and post-war reconstruction. 
But the Liberal States failed to pass the necessary reference of powers 
agreed upon and Curtin had no alternative but to pursue the matter to 
referendum.
~ H.V. Evatt: 1894-1965 D.Litt., MA, LL.D. Lawyer, Secretary to
W.A. Holman (Labor Premier of N.S.W. 1911-20) MLA (N.S.W.) 1925-30. 
1930-40 Judge of High Court of Australia. 1940 entered House of 
Representatives. 1941-49 Attorney-General and Minister for External 
Affairs. Deputy Prime Minister 1946-49. Leader Labor Party 1951-60. 
Appointed 1941 Chairman of Commonwealth Advisory Committee on 
Reconstruction.
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In his introduction to the case for greater Commonwealth powers 
Evatt said:
We profoundly believe that this machinery of government 
and this system of control and organisation [created to 
cope with the emergency of war] are necessary and well- 
adapted to handle the equally difficult and urgent problems 
of the post-war period ... To plan or not to plan - that 
is the question. (Evatt 1942: 6-7)
Significantly, regional development was seen as fundamental to reconstruction 
plans.
Post-war development should be regional. Plans for 
industrial expansion will need to be prepared in terms 
of smaller and clearly defined natural economic regions, 
but the just claims of relatively neglected areas must 
also be considered ... In the future all decisions about 
the location of industry must be co-ordinated with the 
policy of regional development and must be made on 
grounds which take into account the availability of the 
essential material and power, and also the scale of out­
put which is necessary to efficiency. In making these 
decisions the long-term view is necessary. But under 
the constitution as it stands at present the Commonwealth 
will in peace time be unable to plan the location of 
industrial development on any sound regional basis.
(Evatt 1942: 69-70)
The 1944 referendum failed. The 'No' case had the financial and 
influential weight of the Liberal-Country Party Opposition and their news­
paper allies behind it. (Crisp 1960: 196) Curtin then called a conference 
of Commonwealth and State Ministers at which he sought a cooperative 
approach to regional planning within the existing constitutional framework. 
Crisp sees this as a major defeat for Labor's post-war reconstruction 
program.
To Chifley's great regret the White Paper [on Full 
Employment in Australia] and all his planning commissions 
and committees had to fall back on slow, clumsy and 
uncertain 'cooperative federalism' ... Imaginative plans 
had to be substantially scrapped. In public housing, 
land settlement, migration, coal development, unification 
of railway gauges, determination of national works 
priorities ... resort had to be had to 'government by 
agreement' ... with all the delays, frictions, compromise 
and half-measures inherent in that system. (Crisp 1960: 196)
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Nevertheless from this beginning came the final proposals for 
comprehensive regional planning and development involving the Commonwealth, 
the States, and local governments, which are set out in The History of 
Progress and Review of Regional Planning Aetivities Through the Commonwealth3 
issued by the Department of Post-War Reconstruction in 1949. This was a 
blueprint for the careful assessment of resources, physical and human, to 
provide for regional development, decentralisation, and the fullest partici­
pation of citizens at every level of representative government. In the same 
way policy was developed for housing as a result of the Housing Commission 
appointed by Curtin in 1943^ " to inquire into 'the present housing position 
in Australia and the housing requirements during the post-war period'.
The Housing Commission produced a plan of immense importance and 
long term significance, a blueprint for efficient regulation and supply of 
housing and implementation of urban planning that has not yet, in funda­
mental terms, been superseded. It found that housing standards in Australia 
were very low, especially for the low wage earner. It pointed to the short­
age of hpusing and the critical need of complete or partial re-planning in 
cities and towns throughout Australia (paras. 104-40). It envisioned two 
alternatives to the compound problem of inner city slums and outer low 
density sprawl (with its social and economic costs): the possibility of
decentralisation of business and industry in satellite towns, or the 
possibility of integrating town and suburbs in a comprehensive re-building 
scheme involving the principles of zoning, solar planning, open areas etc. 
'Without some such large scale attack it will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to prevent the uncontrolled spread of cities.' (Commonwealth 
Housing Commission 1944: 35)
Members of the Commission were: L.P.D. O'Connor, AICA, Chairman
(Brisbane); J.S. Gawler, FRAIA (Melb.); C.V. Howard, ARAIA (Melb) ;
Mary Ryan, J.P. (N.S.W.): A.V. Thompson, MHA (S.A.) Executive Officer, 
W. Bunning, ARIBA, ARAIA, AASTC. Various advisory committees assisted. 
W.O. Burt sat on the Town Planning Committee, Lloyd Ross and Walter 
Bunning on the Community Facilities Committee.
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It argued that in any area, new or old, a wide range of community 
facilities needed to be provided, and suggested periodic national housing 
surveys to determine the total housing needs of the community and the 
proper location of housing. (Commonwealth Housing Commission 1944: paras. 
818-51) The Commission said that the government should aim to overcome the 
housing shortage within ten years. To do this it was not only necessary to 
ensure a normal annual growth in new housing, but also to provide for the 
repairing and replacement of sub-standard dwellings and for slum clearance. 
The program would require the erection of at least 700,000 dwellings by 
1955 (including single units, attached units, multi-storey dwellings and 
hostels), which meant an annual target of 50,000 dwelling units, rising to 
80,000 by the end of the third post-war year, to be maintained until the 
shortage was overcome. And to achieve this massive program it proposed a 
strategy that, had it been implemented, would have effectively provided an 
urban planning and development base of unparalleled magnitude and effect 
and of a kind that most cities in Australia sorely lack. To achieve this 
the Commission argued that a prime necessity was a coordinated national 
effort in a Commonwealth-State-Local-Government-private enterprise grouping. 
(Commonwealth Housing Commission 1944: paras. 141-59, 329-39)
Further it set a minimum housing standard and proposed a fifty- 
fifty government-private enterprise building program, with the Commonwealth 
sponsoring the effQrts of government agencies in the states. It recommended 
the establishment of a Commonwealth Housing Authority to plan and advise, 
with State Housing Authorities charged with the task of construction and 
administration. Local governments were to have participated in this process, 
with powers delegated from the State Housing Authorities. (Commonwealth
Housing Commission 1944: paras. 365-421)
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There was to be national, regional and town planning. The 
Commonwealth was to set up a Commonwealth Planning Authority. State planning 
was to be coordinated through State Planning Authorities. Regional and 
town planning legislation was to be enacted in all States. 'We consider 
that planning is of such importance that the Commonwealth Government should 
not make available financial assistance for housing unless the State con­
cerned satisfied the Commonwealth that it has taken or is taking definite 
steps to enact and implement regional and town planning legislation.' 
(Commonwealth Housing Commission 1944: 29) And pending the drawing up of 
full town plans, the control of land use was to be through zoning, the 
declaration of housing development areas, and the control of land sub­
divisions. (Commonwealth Housing Commission 1944: paras. 169-292)
National and regional planning may be described as a 
conscious effort to guide the development of the 
resources of the nation and their use in productive 
enterprise so as to provide a rising national income 
and therefore a rising standard of human welfare, 
including ... better housing. In the past, national 
development has been in the hands of private enterprise 
and has thus been governed by the possibilities of 
profit-making rather than by the needs of the community.
We consider that national, regional and town planning 
is an urgent national need.
(Commonwealth Housing Commission 1944: 26)
The most radical proposals recommended were those concerning public 
participation in planning and the need for nationalisation of land. 'We 
stress the importance of setting up an administration which will enable the 
people themselves to initiate proposals and participate in formulating 
them.' (Commonwealth Housing Commission 1944: 27) It was difficult to see 
in practical terms how these noble ideas could be applied. But the 
Commission was cavalier about 'practical difficulties', as can be seen in 
its proposals for land nationalisation. It agreed with the findings of the
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Uthwatt Committee that nationalisation was the only adequate method of
preserving for the people as a whole any increase in land values. But the
Uthwatt Committee had rejected land nationalisation as a practical measure.
Not so the Commonwealth Housing Commission:
We are not in agreement with the objections to 
nationalisation as stated by the Uthwatt Committee ... 
we consider that - political controversy and delay are 
not valid objections to a desirable policy - that the 
size of financial operations required should not daunt 
those used to wartime finance - and that the need for 
complicated administrative machinery should not be a 
deterrent in view of wartime experience. There would 
be considerable public opposition to land nationalisation, 
both from existing landowners and from many who would 
fear that such may be a prelude to other similar 
measures; but it seems to us that nationalisation is the 
only effective way to eliminate private profit-making 
from land and to reserve to the community the unearned 
increment ... Irrespective of whether nationalisation be 
effected, we recommend that land resumed by the Government 
for development purposes should be disposed of on per­
petual leasehold tenure and not by sale as freehold.
(Commonwealth Housing Commission 1944: 43-44)
The Report recommended that the Commonwealth Government set up a 
special committee to investigate land nationalisation. This was never done 
and this crucial issue was never put forward as a policy or legislative 
proposal. Neither was the issue of regional planning.
The Report made concrete suggestions on post-war controls to cover 
manpower and material shortages, rent controls to alleviate the lot of 
those housed but 'under pressure through demand factors', and limitations 
on the cost of dwellings during the shortage period. (Commonwealth Housing 
Commission 1944: paras. 546-614)
Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment, which reported to the 
British Government in 1942. It contained a devastating analysis of the 
ways in which inadequate legislation for compensation and betterment 
made effective planning impossible and impoverished the community. 
(Keeble 1961: 3146)
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State Housing Authorities were to be empowered to declare housing 
development areas so as to control subdivisions and the price of land 
required for housing. They were also to be able to purchase and resume 
land required for housing purposes and to replace and re-subdivide purchased 
land. (Commonwealth Housing Commission 1944: paras. 293-328) The Report 
then went on to deal in detail with materials, labour, construction and 
the organisation of the building industry.
Its perception of past, present and future transport problems gave 
further evidence of its holistic approach to urban problems:
The unplanned development of towns has led to unplanned 
transport and to an excessive amount of travelling between 
different parts of large towns. This in turn has involved 
high costs of transport to the community as a whole, as well 
as to the individual who pays this cost not only in money 
but in time and fatigue. Ribbon development in many places 
has caused unduly long travel and prejudiced rapid transport; 
uncontrolled subdivisions have been added to the outer 
fringe of towns ... without any provision for transport; 
many vacant allotments in subdivisions remain unbuilt on, 
despite that all services are provided, while additional 
areas, still further out, are subdivided and put on the 
market ... The rising price of land ... has driven people 
to the outer areas where land is cheap, but the location 
has forced them to pay high fares, often leaving them worse 
off than before. The decentralisation of industry and the 
possibility of establishing satellite towns will need to be 
considered ...
(Commonwealth Housing Commission 1944: 27) 
Clearly the Commission had produced a more integrated vision and under­
standing of urban development than any previous Australian inquiry.
Although no proposals for land nationalisation ever eventuated 
from this Report, the Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement of 1945 did.
The main points under this agreement, by which Commonwealth funds 
became available for the states' public housing programs, were 'that the 
States were required to ensure that adequate legislation existed to enable 
it at all times to control throughout the State (a) rental housing projects 
(b) slum clearance (c) town planning'. Further, the Housing Authority in
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each State was to allow to low-income tenants a rental rebate equal to the 
difference between economic rent and one-fifth of family income when that 
income equalled the basic wage (as the income fell below or rose above the 
basic wage the proportion varied). The Commonwealth Government was to bear 
three fifths of the financial losses incurred by Government-financed housing 
schemes. And dwellings were to be allotted on the basis of need. The terms 
of the agreement made it difficult for the states to sell dwellings, and 
also ensured that the available public housing went only to those on the 
lowest incomes. South Australia objected to these details of the agreement 
and did not become an effective partner until 1953 when these restraints 
were removed by the Menzies government. (Jones 1972: 7)
Although Jones has questioned the effectiveness of state Housing 
Commission policies in reaching the most needy and poverty-stricken groups 
in the community'1’, the statistical achievement in housing since 1945 has 
been impressive. From 1945 to 1970 about 36 per cent of all new houses 
and flats completed in Australia were directly financed by governments on 
terms and conditions that made them much cheaper than they could have been 
obtained in the private market. By 1970 about 24 per cent of all existing 
houses and flats had been financed in whole or in part with public funds; 
750,000 subsidised dwellings have been built since 1945. The biggest 
single group, 310,000,has been built by the State Housing Commissions.
(Jones 1972: 1)
1 'Sections of the "undeserving poor", especially "Skid Row" men and 
other deviants, are consistently discriminated against in public 
housing policy.' (Jones 1972: 6)
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The assumption behind most of the planning ideas of the social 
reformers of the 1940s was Marxist in theory. Simply stated, evil was the 
result of an unfavourable environment. And since bad conditions were the 
cause of evil, good conditions would make men good. But their remedies were 
not Marxist.
It may have seemed obvious to men witnessing or experiencing the 
poverty and slum life of the 1930s that there was a direct cause and 
effect relationship between physical environment and social and moral 
problems. Thus they emphasised the need for better physical and material 
conditions, particularly housing and full employment. What was less obvious 
to them was the systemic nature of these problems. There was no Professor 
Irvine in the 1940s to suggest that these problems may be endemic to a 
capitalist socio-economic system.
The reformers' ambivalence to this system, their recognition on the 
one hand of the existence of real class conflict and inequality, yet their 
unwillingness, on the other hand, to attempt fundamental structural changes 
(like land nationalisation or socialisation of the functions of private 
property) made them vulnerable to the criticism of conservatives when the 
war ended, and led to their eventual defeat.
Plans for a national health scheme were shelved after heated 
opposition from the medical profession. The High Court declared legislation 
to nationalise all civil airlines in 1945 to be beyond the constitutional 
power of the Commonwealth. And most states failed to implement the under­
taking given to Chifley to pass legislation giving the Commonwealth peace 
time powers to control rents and prices. 'Once again business interests 
hostile to regulation had joined with states-rights doctrinaires. They 
had been able to use State Upper Houses, in particular, to hobble the 
National Parliament.' (Crisp 1960: 306) The 1948 High Court decision on
3.
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bank nationalisation, in the opinion of one Labor journalist, endowed the 
existing capitalist system in Australia with weighty constitutional authority 
and placed 'an almost insurmountable hurdle in the way of economic reforms 
which in most other democratic countries are left to the free decisions of 
the electorate through the democratic parliamentary process'. (Crisp 1960: 
337)
The High Court judgment exposed an interesting situation. While 
private enterprise could, by various economic, commercial and legal 
processes, effectively monopolise a section of interstate trade, commerce 
or industry, the popularly elected Commonwealth government could not, by 
statute, do the like.
While the intentions of the forces of the right were clearly to use 
the existing state system (economic, legal and so on) to the advantage and 
in defence of private enterprise^, as they had always done, the Labor 
government projected no such ideological certainty. In the thinking of 
key men like Curtin, Evatt, Coombs and Ross, as in the party's legislative 
proposals, Labor's intentions seemed clear enough. They wanted to increase 
the efficiency and thereby the distributive justice of the capitalist 
economic system. But some of their reformist goals could not be achieved 
without basic changes to that system. A redistributive approach to city 
planning required the nationalisation of land, a basic change to the 
capitalist system of property ownership. Regional and participatory 
planning required a radical redistribution of power as well as of resources. 
So none of these important changes got beyond the rhetorical stage.
1 'G.E.J. Barwick, K.C., led a strong team for the banks. Building in the
post-war years on the opening afforded by the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council in the James Case of 1936, Barwick was in the process of 
establishing Section 92 of the Constitution as the shield and buckler 
of private enterprise against government in Australia.' (Crisp 1960: 335)
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Admittedly the constraints on reform were considerable. Concerted action 
by the forces of the right (banks, insurance and oil companies, doctors, 
states Upper Houses, a right wing press) had closed off one of the avenues 
of reform, an increase in Federal government powers. But the relative ease 
with which the Labor government gave up the struggle (and in some cases, 
like land nationalisation and regional planning, simply failed to enter the 
ring) suggests either a lack of will, or of the necessary skill, or both, 
to devise alternate means of achieving its goals. Having willed the ends, 
in Hancock's terms, it shuffled out of willing the means.
On this point rests crucial implications for the future possibilities 
of reform under a Labor government. For if it was simply a lack of skill 
that prevented Labor devising means to implement its reforms in the 1940s 
there is room for gentle optimism about the years to come. But if their 
failure stemmed from a lack of will, resulting from basic ideological 
uncertainty within the party as to its 'socialist' principles and the 
extent to which it should attempt structural changes, there is less reason 
for optimism, for this dilemma continues to plague an even more 'revisionist' 
party of the 1970s.
While the Labor government floundered in its ideological uncertainty 
a band of young idealists of different political persuasion, 'supported by 
the manufacturers, the traders, and the pastoralists, painted a rosy picture 
of possibilities should Australia rid itself of the economic planners and 
the menace of communism'. (Clark 1963: 237) The theme of Menzies"^ policy 
speech in 1949 was that if Labor was returned they would press on regardless 
to full socialism. They would find ways to nationalise banks, despite the
1 R.G. Menzies, born 1894. Lawyer. MHR for Kooyong 1934-66. Federal 
Attorney General 1934-39. Prime Minister 1949-66.
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judicial decision of 1948. They would 'pack' the High Court.1 They would
continue petrol rationing. They would open the way via socialism to
2communism. As Fadden put it -
If you choose the Labor Party then your ballot 
paper will truly be your last will and testament, 
disposing in your own lifetime of your liberties and 
your property and condemning your children and your 
children's children to the living death of socialist 
regimentation.
(Crisp 1960: 371-72)
Chifley had seemed to press beyond mere 'welfarism' with his public owner­
ship and planning measures, and by doing so had spurred his opponents. But 
the very real divisions within the Labor Party on the crucial issue of the 
degree to which basic structural changes of the existing social and 
economic system were necessary played into the hands of the Opposition and 
must have confused the public. Chifley himself claimed of the 1949 election, 
that 'the real issue, as in New Zealand and Great Britain, was a straight- 
out fight between the two great forces, socialism and capitalism. We 
played for pretty big stakes and ours was the first attempt in Australia 
to bring real Labor policy into effect'. (Crisp 1960: 373)
Just what was 'real Labor policy', precisely which of 'the two 
great forces, socialism and capitalism', Labor represented, may have been 
clear to Chifley, but it was probably not clear to the Australian public, 
and the electorate's decision in 1949 may well indicate just as much 
confusion in Australians' minds on this issue as was evident in the atti­
tudes and actions of the Labor Party.
An interesting observation, in that most High Court judges have been born 
into the 'middle' and 'upper' classes (Encel 1970: 76) and 'the rest have 
come to belong to these classes by the time they reach the bench'. 
(Playford 1972: 141-42) Judges not only come from a very narrow section 
of the community but 'for their whole training in the law they get an 
inherently conservative bias'. (Professor Peter Brett, S.M.H. 7 October 
1968)
A.W. Fadden: born 1895. Leader of Australian Country Party 1941-58.
MHR 1936-58. Prime Minister August - October 1941. Treasurer 1949-58.
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The Liberal-Country Party coalition which came to office in 1949 
made it clear that Commonwealth assistance to the cities would not be 
extended beyond the agreement already made for funding state public housing 
programs. The Prime Minister, R.G. Menzies, in December 1950 refused to 
assist the N.S.W. Government in the implementation of Sydney's Cumberland 
County Plan on the grounds that to accept any direct responsibility would 
establish a wide precedent for Commonwealth assistance in urban affairs. 
Succeeding Liberal-Country Party governments maintained an aloof attitude 
to the urban problems of the states. In the late 1960s the Labor Party, 
its own basis having changed, (its top leadership increasingly composed of 
professionals rather than trade unionists) acquired an urban policy not 
dissimilar to that of the 1940s.
Blewett (1973: 362) observes that in the 1950s a 'new revisionism' 
became the dominant ideology of the social democratic parties of the west.
If the early revisionists had sought to make 
socialism compatible with democracy, the modern revi­
sionists attempted a quite extraordinary feat - they 
sought to make socialism compatible with capitalism.
The strategy for social democrats was to humanise, no 
longer to transform, capitalism.
But Blewett then argues that this new revisionism did not permeate the 
Australian Labor movement until the 1960s. His chronology is twenty years 
behind the reality. The description of the 'new revisionists' policies 
offered by Blewett corresponds precisely to the thoughts and deeds of the 
ALP of both the 1940s and the 1970s.
For the new revisionists the prevailing order was not 
in dispute. Capitalism would be modified and managed, not 
replaced. The market would remain the pivot of the economy, 
although constrained by progressive taxation, monetary and 
fiscal controls, and an extensive social provision. Through 
enlightened managerialism and state interventionism a 
rational and efficient capitalism would provide increasing 
affluence, full employment and adequate welfare services, 
thereby ensuring greater social equality. Stress was on 
equality of rewards and status. For the new revisionists 
therefore nationalisation was unnecessary. Private property, 
managed and competitive, would be the rule, social property 
the exception. Thus they foreswore the possibility of 
structural change. (Blewett 1973: 362)
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The 1940s were not, contrary to popular myth, the halcyon days of 
the ALP from which it has been in steady ideological decline ever since.
The internal contradictions between aims and ideology evident in the 1940s 
exist in the same form under the Whitlam Labor government of 1973.
Does this mean that the fate of the ambitious 'cities program' of 
the 1972 Labor platform will be similar to that of the 1940s. This problem 
will be dealt with in greater length in the conclusions. Suffice to say 
here that there are reasons for optimism. For there are now the first signs 
of changing public attitudes that may eventually bring about changes in 
party ideology. The different circumstances of the 1970s are making people 
more conscious of environmental and distributive problems. The basic 
premise of all advanced industrial societies (and of many 'undeveloped' 
ones), that economic growth is the most important social goal, is (gradually) 
being questioned. This was clearly not the case in the 1940s when, after 
years of scarcity and rationing, people wanted the right and the possibility 
of choosing between satisfying different social and economic wants. So the 
reformist enthusiasm borne in the heat of war cooled in the immediate post­
war years. Patience lost some of its pristine virtue, especially among 
those who, unlike Tolstoy's creatures, had not been inured by custom and 
class to shuffle their feet. In the 1970s some members of these privileged 
classes are beginning to question the dominance of the growth ideology, 
especially where it impinges on their environmental amenity.
The next three chapters explore some of the changing attitudes to 
cities, to economic growth and to the environment that may prevent the 
history of the 1940s from repeating itself in the 1970s.
CHAPTER SIX
ADELAIDE
The 'radical' conservative planners, the technocrats 
and 'the people': who plans for whom?
The crux of the town planning problem in South Australia is not so much 
technical as political. During the last 30 years successive governments 
have done practically nothing to put our house in order, and the establish­
ment of a supervisory authority to control city suburban development is one 
of our most urgent needs ... A primary necessity is the passing of an 
adequate town planning Act on the lines of measures approved by the 
Parliament in 1917.
J.H. Vaughan {Advertiser 3 21 July 
1950); he had introduced the State's 
first town planning bill in 1916.
... the functions of business at the highest level become increasingly 
political, while the politician and the administrator become increasingly 
involved in the conduct of industry. Thus it comes about that business 
lends government its outstanding personalities, industrialists become 
Ministers, heads of State agencies, members of State Boards, and political 
leaders, high ranking officers and senior civil servants are recruited to 
the Boards of great enterprises. The consequential formation of what has 
been called a 'power elite' must be viewed not as a kind of conspiracy but 
as a logical consequence of the unification of business with administration 
and politics.
Peter Shore, quoted in
John Playford (1969: 14)
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In the middle of the nineteenth century Karl Marx brought the subject 
of power into economic discussion with a vehemence which the world has not 
yet quite ceased to deplore. The notion of a system of competitive firms 
he dismissed as an exercise in vulgar apologetics. Production, he argued, 
was dominated by those who controlled and supplied capital. They set prices 
and wages in their collective interest. They dominated the society, setting 
its moral tone. They also controlled the state, which became an executive 
committee serving the will and interest of the capitalist class.
More recent scholars of the Left have coined the term 'neo-capitalism' 
to describe the close cooperation between business, politics and adminis­
tration which has been an observed feature of developed Western economies 
since the second world war. John Playford (1969: 7) defined neo-capitalism 
as the 'massive entry of business into the institutions of state supervision, 
planning, coordination and control, with all the direct power and influence 
this entails'.
Thomas Playford, Premier of South Australia from 1938 to 1965, 
inherited the broad outlines of a development policy generated by the state 
in response to the economic crisis of the 1930s. His role was to be its 
political executant. The so-called 'Playford era' between 1938 and 1965 
saw the transformation of South Australia from a mainly rural to a mainly 
industrial economy,^ a process set in motion by the state, which supplied 
cheap housing, serviced land and so on to industries to encourage them to 
establish in South Australia. This transformation diversified the old
Between 1933 and 1966 the proportion of the workforce engaged in primary 
industry fell from 22.2% to 10.6% while the proporation in manufacturing 
rose from 15.5 to 27.8%. By the close of the Playford era the percen­
tages of manufacturing and primary industry comprising the total value 
of production had been reversed, factories accounting for 59% in 1965.
And population growth was the highest of any state as a result of a 
high migrant intake.
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'power elite' that had centred around the 'Adelaide Establishment', the 
old families whose wealth derived from land, commerce and banking. (Hirst 
1973)
Galbraith (1967) has argued that the increasing role of the state in 
advanced industrial societies has changed the source of power in those 
societies. No longer is the ownership of land or of capital the decisive 
source. Rather, power now rests with what he calls the 'technostructure', 
the technical experts who increasingly make the decisions in both state 
bureaucracies and private enterprise.
Changes that occurred in the structure of power in South Australia 
between the first wave of planning (1916-29) and the second (from the late 
1950s) are reflected in the efforts to introduce city planning after the 
second world war, in the nature of the opposition generated, and in the 
nature of the planning that emerged in the 1960s. The influence of new 
industries, especially car manufacturing, and the role of the technical 
experts employed by state authorities, especially the engineers, have been 
particularly significant features of the impact of the changing structure 
of power on the city planning process. But neither has eroded the enduring 
influence of those older sources of power based on property ownership.
Their continuing influence remains an important part of the story of post­
war planning in South Australia.
The nature of my concern at the Parliamentary level is that there 
has been no farsighted policy of urban development. This was partly the 
result of Playford's personal style of government and partly an imperative 
of industrialisation. The Premier built around him 'a team of loyal and 
able civil servants dedicated to industrial development. Readily accessible 
to business leaders, he supplemented his civil servants with a wide circle 
of advisers from private enterprise ... he bypassed formal lines of 
communication and responsibility in pursuit of his industrialisation
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objectives'. (Blewett & Jaensch 1971: 3) This approach had grave conse­
quences for parliamentary politics. Playford's Cabinet colleagues were 
virtually excluded from policy formulation, responsibility for which 
devolved from Parliament to outside bodies and individuals. This shift of 
responsibility vitally affected city planning policy in the 1960s.
The Premier's economic objectives were not compatible with the
restrictions on private enterprise that are a necessary part of radical
city planning. Playford made his priorities clear in 1954 in the opening
address of the Australian Planning Institute Congress in Adelaide. There
would be no town planning until his economic objectives had been realised.
And he could execute this economic policy because of his power base. The
consideration of where electoral support lies is one of the most obvious
factors affecting politicians' behaviour and thinking. Playford looked
after the day to day interests of farmers and a few city rich and that,
plus the gerrymandered pattern of electorates, secured him in power for
close on thirty years to do what he liked to the urban majorities whose
2votes he didn't need anyway.
The ruling Liberal Country League (LCL) was largely an instrument 
of the Adelaide Establishment. The interventionist aspects of Playford's 
economic policies were a source of conflict between him and the 
Establishment, to whom Playford was guilty of socialist heresies.
This was confirmed by interviews with some of those present, in 
particular Gavin Walkley, Head of the School of Architecture and Town 
Planning at the South Australia Institute of Technology, and J.D. 
Cheesman, architect and later member of the five man Town Planning 
Committee created in 1955. Interviews 15 January 1973.
Ironically, his long term industrialisation programme not only vitally 
affected this urban majority but eventually changed its character and 
distribution sufficiently for it to vote the LCL out of office in 1965.
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Unlike the Establishment, he recognised the need for minimal 
concessions to maintain the conservative order. For conservatism does not 
entail the rejection of all measures of reform, but survives by the endorse­
ment and promulgation of reform at the least possible cost to the existing 
structure of power and privilege. But 'for all their acceptance of piece­
meal reform and their rhetoric of classlessness, conservative parties remain 
primarily the defence organisation, in the political field, of business and 
property'. (Miliband 1969: 168)
Playford was at one with the Establishment on the preservation of a 
conservative political structure and a conservatively ordered society. He 
relied on the help of the Adelaide financial community. His party was 
dependent on Establishment finance and successful management of the non- 
Labor forces required their cooperation.
Electorally however Playford's survival depended on the small 
farmers of the party. (The ratio of country to city seats was 2:1) Farmers 
dominated the Assembly ranks of the LCL and nearly all of the Cabinet was 
drawn from 'the yeoman proprietary'. (Blewett & Jaensch 1971) The LCL in 
the Assembly never contained more than three (of a possible 13) members 
elected from the metropolitan region. The nine-member Cabinet of 1962-65 
contained one representative from a metropolitan electorate. And this at 
a time when town planning issues were preoccupying the metropolis.
Thus electoral, parliamentary and party political arrangements 
favoured the country, and the economic objectives of the era did not 
encourage concern with the problems and consequences of city growth. Nor 
were the dominant values receptive to social welfare considerations.
If price control and economic intervention breached 
the principles of laissez faire, Playford agreed with the 
Establishment in keeping welfare provision down. Expenditure 
on schools, hospitals, libraries and social services all 
lagged in the 1950s. The Grants Commission noted Playford's 
'economising on social services', the provision of beds in
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public hospitals trailed the average figure for the 
Commonwealth ... As for the derelicts of the modern 
industrial state, Playford shared with the Establishment 
the belief that ... 'charity should be the most strictly 
private enterprise of all'.
(Blewett & Jaensch 1971: 10)
The development of metropolitan Adelaide and its planning problems 
provides an example of the workings of neo-capitalism and extends analysis 
beyond the bi-partisan interpretation of power politics to the more 
inclusive ideological politics of belief and persuasion discussed by 
Galbraith (for example) in The New Industvial State (1967). This dimension 
is essential to any understanding of the present problems of our cities and 
their planning processes, for problems such as pollution, sewerage reticu­
lation, machine noise and traffic congestion do not respect a bi-partisan 
interpretation of politics. Neither will that interpretation shed much 
light on the causes and consequences of mounting environmental problems.
For the Labor Party as well as for the party more usually associated with 
private enterprise, economic growth has been a strongly avowed social goal. 
No other test of social success has had such nearly unanimous acceptance 
as the annual increase in the Gross National Product.^- That one must pause 
to affirm that beauty is worth the sacrifice of some increase in the Gross 
National Product shows how effectively our beliefs have been accomodated 
to the needs of 'the industrial system'.
As Galbraith (1967: 179) notes, this is true of all countries developed 
or undeveloped; communist, socialist or capitalist. Japan has been 
deemed a successful society since World War II because of its high 
increase in GNP. So also Germany and Israel and lately, France.
Britain with a much smaller increase has been perilously close to being 
a failure.
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In the ten years after the second world war a small group of 
enthusiastic individuals sought to persuade the state government of the 
benefits to be derived from and the urgency of the need for town planning 
legislation. They received scant attention. But, in the manner of an 
'approved contradiction' (a phrase used by Galbraith in a similar context), 
while the state resisted the introduction of any control over the activities 
of private enterprise, its own activities, especially those of the South 
Australian Housing Trust, indulged in a degree of economic and physical 
planning that has made Adelaide the most 'planned' of all Australian cities 
(excluding Canberra) since the war.
The first signs of interest in town planning in Adelaide appeared 
with the formation of the TP Institute of S.A. in April 1948 by a 
collection of engineers, architects and surveyors.^ One of the first 
matters to engage the attention of the new Institute was the visit to 
South Australia in November 1948 of Sir Patrick Abercrombie, author of the 
Greater London Plan and Professor of Town Planning at London University.
He spent six days in Adelaide lecturing and talking with town planners, and 
told a meeting at Adelaide University that 'you may have to break up 
completely this artificial plan of a series of administrative boundaries 
in Adelaide and recreate your town on the much more humane basis of 
community planning'. {Newsj 5 November 1948) His suggestion to establish 
a course in Town and Country Planning was acted on and began in February 
1949 at the South Australian School of Mines (Walkley 1972: 3).
The first Council included J.W. Overall and G. Walkley (Architects); 
W.C.D. Veale (Engineer); later in the year J.N. Yeates (engineer, later 
Highways Commissioner) joined and in 1949 J.W. Murrell (engineer, member 
of Town Planning Committee 1955-65, head, E. & W.S. Dept.) also became 
a member. W.C.D. Veale, MC, DCM, MIE (Aust.), M.I. Mun. E. (Lond.)
Hon FSAIA,Town Clerk of City of Adelaide, was elected President.
2.
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In the same year the President of the Institute (W.C.D. Veale) gave 
evidence on its behalf before the Royal Commission on State Transport, 
emphasising the fact that, in the absence of satisfactory legislation, 
growth and development throughout the state had been mixed and haphazard.
He recommended the preparation of a Master Plan for the Metropolitan Area 
of Adelaide {Advertiser19 February 1949).
The Council of the Institute was preoccupied with the problem of 
persuading the state government to introduce suitable legislation for the 
preparation of a Development Plan for Adelaide and approached the government 
on the matter early in 1950, but received no encouragement. It then decided 
that the public generally and the politicians in particular should be better 
informed about town planning and its implications for Adelaide. At this 
stage the town planning movement was fortunate to have as one of its 
adherents Sir Lloyd Dumas, Managing Director of The Advertiser. He 
cooperated with the Town Planning Institute by financing a visit to 
Adelaide during 1950 by Professor Denis Winston (Professor of Town Planning 
at Sydney University) to write a series of articles for The Advertiser 
explaining the evils of the present haphazard growth of the city and the 
necessity for the preparation of a development plan.^ (Walkley 1972: 4) 
Winston's views were endorsed by civic authorities, architects and planners, 
who urged immediate action on a governmental level to bring about some form 
of master plan correlating the work of municipal, transport, housing and 
other developmental authorities to achieve the coordinated planning of 
Adelaide's future development. It was this occasion that inspired the 
comment by J.H. Vaughan which introduces this chapter {Advertiser ^ 21 July 
1950).
The articles appeared in the Advertiser on 18 July, 'What sort of 
planning for the city's growth and development?', 19 July, 'Traffic 
Problems and crowding in the heart of the city', and 20 July 'Combined 
Operations - the secret of successful planning'.
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Taking advantage of the interest generated by these articles Veale 
then led a deputation to the Premier in August 1950, while Dumas used his 
personal friendship with Playford to apply pressure for action. Playford 
agreed to appoint an honorary committee to report to him on the matter and 
named the Commissioner of Highways (P.A. Richmond) as Chairman of the 
Committee which was to enquire into 'what steps should be taken to provide 
a coordinated plan of development for the metropolitan area' {Advertiser 3 
26 June 1951) .
In September 1952 the Committee completed its report but the state
government was reluctant to move. Meanwhile the thinking of Adelaide's
planners continued to be fertilised by prominent overseas visitors1 and the
press, especially the Advertiser3 continued its wholehearted support for a
2master plan for Adelaide, and published attacks on Playford's intransigence.
It was regrettable for the future of Adelaide that 
the Premier should feel as he did about planning the city, 
a leading architect (J.H.McConnel) said today. He was 
commenting on Playford's reply to Mr Hutchens' question 
in Parliament as to whether he would introduce legislation 
to initiate planning. Playford replied that 'Adelaide had 
been planned as a city many years ago and all that could 
be done now was street widening and other alterations ...
{Advertiser3 5 December 1952)
In August 1951 W.G. Holford (Professor of Town Planning at London
University) spoke in Adelaide on 'Planning for the expanding city',
reinforcing the advice of Abercrombie and Winston {Advertiser 30 August
1951).
Major articles advocating town planning appeared from 1941 onwards: e.g.
- 20 & 21 Dec. 1949, 'Time we ceased to rest on Colonel Light's Laurels' 
and 'A Lesson for South Australia in Britain's satellite towns' by 
Walkley.
- 28 & 29 Jan. 1953, Adelaide criticised by A.N. Kemsley (Victorian Town 
& Country Planning Board) as 'the most moribund of all Australian 
capitals as far as town planning is concerned'.
- 21 November 1953, 'Why can't we have a city plan?' by Walkley.
- 16 December 1953 & 23 June 1954, articles supplied by SAIA on the 
urgent need for a master plan.
- 12 June 1954, '25 Years without a Plan'.
- 14 June 1954, 'Green Belt Project: revival move started'.
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At this stage the few powers that did exist for dealing with the 
direction and nature of metropolitan growth were scattered through a variety 
of Acts, all containing conspicuous weaknesses.
The 1929 Town Planning Act had vested control of subdivision in the 
Town Planner and local councils, who could withhold approval of a sub­
division plan if the land were liable to flooding, if adequate drainage was 
not provided, if the roads had unsatisfactory grades, if the subdivision 
would destroy natural beauty spots or failed to provide adequate reserves. 
Minimum areas and dimensions of allotments were set out in the 1923 Building 
Act. But no control of subdivision was exercised within the City of 
Adelaide, and control outside the metropolitan area concerned only the 
design and suitability of the land. There was no control over the location 
of subdivision or over premature subdivision, and there was lack of co­
ordination between the subdivision and the subsequent use of the land. And 
while the Governor could proclaim that an area could not be subdivided if 
it were in the public interest that the area be preserved as open space, 
such a proclamation could only prevent subdivision; it could not restrict 
change in the use of land.
Under the 1923 Building Act councils could make bylaws regarding 
the structure, use, condition, density, height, location and appearance of 
buildings, and could also make zoning regulations. But most of these powers 
had never been invoked. And, since each council could make its own zoning 
bylaws, a considerable range of laws existed, many falling short of 
reasonable standards. As zoning was a permissive power, councils were 
under no obligation to prepare zoning regulations, and too often when they
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did so it was without regard to overall metropolitan needs. Shopping zones 
along main roads were frequent, despite the resulting danger and congested 
traffic conditions.^
Legislation finally introduced in August 1954 by Playford provided 
for the establishment of a Town Planning Committee of five members to pre­
pare a plan for the proper development of the metropolitan area: for
subdividers to pay the cost of roads and to set aside 10 per cent of land 
for recreation areas; and that no subdivision plan be approved unless it 
could be 'economically and advantageously sewered and reticulated with 
water' (SAPD 1954: 426). In Parliament Playford's true intentions were 
questioned by opposition members -
The obvious stage management, publicity - both 
spontaneous and stimulated - and careful timing of its 
introduction to coincide with the Town Planning 
Conference, all tend to justify the Leader of the 
Opposition's opinion that this Bill is not intended 
to work nor will it give effect to what it purports 
but is rather intended as a sop to the public clamour 
for town planning.
(SAPD 1954: 512)
Nevertheless he was supported by the Labor Party in the Assembly on the 
grounds that the Bill was 'another stage in the Government's conversion to 
the principles which we have been expounding for many years: a very direct
step towards coordinating the system of town planning both as regards 
immediate needs and long range policy' and they suggested that the 
Government go all the way and adopt the complete Labor policy, a Greater 
Adelaide scheme (SAPD 1954: 461).
When the Town Planning Committee (created 1955) presented its Report in 
1962 its review of existing legislation concluded that
acquisition of land for public purposes in advance of 
requirements is usually limited by lack of money rather 
than by lack of powers. Delay in acquisition means 
schools are erected on expensive and poorly located sites, 
open spaces are not provided, land which may be needed for 
roads and railways is subdivided and built on ... The 
existing legislation does not provide adequate safeguards 
against premature subdivision scattered on the fringes.
Thus haphazard development leads to costly provision of 
public and social services.
(Report on Metropolitan Area of Adelaide, 1962: 121).
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Two sorts of opposition were voiced in the Legislative Council. The 
most predictable came from E. Anthoney on the familiar theme of protection 
of property rights -
... a man might have a large piece of land that he could 
easily sell but could be told by the Government that he 
could not sell it because it might be needed for a beauty 
spot. That is taking away the rights of the individual, 
and we are here to safeguard people's property rights.
(SAPD 1954: 1760)
But while he spoke for the rights of property owners to profit from 
their land, a Labor councillor (K, Bardolph) spoke about everyman's demo­
cratic right to control his destiny through the machinery of Parliamentary 
responsibility, and accordingly attacked the Bill as 'a totalitarian 
proposal inasmuch as it will hand the responsibility of this Parliament 
over to a Committee' (SAPD 1954: 1691). In the light of future events his 
opposition was most perceptive.
Don Dunstan (ALP member for Norwood, future ALP leader and Premier) 
thought it
significant that the members of the public who are most 
outspoken against this measure are the speculative land­
holders ... In South Australia many speculative landholders 
have reaped a good profit from the public by means of 
improper subdivisions.
(SAPD 1955: 1047)
And it was true that outside Parliament immediate opposition to the Bill 
came from the Real Estate institute and the Chamber of Commerce, who joined 
forces in a (successful) endeavour to get the Bill withdrawn in its original 
form and delayed until amendments were prepared. The President of the Real 
Estate Institute (W.E. Taplin) submitted a report arguing that if the Bill 
were approved it would result in further inflationary tendencies for land 
in sewered areas, adding to the high cost of homes. (Indicative of the 
widespread ignorance prevalent at this stage was his statement 'that the 
Melbourne town plan introduced in 1932 had had the effect of throwing a 
blanket over Melbourne's real estate until this year when the plan was made
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available to the public'^). The Real Estate Institute wanted its own 
representative on the Town Planning Committee; opposed the section of the 
Bill compelling subdividers to provide roads 24 feet wide and sealed with 
bitumen; felt that the phrase 'economically and advantageously sewered' was 
too wide and should be deleted; and criticised the Bill for making no 
provision for compensation to owners of real estate (in cases, e.g. where 
land was zoned agricultural or roads had to be provided at the owner's 
expense). Lack of such provision, it argued, 'was against the rights and 
freedom of the people'. Its ally, the Chamber of Commerce, wanted the 
whole matter put to a Select Committee (Advertiser 31 August 1954).
Given this unfavourable response to the Bill by organisations from 
which the Liberal Party received major support, no one was surprised when 
the Bill was shelved by the Legislative Council in December 1954.
In diluted form it was reintroduced and passed in 1955, establishing 
a Town Planning Committee of five members with the Town Planner as Chairman, 
and retaining the important provision that land proposed for subdivision 
must be able to be economically watered and sewered. The state was now, 
in form at least, finally moving towards the preparation of a master plan 
for Adelaide. (Like the 1949 Town Planning Act in Victoria, though, there 
was no provision that the plan, once prepared, need be acted on.)
But throughout this protracted struggle to create the more conven­
tional channels for the town planning of private freeholds, the South 
Australian Housing Trust (SAHT), on public land, was well under way with 
a housing and town planning program closely integrated with the state's 
economic planning.
The Melbourne Plan was released in 1929 but was never adopted as a 
statutory plan and therefore cannot be said to have had a major 
effect on the real estate market.
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In 1949, in need of a large area of land on which to concentrate its 
activities, the SAHT purchased 5,000 acres of farmland seventeen miles 
north of Adelaide. Just thirty years after Ebenezer Howard (whose Garden 
City theory had been partly inspired by Light's plan for Adelaide) had 
written to Reade in Adelaide lamenting the concentration of half of 
Australia's population in five cities and advocating properly planned rural 
garden towns as the best corrective, (Advertisers 19 May 1920) the SAHT 
espoused decentralisation by means of new towns as its official ideology 
and began to plan the country's first new town at Elizabeth.
The tendency of large cities to sprawl in a more or 
less haphazard fashion ever further and further afield, 
often running out for many miles along arterial roads in 
'ribbon development' has been a matter of concern not only 
to professional town planners but to all who are aware of 
even some of the innumerable problems created by the 
necessary provision for water supply, sewerage, transport 
and other essential services. Unchecked proliferation of 
suburban areas may solve the immediate housing difficulties 
of very many citizens but only at the cost of imposing 
permanent and ever increasing burdens on the city dwelling 
community as a whole. It is significant that the cost of 
living is substantially higher in the large cities than in 
those of smaller population and area.
Undue centralisation of urban life is an evil, and 
one which, once it has taken place, cannot be reversed.
Active steps are therefore required to prevent over­
centralisation occurring, and these steps must first 
take the form of bold and decisive forward planning for 
the needs of the increasing population of the future.
One of the recognised forms which planned 
decentralisation may take is the development of new 
towns ... Such towns, if they are not merely to be 
'dormitory suburbs', require some reason for their 
existence and this must ordinarily be provided by a 
hard core of industrial or commercial development. The 
town must, in fact, be to a large extent self-sufficient.
(Fourteenth Annual Report, SAHT,
30 June 1950)
In 1954 construction began for a new town of 25,000 people, designed on 
the principles of British new townß - neighbourhoods of five to six 
thousand people surrounded and defined by open spaces, a town centre to 
include civic buildings, shops, commercial facilities and a pedestrian mall,
and initial employment provided at the nearby Weapons Research Establishment.
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By 1957 envisaged population was 50,000 (21st Annual Report) and by mid 
1961 the Trust's 25th Annual Report noted that 5,741 homes had been completed, 
population exceeded 23,000 and many industrial plants had been established. 
Plans were now extended to a town of some 80,000. Just on ten and a half 
years after construction commenced, the ten thousandth house was completed 
and the population had reached 42,400 (Thirtieth Annual Report, June 1966).
Originally conceived to cope with 'the rapid growth of the population 
of Adelaide due to natural increase and immigration and the increasing 
rate of industrial development in the state' (Fourteenth Annual Report) a 
large proportion of Elizabeth's subsequent population was immigrant workers, 
resulting in a somewhat unbalanced population which has caused criticism 
of the 'British ghetto' or 'blue collar government town'. But the Trust's 
leaders were aware that
the social problems of new areas are very great; when 
thousands of people pour into a new area it is not easy 
to weld them into a community. It takes time for 
natural leaders to appear. Most of the families are 
young and most of them are not wealthy enough to endow 
the many social institutions found in older communities ...
The Trust has placed emphasis on the growth of such 
institutions.
(Ramsay 1955-56: 14)
The Trust did what it could about these growing pains, which was 'far more 
than other Australian housing authorities do to organise, entice and pester 
[religious, sporting, charitable, municipal, health and welfare] services 
into position in full force and in good time' (Stretton 1970: 156).
Within the limits of Housing Trust power and financial resources 
then, how successful has Elizabeth been? Its climate and land are relatively 
poor, and house and street design monotonous. Women and children are 
disadvantaged by the surrender to the predominance of the motor car and the 
lack of pedestrian ways. And it has the permanent built-in shortcomings 
'of a low income town on cheap land with few middle class members beyond 
the minimum required for the town's own service' (Stretton 1970: 159).
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Elizabeth's real gains, its reasons for success, are ironic or 
paradoxical ones. Though conceived as a self-sufficient town, its citizens 
are within 35 cheap minutes from Adelaide, to which they can escape from 
the town's social deficiencies or commute to other employment opportunities 
without consuming half their day or their pay. Although built by the 
Housing Trust most of its clients had the option of public housing in other 
parts of the metropolis. Elizabeth contains its fair share of the sick, 
handicapped, disturbed or deserted fragments of families, as do all Housing 
Commission estates. But the SAHT builds a third of all new houses in the 
state
which gets the houses themselves a better social reputation, 
then rents and sells them, without any means test, to all 
comers. So Elizabeth has as many volunteers attracted by 
its jobs, or its superior houses, as captives held by its 
rental houses. Its society is strengthened by large numbers 
of highly skilled workers, by their competent ambitious 
families, and by a scattering of resident doctors, teachers, 
technicians, and small business proprietors.
(Stretton 1970: 162)
Elizabeth may have been conceived by tough-minded oligarchs, but they at 
least
had some holistic understanding of a city as a spirited 
system, and of a worker as a thoughtful sentient man with 
five in his family, and 24 hours in his day; and a life 
to live, and death to think about.
(Stretton 1970: 162, 166)
In terms of distributive justice, costs of journeys to work and 
equality of access to some of the non-material goods of urban life, Howard 
would have been content with the South Australian application of his theory 
On the surface, the irony of the achievement was that the South Australian 
Housing Trust had come into being in the thirties as the principal instru­
ment of Butler's industrialisation programme, had developed in the forties 
under the strict 'anti-planning' auspices of the Playford government, but 
yet produced in the fifties Australia's first 'New Town'.
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But this contradiction is more apparent than real. For as Miliband 
(1969:112) has explained, 'state intervention in economic life entails a 
constant relationship between businessmen and civil servants, not as 
antagonists or even as representatives of different and divergent interests, 
but as partners in the service of a "national interest" which civil servants, 
like politicians, are most likely to define in terms congruent with the long­
term interests of private capitalism'. The new town of Elizabeth, understood 
in this framework of the nature of the 'neo-capitalist state', was an 
example of state planning to improve the living conditions of the productive 
workers (and happy workers, the argument goes, will be more productive ones) 
while in no way disadvantaging the economic interests of private enterprise.
3.
Between 1955, when the Act authorising preparation of a town plan 
for Adelaide was passed, and 1965, when the Labor Party won their first 
election in 32 years, one man leading a small committee struggled to roll 
the stone of town planning up the hill of state government resistance to 
any interference with private enterprise.
In November 1956 in reply to a question about the progress of the 
Town Planning Committee Playford quoted from the Committee's own report 
that their work 'had been handicapped by the absence of a permanent town 
planner, planning staff and adequate accomodation'. (SAPD 1956: 1405) 
Stuart Hart1 was appointed South Australian town planner and Chairman of
S.B. Hart: B.Sc. (Engineering), 1944, AMICE, AMIME; Hart was only 33
when he arrived in Adelaide and politically inexperienced. His previous 
work had been as a member of a team responsible for preparing plans to 
reconstruct Plymouth after World War II, then in the preparation of a 
five year reconstruction plan for the Royal Aircraft Establishment at 
Farnborough, then briefly as deputy planning officer for Fife County 
Council, Scotland (Advertiser3 19 October 1956).
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the Town Planning Committee in October 1956. He was not encouraged by
Playford. According to one member of the Committee^ the first two or three
years of its existence were spent struggling to get funds and staff for
2Hart by the rest of the Committee, who had personal influence with the 
heads of other public service departments.
Hart was immediately warned of the implacable opposition with which
he would be confronted by the Surveyors' Institute, the Real Estate
3Institute, Chamber of Commerce and Adelaide City Council. His extremely 
cautious recommendations and ideas in the sixties must be understood in 
the context of his initial experience in Adelaide and of his knowledge of 
the causes of the demise of town planning in South Australia in the 
twenties.
The situation confronting him in the late fifties was that of a 
public largely uneducated in town planning principles, a government largely 
uninterested in applying them, and an immediate crisis in speculative land 
subdivision, especially along the hills face. His first concern was to 
try to protect the hills' face. Several foothills subdivision plans were 
refused approval by the Town Planning Committee, on the grounds that they 
could not be economically sewered and provided with water. In strict legal 
terms, however, Hart did not have the power to refuse subdivision on these 
grounds, because they did not apply outside the metropolitan area. Thus 
when one subdivider (Skye Estate Ltd.) appealed to the Full Court to squash 
the Town Planning Committee's decision regarding a 180 acre subdivision on 
the upper levels of the Adelaide hills their appeal was upheld [Advertiserj
J.D. Cheesman, in an interview 15 January, 1973.
2 Other members of the Committee were Veale, H.H. Tyler (Town Clerk of 
Enfield) and J.W. Murrell (head of E. & W.S. Dept.).
Interview with Hart, 12 January 1973.3
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22 August 1957, 1 March 1958). Hart had lost his first battle, but his 
Committee's first Report tabled in Parliament at the same time requested 
more extensive powers to deal with such cases.
In 1956 a Town Planning Act Amendment Act, dealing with subdivision
control, had been passed, providing that existing regulations be applied
to rural as well as to urban land.^ But the controls over rural subdivision
in the Amendment Act were much less stringent than those applying to urban
land, in particular with regard to the economic provision of water and
sewerage, which prompted the Town Planner's lament in the Annual Report of
the Town Planning Committee in 1959 that
one of the greatest costs the community has to bear in 
a rapidly expanding city is the provision of public services.
By limiting development to areas where services can be 
applied easily and cheaply, services can keep pace with 
development ... At present the Engineer-in-Chief's 
authority extends only to the defined metropolitan area ...
As the bulk of subdivision is now taking place outside 
the defined metropolitan area, the area should be extended 
as a matter of urgency. The Engineer-in-Chief reported 
on ten applications involving 1,232 allotments adjoining 
the metropolitan area that, if the land had been within 
the area he would have been unable to certify that it could 
be advantageously and economically sewered and reticulated 
with water.'
(Town Planning Committee of South Australia,
Fourth Annual Report, 1959, p.17)
It was also noted that applications for approval of subdivision 
plans had increased by 79 per cent from October 1957 to October 1959. In 
1959 the total number of new residential allotments created was 17,300.
The total number of dwellings completed throughout South Australia in 1958
Apparently ambitious subdividers, deterred by the responsibilities 
placed on them in urban subdivision by the 1955 Act had begun dividing 
agricultural land into three to four acre allotments on the main roads 
from Adelaide. Since these allotments were described as 'farmlets' for 
rural purposes there was no obligation to lodge plans for subdivision 
approval. It was then possible later to resubdivide the land into 
building blocks and yet escape the 1955 Act's requirements for sub­
division plans. This was causing ribbon development along the busy 
main roads out of Adelaide.
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was 8,300, and the same was estimated for 1959. So the rate of creation of 
building allotments was twice the actual requirement. This led the 
Minister to express public concern on 3 November 1959 at the growth of 
speculative investment in land subdivision. But the number of applications 
for approval increased considerably in November and December and property 
owners made it clear that they would brook no delay in or interference with 
their profitmaking activities. They formed the South Australian Landowners' 
Protection League and in September 1959 their Secretary (K.J. Tomkinson, 
land agent) protested strongly against the 'increasing, costly and 
unnecessary delays by the Town Planning Office in processing subdivision 
applications'. A public meeting of landowners was arranged to protest 
against 'injustices' in the Town Planning Act and regulations {Advertiser3 
17 September 1959). Here was another defeat for Hart, who, in the absence 
of the necessary powers, had been using delaying tactics on undesirable 
subdivision plans. The trouble arising from this probably accounts for 
Hart's 'impeccable cooperation' (Stretton 1970: 174) in processing plans 
to carve up the hills' face in the sixties.
By July 1960 the Town Planning Committee felt the situation to be 
so crucial that it produced an Interim Report urgently recommending a 
system of rural zoning based on the economic provision of public services 
and the extension of the area in which the Engineer-in-Chief's certificate 
applied. The Report also regarded as essential the retention of the open 
character of the hills' face, seeing this as of equal significance to the 
provision of parklands by Colonel Light.
Presumably as a response to these urgent recommendations the Liberal 
Government introduced the Town Planning Act Amendment Bill in October 1960 
'to extend control of subdivision plans to all areas, not just the 
metropolitan area'. The Bill was shelved. Consequently the Town Planning 
Committee Report on the Metropolitan Area of Adelaide, Report on Objections,
1965, repeated its now monotonously regular theme -
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The extension of the power of the Engineer-in-Chief to 
ensure that subdivision only takes place where public 
services can be supplied economically, is one of the 
principal recommendations of the Committee's report.
No action has been taken with regard to this important 
matter, consequently premature subdivision continues, 
unsatisfactory living conditions are being created and 
the cost of providing public services to these areas 
will be extremely high. Urgent action is necessary.
(Town Planning Committee 1965: 7)
Meanwhile in 1962 the Committee's main task, its Report and Plan for the
Development of the Metropolitan Area of Adelaide3 had been released. 'It
presumably represented the Town Planner's judgment of the best his
unpromising government might be persuaded to accept' (Stretton 1970: 173).
Hart may well have been a 'scrupulous democrat' when he arrived in Adelaide.
Brief experience with the city's political realities would have taught him
in any case that scrupulous democracy was the only possible strategy to
adopt. For with an unsympathetic government, an apathetic public, and an
actively hostile collection of vested interests the only course likely to
succeed in changing government attitudes was public clamour for town
planning. The 1920s' experience also suggested to Hart that planners
can never expect ... to be too far ahead of public opinion.
... on reflection, perhaps the lesson of the repeal (of 
1929) is that town planning is one tenth bright ideas and 
nine tenths of sheer hard work putting those ideas into 
effect over what may prove to be a very long period of time.
(Hart 1967: 60)
Accordingly much of his time was spent talking to citizens and citizen 
groups, councils and industrialists, about the advantages of town planning. 
In ten years he delivered over 350 talks, which works out to one tenth of 
one per cent of the population - the smallest number that Hart believes 
need to be convinced and vocal before any politician will act.^ This 
approach demands close attention to citizens' preferences and keeping close 
to present trends, and is of necessity fairly conservative since it depends 
on the articulation of needs and ideas by largely uninformed citizens.
1 Interview with Hart.
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This conservative approach was inevitably then, built into the 1962 Plan.
As Platten"*- noted,
there can be little doubt that the plan was documented to 
be politically acceptable to the government of the day, a 
government which had shown little enthusiasm for planning. 
Understandably directed toward acceptance and subsequent 
legislation the plan became for the most part an extra­
polation of current trends.
(Platten 1969: 118)
Specifically, it espoused the 'preference for single family dwellings'
(1962 Metropolitan Development Plan Report: 5) and therefore allowed for 
continuing residential densities lower than Canberra's. It argued that 
'there is little valid evidence to support the view that the metropolitan 
area could or should be limited, either in the size of the population or 
the area of the land built on' (TP Committee 1962: 5) and therefore accepted 
that 'the development of the metropolitan area will continue'. On the one 
hand it agreed that 'the desirability of greater dispersal of the population 
over the state is widely accepted'. On the other hand, it decided that in 
assessing future population 'the possibility of organised decentralisation 
has been excluded and a forecast is made only on the basis of social and eco­
nomic trends'(TP Committee 1962:57). The Committee also accepted the increas­
ing use of the private motor car and therefore proposed several major free­
way systems in preference to large scale public transport improvements.
2Yet within its self-imposed but realistic limitations, the Plan's 
positive proposals were sensible and humane enough -
Then Chairman of the Public Relations Committee of the RAIA.
'. . . a statutory planning authority is also faced with grim reality 
and cannot indulge in theoretical academic exercises. A development 
plan must be acceptable and workable; and to that end judgment must 
be based on what can or cannot be done within the prevailing economic, 
social and political situation' (Hart 1972).
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The type of expansion most desirable for metropolitan 
Adelaide is in the form of metropolitan districts 
varying in size from 50,000 to 100,000. Each would 
be self-contained with industry, commerce, recreation, 
and educational facilities. Individual identity can be 
achieved by separating each district by strips of open 
development - large institutions and recreation areas - 
and each district should also be served by fast means 
of transport with the central area. It is essential that 
easy access to open country or beaches be achieved from 
each district.
(Town Planning Committee 1962: 230)
The Plan was clear as to the mechanisms of power needed to implement 
its proposals. It would require additional measures to control land sub­
division more effectively; a unified system of zoning to govern the use 
and development of land; new measures to ensure that land for essential 
public purposes (highways, schools, open spaces, etc.) is available at the 
right time and place; and a more effective way of obtaining land for public 
open space. (Town Planning Committee 1962: 289)
What, then, came of the 1962 Plan?
When it received this plan the Government was 
quicker than usual in deciding to do nothing rash.
It published the Report and Plan the next day and 
next year amended the Act to allow a further year 
for objectors to object. It considered the Plan's 
traffic proposals for three years, then ordered another 
survey of metropolitan transport needs, which took 
three further years to carry out.
(Stretton 1970: 176)
Meantime the Assistant Town Planner, Hans Westerman, resigned to 
take a position in Canberra, observing on his way out that the difference 
between Canberra and South Australia was that Canberra possessed a blue­
print upon which it Would act, but that South Australia had a blueprint 
upon which it might or might not act {Advertiser, 4 August 1964). Whether 
it did or not was no reflection on the effort invested by Hart, which 
according to the Advertiser leader writer in November 1964 was nothing less
than a 'quiet revolution'.
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A decisive breakthrough is occurring in the ability 
of town planning supporters to secure enforcement of the 
main provisions of the town plan for metropolitan Adelaide. 
It is a "quiet revolution" with no abrupt disintegration of 
some stubborn administrative sound barrier, and no obvious 
change yet in the cautious attitude of the state government 
Rather it is due to the gradual conversion of many hundreds 
of community leaders in business, industry, the professions 
and local government to the view that, subject to necessary 
amendments, the town plan is basically a matter of common 
sense ...
The new outlook on town planning in the South 
Australian community is a personal tribute to the Town 
Planner and his belief in the ultimate power of reason to 
achieve more than the big stick. What he has said has made 
enough sense to enough people to swing the tide his way.
As a story of patient persistence it probably has few equals 
in South Australian public life.
(Advertiser 3 26 November 1964)
This was a fitting epitaph to the stage planning had reached in the -twilight 
days of the Playford era, and an anticipation of the new dawn of the Labor 
Government of 1965, the first for thirty two years.
4.
Between 1965 and 1970 the long campaign to introduce town planning 
came to fruition with the passing of the Town Planning and Development Act 
of 1967, the creation of the State Planning Authority (SPA) and the 
production of the Metropolitan Adelaide Transportation Study (MATS) in 
1968. These were the years of the 'technocrats', in that the land-use and 
the transportation planning had been left to the technical experts (a 
practice given institutional sanction in the constitution of the SPA) and 
the fruits of their work were released to the public in 1968. No one was 
more surprised than they themselves at the intensity of the hostility with 
which their MATS plan was met, for until then there had been very little 
public interest in the planning process. This section explores the nature 
of the planning that emerged in the 1960s and the nature of the opposition 
to it, and the final section examines some of the ongoing effects of that
opposition since 1970.
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Neither the legislation introduced by Playford in 1954 nor the 
amended legislation of the following year mentioned long term planning goals 
or objectives. The 1955 Act which created the Town Planning Committee to 
prepare a development plan was given no guidelines by Parliament as to the 
future development of Adelaide and members of both Houses entered into 
almost no discussion of where the city was going and why.
The production of the 1962 Plan after almost seven years still 
brought no discussion in Parliament of planning or of road construction 
programmes of the size envisaged in the 1962 Report (97 miles of freeways). 
There was no general thesis on roads or their relationship to the city, the 
people or land use. There was though a general belief in their inevitability 
and their economic worth in terms of the State's progress (SAPD 1962: 912).
Discussion revolved around zoning regulations and subdivision with 
no broad analysis of either community planning or problems of noise, 
pollution and congestion. The inevitability of a motorised society was 
accepted and turned by LCL members into a statement of ideological belief."^ 
Of all the occasions appropriate to such discussions only three times was 
the subject seriously broached.2
C.C.D. Octoman (SAPD 1965: 74) 'Encouragement is an admirable thing but 
coercion into using public transport is another matter. [That] would be 
a deplorable misuse of power. Time and again we have seen bureaucratic 
controls stifle free enterprise.'
T. Playford (SAPD 1963-4: 650) 'members should realise that in a report 
of this description (1962 Plan) where many private interests are 
involved, it is difficult to arrive quickly at a correct decision.'
K. Bardolph, ALP (SAPD 1963-4: 1881) 'Town and country planning is the 
direction of the development and use of land to serve the economic and 
social welfare of the community in respect of convenience, health and 
amenity ... Purpose must dominate any town plan ... The object of town 
planning is the well being of the people in so far as physical environ­
ment can contribute to that end.'
Sir A. Rymill, at whose insistence the MATS plan was brought to 
Parliament after being called a 'service plan' did have a vision of the 
city and had goals (see SAPD 1969: 999-1001) in contrast to his party's 
(LCL) ad hoc approach. But he always voted with his party.
(footnote continued)
202
Yet, as has often been noted, the most powerful and insistent of 
the forces shaping the city are those vested in changing modes of trans­
portation. Jensen (1968: 37) stated that the MATS proposals would 
'constitute the single biggest change in the Adelaide metropolitan area to 
occur in the whole of its 130 years of history.' In recent years all major 
Australian cities have undertaken transportation studies and the controversy 
thereby triggered is one that inevitably develops when communities face up 
to the real costs of the motor age and the rising demand for individual 
mobility. In Australia the dispersion of cities following the increased 
mobility given by the car has taken place in the almost complete absence of 
coordinated planning, apart from very general zoning regulations. Such 
zoning has usually been the responsibility of local authorities whose aim 
has been to attract as much development as possible, preferably private 
rather than public because of rateable values. This has resulted in 
commercial and industrial expansion along the most frequently travelled 
highways; tentacles of mixed uses (factories, junk yards, shops, houses, 
used car lots and service stations) decorated with garish advertising, 
eventually inhibit the very mobility that first attracts the businesses.
But as the Buchanan Report (1964: 245) notes
poor accessibility is not the whole of the traffic 
problem ... The penetration of motor vehicles through­
out urban areas is bringing its own peculiar penalties 
of accidents, anxiety, intimidation by large or fast 
vehicles that are out of scale with the surroundings, 
noise, fumes, vibration, dirt and visual intrusion on 
a vast scale. Included in the last item is the 
proliferation of establishments serving or served by 
the motor vehicle.
1 (continued from previous page)
T.M. Casey (SAPD 1965: 425) saw dangers in piecemeal muddling with the 
nature of the city. 'I think we have a choice between people on the one 
hand and motor vehicles on the other. I hope that in this country we 
do not fall into the pit falls that people in many overseas cities have 
fallen into, especially America'.
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The freeway proposals of the MATS plan paid no attention to these 
problems and ignored the impact of the proposals both on the people and on 
the visual integrity of the city. So we need to describe the political 
arena in which it was decided to conduct a transportation study, and the 
ideologies of those responsible will indicate another reason why there has 
been in South Australia no integrated conception of city and regional 
planning on humanistic lines.
The lack of interest shown by Parliamentary members over the last 
fourteen years is part of this problem. Why is there a lack of ideas in 
both parliamentary parties? Is parliamentary democracy suitably structured 
to be able to discuss the problems of urban development?
These problems are traceable in part to the architecture of
Adelaide's political society, delineated in Chapter 2 and the first section
of this chapter. The inertia since 1955 can be explained partly by the
abrogation of responsibility to public servants and in particular to the
Town Planning Committee, then the Joint Steering Committee of MATS, then
2the Metropolitan Transportation Committee, and partly by the thirty year
influence of Playford's paternalism over many members. Both deserve more
detailed attention than space allows. Playford's ideology had social
effects as significant as those resulting from the transfer of responsibility
3to public servants with their ideology of 'technical rationality'.
But first, a look at some other relevant factors impinging on the 
consciousness of parliamentarians of both parties, presenting definite 
parameters to legislative possibilities, and helping to explain the lack of 
a far sighted planning philosophy.
 ^ Ordered by the LCL government in 1965 and completed just after its 
return to office in 1968.
2 This very development was feared by one lone perceptive parliamentarian 
in 1955 (see earlier comment).
3 The term is Altshuler's (1966: 345).
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'The largest single industry in South Australia and the major
contributor to the postwar industrial growth is the motor vehicle industry'
(S.A. Year Book 1968: 441). It continues,
these large motor vehicle plants [G.M.H. Pty. Ltd. and 
Chrysler Aust. Ltd.] absorb the products of many 
establishments producing vehicle components. Other 
manufacturers produce omnibus and commercial vehicle 
bodies, fork lift trucks, garage equipment, trailers, 
caravans and a wide range of vehicle accessories ...
Repairs to motor vehicles are carried out in larger 
workshops operated by new vehicle distributors and in  ^
many smaller workshops associated with service stations.
The motor vehicle industry in South Australia accounts for approximately
30 per cent of the total value of production and employs about 39 per cent
of the total work force (S.A. Year Book and S.A. Statistical Register,
parts V6, Class 4, and VI, 1966-7). In a state lacking in industry and
natural resources the presence of firms playing such a large part in the
financial structure of the state cannot be ignored. The 1962 Plan
acknowledges this:
Secondary industry is destined to play an 
increasingly important part in the future development 
of the state ... In the future industrial expansion 
is assured by certain projected developments of key 
significance. The most important is the new steel 
making plant of B.H.P. Ltd. and a large scale expansion 
programme by G.M.H. Ltd. ... which will encourage 
further linked industries ... This is the background 
against which the future urban economy of metropolitan 
Adelaide must be considered.
(Town Planning Committee 1962: 43)
It is also an important source of employment. A transport programme geared
to the motor industry is understandably something all companies in the
2industry would endorse.
See also R.O. Jose 'The effect of MATS on industry and commerce' in 
MATS and the Future Development of Adelaide (1969).
'This state depends a lot upon the motor car industry ... I know the 
great benefit to commerce and industry in this state that the motor car 
provides'. C.M. Hill (then Minister for Roads and Transport and 
Minister in charge of Town Planning 1968-70) {Advertiser 7 February 
1969).
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Professor Winston has said
the motor car must be sensibly brought under control but 
this means doing battle with the vast lobby of motor 
manufacturers, cement and rubber suppliers, highways 
contractors, and sometimes traffic 'experts' themselves.
(quoted by Jensen 1969: 43).
Jensen writes that
it is indeed obvious that in attempting to counter 
development and transportation proposals for Adelaide 
a powerful vested interest exists which appears to see in 
the urban freeway the furtherance of the interests of 
business, commerce and industry. Not the least of those 
'vested interests' are politicians who, through deference 
to highway engineering expertise and the 'economic 
equilibrium of the state' view proposals for state 
economic expansion as sacred cows not to be interfered 
with. (Jensen 1969: 46)
But if the Liberal Party has traditionally supported and nurtured 
free enterprise, the Labor Party is also curtailed by the employment factor 
of this balance, and any attempt to interfere with transport proposals 
could bring the lowering of employment potential and union opposition.
Thus statements and actions by the Labor Party concerning MATS are in 
keeping with the general feeling and sensitivity of the ALP to big business 
and the Commonwealth."*"
Another relevant factor in the thinking and activities of politicians 
is the multitude of responsibilities held by local, state and federal 
governments in town planning matters, which readily lends itself to 'passing 
the buck' and disclaiming responsibility for any task which is not easily 
categorised. In South Australia there are fifty five government departments, 
ten of which have duties and responsibilities for aspects of planning and
The onset of regional recession in South Australia coincided with the 
first term of office of a Labor Government since 1933. Thus at the 
1967 annual general meeting of the LCL the Commonwealth Health Minister, 
Dr Forbes, claimed that South Australia was 'an island of stagnation in 
a sea of prosperity' and attributed this to the 'socialist policies of 
the State government' (Lundberg 1969: 4).
206
city development. Local councils also have responsibilities, especially in 
connection with roadworks, sewerage and rubbish disposal. And the 
Commonwealth, as a revenue provider, has some responsibility. The clearly 
defined responsibilities of each department in theory mean in practice that 
no one, for example, is responsible for measuring decay and the physical 
impact of the car on the city environment (Colman 1967: 83-86).
Two of the most powerful agencies of planning administration in 
South Australia are the State Planning Authority (SPA) and the Highways 
Department. The SPA was created by legislation passed by the Dunstan Labor 
Government in 1967 after a protracted struggle in the Legislative Council 
where the chief protagonist against town planning legislation was the real 
estate agent Murray Hill. The Planning and Development Bill introduced in 
February 1966 was to replace all previous Town Planning Acts and to give 
effect to the 1962 Plan's general intentions. It created the SPA, which was 
to be chaired by the Director of Planning (formerly Town Planner, S.B. Hart) 
and which could buy and develop land; recommend planning areas; prepare 
development plans; prepare, recommend and administer planning regulations; 
redevelop land; give interim development control of local government areas 
while planning regulations are being prepared; administer a planning and 
development fund; and set up advisory committees and public reports. It 
also set up an independent Planning Appeal Board to 'safeguard the interests 
of the individual'. Its membership comprises a legal practitioner as 
Chairman, a local government representative, a representative from the 
Australian Planning Institute, and a businessman. There were provisions 
for land to be reserved for future public use, for interim controls, and 
for uniform rules about zoning and subdivision. A flexible arrangement 
between the SPA and local councils was intended to leave councils some 
freedom to decide their part in planning their areas but not the freedom to 
do no planning at all. And the Bill gave the 1962 Plan official status as
Adelaide's development plan.
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It took nine months to get through the Lower House. The Legislative
Council then proceeded to deal with it brutally and quickly, provoking
Dunstan to public denunciation.’*’ Murray Hill, who led the hostile opposition,
wondered 'to what extent town planning should be permitted'. He himself
had a conspiratorial interpretation of the upsurge of public interest in
the matter. He believed that 'a forceful group of planners in this state
is endeavouring to mould public opinion in an attempt to have the principle
of town planning accepted', but he was not convinced
that most people are prepared to accept, or even want, 
such planning ... [the planners] realise and acknowledge 
that town planning is not particularly popular with the 
people unless the climate for its acceptance has been 
created. I believe that these people have formed an 
association and they are endeavouring to establish that 
climate ... At its meetings the association attempts to 
mould public opinion ... However I think many people 
are still cautious about the results that will ensue if 
we are not careful in controlling the degree of power 
to be given to the town planning authority under this 
measure.
(SAPD 1966: 2870-1)
Hill claimed to be speaking for the little man, the businessman and the
alderman. Planning would, he thought, adversely affect ordinary people's
lives, industries' prosperity and local governments' powers. There was
some inconsistency in Hill's denial here of the right of planners to try to
influence public opinion when, in 1970, as Minister for Transport, he
purchased some 500 copies of the Sunday Mail containing a metropolitan
development questionnaire, in order, apparently, to influence the result.
As The Advertiser politely observed (26 May 1970)
the most charitable view ... is that [Hill] is so 
wedded to the MATS plan that he saw nothing wrong 
in whipping up public support for it by ordering 
papers by the hundred, and, as he says, distributing 
them among his friends so that they could have their 
enthusiastic say as well.
He accused the Council of 'Obstructionism' and of being 'a block to 
progress and the will of the people' in not passing the Town Planning 
Bill, claiming that the government had been elected on a clear under­
taking to introduce planning legislation {Advertiser 3 19 November 1966).
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Hill also opposed the power of the SPA to purchase, subdivide and develop 
land. This was an 'insidious form of socialism' and Hill was 'definitely- 
opposed to any legislation of a socialistic kind' (SAPD 1966: 2874).
In spite of all this, the Act which finally emerged was surprisingly 
intact. Appeals arrangements were made slightly tougher, some statutory 
planning delays made more lengthy and some planning initiatives made more 
the preserve of the local authorities. And a couple more businessmen, one 
from the Real Estate Institute, were added to the SPA.
An examination of the values and ideas of the people in both the 
SPA and the Highways Department suggests the bias the occurs when so much 
decision making devolves from Parliament to such bodies. These two agencies 
illustrate de facto goals and professional bias almost free from public 
scrutiny. The values of the agencies that determine the shape of the city 
need to be understood, and they are revealed on the most immediate level by 
looking at the composition of the bodies responsible for that planning.
The Town Planning Committee created by the 1955 Act to prepare the 
metropolitan development plan was chaired by Stuart Hart, who was the only 
member qualified as a planner. His earlier training though was in engineer­
ing. Of the five members of the Committee only two were not engineers. 
W.C.D. Veale was the Chief Engineer and Town Clerk for the City of Adelaide 
and favoured freeways as instruments of efficiency. He was, on many issues, 
a humane planner who did think about people. (He insisted on a garden in the 
south parklands that was named after him being something the old folk could 
really enjoy and not a sterile architectural exhibition.) But he was not 
qualified as a planner and both he and J.D. Cheesman^ were members of the 
Adelaide Club. J.W. Murrell was the Chief Engineer in charge of sewerage 
with the Engineering and Water Supply Department and member of four
1 J.D. Cheesman, Federal President of RAIA 1948-50, President SAIA 1945-47. 
Involved in establishment of Town Planning Institute of South Australia.
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engineering societies. His concern was with the efficient provision of 
1 2services. H.H. Tyler was neither planner, architect nor engineer, but 
Town Clerk of Enfield. His position demanded prime concern with efficiency 
and precision. In short, the Town Planning Committee was oriented towards
bplanning in terms of technical efficiency.
The Committee's 1962 Report stressed the need for coordinating all 
forms of transport to ensure the most economic and efficient movement of 
people and goods. The traffic system recommended was the extension of 
public transport services, including some new railway lines, and the 
construction of 97 miles of freeways and extensions to existing roads. A 
Joint Steering Committee was set up by the LCL government to follow up 
these transport proposals. It comprised the Commissioner of Highways as 
Chairman, the Town Planner, the Railways Commissioner (R.J. Fitch), the 
General Manager of the MTT (F.R. Harris) and W.C.D. Veale. Under them the 
Metropolitan Adelaide Transportation Study was set up and they were 
responsible for overall direction and making of policy decisions during 
the study. Their assistants or deputies gave technical advice through the 
Technical Advisory Committee. Among the two committees were six engineers 
in a membership of ten. Four of these (Hart, Johinke, Bubb and Flint) had 
town planning diplomas. Harris had accounting qualifications. Speechley 
(the Deputy Town Planner) first qualified as a surveyor, and the other two 
members had mathematical backgrounds. The consultants employed by the 
Joint Steering Committee (De Leuw Cather & Co.) were engineering consultants 
who further biased the final result by their specialised technical interest 
in planning. The fact that 'the goals and objectives of the study as well
Interview with Stuart Hart.
H.H. Tyler. Town Clerk of Enfield since 1941. Member of Local Government 
Clerks' Examination Board, Local Government Officers' Classification 
Board, fellow of the Institutes of Municipal and Public Administration.
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as the formulation of the recommendations were established in conference 
with the Joint Steering Committee' (MATS 1968: 4) made little difference 
given the similarity of outlook of both groups and the complete affinity 
of professional interests. Hart was perhaps the one exception to this. On 
his return from America in 1964 he reported,
The freeways carry, and attract, large volumes of 
traffic and as each new one is opened, capacity volumes 
are soon reached creating a demand for more freeways.
The congestion on freeways at peak hours and the decline 
in public transport are causing public concern. Building 
more freeways is clearly not the most efficient or 
economic way of meeting the needs of the expanding 
metropolitan area.
(Hart 1964: 1-2)
But Hart, significantly, was not the Chairman of the Committee. Moreover, 
his ardour for these large battles had been dampened by his earlier defeats 
over protection of the hills' face, so he was unlikely to take a strong 
stand against a freeway programme.
One observer of the American city planning process has concluded that
Highway engineers tend to think that the setting 
of highway routes should be a technical endeavour.
Others, including city planners, often complain that 
highway engineers are inclined to handle the side 
effects of route location - which may be as important 
as intended effects - as peripheral matters.
(Altshuler 1966: 317)
More generally, as Meynaud argued in a study of French technocrats:
As for the will, so often affirmed, to treat problems 
without reference to ideology - which is one of the 
constant themes of the technocratic argument - it simply 
means the acceptance of dominant ideologies and, con­
sequently, of the relations of forces which they express 
or justify.
(Miliband 1969: 114)
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This tends to invalidate arguments about the objectivity and political 
neutrality of public servants.^ The idea of political neutrality demands 
that individuals have no values and make no choices. But no planning 
information, as Stretton has pointed out in relation to transportation 
planning in Australia, is more political - and moral or immoral - than the 
traffic planner's choice of what to feed into his computer.
If a traffic planner quietly leaves pedestrians, 
school journeys, residential noise and adjacent property 
values and amenities out of his test programme, and if 
he includes direct compensations but not true replace­
ment and relocation costs, or if he leaves out everything 
that can't be quantified simply because it can't be 
quantified, and announces his result as 'an optimum 
transport system' - then ... he has deliberately chosen 
to plan for some classes and individuals against others 
and probably for a general increase in his city's real 
inequalities.
(Stretton 1970: 273)
The South Australian Highways Department confined its terms of 
reference to 'technical' considerations to such an extent that objections 
were met before they were heard. One of the victories for technical 
rationality was the proviso of the Metropolitan Transportation Committee 
to people living along the proposed Noarlunga Freeway that those wishing 
to present a submission must do so in the form of an alternative freeway. 
That is, the Committee would only allow one solution - the freeway 
solution - and the only question to be resolved was where it was to go.
'As between contending classes and interests in advanced capitalist 
societies, civil servants are not 'neutral': they are allies, whether
they are aware of it or not, of capital against labour. The state 
bureaucracy, in all its parts, is not an impersonal, un-ideological, 
a political element in society, above the conflicts in which classes, 
interests and groups engage. By virtue of its ideological dispositions, 
reinforced by its own interests, that bureaucracy, on the contrary, is 
a crucially important and committed element in the maintenance and 
defence of the structure of power and privilege inherent in advanced 
capitalism'. (Miliband 1969: 115-116)
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In December 1969 the Town and Country Planning Association learned
that the Committee would be taking evidence on the alternatives to the
Noarlunga Freeway. The Association sought to give evidence on noise, air
pollution, alternative land use patterns, and the inadequacy of the MATS
plan to cope with these problems. The Association was told that none of
these things were relevant to the enquiry and permission to appear before
2the Committee was refused.
Transportation is an essential element of urban development which 
should be integrated with people's needs for it and with a planning process 
responsive to those needs. But this is not possible when allocations to 
the Highways Department make it independent of Parliamentary control. 
Transport Minister Hill realised this (together with the advantages of the 
plan to the motor car and real estate industries) and attempted to have the 
plan ratified as a 'service plan'.^
The three main sources of road finance are state motor vehicle
taxation and drivers' license fees, Commonwealth grants, and property
rates imposed by municipal councils. The main bulk of Highways money comes
from allocations under the Commonwealth Roads Act (Mathews 1967: 110-129).
Costs considered in the allocation of this money are
construction, reconstruction, property acquisition and 
maintenance. Benefits considered (are) community 
benefits arising from reduced time, accidents and 
vehicle operating costs, including saving in private
Formed 1963-4 out of initiatives from members of the professional Town 
Planning Institute who thought there was a need for a general citizens' 
organisation to act as a militant protest group and as disseminator of 
information (interview with Gavin Walkley).
Planning3 S.A. No.15, May-June 1970, p.2 (publication of the Town and 
Country Planning Association).
Just before the Parliamentary decision on MATS Hill said, 'Unless we 
adopt the MATS plan this State will lose $59 m. in Federal money.' 
{Planning3 S.A. 1970: 3) .
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travel time. It (is) not considered acceptable to 
measure in monetary terms such things as (are) 
difficult of a monetary evaluation, including 
disruption to community life associated with road 
works.
(Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on 
Commonwealth Financial Assistance to the 
States for Roads, 1969)
Yet this is the largest of the social factors associated with freeways.
The freedom and autonomy available to the Highways Department in 
the control of the most powerful force re-shaping the city is freedom from 
public scrutiny, financial self-sufficiency and effective insulation from 
opposition by monopolising 'technical expertise'.
The SPA is not an effective counterbalance to this predominance of 
engineering values in the government agencies responsible for Adelaide's 
transport planning. The chairman of the SPA is the Director of Planning, 
Hart. Three top public servants are automatic members - the Director of 
E. & W.S. Department, the Commissioner of Highways, and the Surveyor-General. 
The remaining seven members are 'appointed by the Governor' - one nominated 
by the Minister of Housing and one by the Minister of Transport, one by 
the Adelaide City Council and one from each of a panel of three names 
submitted by the Municipal Association of South Australia, the Local 
Government Association, the Chamber of Manufacturers, and the Real Estate 
Institute. So four and possibly six could have engineering backgrounds, 
and two, possibly four, even five, could have interests in property which 
could be considered undesirable. An anology drawn by one commentator shows 
the major area of concern about the SPA -
If a mouse conservation association contains cats, 
we may be suspicious of its effectiveness, even if we 
believe them to be high minded cats. If the mouse 
organisations have no representative, our suspicions 
will be increased. If the end result is a decrease in 
the mouse population our suspicions will be confirmed.
(D.A. Hester Advertiser} 22 July 1970)^
1 See also Advertiser discussion from 14 to 24 July 1970.
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This, he concludes, is the situation on the SPA: no formal representation
for conservation groups and a history of decisions in favour of sub­
divisions .
Other bodies with vital interests in the by-products of the freeway 
routes - education and housing authorities for example - had no official 
representation in the discussion of the largest and most dramatic plan to 
re-shape Adelaide, a plan requiring $436 million for highways and $105 
million for public transport and anticipating that the trend in declining 
public transport would continue. Of the money spent on highways, $280 
million was for 'the highest type of highway facility' - the freeways 
(MATS Report- 1968: 28 & 177).
This section has gone on rather long, but it seems necessary to 
illustrate that no matter how long awaited and fought for, planning per se 
is not necessarily a good thing. These were bleak years in the record of 
Adelaide's stock of ideas and intended actions in the planning field. But 
they produced fertile results in a healthy citizen backlash of distrust 
for planning, or rather a distrust of leaving it to the so called 'experts' 
which has resulted in major policy changes over the past two years (1970-2)
How did it happen then that what looked like one of the most 
unassailable power structures in Australia has proven over the last few 
years so fertile for intervention? This general problem of social and 
political change has no general theoretical answer. Whether change comes 
about from above or from below must depend on the historical situation.
When Hart came to Adelaide he perceived that only by massive public demand 
would South Australia's rulers be persuaded to accept some modicum of 
planning. His single-handed public education campaign, involving prominent 
citizens' organisations, councils and so on, matured at just the right time 
to reap its just harvest. By the late sixties, as never before, a strong 
dose of citizen indignation needed to be injected into the body politic
s
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to counterbalance the predominance of the engineers and their MATS plan.
The LCL government's own handling of the MATS plan helped bring about this 
'revolution from below'. Opposition began among individuals and groups 
whose professional or personal interests were threatened. But the more the 
Plan was debated the more did politicians and public perceive the basic 
issues and implications involved. And opposition was strengthened by 
Premier Hall's handling of the matter.
When the plan was released in August 1968 his Government insisted 
it would not commit itself to MATS until it had been studied and objections 
had been heard for six months, and it had been debated in Parliament. Yet 
on February 19, 1969, he issued a Ministerial statement to the effect that 
the Government endorsed all the general principles of MATS, including the 
expressways and freeways. All this in spite of mounting articulate press 
and public hostility, in spite of 966 submissions and 24 council reports 
(between August 1968 and February 1969) and despite an urgent motion by his 
own party in the Legislative Council the previous week that - 'the MATS 
should be considered by Parliament before any substantial portion of the 
plan is approved by the Government.' (SAPD- 1969: 3506, Sir Arthur Rymill).1
Rymill's criticisms of MATS were both basic and specific. He argued 
that the plan 'has the attitude that no one counts except the traffic 
engineer and that no considerations count other than traffic engineering ... 
Sweeping geometrical curves have been drawn over the plans of the metropoli­
tan area and no part of the plan has sought to avoid things that might be 
in the way of these geometrical curves.' (SAPD 1969: 3507) He took the
usual Legislative Council stand on 'the rights of property ownership', but 
also attacked the imbalance in the Plan between the development of public
1 Sir Arthur Rymill, MLC, member of the Adelaide Club and Chairman of the 
Bank of Adelaide.
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and private transport, and the whole concept of freeways - 'People who say 
these freeways are traffic generators have been scoffed at by the 
Department. Many of us know they are. When we make them we are only 
building up fresh trouble for ourselves.' (SAPD 1969: 3510)
He ended by pointing to the financial absurdity of the transport 
proposals, and by urging the Government 'to drop the city and suburban 
freeway schemes and to recommend satisfactory alternatives.'(SAPD 1969:3512) 
Murray Hill opposed Rymill's motion on the grounds that MATS was a serV'ioe 
plan, not a development plan, and therefore did not have to be debated by 
Parliament. But Premier Hall eventually relented a little in face of multi­
directional pressures, and in March 1969 established the Metropolitan 
Transport Committee, chaired this time by Stuart Hart, not the Highways 
Commissioner, 'to recommend any variations in the proposals of the MATS.'
In August 1969 Opposition Leader Dunstan moved that the plan be 
withdrawn and referred to the State Planning authority for reassessment on 
grounds of financial feasibility, inadequate public transport provisions, 
and unnecessary destruction of homes and other properties. Dunstan's 
criticisms were three-fold, and he quoted extensively from 'Tomorrow's 
Transportation', the official report of the US Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (published April 1969) to reinforce his points. The 
first was that MATS was based on the false assumption that the private car 
was and would continue to be the only acceptable form of transport. As the 
US report showed, there were many new systems of transportation that ought 
to be investigated in any forward transportation planning (e.g. dial-a-bus, 
dual mode vehicle systems, moving belts ...). Second, he questioned the 
desirability of freeways - 'The dislocation of people and businesses, the 
erosion of the real property tax base, the distortion of land use, and the 
dollar and cents cost, make this an increasingly unacceptable solution'
(SAPD 1969; 850) .
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The social consequences of the transport proposals formed his third 
main criticism - the fate of 'that section of the people who must always 
be served by public transport. If we are to have a constantly declining 
public transport system (and the forecast in this plan is for just that) a 
large section of the population will be inadequately served.1
Outside Parliament there was a predictable dichotomy of opinions. 
Support for the plan came from those organisations who had a vested interest 
in the car industry or stood to gain from the increased road expenditures.
The Adelaide City Council supported the plan for 'it will greatly 
improve traffic conditions in the City of Adelaide (ACC Annual Report 
1969-70: 20). The Council had appointed a special committee to report to 
it on MATS. The Committee recommended support of the Plan. Given that 
'the plan should be aimed at maintaining and enhancing the vitality of the 
entire metropolitan area with particular emphasis on the CBD' (one of the 
'guide lines' from the MATS' 'broad planning principles') their support was 
not surprising. But as Stretton noted, the concentrated study, research 
and consultation which the Council undertook on behalf of the retailing and 
business interests contrasted sharply with the 'studied ignorance' of the 
effect of road and rebuilding programmes on the poorer residents.
The Royal Automobile Association defended the MATS plan with the 
argument that 'Australia is one of the most highly motorised countries in 
ehe world and whether some sections of the public like it or not, people 
who own cars expect to be able to use them' (S.A. Motor3 January 1969).
The Australian Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors strongly 
supported the freeway proposals, disguising basically economic and 
professional motives in communitarian clothing."*" No wonder people saw a
1 See letter to Advertiser 3 16 November 1968 by L.M. Robertson, Chairman 
of S.A. Branch.
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certain conspiratorial air on the part of private enterprise in the issue."*" 
The Australian Road Federation also supported the plan.
It thus did appear from statements made on MATS that 'only the 
engineers for highway construction freely support the MATS plan', and 
then 'solely from a technical point of view' (Advertiser3 13 February 1969).
Physical and visual destruction of the environment, anticipated 
reduction of property values, increasing traffic and volume of noise, bad 
effects on residential areas and the inadequacy of the concept of the 1962 
Plan were the major areas of opposition to MATS. Opposition came most 
consistently from the MATS Revision committees, the Town and Country 
Planning Association, the RAIA, the Australian Planning Institute, public 
statements by Labor M.P.s, local residents' meetings and private statements 
by people in letters to the Advertiser (Duigan 1970: 63).
The Council of the South Australian Chapter of the RAIA argued that
MATS did not present a satisfactory picture for the growth of the city and
did not explore alternatives. They wanted the plan immediately reviewed
by the SPA and drew attention to the lack of detail on public transport
finance, the lack of compensation for those injuriously affected, the effect
of freeways on the environment and the inconsistency in the claim of concern
for social values. The Architects accused the MATS planners of giving no
explanation of the social effects of their proposals on suburban communities
or on the city as a whole. The routes ploughed through suburbs disrupting
access to facilities and recreation areas and posing distribution and access
2problems for industry and commerce.
E.g. letter to Advertiser 3 20 November 1968 by E.H. Crimes.
2 'Though the planners claimed to have accounted for social values they did 
not claim to have based their work on any social research at all. They 
offered no restorative land use or economic or social replanning of the 
territories which their routes disturbed or fragmented. The land they 
actually took they would pay for; with that (they thought) public 
responsibility ended.' (Stretton 1970: 186)
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The Town and Country Planning Association also submitted a lengthy
critique, concluding their objections with the statement,
we also believe that the inclusion of the professed 
objectives of the report and the errors which show 
public transport at a disadvantage reveal an attempt 
on the part of the MATS planners to mislead the 
government and the public and promote the inevitability 
of a freeway solution.
Their recommendations urged re-thinking of what planning involves.
Planning is not another name for gazing into 
a crystal ball, even one linked to a computer.
Planning means setting sights on some desirable goal 
and so ordering the forces of change so that that 
goal is attained.
They criticised the 1962 Plan for its extrapolation and reinforcement of 
present trends with no evaluation of social priorities. 'Transport', 
their submission concluded, 'important though it is, is not the pre­
eminent factor in planning. Human values should have the dominant priority.' 
(Duigan 1970: 63-66)
The submission by the Australian Planning Institute said that the 
proposals were too expensive, that they failed to evaluate proposed trans­
port expenditure, that the plan was apparently drawn up in isolation of its 
effect on land usage, and that public transport had been neglected. 
{Advertiser 8 March 1969). But they criticised in vague general terms 
which had less impact than most press correspondence. However their 
reserved tone can be understood by appreciating that the API has a small 
membership many of whom are government employees in the E. and W.S. 
Department, the Highways Department and the State Planning Office. The 
President of the Institute at the time was Doug Speechley, Deputy Director 
of the Technical Advisory Committee on MATS.
One writer was able to question MATS engineering expertise, the 
emphasis on the motor car, the destruction of the environment and the social 
values involved in the Report through a poem which he entitled 'A 
Sentimental Bloke - with apologies to C.J. Denis' (Duigan 1970: 69).
220
When I first heard about the MATS 
I thought - My Gawd, they've all gone bats 
'Oo do they think they bloody are?
God 'isself 'cos they drives a car?
They're makin' such a 'spensive fuss 
Wen wot we wants is a flamin' bus 
An' a few more trains and a subway too.
But these poor b's ain't got a clue 
'Stead o' usin' brains, they got them Yanks 
'Oo when they seen the Torrens' banks 
Where some kids fish an' others play 
Said, "There's the track f' y' new freeway.
That useless creek an' them scrappy trees 
Wavin' about in the mornin' breeze 
Will be transformed into concrete piles 
With curvin' roads stretchin' out f' miles.
Fair dinkum! I ask you, give us a go 
What do they think they bloody know?
Our kids need schools an' open space 
Not freeways smog an' rat-race pace.
Where do their kids fish an' play 
In the concrete mess of the U.S.A.?
Their kids, they never sees the stars 
'Cos o' all the muck from motor cars.
An article in the Advertiser (3 October 1968) by John Miles
entitled 'Public Clamour Intensifies' noted that
the sound waves arising from the proposals which 
are estimated to affect directly 2500 properties 
and 5000 more indirectly are loud and continuing ... 
the resultant public clamour is deeper in intensity 
than the reaction to any other report in the state's 
history.
By July 1970 there was a clear indication that Adelaide residents were not 
prepared to take the MATS plan on trust. Public meetings about the Plan 
drew attendances of hundreds, and editorial comments in the newspapers had 
a much more critical tone. In that month the Hall LCL Government fell, 
officially on the issue of the building of the Chowilla or Dartmouth dams. 
While the opinion of one columnist, that 'for every one who voted for 
Dartmouth now there were a dozen who voted for MATS never' (Riddell in 
Advertiser 27 February 1971) can not be proved, there was a clear division 
between the parties on this issue, Labor promising to 'withdraw and revise 
the MATS plan'. The present Minister of Transport promised that 'a Labor 
Government will withdraw both the 1968 Plan and the 1962 Plan. We will
require the SPA to produce a plan which not only integrates public transport
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with other transport, but also one which is financially possible and 
reduces■property destruction to an absolute minimum.' (Hon. G.T. Virgo in 
an election brochure.)
One of the first actions of the new Labor Government was to appoint 
as a Consultant Dr S.L. Breuning, a former Professor of Transport Projects 
at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and now Chairman of Social 
Technology Systems, Boston. His report was received by the Government in 
November 1970. It emphasised the need 'to provide the user with a service 
as good as or better than his car, but with great reductions in the social 
disadvantages'. Its recommendations were to foster public transportation 
in the central city and near suburbs; to develop promising transit 
innovations; to provide road and highway improvements to keep pace with 
growing demand; to prepare for future high speed routes by continuing 
acquisition of land as it is offered; and to develop State competence for 
new transportation developments (Marshall 1971: 54-55).
The emphasis is the reverse of the MATS plan. Instead of assuming 
that the use of public transport will decline, the first priority is to 
improve it and increase its usage. Instead of emphasis on freeways, the 
need for them is described as 'questionable' and use of the term 'high speed 
transportation corridor' clearly implies new forms of transport.
In February 1971 the Minister for Roads and Transport moved that 
the House endorse the Government in adopting the philosophy of action 
contained in the Breuning Report:
Dr Breuning has made the point as strongly as 
possible that Adelaide should not engage in building 
freeways as envisaged in the MATS plan, but that it 
should use the time available to exploit the newer 
developments in public transport ... We should have 
a complete review of our transport policy ... and 
should have a Director-General capable of co-ordinating 
the activities in all forms of transport ... and the 
various forms of transport ought to be brought within 
the one control and Ministerial supervision in a 
Department of Transport.
(SAPD 1971: 3507)
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The Leader of the Opposition (R.S. Hall) called the Report a 'hoax' 
and questioned Breuning's qualifications. He criticised the suggested 
delay in building freeways and this was echoed by all Opposition speakers. 
Suggestions of modern transport improvement were dismissed as 'airy-fairy 
nonsense', units attached to moving belts were named 'comic capsules' (the 
old cable car works on this principle) and 'dial-a-bus' systems were 
dismissed as 'hopelessly expensive', forgetting the $280 million that the 
MATS freeways would cost to build (SAPD 1971: 3539-3546).
Nevertheless the motion was carried in March 1971 and the state has 
since secured a Director-General of Transport and decided to establish an 
industrial research institute containing transport research facilities.
The issue is much larger than merely deciding the best roads to 
build for private motor cars. It is the whole question of whether 
unrestricted use of private cars is not in the long run detrimental to the 
city as a place to live, work and play.
It requires vision ... to translate modern 
technology into a computerised mass transport system 
and to think of cities as places where one could 
enjoyably walk - and courage to stand up against the 
wealthy, powerful and entrenched forces which have 
much to lose from any restriction of automobile 
usage. ,
(Marshall 1971: 55-57)
The 'Freeway Revolt' of the San Francisco Bay Area and the creation of 
the Bay Area Rapid Transport Development is an indication of what can 
be done (against powerful opponents) by citizens who appreciate the 
quality of their environment more than their motor car. This is the 
first public transit system openly to challenge the private car in the 
era marked by the ascendancy of the automobile and the freeway. To 
create it, the people had to forego Federal money from petrol tax and 
float a bond issue. (Schoop and Hirten 1971: 2-11)
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To the handful of city planning reformers urging legislation from 
the second world war onwards, the situation must have looked fairly 
intractable. Ten years after such legislation had been passed in N.S.W. 
and Victoria (1945 and 1944) Playford had strangled their hopes in his 
message to the 1954 Congress. And when Hart had been appointed town planner 
in 1957 he had found a public uneducated in planning principles, a govern­
ment uninterested in applying them, and a collection of vested interests 
actively opposing them. Yet Adelaide is now, of all Australian cities, the 
most advanced in its planning aims and achievements.
We have seen how, in the field of transport planning, citizen 
indignation has wrought a major change in urban transportation policy in 
Adelaide. The citizen backlash of distrust for planning, or rather a 
distrust of leaving it to the so-called 'experts' (which in Adelaide in 
the sixties had meant engineers dominated by 'technical rationality') 
engendered by the MATS plan, has spilt over into other areas of urban policy 
since 1970. In at least two major areas, those of urban redevelopment and 
of decentralisation, South Australia's latest policy makers have reversed 
traditional assumptions and provided an example for the rest of the country - 
but only because they have been roused by public indignation and partici­
pation. Four developments over the past two years illustrate this new 
trend in participatory planning.^ Two of these projects were the product 
of government initiative. The other two were responses by the government 
to public protests.
5.
1 The Hackney redevelopment project, the Noarlunga Regional Centre, the 
reform of the Adelaide City Council and formation of the city of 
Adelaide Steering Committee, and plans for a new town at Monarto.
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Hackney is an old suburb in Dunstan's electorate just across the 
parklands bounding the old city. North Hackney has always been a low income 
area housing some 180 to 250 residents in 13 acres. It is a run down area, 
made up of decrepit nineteenth century cottages, a CSIRO Research Unit with 
sheep pens, a caravan park, church, pub and car park. Some of the residents 
are pensioners renting premises, some are older couples, and some migrant 
families.
In 1967 it was decided that this was an area that was ripe for 
redevelopment of a kind that was 'economically feasible' for the state 
government. At that time, when no one else was much interested in the 
matter, Rolf Jensen, Professor of Architecture and Town Planning at 
Adelaide University, and author of High Density Living (1966), was the 
state's 'expert' on redevelopment. He headed the subcommittee'1’ of the SPA 
that submitted a report to the 1968 Liberal Government on the Hackney North 
Comprehensive Redevelopment Area. The Liberals were not interested and 
shelved the matter for two years, but during this period the Housing Trust 
and the Local Council (St Peters) acquired some of the houses that had been 
declared substandard.
Jensen is an advocate of high density living in general and high
density redevelopment in particular;
... world opinion is now showing a clear trend in favour 
of a considerable programme of urban renewal and high 
urban densities, and the problem now is to ensure that 
this work is undertaken in the soundest possible way 
so as to constitute a real and permanent solution to 
urban growth ...
(Jensen 1966: 1)
The other members were D.A. Speechley (Deputy Director of Planning, 
B.F. Davis (Chief Accountant, S.A. Housing Trust), H.F. Gaetjens 
(Real Estate Institute representative on SPA) and D.G. Pitt (Town 
Clerk of St Peters).
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And Don Dunstan has been sympathetic with these views.
The suburban villa and the motor car ... 
constitute the greatest planning problems we have 
to deal with .... I would like to raise my voice 
against this as the dominant form of housing ...
(Dunstan 1972: 13-15)
The proposals for Hackney involved high density residential redevelopment 
of an area of 14 acres with a 1972 population of 182 people to accomodate 
some 1,000 people (9 acres of private enterprise, 5 of Housing Trust 
development) at a density of approximately 70 to the acre. (SPA Information 
Sheet, March 1972) These proposals, resubmitted to the new Labor Government 
of 1970, received the endorsement and public support of Dunstan.
What followed was a political embarrassment of the first order to 
Dunstan and a lesson to Australian governments espousing theories of high 
density living, that they are out of touch with the values and needs of 
most 'ordinary Australians', and especially with the needs of families.
The St Peters Residents' Association took up arms on behalf of the 
'victims' of the Hackney proposals and created so much disaffection in the 
area that there was a substantial drop in ALP support. So much so in fact, 
that the day after the local government elections of June 30th 1972, for 
which the ALP Mayor of St Peters found he had lost too much support even to 
both running for re-election, Dunstan perceived the political threat to be 
so great as to call for a drastic policy reversal. No matter how 
Machiavellian the motives, his concessions to public indignation were major. 
The new philosophy and approach to urban renewal were expounded six weeks 
later to the RAPI Conference in Brisbane.
Inner city redevelopment [does not mean] the wholesale 
tearing down of existing communities simply to replace 
them with an asphalt desert and high rise blocks of flats ... 
the existing communities [should not be] displaced, but 
augmented; not bulldozed, but added to; not compartmentalised, 
but given the opportunity of achieving the social and 
economic cohesiveness that should exist in an urban city 
region ... Further, such redevelopment should mean progressive 
planning, involving on the one hand the community of the area,
on the other ... the new settlers. (Dunstan 1972: 15-16)
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Dunstan himself pointed out that the lessons to be learnt from this 
experience were of fundamental importance to any government involved in 
residential redevelopment -
They relate chiefly to communication. It is 
essential to maintain at every point in the planning 
process a close involvement with and by the residents ...
Their participation and agreement must be secured at 
each decisive point. If this is not done the result 
can be more socially disturbing [and, he might have 
added, politically ruinous] than the very situation 
that redevelopment should be endeavouring to alleviate.
(Dunstan 1972: 22)
A special committee (comprising residents of the area as well as 
planners and bureaucrats) was set up by State Cabinet to review the 
project, develop a detailed programme for the renewal of the area in co­
operation with the residents, and ultimately to implement this programme 
(Hackney Project News No. 1, Nov. 1972). The large social thoughts 
written into their approach are unprecedented in the history of urban 
redevelopment in Australia.
Urban renewal ... not only involves the integration 
of all the elements which comprise any effectively 
planned new urban development, but also requires the 
evaluation of the existing structures ... These are not 
only physical, e.g. the different uses of the land, the 
condition of buildings and traffic patterns. Of equal 
importance are the economics and social characteristics 
of an area and how these are related to its physical 
features. It is necessary, e.g. to assess the inter­
connections between rates and rentals and the condition 
of buildings and to be aware of what services are 
housed by these buildings and how the people living in 
the area assess them. Less tangible but of great 
significance are the social experiences the area provides - 
whether it is neighbourly, convenient to friends or 
relatives, and offers valued services such as a good 
doctor.
The implications on all these factors of any 
renewal proposals must be taken into account in developing 
and evaluating them. The process is therefore a complex 
one requiring a range of skills and experiences. The 
adverse consequences of renewal programmes developed 
without recognition of this complexity, as has occurred 
in some of the inner suburbs of Melbourne and many overseas 
cities, are striking evidence of the essential need to 
attempt to develop any renewal programme within a framework 
which recognises all the physical, social and economic factors.
(Hackney Project News, No.l,
November 1972: 3)
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The Hackney trauma made one thing certain: nothing of the sort
would ever be allowed to happen again in a Dunstan administration.
Democratic socialism would be, and would be seen to be, responsive to those 
concerned. The 'victims of progress' - those ousted by new highways, new 
cities, urban renewal - would, in South Australia at least, be consulted at 
the earliest possible stage and then kept in touch.
Dunstan may have changed his policy regarding urban renewal but
recent evidence suggests that he still favours the idea of high density
urban living (because, the argument goes, it generates a more urbane city).
This penchant is reflected in his intentions for the Monarto New Town.
According to R.D. Bakewell,  ^Director of the Department of the Premier and
2of Development, and Chairman of the Monarto New Town Steering Committee
the Premier envisages radically different design principles for the town -
no sprawling suburban villas but Swinger Hill (Canberra's latest attempt
at European density and urbanity) type clusters to create the European city
flavour. Some public servants may be forced to follow their jobs there.
And so will the state's third university. But apart from these no one will
be coerced. It is hoped that the 'unique residential attractions' will be
3sufficient to draw the numbers necessary to get the town growing quickly.
But after Hackney Dunstan should be more aware of the dangers inherent in 
challenging the traditional house and garden pattern. The Hackney uprising 
was not only about the exclusion of citizens from the policy making process. 
Residents were hostile because of this - but even more so because of the
1 In an interview 19 January 1973.
2 The other members are Ramsay, Hart, Dr W.G. Inglis (Director of 
Conservation) and K.C. Belchamber (assistant director, Industrial 
Development Division).
Bakewell interview. No plans are as yet definite.3
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kind of planning proposed: that is because of the proposals for high
density redevelopment.^
It is possible that lack of Federal financial support may threaten 
the success of this new town project. But the decision by the South 
Australian Government to halt the growth of Adelaide at 1.3 million is a 
major theoretical advance in metropolitan growth policy - the first
2commitment of this kind by an Australian government, state or federal, 
and the first major departure from the 'acceptance of present trends' line 
of thinking embodied in the 1962 Plan.
Meanwhile, as happened twenty years ago when it built the country's 
first 'new town' at Elizabeth, the South Australian Housing Trust is 
continuing the planned decentralisation policy that it has espoused since 
1950, this time south of the city on land it purchased in the fifties (at 
Noarlunga, now the fastest growing district of metropolitan Adelaide).
While in theory, and if and when it gets off the ground, the Murray 
New Town will emphasise public participation in its planning, in practice 
this is already one of the 'revolutionary' aspects of preparatory work for 
the Noarlunga Regional Centre (NRC).
The Government believes that the character of 
the planning of such a major centre is too important 
to be 'left to experts'. The planners and members 
of the general community, especially the people of 
Noarlunga, should join together in the exercise to 
build the best town their collective skill and 
imagination can produce.
(NRC Team, Information Sheet,
8 June, 1972)
Interview with John Byrne, Ramsay's assistant and special assistant to 
the Hackney Project Committee.
The Federal Labor Government elected in December 1972 has also committed 
itself to planned decentralisation, but this was several months after 
the South Australia decision.
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Means have already been established to encourage a two-way flow of 
information and ideas between the public and the planners - people can 
drop in on the planners to contribute ideas, get information and examine 
plans in preparation; the planners have already held a series of meetings 
in the Noarlunga district;'1' the formation of informal community groups has 
been encouraged, to consider specific problems (facilities for youth, 
environmental issues) and the planners have maintained contact with students 
and staff of the local high school and with planning students at Adelaide 
University and the Institute of Technology. This is a new development in 
the planning process in Australia. Previously citizens have only known the 
process of formal objections to a semi-finalised plan. By contrast, the 
first meeting at Noarlunga preceded, the start of physical planning.
The location of the new centre has all the positive environmental 
attractions that Elizabeth lacked, as well as some of Elizabeth's advantages. 
It is less than a mile from the Onkaparinga Estuary where the SPA has been 
purchasing land for a major district park of 880 acres; and it is within 
easy reach of hills and beach. Like Elizabeth it is adjacent to a (new) 
railway line and to the proposed 'transportation corridor' of the 1970 
Breuning Report, so like Elizabeth it has the dual advantages of being both 
separate from but directly connected with the old city. Industrial employ­
ments are comparable to Elizabeth's at a similar stage of its development. 
But, learning from the social problems of Elizabeth, the character of the 
area and its residents promises to be 'somewhat less industrial and more 
diversified than at Elizabeth (NRC Information Sheet, August 1972).
The first on 20 June 1972 attracted 300 people. It was addressed by 
R.D. Bakewell (Head, Premiers Dept.) and Hugh Stretton (Chairman,
NRC Advisory Committee and member of the Board of the Housing Trust 
since 1970).
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It is intended that the town will serve as an administrative, 
educational, cultural and recreational centre as well as district shopping 
centre. With this projected scale of activities the planners have been 
encouraged to explore the possibility of giving the centre the special 
character of a college town.’*' (Important implications flow from this for 
'the quality of life' - most successful teaching universities have 
flourished in a town and gown mixture of the kind and scale proposed for 
Noarlunga.) Noarlunga's success as an experiment in public participation 
during the planning process and as a viable centre embracing concerns more 
comprehensive than ever before attempted in any Australian new town seems 
assured for several reasons. Its locational advantages outweigh Elizabeth's 
and as a Housing Trust project it is less vulnerable to the party-political 
vicissitudes of State and Federal politics. Furthermore, because the 
Trust's housing programme will provide 25 to 30 per cent of the district's 
population increase to 1986 the Trust can coordinate the location and timing 
of a significant amount of population with the early growth of the Centre, 
thereby avoiding most of the difficulties of the pioneering period of new 
cities.
The importance of consulting with citizens about changes in their 
city (once these citizens have been provoked into a mood of critical 
awareness) was again impressed on the South Australian government in matters 
relating to the character and development of the City of Adelaide.
In 1965 H.C. Bubb succeeded W.C.D. Veale as city engineer and later 
'town planner' of the City of Adelaide. Like Jensen he favoured high 
density living and hoped to replace much of the run down terrace housing
1 Interviews with John Byrne, co-ordinator of the planning team and 
Hugh Stretton, 8th and 17th January 1973.
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in the city with high rise development. Bubb's main concern was to build 
up the tax base of the City of Adelaide. Rates in Adelaide are based on 
rental values of properties. Therefore he set out to promote redevelopment 
at high densities to get higher rents on sites and collect higher rates. 
Applications for permission to renovate or destroy and rebuild the small 
cottages scattered around the city square mile were refused. Instead, they
were allowed to deteriorate beyond a 'state fit for human habitation' and
r
were then legally resumed and demolished by the Council. Thus over the 
space of a few years several hundred small cottages disappeared, replaced 
temporarily by car parks.
There was not much that the poor, inarticulate and powerless residents 
of the inner city could do about this. But when intentions were announced 
to bulldoze a residential section of North Adelaide that housed some of the 
state's most prestigious, wealthy and educated citizens to make way for a 
shopping/high rise/parking complex, the local indignation led to the 
formation of the North Adelaide Residents' Association, which then set about 
reforming the Adelaide City Council itself.
This was done by electing sympathetic representatives from the 
North Adelaide ward to the Council and persuading a few more councillors 
to their cause, including the new Lord Mayor. These activists not only 
managed to stop the bulldozer in North Adelaide but also persuaded the 
Council to put city development under Interim Development Control. 
(Historically the Council has always had sufficient influence, usually 
through its connections in the Upper House, to get itself excluded from 
the provisions of all Planning Acts. This applied to the 1967 Act, but 
it was written into that Act that if the Council chose to it could apply to 
the Premier to adopt Interim Development Control.)
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This it did in 1972, though rather than be placed under the control 
of the SPA, which this entailed, the Mayor asked Dunstan to delegate 
authority back to the Council. This Dunstan refused, but it was agreed to 
set up a City of Adelaide Development Committee of seven members, four to 
be government appointees. The Upper House amended this to three, with 
three city councillors and the Lord Mayor as Chairman.^
The Council has appointed consultants to draw up a master plan for 
the city and appointed its own client committee to instruct them. They 
envisage an Adelaide rebuilt for people, with pedestrian malls, plazas and 
promenades, and trees - a city for living and playing as well as working - 
a Mumfordian emphasis on human scale and human values. (Australian Financial 
Review 26 October 1973).
It has been clear for some time that planning cannot succeed unless 
it has the human as well as the material resources for its execution. There 
are two crucial components of the 'human resources' problem. Above all else 
perhaps we need political commitment by the states' and nation's rulers to 
the concepts and practices of planning. Nothing can be achieved without 
their cooperation and active support. If nothing else, the history of 
these past seventy years has taught us that. But we also need a community 
aware of and willing to participate in the issues, debates and decisions 
and a political process whereby they can. So there is a need for 
redistribution of power  ^ not just of resources.
One of the preconditions for future innovation and change is that 
political structures must be 'open'. Adelaide's have been at two main
The Government appointees are Stretton, Bakewell and Newell Platten. The 
ACC representatives are J. Roche (Manager, Adelaide Development Co., 
multi-millionaire, land owner in Adelaide and Perth, owner of approxi­
mately 40 acres of land in the city and more along the hills' face);
Bowen (Director of L.J. Hookers) and J. Chappel (architect and small 
land owner in the City).
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points. The State Labor Government has been responsive (though it remains 
to be seen whether this revolution will go beyond rhetoric and good 
intentions). And the Adelaide City Council has been vulnerable to public 
protest and involvement. Perhaps too, Adelaide has been receptive to 
pressures for change because of the imaginative (and respectable) leader­
ship of the academic, author and activist Hugh Stretton. He has been on 
the Board of the SAHT since 1970 and played an important part in the Hackney 
and City of Adelaide reforms and the Noarlunga innovations.
With a responsive government operating in what resembles a small 
'city-state* environment, Adelaide's activists have achieved changes not 
only in planning policies but in the nature of the planning process, which 
now incorporates citizen involvement in its early stages. But Adelaide has 
been unique in its combination of people, opportunities and events, 
beginning in the late fifties with Hart's public education efforts, helped 
on the way by the provocative MATS plan, and culminating in the early 
seventies with imaginative leadership, an aroused populace and a responsive 
government.
Dr Stover"*" is right. To make democracy work in the world and on the 
time scale of today 'special burdens' must be carried, not only by 'highest 
elected officials' but by citizens also. By and large these burdens have 
no place at present in the political philosophies of western nations.
2They are beginning to flourish in Adelaide. But that is no cause 
for complacency. For that was also the situation in 1920. At that time 
property owners had little difficulty in defeating radical planning
1 c.F. stover, The California Experiment - an appraisal (1966) quoted in 
Vickers 1968: 123.2 For Dunstan's commitment see 'We could live in the dream state', Sunday 
Mailj 31 December 1972. Some of his ideas may be out of touch with the 
values and needs of the 'average Australian', but, at present, Adelaide 
has some vigilant citizens ready to curb his (albeit civilised) excesses.
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proposals, which they saw as a direct threat to the bases of their wealth. 
Since then a changing pattern of interests among some sections of the 
business and property owning communities, involving environmental considera­
tions (for example in Rymill's opposition to MATS) as well as recognition
that profits can still be made under the umbrella of state developmental
1  ;planning (for example, the favourable attitudes of Jennings and Dusseldorp,' 
two of the largest developers in the country, to land nationalisation) have 
contributed just as much to the recent good changes of opinion as have the 
rebellious feelings of 'the people'.
Neo-capitalism is alive and well and merely adjusting the interests 
of Jennings and Dusseldorp to make them both now, in favour of nationalising 
land. This is clearly not in the interest of pure land speculators. But 
this changing set of interests within the capitalist class creates a 
situation which an alert grass roots movement may well be able to manipulate 
to their own advantage, as has been the case in Adelaide, to introduce a 
more radical style and conception of city planning involving a new 
emphasis on community welfare, social equity, and protection of the 
environment.
V.E. Jennings. Chairman and Managing Director of A.V. Jennings 
Industries Ltd., one of the five largest development corporations.
2 G.J. Dusseldorp. Chairman of Lend Lease Corporation, largest property 
development firm in Australia in 1972-3. (Australian 3 August 1973)
CHAPTER SEVEN
MELBOURNE
CAPITALISM, CRUDE AND UNCIVILISED
'In Britain the need for planning got its major impetus from the destruction 
of the war. In Victoria both the impetus and the inhibitors are largely 
vested interests.'
H.W. Viney 1967 : 110
'Under the present capitalist system such meagre planning as has been attemp­
ted is frustrated at every level by private ownership . . . and by the 
influence of such owners on public authorities at all levels - by speculation 
and profiteering by property owners and by corruption of public officers and 
politicians in connection with them.'
R. and M. Crow 1969 : 21
'An enduring quality of the city and its government [is that] private 
initiatives lead, public services catch up when they can.'
H. Stretton 1970 : 195
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1 .
'Across the bargaining tables of power the bureaucracies of business and 
government face one another, and under the tables their myriad feet are 
interlocked in wonderfully complex ways.' (C. Wright Mills 1951 : 79)
The chronic instability of Victorian politics up to 1955 was outlined 
in Chapter 3. This was one reason why so little was achieved in city 
planning despite the many probing inquiries into, and diagnoses of, the 
problems. In the immediate post-war decade, from the passing of Victoria's 
first Town Planning Act in 1944 to the preparation of the plan for Melbourne 
by the Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works (MMBW) in 1954, there were 
ten governments in which every coalition was tried with the exception of a 
Labor and a conservative Liberal Govern ment.
Three issues of this period illustrate the ability of the 'class of 
owners' to use the political power of the state to protect the fundamental 
institutions of property. When the banking issue (Chapter 5) broke in late 
1947, Labor formed the State government but lacked a majority in the Upper 
House. The Leader of the Opposition in this House was Vice-Chairman of the 
National Bank. He saw nothing improper in declaring that the Opposition 
would block the Supply Bill (thereby stopping all government finance) until 
the State government resigned and faced the people at an election fought on 
the banking issue. The tactic was successful.
In 1949 the Liberal Premier H ollway introduced a Bill setting up a 
Royal Commission into the Communist Party in Victoria, 'to discover whether 
Victoria's 3000 or 4000 Communists had influence in the Government and 
intended to overthrow the established government.' (Blazey 1972)
236
Closer to the concerns of the city itself, the Upper House defeated
the Greater Melbourne Bill in 1951. This Bill was unificationist in
principle, providing for the incorporation of the MMBW and the thirty
Municipal councils in a Greater Melbourne Council. Its opponents were urban
1 2and rural property owners like Sir William Angliss, Sir Frank Beaurepaire,
3 4 5Sir Frank Clarke, Sir James Kennedy, Sir George Lansell and A.G. (later
0
Sir Arthur) Warner. It was argued that the Government had no mandate for 
th is 'revolutionary proposal' and that a Greater Melbourne Council would be 
'a sort of socialist octopus - whose chief disadvantage will be its intense 
centralisation'. (V.P.D. 1951 : 4586-7)
b.1856. M.L.C. for Southern Province since 1912. Occupation: Company 
Director (1950 Who's Who of Australia) Chairman of Vesteys and allied 
companies, Queensland Stations PI, Vanrook Pastoral Co PI, Eagle Star 
Insurance Co Ltd, Kenyu Pastoral Co PI, Benbow Mills PI, Bluff Downs 
Pastoral Co PI, Clifton Brick and Tile Co PI, Premier Printing Co PI: 
Director of Aust. Cement Ltd, Mutual Store Ltd, Peerless Silk Mills 
Ltd, Duke & Orr's Dry Docks, Equity Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd, 
Hume Pipe Co Ltd, Hume Steel Ltd.
b.1891. M.L.C. since 1942. Lord Mayor of Melbourne 1940-42, Founder 
and Chairman of Olympic Tyre & Rubber Co (1950 Who's Who of Australia)
b.1879. M.L.C. since 1923. Minister of Lands 1917-19, Minister of Water 
Supply 1917-21; Commissioner of Public Works 1919-23; Director of National 
Bank and Goldsborough Mort; Local Director of AMP Society. (1950 Who's 
Who of Australia)
M.L.C. since 1937. Minister for Public Works 1942-50; Minister for 
Transport and Works 1943-5; Mayor of Brighton 1932-3; Secretary of 
Melbourne Investment Trust Ltd.
b.1883. Managing Director of Rochester Irrigator, Riverina Herald; 
Governing Director, Bendigo Pottery & 3 CV Broadcasting PI; Director 
Australian Swiss Watch Co PI; Proprietor Stock and Station Journal; 
Chairman of S. & N.D. Trustee Co; Managing Director of B.M.P. & L. 
Building Society, Hanro Knitting Mills. (1950 Who's Who of Australia)
b.1899. M.L.C. since 1946. Minister for Housing 1947-50; Minister 
for Transport 1955, Minister for Electrical Undertakings 1949-50; 
Chairman of Homecrafts PI, Aust. & International Insurances Ltd; 
Managing Director of Electronic Industries Ltd, Radio Corps PI, 
Neutrodyne PI, National Radio PI, Universal Guarantee PI, Eagle Star 
Insurance Co; Chairman of Business Advisory Panel during World War II 
(1955 Who's Who of Australia)
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These three issues are evidence of class power in action, using the 
institutions of the state to defend the bases of that power. The pro­
business bias which is encountered in all the legislatures of the capitalist 
world stems from
the unprompted inclinations of legislators ... It would 
be naive to think that members of legislatures are the 
unwilling instruments of powerful business and other 
propertied interests. If they defend these interests 
it is because they find it easy to equate that defence 
with the 'national interest'. ( Miliband 1969 : 151)
Within this structure of power, the prospects for purposeful city planning in 
the immediate post-war period were dim. They did not improve in 1955 when 
the long reign of the Liberal Party under Henry Bolte"*- began.
Bolte had never lived in the city until he entered Parliament at the 
age of 39. He
made no contributions to party philosophy and was little 
concerned with social welfare or with the implications of 
urban development. He was, after all, a country member. 
Not raising his eyes above the narrow gamut of his rural 
preoccupations he dealt with practically no other matters 
except finance ... He started as he finished, a 
Victorian chauvinist. (Blazey 1972 : 54)
He was, as his original backers had believed,
a very talented small-town horsetrader who would repay 
their patronage by keeping a conservative government in 
power and allowing them and their friends to develop 
their business interests with a minimum of government 
disturbance. (Blazey 1972 : 85)
Neither Bolte's ready accessibility to business leaders nor the Liberal
2Party's responsiveness to its big business backers were conducive to a
H. Bolte b. 1908. Farmer. Premier and Treasurer of Victoria 1955-1972.
The membership of the state finance committee of the Liberal Party suggests 
the close links between it and the Collins Street 'financial establish­
ment'. Trustees of this Committee have included Sir Ian Potter (rated 
by the Financial Review as 'the monarch of Melbourne finance') and Sir 
Maurice Nathan. (Lord Mayor of Melbourne 1961-3. Chairman and Managing 
Director of Patersons Aust. Ltd. and associated companies; Chairman of 
Courage Breweries Ltd; Founder and Chairman of Victorian Promotion 
Committee) (Blazey 1972)
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radical, equity-oriented style of city planning. Nor were the economic 
objectives of the post-war period. Bolte's priorities were never in doubt. 
'We are concerned about water pollution, but it is not as important as a 
$100m. industry . . . Pollution of minds is a more important problem than 
air or water pollution'. (Age 12 March, 14 April 1970)
Victoria in the Bolte era provides a classic example of the develop­
ment in Western economies which has been called 'neo-capitalism' - the 
unification of business with administration and politics and the management 
of the State's political and administrative apparatus in the interests of 
business and industry. Given their view of the existing economic system it 
is easy to understand why governments in western industrialised countries 
should wish to help business in every way, yet do not feel that this entails 
any degree of bias towards particular classes or interests. For if the 
'national interest' is inextricably bound up with the fortunes of capitalist 
enterprise, apparent partiality towards it is not really partiality at all. 
From this standpoint the phrase 'what is good for General Motors is good 
for America' (or BHP for Australia) is instructive. If G.M. or B.H.P. is 
taken to stand for the world of capitalist enterprise as a whole the slogan 
is one to which governments in capitalist countries explicitly subscribe.
And they do so because they accept the notion that the economic 
rationality of the capitalist system is synonymous with rational­
ity itself, and that it provides the best possible set of 
arrangements in a necessarily imperfect world. (Miliband 
1969 : 69)
In post-war Victoria these links between business, government and 
administration were both formal and informal. They were informally sus­
tained by Bolte's personal circle of friends and backers, Sir Reginald Ansett,1
Managing Director of Ansett Transport Industries Ltd, Ansett Airlines of 
Australia, Airlines of NSW Ltd, Ansett Freight Express Ltd, Ansett Hotels 
Pty Ltd, Ansett Pioneer, Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd, National Instrument 
Co Ltd, Woolcord Fabrics Ltd. (1968-9 Business Who's Who in Australia).
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1 2Sir Cecil Looker, Sir Charles McGrath, Sir Arthur Warner, Sir Thomas 
3 4Ramsay, and Sir Ian Potter. Bolte toured Europe with Nathan, Looker, 
McGrath and Ramsay (all members of the Victorian Promotion Committee) in 1971 
seeking to attract overseas capital to invest in Victoria (Age 20 August 
1971).
Formal or institutionalised examples of the influence of businessmen 
on public policy-making bodies are numerous. Victoria's fourth university 
committee had a majority of business interests and was chaired by Sir Thomas 
Ramsay (Age 19 February 1972). The State Electricity Commission is run by 
three Commissioners, T.P. Scott (retired General Manager of National Mutual 
Life Association), Sir Roger Darvall (former General Manager of A.N.Z. Bank 
Ltd and Director of B.H.P. Co Ltd) and a civil engineer. The Melbourne 
Underground Rail Loop Authority is headed by R. Roscoe (merchant banker,
Director of Aust. United Corp Ltd., AV Jennings Industries Ltd, Ian Potter 
& Co, Investors Services Ltd, Plessey C. of Aus. Southern Cross Properties 
Ltd. (1968-9 Business Who's Who in Australia)
"member of many key government committees and Federal Treasurer of the 
Liberal Party" (Rowley 1972:277) Director of Repco Ltd, Anti-Corrosive 
Pipe & Lining Co Pty Ltd, Associated Power Seals Pty Ltd, Payne, Byrne 
& Blackford Pty Ltd, Petersville Aus Ltd, Super Seals Pty Ltd. (1968-9 
Business Who's Who in Australia)
Managing Director of Kiwi International Co Ltd since 1956, Chairman since 
1967. President Associated Chamber of Manufacturers Aust. 1962-3. Member 
of Manufacturing Industries Advisory Council, Vic. Promotions Committee, 
Netherlands-Aust Trade & Industrial Development Council, Aust-Japan 
Business Co-operation Committee; Chairman of Vic Portland Cement Co PI, 
Director A.C.I. Ltd Group, Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd, 
Collie Aust Ltd Group, Overseas Corporation (Aust) Ltd, Rocla Industries 
Ltd, Norwich Union Insurance Group, First National City Trust Co. (Bahamas) 
Ltd. (1968-9 Business Who's Who in Australia)
Director of the following companies according to the 1969 Business Who's 
Who in Australia: Asea Electric Ltd, Associated Steamships Pty Ltd,
Aust. Petrochemicals Ltd, Aust. United Investment Co Ltd, BX Plastics 
Pty Ltd, CIBA Pty Ltd, Commercial Union Assurance Co of Aus. Ltd, Email 
Ltd, Formica Plastics Pty Ltd, Mcllwraith McEacharn Ltd, Nestle Co Ltd, 
Petrochemical Holdings Ltd, Ian Potter & Co, T.R. Services Pty Ltd.
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Director of Chase N.B.A. Group Ltd). Its other members include T.P. Scott, 
W.H.B. Daddo (Deputy Chairman of Repco -manufacturer of automobile compon­
ents) , K.A. Allen (President of the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce),
Councillor C.I. Beaurepaire (Director Olympic Tyre & Rubber Co Pty Ltd, 
Olympic Cables Pty Ltd, Olympic Consolidated Industries Ltd, Olympic General 
Products Ltd), G.F.W. Brown (Chairman Victorian Railways, Director Rocla Ltd) 
and Robin Boyd (Age 21 January 1971) who was replaced on his death by Bill 
Gibbs, General Manager of G.M.H. Aus. Ltd (who recently has been appointed 
to head the Victorian Railways.)
It may be that businessmen who enter the state system may not think 
of themselves as representatives of business in general or even less of their 
own firms or industries in particular. But businessmen involved in govern­
ment or administration are not very likely to find much merit in policies 
which appear to run counter to what they conceive to be the interests of 
business, much less to make themselves the advocates of such policies, since 
they are almost by definition likely to believe such policies to be inimical 
to the 'national interest'.
This brief selection of examples of the interconnections between 
business, politics and administration in Victoria does not prove the exis­
tence of a 'ruling class'. At most it suggests possible members of such a 
class. As Connell and Irving (1973) have argued, it is not enough to do 
what some left-wing intellectuals have done, piling up facts about ownership, 
income, prestige and control.^
This can show that we have rich, and possibly that we have 
powerful men. But it does not get at the central problem, 
the connection of inequality and power with the capitalist
for instance McFarlane Economic Policy in Australia: Playford
Neo-Capitalism in Australia 1969: Wheelwright Ownership and Control of
Australian Companies 1957: Campbell The 60 Rich Families who own
Australia 1963: Encel Equality and Authority 1970; Rolfe The Controllers
1967
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nature of the social order. We cannot simply assume that 
the rich and powerful have an interest in maintaining the 
system as a system of inequality and exploitation. We 
have to show them acting, in critical situations, as a 
ruling class. (Connell & Irving 1973 : 36).
The only way we can do this is by studying the course of Australian history. 
This chapter attempts to delineate issues close to the heart of city planning 
that provide examples of class power in action in the process of urban 
development - in the growth of the central city, the decision to make 
Westernport Victoria's 'Ruhr', the proposals to allocate $1400m. for free­
way construction, and the neglect of social and welfare services in the 
'deprived' western suburbs. It is not argued that class power is the only 
determinant in urban development. Obviously such factors as climate or 
topography can be a strong influence in the distribution of 'real income' in 
a metropolis. But the importance of class power is emphasised in this chapter 
because in previous accounts of the process of urban development it has not 
been considered.'*'
This next section outlines the growth and gradual acceptance of 
statutory planning, its limitations, and the potential for corruption 
inherent in and associated with statutory planning in a capitalist society 
in which ownership of land has become one of the most fruitful sources of 
wealth.
For example, the first extensive account of urban growth in an Australian 
city, by the Urban Research Unit, Urban Development in Melbourne 1973, 
identifies five main 'actors' in the process of urban development but 
does not probe the class bias of that development by locating the five 
actors in the class (i.e. economic and political) structure and assess­
ing which of the actors has most power.
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'The national hobby of land speculation must be controlled if land use is to 
be controlled and planning ideals realised. This is no longer a radical 
dream, except in Australia.' (Neil Clerehan, Age 28 February 1972)
In the past in Victoria, after each wave of pressure for a body with 
metropolitan-wide coordinating powers had come to a head then failed, one of 
its proposed functions which had been causing special concern at the time had 
been separately settled with its own special authority.'*' The same was to 
happen in the post-war period for that major function, city planning.
Partly in response to Commonwealth initiatives, partly in response 
to the movement for town planning which had existed since the first world 
war, Victoria passed its first planning legislation in 1944. The Town and 
Country Planning Act empowered municipalities to regulate their land uses and 
created the Town and Country Planning Board (TCPB) to advise the Minister 
(for Local Government) on planning matters. The few municipalities which 
took advantage of these powers were
chiefly the richer ones with high residential values to 
protect. Most of the poorer suburbs that needed defence 
from industrial intrusion didn't get it - too often the 
industrial intruders were the most influential ratepayers.
Most of the outer suburbs whose growth needed planning 
didn't plan it. (Stretton 1970 : 197)
So more state initiative was needed. Thus the Town and Country Planning Act 
of 1949 appointed the MMBW to prepare and submit for approval a planning 
scheme for the metropolitan area. But no provision was made under the Act 
for implementation of such a plan. (VPD 1949 : 471) The Minister introducing
2 .
Hence the formation of the MMBW, the Metropolitan Fire Brigade, the 
Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board and the Victorian Housing 
Commission.
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the Bill (Oldham - Attorney-General) referred at length to the Third Annual 
Report of the TCPB, which had dealt with the alarming 'sprawl' of recent 
development and the need to halt it, and had drawn attention to the excess­
ive cost involved in uncontrolled development where street construction, 
water, gas, electricity and sewerage services had to be supplied over 
sparsely developed areas. (VPD 1949 : 1471)
The completed scheme was published in 1954. It was approved by the 
Board in 1955 and legislation was enacted to empower the Board to implement 
the scheme, which was put into effect in 1955 as an Interim Development 
Order. At the same time it was placed on public exhibition so that objec­
tions could be lodged. Over 4000 objections were received, and the 
determination of these, together with consequent modification, was not 
completed until 1958. The modified scheme was then adopted by the Board in 
1959 and forwarded to the Minister for approval.
Its main objectives were summarised in a later assessment (MMBW 1962 : 
4) as follows :
1. to provide physically and practically for a future 
population of about 2.5 million within the Metropolitan 
Planning Area.
2. to bring under control and relate to the public utility 
services, but not necessarily to halt, the outward 
expansion of the city by establishing a rural zone 
around the urban area.
3. To encourage the growth of major retail outlets, 
offices and other development normally associated with 
the city in a number of selected district centres in 
suburban areas, though still accepting that Melbourne's 
central city area would remain the principal focal
point.
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4. to check the population 'drift' to the outer areas
by encouraging the redevelopment of the inner suburbs, 
enabling them to rebuild their population to at least 
the 1950 figure.
5. to improve the relationship of residence to workplace 
(planning analysis had shown that 85 per cent of 
industrial employment was in the central, west and 
northern sectors, while 68 per cent of all new houses 
were being built in the eastern and southern sectors) 
by appropriate zoning.
6. to provide a modern and effective highway system co­
ordinated with and related to an improved public 
transport system.
As planning schemes go, this was a cautious one, reflecting the 
political sensitivity of the issue of metropolitan planning. It took a 
cautious view of the amount of planning that would be accepted and financed, 
suggesting three broad lines of policy - for zoning, public works and the 
general shape of the city. While the Report did discuss alternatives to 
incremental metropolitan expansion, including the development of satellite 
towns and other forms of decentralisation, it did not regard action on these 
matters as within the scope of the Board's planning responsibilities. Nor 
would it have been possible within the boundaries of the metropolitan area 
defined for its work.
The fundamental approach to this 1954 Plan could be described as 
'trend planning.'
Trend planning usually starts with projections of current 
situations into the future and the plan consists in 
harmonising public and private development with these 
trends.. Such planning ... assumes that many factors 
are fixed and not ranges of alternative figures within 
which the choice of particular value is, in part or whole, 
a matter of policy judgment. (Simmie 1971 : 451)
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The Melbourne scheme made no attempt to specifically restructure metropolitan 
development/ planners judging this both unnecessary and undesirable. Rather, 
development trends evident and perceived as desirable at the time were used 
as a guide to the allocation of future urban zonings. For example, among 
the factors influencing the policy for allocating residential zones were: 
recognition of the strong preference for residence to the south and east, 
compared with the relative unpopularity of the west; and recognition that 
development to the south and east was more economical to the community than 
development to the north and west. (MMBW 1954 : 41) In catering for an 
increase in population up to 2.5 m. the Board did not consider or intend any 
limit to Melbourne's eventual population. At the time the plan was consid­
ered to be adequate for the growth demands of at least thirty years.
With the advantage of twenty years hindsight it is possible to 
delineate the strengths and weaknesses of the 1954 plan and assess its impact 
on the process of urban development. Land use was controlled,'though some 
industries still expand where they weren't meant to, and outer suburban 
development is still beset by occasional confusions and suspicions as some 
'green' zones respond all too flexibly to local politics.' (Strefeton 1970 : 
198) Chiefly because resources were limited, few of the major road works 
proposed were completed. Similarly with parklands; a central fund was 
created but it had to buy where land was cheap, mostly on the periphery, 
adding little to the old slums in the inner areas that needed them most.
In terms of its original objectives though, the scheme appears to have been 
successful in restraining premature subdivision of land well beyond the 
built up area within the planning scheme boundary. But areas beyond that 
boundary, particularly east of Dandenong and in the Croydon-Lillydale 
corridor, have suffered from unregulated subdivision activities.
246
In the main areas where the scheme was intended to counter existing 
trends or encourage new forms of development it has been less successful, 
as two examples illustrate. The attempt to check the decline of population 
in the inner areas by comprehensive redevelopment has failed, and population 
has continued to decline. Secondly, there has been no public development of 
the recommended five district centres and next to no co-ordination of retail 
dispersal. The large areas of land required for the new 'regional' shopping 
centres were usually not available in the proposed district centres. It is 
a measure of the inability of statutory planning schemes to directly sponsor 
development that the eventual location of these regional shopping centres 
usually required a variation to the land use zoning proposals of the 1954 
plan.
There has been more success, though perhaps more by good luck than 
good management, with the general shape of the metropolis and the distri­
bution of its work. The planners had expected an increase in central city 
employment and aimed to match this with major road reconstructions. The 
expected increase did not eventuate. The central city workforce remained 
stable for 15 years, but this took the pressure off lagging road works. 
Outside the city centre, residence and w ork moved more conformably with the 
plan, chiefly because the plan set out to predict, accept and help 'natural' 
tendencies. Planners reserved substantial areas in the south-east for 
industrial purposes and plenty of industry has since located there.
Overall, however, it appears that the average length of 
the journey to work is increasing. The predominance of 
the central and inner ring as the main areas of employ­
ment has not been significantly diminished by suburban 
dispersal. Between 1954 and 1966 employment in the 
central and inner ring increased 28 per cent, from 457,000 
to 586,000, accounting for 64 per cent of all employment 
in 1966, but the resident population had decreased from 
787,000 (52 per cent of total) in 1954 to 766,000 (36.7 
per cent) in 1966. Suburban employment more than doubled 
over the same period, increasing from 140,000 to 382,000 
... more than matching the rate of increase in the sub­
urban population which rose from 781,000 to 1.4 million. 
(Urban Research Unit 1973 : 175)
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But development does not wait for the tardy processes of statutory planning 
to catch up with it. The 1954 plan's unde restimation both of the rate of 
growth and of the areas needed to accommodate it was recognised by the Board 
in its 1958 Report, The Problems of Urban Expansion In the Melbourne 
Metropolitan Area. This recommended immediate release of further zoned 
areas to accommodate an additional population of 250,000 beyond the antici­
pated 2.25m which it was then felt the existing scheme could handle. The 
report also emphasised the need to revise metropolitan planning boundaries 
to incorporate areas then outside the planning area but being substantially 
developed. But the new Interim Development Order, (including amendments to 
the 1954 scheme resulting from objections) which came into operation in 1960 
provided for substantially the same zoned areas as the 1954 scheme.
In 1962 a report was prepared setting out additional zonings to 
accommodate a further 250,000 people within the planning area. Existing 
development trends were still accepted as the main guide to the location of 
additional zoned land.
It is clear that the settlement trend established by the 
original survey has not substantially altered, and some 
two-thirds of all metropolitan settlement has continued 
to be in the eastern and southern sectors. (MMBW 1962 : 9)
Finally in 1967 the zoned area was extended up to the 320 square 
miles sought in 1962, and the 1954 scheme, so modified, came into effect as 
the Approved Planning Scheme in 1968.
Meanwhile new moves were afoot, related to the old problem of the 
need for more co-ordination between the public utilities and the planning 
authority. The MMBW had 'no official links, and imperfect working links, 
with the other utilities and departments. So railways, trams, buses, power, 
gas, education, housing, hospitals, harbors and industrial promotion all 
studied their independent crystal balls and planned their works ahead into 
the different metropolitan futures they saw there.' (Stretton 1970 : 200)
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It became apparent in the early 1960s not only that planning for a population 
in excess of 2.5m. would be needed but also that some re-assessment-of over­
all goals may be necessary. Accordingly in 1966 the Minister for Local 
Government called for a general review of the planning of the metropolis.
In letters to the Town and Country Planning Board, the MMBW, and the Town 
and Country Planning Association, he ask ed them to consider
1. the most desirable shape and nature of the urban community 
of Melbourne in the future
2. the most suitable method of planning and regulating the 
future growth of the metropolis
3. the most suitable authority or authorities to carry out 
such planning and supervision. (MMBW 1967 : 29)
The Minister stated that the need for an overall revision of urban 
planning policy was indicated by the 'overspill of growth beyond the limited 
MMBW Planning Scheme Area; by the narrow margin between present population 
and the population capacity of the zoning in the Board of Works Scheme; by 
the work being done to arrive at a firm Transportation Plan for 1985, based 
on the recent Metropolitan Transportation Study, and by the need to relate 
this specialist component to an approved land-use plan. (Town and Country 
Planning Board 1967 : 5)
As suggested by the title, Organisation for Strategic Plannings the 
TCPB Report concentrated less on the desirable shape of the future metropolis 
than on defining the critical issues of planning policy and the most suitable 
authority to formulate and carry out that policy. So above all this Report 
stressed the political realities behind any planning schemes or ideas. It 
suggested that planning must be a state responsibility and that 'it is 
inconceivable that the Government could or should yield these responsibilities 
...to any separately elected body. Any such directly or indirectly elected
authority would be competing with State Parliament itself.' (TCPB 1967 : 22)
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This, of course, was one of the arguments which had always been used by 
opponents of a Greater Melbourne authority. By implication too, this meant 
that the Board of Works, an 'indirectly elected' body, was not suitable as a 
strategic planning body. The Report suggested two possibilities in this 
regard (emphasising its belief that a state can plan only by determined co­
ordination of all its investments) - a new State planning authority or a 
reconstituted Town and Country Planning B oard, which could be renamed the 
State Planning Board. Realising that this Board, even if reconstituted with 
greater powers, could not hope to accomplish the necessary integration and 
coordination of all government policies related to physical utilities and 
social infrastructure, it further recommended the establishment of a Council 
for the Coordination of Regional Planning. This body would have 'the 
responsibility of reviewing and endorsing (and if felt necessary, initiating) 
strategic planning proposals formulated by the Board'. (TCPB 1967 : 28). 
Members of the Council were to be the Secretaries of the Premiers Department 
and of the Municipal Association of Victoria, the Directors of Finance and 
of the Fisheries and Wildlife Department, and the Chairman of the Country 
Roads Board, Housing Commission, Victorian Railways Commissioners, Town and 
Country Planning Board, State Electricity Commission, Soil Conservation 
Authority, and State Rivers and Water Supply Commission. This wide-ranging 
constitution of the Council, it was hoped, would lead to the desired inte­
gration of government policies.
On the shape of the future metropolis this Report was both brief 
and cautious. It recommended linear growth by corridors of metropolitan 
towns, thus implicitly rejecting both the principles of the old Sydney plan 
(Cumberland County Plan) and of the new Board of Works plan. It was 
accommodating, rather than directive, working on the belief that a government 
shouldn't force its citizens into settlements of unwelcome shape or density. 
But planners did hope to direct growth into three radial corridors of 
metro-towns. The Report warns that s uch a plan can be 'a speculator's
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guide', and that it would need to be accompanied by some action 'to restrain 
the price of the new corridor land and compel its development without 
speculative withholding.' But any of the methods for doing this are 
anathema to Victorian freeholders, and w ould probably be killed at birth by 
the Liberal and Country Party majority in the State Parliament. And without 
some such action, any plan which tries to reserve land on the perimeter for 
open space and rural conservation could well do more harm than good.
Compared to the Town and Country Planning Board's Report, that of 
the MMBW {The Future Growth of Melbourne1967) gave much more consideration 
to the shape of Melbourne. It examined the same three basic patterns - 
growth corridors (or 'linear growth'), controlled outward growth, and 
satellite cities ('balanced periphery growth') - and came up with recommen­
dations for a mix of these: corridor growth, with some limited satellite
city growth in the north and west to 'balance' development of the metropolitan 
area, (MMBW 1967 : 17) and some 'filling in' and 'filling out'. The Report 
favoured low-density expansion into the countryside, but thought there could 
be medium and high density redevelopment of most of the pre-1929 metropolis, 
to include 300,000 additional jobs there and residence for 500,000 people on 
8,000 acres at 130-160 people per acre.
The chief protagonist of the Board's 'balanced growth' plan, at a 
forum held after the release of the two reports in September 1967, was Sir 
Bernard Evans1, who at the time held two key positions: Chairman of the 
Melbourne City Council (M.C.C.) Building and Town Planning Committee and 
Vice Chairman of the MMBW Planning and Highways Committee. He had personal 
and political reasons (discussed in the next section) for supporting a radial 
corridor plan. He started from the premise that Melbourne's growth hitherto
b. 1905. Lord Mayor of Melbourne 1959-61. MMBW Commissioner, Vice 
chairman of MMBW Planning and Highways Committee, practising architect. 
Director of several private companies dealing in property.
1
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had been lopsidely to the east and south and argued the MMBW's case for a 
'balanced' Melbourne. (He himself lives in Toorak). By this he meant that 
there should be planned development to the north and west so that the 
Central Business District (CBD) would be centred in the metropolis. He 
pointed out that it was reasonably developed for trading and best use could 
be made of it by western development aided by the new Lower Yarra Crossing 
(Westgate bridge) (Crow 1972 : 7)
In the Survey and Analysis accompanying its 1954 plan the MMBW had 
written :
In the west .. the country is flat, windswept and barren.
The soil heavy and tenacious, the rainfall low and 
generally the area is more suited for industrial than 
residential use. The north, whi le more attractive than 
the west, has not the same appeal as the east and south.
It is not surprising, therefore, that ... two-thirds 
of the population increase has settled in the eastern 
and southern districts. This trend expresses a strong 
desire which cannot be ignored. (MMBW 1954 : 49)
Yet little more than a decade later the MMBW itself, with its 
planning committee under Evans' leadership, not only 'ignored' these factors 
in its planning, but did not even mention its own earlier analysis or 
explain why it no longer operated or was no longer important. The statis­
tics on heavy manufacturing industry in the Board's Planning Policies for 
the Melbourne Region show a shift of employment in these industries from the 
west to the south during the 1960s (MMBW 1971 : 29). The Board's plan 
forcing workers westward to follow jobs there is discriminatory planning 
against such workers.
How did the 1967-71 MMBW - Evans radial corridor plan to the west 
and north come to overthrow the whole direction of 1954 MMBW planning?
What sections stand to gain by an intensive subsidised drive to develop an 
urban corridor due west to Melton or satellites at Melton or Sunbury? 
Firstly and obviously, developers and would-be developers who own land in 
this direction and expect to profit from the plan. (Evans himself owned
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land west at Altona.) Secondly there is a specialised need by established 
manufacturers or potential manufacturers in the west to attract top 
executives and technical staff to work in their plants. Ever-increasing 
commuting distances and deteriorating transport have meant an increasing 
impediment to the movement of executive and higher-skilled workforce to the 
west. Remedies advanced by "tough sophisticated realists" (Stretton 1970 : 
202) do not contemplate this elite actually coming to live amonst the lowpaid 
migrant industrial workers. The industrialists envisage relief coming from 
two directions - from the Westgate bridge (speeding travel time from east to 
west) and from some little separated "Tooraks" at Hoppers Crossing, Werribee, 
Melton or Sunbury. As Mr C.A. Wilson, General Manager of the Lower Yarra 
Crossing Authority explained to the "Deprived West" Seminar in May 1972,
Industry in the west will be far more accessible from the 
south-east. This can be expected to provide a much 
greater potential labour force pool, with a wider range 
of skills. This will encourage a more diverse range of 
industry in the west, and accelerate industrial develop­
ment which, despite cheaper land prices, has been 
deterred by the inattractive labour force situation.
(Wilson 1972 : 3)
So, too, the MMBW's Regional Policies Report (1971 : 70) states that 
the establishment of satellite cities would seem to offer one means of 
achieving the greater diversity of population which they say is desirable 
for the north and west. As no other me ans are hinted at, it would seem the 
MMBW is concerned not so much with desegregation as with supplying the needs 
of industry in the west to make the Evans plan a feasible one.
The linear concept advanced by the TCPB was rejected by the Bolte 
Government in favour of corridor development along the main rail and road 
routes radiating from the centre. (VPD 1963 : 3244) The reason for this 
choice appears to have been the need to compromise between pressures for 
'development', which naturally came from landowners north and west as well 
as south and east of the city.
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If the art of the 'practical planners' is to contrive something that 
is a compromise for everyone, and if the art of the politician is to produce 
something which no one will protest, then the Evans plan appeared incon­
trovertible, seeming to embrace the legitimate interests of the age-old 
speculators with the new-fangled conservationists, the interests of the 
modern freeway advocates with the traditional lovers of the central city 
areas.
On the form of authority best suited for broad planning of the 
metropolitan area the MMBW, like the Town and Country Planning Board, 
nominated itself for the job, but conceded that specialized authorities for 
the satellites and redevelopment areas would be needed.
There were two basic differences in the Reports of the two Boards - 
involving the planning area, and the methods and organisation for planning.
The Town and Country Planning Board thought long-range strategic planning ought 
to take place within a large Port Phillip district, and that broad policies 
should be decided by a reconstituted State Planning Board, a new Council for 
the Co-ordination of Regional Planning, and State Cabinet. Once approved 
these policies would be handed down to the appropriate planning authorites,
'preferably regional planning authorities, but in their absence the muni-
i
cipal planning authorites, for the areas affected. (TCPB 1967 : 28) 
Significantly the TCPB proposed no representation by the Board of Works on 
the new council, and made no comment about enlarging its area.
The Board of Works did admit that some kind of State Authority to 
advise Cabinet on planning matters was needed, but emphasised autonomy or 
self-determination for each region. It regarded itself, much enlarged, as 
the appropriate metropolitan planning authority. It would operate through 
statutory planning mechanisms at a local level, and prepare long-term 
statements of regional planning policy which would be approved by the
government.
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Bunker has noted an interesting shift here, from a planner's point 
of view, from concern with static land-use plans to broad strategic policies 
and programmes of development, with suggested mechanisms to obtain State 
Government committal to these, a move especially noticeable in the report 
of the Town and Country Planning Board. (Bunker 1971 : 376)
The immediate result of these two Reports was the Town and Country 
Planning (Amendment) Act 1968, compromising between each set of recommend­
ations. The Bill had four main objectives, the last of which was the most 
important: to provide a tribunal to hear and decide town planning appeals;
to make better provisions for cooperation between local councils on planning 
schemes involving more than one council area; to provide for the establish­
ment of a State Planning Council; and to extend the metropolitan area. 
(V.P.D. 1968: 3226 - 3232) The area administered by the MMBW was trebled 
and the Board was made the responsible authority for planning this area, but 
it was brought more tightly under the control of the Minister. Three levels 
of planning were defined: strategic planning, that is, broad structure
planning at Government level incorporating major projects initiated by 
Government authorities and expressed as statement of planning policy setting 
the pattern and providing the guide lines for physical planning; regional 
planning, physical planning at local government level for areas extending 
beyond the boundaries of one municipality; and local planning, physical 
planning for unified areas within a single municipality. (Bunker 1971 : 377) 
Geelong and Westernport were incorporated as separate regions with second- 
tier regional planning authorities.
The Town and Country Planning Board, a State Planning Council (on 
which the MMBW is represented) and State Cabinet deal with strategic plan­
ning, while regional planning is carried out by authorities set up for the 
purpose, and local government handles local planning. The Act thus closely 
followed the organisational recommendations of the TCPB Report and the 
Minister introducing the Bill borrowed heavily from that Report to explain
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and justify the measures (V.P.D. 1968 : 3227)
The State Planning Council established by the Act is very similar 
to the recommendation of the Town and Country Planning Board for a Council 
for the Coordination of Regional Planning. Its membership was established 
as the Chairman of the Town and Country Planning Board, the Country Roads 
Board, Housing Commission, State Electricity Commission, Victorian Railways 
Commissioners, State Rivers and Water Supply Commission, MMBW, Land Utili­
zation Advisory Council; the Directors-General of Public Works and Education; 
the Secretary of the Premier's Department, and the Under-Secretary. Its 
functions are
(a) to coordinate planning by State instrumentalities and 
semi-government authorities of future works and develop­
ments for which they are responsible;
(b) to act as a consultant and adviser to the Town and 
Country Planning Board with respect to the preparation 
and adoption of any statement of planning policy 
prepared by the Board with respect to any other 
matter necessary to be provided for in the interests 
of the State in the preparation of regional or other 
planning schemes.
[1968 Town and Country Planning Act, Section 8B(1)]
At the same time an Act was passed introducing important changes in 
the role and structure of the MMBW, bringing the Board under ministerial 
supervision and providing that the Chairman be appointed by the Minister, 
replacing the former process of election from and by the Board of Commiss­
ioners. The implications of this for planning policy are significant.
Before this amendment to the MMBW Act the Board could only be requested, not 
directed, by the Minister to prepare and implement policies and schemes.
The Minister can now set priorities, policies and programmes. To enable
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him to do so, all information and accounts are open to him and all projects 
costing more than $50,000 must have his sanction. This does at least provide 
the means whereby an energetic and intelligent Minister with reformist 
intentions (given a supportive Cabinet, and other necessary pre-conditions) 
could have considerable influence on the social philosophy behind planning 
policy.
One of these pre-conditions is public support. In South Australia 
we have seen that the statutory planners had to work hard on public education 
to create a 'demand' for planning through political channels, which they could 
then respond to. How has the Victorian public reacted to these new edifices 
of ideas and planning structures?
By and large those who have been interested have not been impressed.
In February 1972 the MMBW arranged the first public discussion of its new 
plan. 1500 people applied for 1300 tickets at $2 each. 'Why accept a plan 
for a Melbourne of five million?' many participants asked. 'Why not insist 
on a State plan and a Federal plan that precludes cities of five million?'
The Board's 1971 Plan was criticised for being what is called a first gener­
ation plan - an elaborate but unsatisfactory pattern of land-use restrictions, 
red, pink and green areas on a map that can always be changed by someone who 
makes enough noise; for assuming that Melbourne must grow to nearly three 
times its present unmanageable size, without even questioning the premise, 
and without offering any alternatives; and for failing to tackle the problem 
of land speculation. (Age 28 Feb 1972)
By late 1972 radical alternatives were being proposed by concerned 
groups of citizens at the hearing of objections into the Planning Scheme.
The President of Town and Country Planning Association (Mr R.A. Gardner) 
argued that Melbourne should develop in a 76 mile linear corridor stretching 
from the city to Trafalgar in Gippsland. The six mile wide corridor could 
house the 2.3 million extra people that the Board expects Melbourne to have
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by 1997. A super freeway would run down the centre alongside 125 m.p.h. 
trains. A joint submission by the Victorian Chapter of the Royal Australian 
Institute of Architects and the Royal Australian Planning Institute criticised 
the absence of maximum population levels, considering the idea of indefinite 
growth of the Melbourne Metropolitan area ('Melbourne Unlimited', as an Age 
editorial critically referred to it on 20 February 1973) as unacceptable.
The institutes claimed the present plan failed to compare alternatives or to 
present a rational argument to support its strategies, and that its policies 
concentrated on physical aspects of planning and did not take social planning 
and its costs and benefits into account. (Age 10 November 1972) These 
formal objections to a formal plan illustrate only the tip of an iceberg.
Since 1968 public opposition to many aspects of Government policy in relation 
to the city (freeways, high-rise 'ghettoes', terrace demolition, overbuilding 
of the CBD and environmental pollution)has been gathering momentum and 
forcing changes on a reluctant government. A more vigilant press, reinforced 
by a more concerned public, has detailed some of the questionable dealings 
which appear to be inseparable from the statutory planning process.'*’
In February of 1973 the Board of Works' chief planner J.A. Hepburn 
announced that the Board was likely to ask the State Government to slow down 
Melbourne's growth. Only after it had heard all of the objections in
In October 1972, following reports in The Age on land transactions 
totalling $350,000 by the Chairman of the MMBW, implying misuse of 
information gained through his position as a local councillor and 
as a Commissioner on the MMBW, a board of inquiry was appointed by the 
Government to look into these dealings. The inquiry found no culpable 
conduct. {Age 16 October 1972)
In February 1973 a company of which a Ch airman of the Town Planning 
Appeals Tribunal and his wife were the sole directors and shareholders 
was reported to have made over $700,000 on a city property sale.
The deal went through after the company had objected to plans for 
the $19m. redevelopment scheme of the Nauruan Government. The grounds 
of the objection made it impossible for the Nauruan Government to go 
ahead unless it purchased the land owned by the company {Age 
24 February 1973)
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principle to the 1971 Scheme, most of which were opposed to unrestricted 
growth of Melbourne, did the Board feel justified in taking such initiative. 
This is not surprising given that for fifteen years under Bolte the state's 
watchword had been growth, of both industry and population. In making his 
statement Hepburn said that restraints on this growth would require a firm 
government planning policy direction (Age 22 February 1973). The timing and 
nature of this statement is indicative of the role that planning has played 
in post-war urban development in Victoria - a conservative rather than an 
innovative one.
Rationalisation of existing land use patterns, and regulation 
of new development have been the important influences.
Overall restraint of metropolitan growth has ... been regarded 
as beyond the scope of land use planning, but structuring of 
metropolitan form to achieve increased efficiency ... is 
emerging as a desirable objective...Planning has been 
administered as a check-and-balance system, whereby the public 
interest, as interpreted by the planning authorities, has 
been used as a restraint on the operations of the self- 
interested participants in the urban property market ..
From rather tentative beginnings planning has become part 
of the apparatus of urban government with increasing (but 
cautious) legislative b acking from the State. But the 
effectiveness of planning remains dependent on the degree 
of political support for its various objectives, (Urban 
Research Unit 1973 : 171)
And that, historically, has been Victori a's problem. It has proved very
difficult for the planning authorities to restrain the operations of 'the
iself-interested participants in the urban property market. For, as the 
developers' newsletter Crunch  ^boasts,
The land development industry in Victoria is an $80 
million industry and during this financial year for the 
first time $100 million will probably be spent on 
developing new subdivisions. What a far cry from the 
days of the early 50s when less than $100,000 would 
have comfortably produced more than double the number 
of lots the industry produces today . (Crunch No. 4 
Edition, September 1972)
1 Published by Land Sales & Development Pty Ltd.
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A later edition of this newsletter, after listing record prices for land in 
Springvale, Noble Park, Epping, Frankston and Tullamarine, commented - 
'Everyone of these sales indicates that uncertainty about zoning, lack of 
services in the outer suburbs of Melbourne and the new Federal Government 
are no concern to the fearless developers of Melbourne'. (Crunch No. 1
edition, January 1973). Proof of their confidence in the malleability of 
the planners and politicians was revealed in The Age (27 October 1971) which 
listed the following organisations as having made substantial purchases of 
land outside the existing planning scheme boundary, east of Dandenong. This 
was over a month before the MMBW published its Planning Policies for the 
Melbourne Metropolitan Region3 which indicated that this area was to be zoned 
for residential development. The size and value of the purchases shows the 
confidence of the developers that they could get permission to develop this 
land (which at the time of purchase was rural land) within a reasonable 
period.
BUYER AREA (acres) COST ($m.)
Housing Commission of Victoria 505 1.17
Standard Roads 518 1.57
P. KcDougall 32 .10
H.G. and R. Nominees 61 .12
Coringah 192 .50
Landstrom 110 .19
Page Johnson 135 .16
C .B . Gardens, Cochran 329 .29
TOTAL 1,882 4.10
For the developer, the major return from his investment relates not 
to a manufactured product, nor to the use of other's labour to produce 
excess returns, but to the inflation of land values that relate specifi­
cally to the control of urban space.
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The larger land development companies are thoroughly integrated into 
the investment and speculation aspects of the capitalist economy. A study 
carried out in 1972 by Ian Potter and Co of seven of the larger public 
companies listed as property developers on the Australian stock exchange 
indicates the character of the leading companies in the industry.
Their sources of earnings ranged from land subdivision through home building, 
commercial development, property management and general investment to owner­
ship of industrial firms producing textiles, plastics and building materials, 
together with agricultural and mining enterprises. The importance and scale 
of these companies is shown by their combined total tangible assets, which 
at the time of the survey were valued at $340 million (Urban Research Unit 
1973: 116). The risk involved in development projects has led developers to 
seek returns on equity capital of at least 30 per cent per annum.
Large finance companies have become directly involved in development 
projects in Melbourne. The AMP Society is jointly promoting an industrial 
estate near Dandenong in association with A.V. Jennings Ltd. T & G Insurance 
Ltd recently acquired over 1,000 acres for residential development north of 
Melbourne. Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd, a finance company, is also an 
active land developer. Among the members of the Land Development Conference 
are such noted finance companies as Australian Securities Ltd, Australian 
Guaranty Corporation Ltd, Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd, Mutual 
Acceptance Co Ltd, Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd, and others. (Urban 
Research Unit 1973 : 135)
The ideology of the developer is one of straightforward, profit- 
maximising .
Where the constraints applied by the regulating authorities 
increase his costs without offering a complementary increase 
in selling price, thereby reducing his profit margin, he 
will try to avoid them. He can do this by either operating 
only where they do not apply, by resorting to the statutory 
procedures open to him to appeal against them, by taking 
some form of political action, or acting in some less 
socially acceptable way . (Urban Research Unit 1973 : 135-6)
261
This does not make developers peculiar in a capitalist economy. Planning 
authorities have tried to regulate their behaviour to more socially 
responsible ends. But their success has been minimal because the aims of 
planning authorities must be backed by concrete political support, and this 
is unlikely when the philosophy of the dominant political party respects and 
defends the right of the individual to do what he likes with his own property.
This conflict between the best planning intentions and the harshest 
political and economic realities is illustrated in the next section, in the 
over-development of the central business district, the industrialisation of 
Westernport, and the freeway program.
3.
1. Transportation
The highway system mainly serves as an accessory to the private 
automobile ... highways, like other institutions of the right, 
exist for the sake of a product. Auto manufacturers ... produce 
simultaneously both cars and the demand for cars. They also 
produce the demand for multi-lane highways, bridges and oil­
fields. The private car is the focus of a cluster of right 
wing institutions. The high cost of each element is dictated 
by the elaboration of the basic product, and to sell the basic 
product is to 'hook' society on the entire package.
(Illich 1972 : 92)
The preparation of the Transportation Plan for Melbourne was a more 
or less independent event in the development of metropolitan planning. It 
was prepared under the supervision of the Metropolitan Transportation 
Committee (MTC), established by legislation in 1963 to advise the Government 
on the planning, development, coordination, control and improvement of 
Melbourne's transport facilities. The study prepared a plan for transport 
facilities to serve a projected metropolitan population of 3.7 million 
(expected by 1985). The distribution of this population and the land uses
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required by it was projected for the MTC by the MMBW. The composition of 
the MTC, like that of the Steering Committee that guided the Adelaide 
Transportation Study, was dominated by engineers.^ Also like the Adelaide 
MATS plan it hired an American firm (predominantly engineering) Wilbur Smith 
and Associates, and, predictably, the results were very similar to those 
produced in the MATS plan. Of a total proposed expenditure of $2616 million, 
$1,675 million was to build 307 miles of metropolitan freeways and a further 
$546 million for highways, totalling $2,221 on roads, as compared with $255 
million for public transport.
What can be gathered by implication from Volumes One and Two is 
openly stated in Volume Three of the Study. 'The plan should be a 'demand' 
plan'. By 'demand' the MTC quite literally means individual consumer demand, 
uncontrolled by what we might term 'community consumer demand'. To the 
Committee the question of the accumulation of all the individual consumer 
demands of all the individual car owners added up, quite inescapably, not 
only to a freeway system of several hundred miles, but one which funnelled 
traffic right into the centre of the city. Wilbur Smith not only 'forecast' 
the necessity of all day parking in the city but even calculated 'balancing' 
the supply to the demand, block by block. To make this workable a ring-freeway 
in a tight loop around the CBD (which would destroy large areas of the inner 
suburbs) was necessary. 'Without this by-passing function (of the ring 
freeway) it would not be possible to increase the central parking area 
predicted for 1985 except at the risk of overtaxing the city streets and
Chairman Hon. V.F. Wilcox, LL.B., Minister of Transport; Deputy Chairman 
Hon. R.J. Hamer, LL.M., Minister for Local Government; Councillor I.F. 
Beaurepaire, Melbourne City Council (Director of Olympic Tyre and Rubber 
Co Pty Ltd); A.G. Brown, M.Inst.T., Coordinator of Transport; G.F.W. Brown, 
F.I.E. Aust., Chairman Victorian Railways Commissioners; E.W. Coates,
B. Comm., Director of Finance; A.H. Croxford, LL.B., Chairman MMBW:
E.V.N. Field, M.Inst.T., Chairman Transport Regulation Board; I.J. 
O'Donnell, B.C.E., F.I.E.Aust., Chairman, Country Roads Board; R.J. Risson, 
B.E., F.I.C.E., F.I.E. Aust, Chairman MMTB; only 2 members had planning 
backgrounds, J.A. Hepburn, A.M.T.P.I., F.A.P.I., Chief Planner MMBW, and 
J.G. Westland, Dip. T. & R.P., M.I.E.Aust., M.A.P.I., Chairman Traffic 
Commission. Only one member (Hepburn) of the Technical Committee of the 
M.T.C. was a town planner. The other six members were all engineers. 
(Metropolitan Transportation Study Vol.3, p.61)
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creating permanent peak-hour traffic chaos'. (MTS Vol. Ill: 54)
The basic methodology of the predictive aspects of the Wilbur Smith 
report is trend planning of the worst kind. In a very real sense it is a 
non-plan, a product of laissez-faire policies which in the context of the 
1970s mean that the interests of the biggest corporations have the biggest 
influence - not only the car manufacturers and oil companies but the finance 
and hire purchase companies, who have fourteen full-time paid lobbyists in 
Canberra, working on and through the Liberal Party and department heads.
Yet one of the stated objectives of the Plan is 'to maintain a proper 
balance between public and private transport' (Vol.Ill p.3). To achieve 
'balance' a much greater investment would have to be made in public than in 
private transport. But the Plan proposes the reverse, requiring six-and-a- 
half times more investment on highways than on public transport. The MTS 
is understandable in terms of the ideology of the 'technical experts' 
responsible for it and the political arena in which it was decided to under­
take such a study. Liberal politics (and finance) have always been receptive 
to car manufacturers, oil companies and BHP.
Public reaction to the MTS was also similar to that aroused by the 
MATS plan in Adelaide. Those organisations with a vested interest in the 
car industry (e.g. the RACV) or who stood to gain from increased road 
expenditure (e.g. the Melbourne City Council) and engineers with their purely 
technical approach to the issue, all supported the MTS. The Royal Auto 
Journal (the RACV journal) of February 1970 issued an eight page report 
eulogising freeways on the grounds that they would reduce travel time and 
increase safety. There was no mention of their environmental and social 
impact.
Sir Bernard Evans defended the Study in the face of growing public 
opposition. In 1971 he addressed the MMBW planning and highways committee 
on the eastern leg of the ring freeway -
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Your committee and the Board's engineers have been working 
on this project for almost eight years. We have spent $1.5 
million on acquiring properties and having consultants 
and engineers work on the project - the whole thing is 
ready to go ... (But) all sorts of people are crawling 
out of the woodwork to criticise the scheme unnecessarily . 
(Age 15 September 1971)
The financial and engineering criteria used by Evans, the engineers of the 
MMBW and CRB, and the RACV did not impress some sections of the public. In 
the absence of survey evidence, a six month sample of opinion expressed in 
The Age from July to December 1971 revealed thirty letters or articles 
opposing the freeways, from churches, inner suburban residents associations, 
private individuals, the Town and Country Planning Association^- and the 
Commuters Campaign. Opposition was not united on the degree to which 
freeways were a bad thing. While some groups objected to any freeways, 
others wanted routes more carefully chosen to minimise social, community 
and environmental destruction. The Town and Country Planning Association 
wanted three freeways scrapped, especially the inner-city system (which 
would involve resumption of more than eight acres of city parkland and 
destruction of more than 100 trees). They advocated development of a fast 
and efficient public transport system to keep the city alive. (Age 29 June 
1971)
Government response was slow. In July 1971 the Minister for Public 
Transport emphasised that Government action depended largely on public 
demand. 'If such demands are not made funds go elsewhere'. He argued that 
while the motor car owner readily provides funds for road building there was 
no public transport users association to make demands. 'Only through positive 
demands will the Government stop neglecting public transport. In part this
 ^ A voluntary body of interested laymen, administered by a council of 
architects, planners, local councillors and other concerned citizens.
It has been active in urban problems throughout the 1960s, registering 
opposition to freeways, to the MMBW 1971 Plan, to the VHC redevelopment 
policies in the inner suburbs, and so on.
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is already taking place and it is encouraging when organisations throughout 
the community ... take the unprecedented step of demanding better public 
transport'. (Age 8 July 1971)
In August 1971 the cost of the proposed freeway system leaped to 
$3,000 million. The Commuters Campaign followed this announcement with a 
strong protest against the social and financial costs of the plan, 
criticising its'misallocation of limited public resources'. They recommended
(1) bigger car parks at local railway stations
(2) complete overhaul and upgrading of public transport
(3) re-examination by the MTC of the basis of the 'demand' 
for people's travelling habits
(4) direction to the Railways to pinpoint major sources 
of revenue loss.
We support Mr Hamer ... in his abhorrence of the network 
of freeways near the inner areas and trust his view prevails 
over those who would otherwise give credence to the idea 
that the State Government is more closely attuned to the 
interests of the petrol companies, metal and car manufacturing 
corporations and highway construction bureaucracy rather 
than the interests of the community . (Letter from H.S. 
Hodgens, Secretary of the Commuters Campaign, Age 25 August 
1971)
But public transport users were not the only sources of community opposition. 
Particularly vocal were residents from those areas directly threatened by 
construction, the educated and articulate from the inner and south 
eastern suburbs. In January 1973 nine south-eastern suburban councils^ 
protested to the State Government that the recent cut-back in the freeway 
network (Hamer had announced three weeks earlier that the network would be 
halved by scrapping 150 miles through built-up suburban areas) was not 
enough. (Age 17 January 1973) UNFAG (United Freeway Action Group), the
Brighton, Caulfield, Malvern, Moorab in, Port Melbourne, Prahran, 
St Kilda, Sandringham and South Melbourne.
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Carlton Association and the Committee for Urban Action (an association of 
several inner-suburban action groups) campaigned for public transport, each 
distributing well-argued literature.1 The Carlton Association established 
its Freeway Action Group to deal with the threat of the proposed freeway 
which would disrupt the communities of North Carlton and Fitzroy.
The Carlton Association is not necessarily opposed to 
the construction of freeways - it does however place the 
preservation of peoples homes above the construction of 
freeways which are not properly researched, planned and 
coordinated, and is determined to prevent unnecessary 
destruction in such circumstances".
(Carlton Association 1970 : 1)
Stong opposition was voiced by residents of the wealthier eastern suburbs
affected by the proposed eastern le§ of the city ring road. Responding to
2this pressure from a Liberal voting area Liberal Premier Hamer ordered 
the TCPB to examine the project from 'angles other than traffic engineer­
ing', to consider the aesthetic, environmental and sociological implications 
before deciding the future of this segment of the network. {.Age 16 September 
1971) And in October 1971 the Government decided to scrap the eastern leg.
In a major policy switch yesterday State Cabinet decided to 
investigate putting public transport before cars in Melbourne. 
It directed the MTC to investigate ways of improving public 
transport rather than road traffic systems. The committee 
will also consider modifying the proposed multi-million 
dollar freeway network to reduce costs and disruption of 
community life. The decision was a major defeat for the 
MMBW and its Chairman who were ardent supporters of the 
scheme . {Age 5 October 1971)
Cabinet had made its decision after reports from four planning organisations 
that condemned the freeway system - the TCPB, Town and Country Planning 
Association, CRB, and Committee for Urban Action. The Age editorial was
A Transport Policy and Evaluation3 issued by the Committee for Urban 
Action, December 1970. Freeway Crisis3 a Carlton Association Report, 
March 1970.
R.J. Hamer b.1916. Lawyer. Entered Victorian Parliament 1958. Minister 
for Immigration 1962-4. Minister for Local Government 1964-72. Premier 
since 1972.
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sceptical. 'The Government's decision must be treated with caution because 
of the suspicion, founded on experience, that this latest review might turn 
out to be just another excuse for protracted delay in taking action'.
But their scepticism was not justified by events. On 28 March 1973 
the Premier issued a statement on the Melbourne Freeway Network. In the face 
of many-sided pressures, from the new Federal Government to the multitude 
of citizens action groups, Hamer announced that freeways would not be built 
in inner areas where their construction would involve substantial loss of 
established housing and disruption of existing communities. This was a 
victory for grass-roots political action, albeit self-interested in its own 
way. The full implications of the decision to scrap large parts of the 
proposed freeway system will be discussed in the final section on residents 
action and the future of reform under H amer's liberal progressivism.
2. The City and the City Council
... a most "respectable" body of wealthy men; three or 
four being "contractors", others interested in real estate, 
others were leading solicitors and merchants ... there are no 
"parties" in the council and not a suspicion of philanthropic 
sentiment: they are there in the main to improve the value
of city property by economical and wise corporate action and 
indirectly to provide clean and well-lighted streets for the 
mass of the citizens .
Beatrice and Sidney Webb 1898 (Austin 1965 : 72)
Nothing much has changed in the seventy-five years since the Webbs 
made these observations of the Melbourne City Council (MCC). A more recent 
observer has labelled the Council 'a cosy collection of club-land cronies'.^ 
The MCC has done little to ensure that the city is developed in an egalitarian 
manner. The reason can partly be found in the fact that the governing Civic 
Group (Liberal) councillors all live at upper class addresses outside the
1 Barry Jones, Labor MLA for Melbourne. Interview 14 June 1973.
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city'*' while the Labor councillors all live at lower class addresses in the 
city. The six wards in the CBD (non-residential) elect eighteen of the 
thirty-three councillors (i.e. eighteen councillors are absentee rate-paying 
businessmen). So it is impossible for Labor to gain a majority. Moreover 
clauses of the Melbourne and Geelong Corporation Act (1938) exempt the MCC 
and the GCC from the operation of the Local Government Act, which mean that 
they cannot be reformed without their own consent. While 29 per cent of the 
voters elect half the Councillors, 71 per cent elect the rest. While Batman 
Ward (business) has 1,617 voters and three councillors, Hopetoun Ward 
(residential) has 6,770 voters and the same number of councillors. Labor 
is further disadvantaged because the Council and its committees sit during 
the day. For effectiveness on Council it is essential to be on its committees 
(particularly the powerful building and planning committee) but most Labor 
candidates' occupations (school-teachers, public servants) prevent them 
from getting the necessary time off to devote to Council business.
What effect has this unrepresentative Council had on city develop-
.* .*
ment? Who has gained most from the kind of development that has taken place? 
Would this have been different under a Labor administration?
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to undertake a thorough exam­
ination of investment in the CBD. But some recent figures indicate who is 
investing in and profiting from land and office speculation. It is also 
clear that those who collect the profits are not collecting any of the costs 
(externalities) of this overgrowth of the city.
In 1971 it was announced that land values in the CBD had increased 
800 per cent in three years, that sites were now selling at $100 per square 
foot, and that in the past twelve months twenty-six permits had been issued 
for multi-storey office and shop complexes. (Age 27 May 1971) In June 1973
1 Most of them in the 'silvertail' suburb of Toorak.
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the MCC released a report which revealed that land prices throughout the 
city had doubled since 1968. 'The great economic expansion in the city has 
forced out activities that are not capable of meeting rising land values and 
rents', the report commented. Earlier in the year Melbourne's Strategy Plan 
consultants, the American firm of Interplan, had issued a draft report which 
included figures forecasting a $33 million over-supply of office space by 
1975. {Age 20 June 1973)
These speculative activities have been encouraged by the MCC because 
each new building increases Council revenue. A building like the 26 storey 
AMP block pays rates to the Council of $165,000 a year, whereas the old 
buildings that had occupied the AMP site returned only one-ninth of this. 
{Age 27 May 1971)
An acre of land abutting the City Square, for sale in December 1972, 
was expected to fetch between $8m and $12m. (between $175 and $250 per 
square foot) Who can afford these prices? Hammerson's, (a large British 
development company) Lend Lease Corporation, Mainline, Hanover Holdings,
AMP Society and T & G Mutual Life Assurance were expected to bid {Age 
12 December 1972)
Life offices are by far the biggest investors in city 
land. The property boom has drawn huge sums of insurance 
money from the sharemarket into the hands of real estate 
agents ... When looked at in terms of city land owner­
ship in Melbourne the big life offices rank as follows :
AMP, National Mutual, Colonial Mutual Life, and T & G 
Insurance.
{Australian 7 September 1973)
Australia's largest institution, the AMP Society, bought heavily in real 
estate in 1971, when it added $81.4m of property assets to its investment 
pool. Real estate then absorbed 28% of AMP investment funds. {Age 3 May 
1973) Similarly National Mutual life put 29% of its funds into real estate, 
adding $32.8m to lift the group's total property holding to $168.5m. Their 
real estate holdings have doubled since 1966. {Age 8 March 1972)
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While the insurance and big development companies have gained from 
the property boom, planning authorities have worried about how to cope with 
the added strain to the road and transport system which this rapid growth in 
speculative office building has caused. The Report on a Planning Scheme for 
the Central Business Area of Melbourne (Borrie 1964) pointed to the declining 
CBD employment in manufacturing (reduced by 46%) and warehousing (34%) since 
1951 and the increase in office employment. The Melbourne Transportation 
Study (1964) showed that 31.5% of the 154,000 CBD workers travelled by 
private car. Melbourne's transport services are encountering the same dis­
abilities as those experienced in Sydney. The journey-to-work is becoming 
longer and more expensive and the loss on the railways for 1972-73 was forecast 
at $37m. (Harrison 1972 : 9) Yet (as in Sydney) there has been no sugges­
tion that growth should be limited.
When in 1970 the MMBW proposed a planning amendment to reduce 
allowable plot ratios in the city, 'it was greeted with horror by city
Idevelopers and architects. (Age 30 July 1970) The Institute of Architects,
the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce and city development firms attacked the 
MMBW. One city real estate agent and property developer (A. Sallman) argued 
that if the amendment was adopted 'it would reduce the size of buildings by 
10 to 15%, effectively writing off $100m in city values. (Age 30 July 1970). 
Within three days property owners had formed the Building Owners and Managers 
Association 'to represent the owners and managers in the many spheres where 
collective thought and action would be beneficial to their interests.'
(Age 1 Aug 1970) their first task was to investigate the question of plot 
ratios in the city. The MMBW did not pursue its amendment.
While the property owners form a small and cohesive group which is 
able to act swiftly and decisively when it perceives a threat to its 
interests, the majority of city-users - non-executive office workers, shop 
assistants, cleaners, shoppers - have no say in the pattern of development.
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It is unlikely that they would understand the significance of a change in 
the floor space ratio if they happened to read about it in the press - and 
even if they did their chances of influencing the policy, in the direct way 
open to the property owners, are minimal. Such situations make nonsense 
of the pluralist theory of democracy'*' which argues that there is no dominant 
group or class or interest in society. Rather a multitude of groups and 
associations organise openly and freely compete with each other for the 
advancement of such purposes as their members may wish. What is wrong with 
pluralist-democratic theory is not its insistence on the fact of competition 
but its claim that the major organised 'interests' compete on more or less 
equal terms, and that none of them is therefore able to achieve a decisive 
or permanent advantage in the process of competition. Business, particularly 
large-scale business, enjoys permanent advantage 'inside the state system by 
virtue of the composition and ideological inclination of the state elite' 
and outside the state system by virtue of the pressure it can bring to bear 
on governments because of its private control of industrial, commercial and 
financial resources. (Miliband 1969 : 131)
At one level therefore it is clear that radical changes in the 
nature of city development are not possible while political structures and 
informal channels of influence operate on behalf of the big property 
owning section of the community.
One liberal reformer cannot have much impact on these deep-rooted 
structural and cultural problems. Nevertheless the Minister for Local 
Government, Mr Hamer, sent a letter to the MCC in January 1971 asking the 
Council to set up a city planning department to make a blueprint for the 
central city area. He proposed 'a colourful living city with a wide variety 
of activity working twenty-four hours a day: maximum separation of
1 The most quoted exposition of this theory is R.A. Dahl, Who Governs? 
Democracy and Power in an American Citys 1961.
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pedestrian and vehicle traffic: a car parking policy related to public trans­
port into and within the city and to circulation of pedestrians and cars: 
and an overall strategy to provide for harmonised retail, commercial and 
office functions as well as theatres, hotels and restaurants. The last 
thing we want is a city of concrete canyons hedged with monolithic office 
buildings and populated only in office hours'. (Herald 20 January 1971)
The resistance that the MCC is able to offer to planning was indi­
cated in 1972 when it was revealed that the Council had been withholding for 
more than a year a report it commissioned on city residential planning. The 
MCC, which in 1971 voted for a strategy plan to be drawn up and also estab­
lished itself as an urban renewal authority, had commissioned the report 
in 1970. Loder and Bayly, town planning consultants, submitted the report 
to the Council in June 1971. It recommended that conservation areas should 
be limited to two storeys; that the Council should set up a special demon­
stration project for a planned environment; and that large-scale demolition 
was unnecessary. It also warned of the threat posed by uncontrolled rising 
car ownership levels to the amenity of the inner suburbs. However all 
efforts to have the document released for public discussion were rejected 
by the Council's Building and Planning Committee. (Age 17 July 1972)
At another level planning intentions are undermined by individuals 
'working the system' for their own financial gain. The examples of the 
Chairman of the MMBW and the Chairman of the Town Planning Appeals Tribunal 
have already been cited. Such activities on local councils are a matter of 
notoriety.1 These cases involve individuals using positions of influence to 
alter zoning regulations laid down in the statutory plan, using foreknowledge 
of planning decisions to buy land earmarked for public use (for an under­
ground railway, a future 'urban' zone, a Housing Commission estate) and so 
on.
1 See later section on Westernport.
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On 8 December 1970 a Labor MLC (Mr Walton, North Melbourne) told the 
Legislative Council that the activities of certain City Councillors who 
seized on the opportunities given by their public office 'have become a 
matter of public notoriety'. He said these related to the railways, the 
West Gate Bridge and the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology. Mr Walton 
referred to transactions by a company, Withalit Pty Ltd, as 'part of a 
deliberate and careful plan to enrich certain people who, by reason of their 
public office, were in possession of information concerning the acquisition
t
of land for public purposes, not yet released to the public. He said that 
Sir Bernard Evans, who had championed the Lower Yarra crossing, was assoc­
iated with a company which bought 327 acres close to the proposed bridge.
'In order to achieve the transaction ... an intricate network of 16 inter­
locking private companies was set up, with the councillor [Evans] having a 
dominating influence over most by either private shareholding or by share­
holdings of other companies over which he had a controlling interest'.
(Mr Walton, VPD 1970 : 3001-13)
In an earlier debate on the underground railway (25 November 1970)
Mr Walton accused the State Government of allowing people with prior know­
ledge of the underground route to speculate in public property near one of 
the underground stations. This involved the company Withalit Pty Ltd, whose 
directors were Sir Bernard Evans, Lady Evans and a solicitor. Evans, a former 
Lord Mayor, was, at the time of the allegations, chairman of the MCC Building 
and Town Planning committee and vice chairman of the Board of Works Planning 
and Highways committee. In March 1958 he had been appointed as one of the 
two City Council representatives on an underground railway investigation 
committee set up by the Victorian Government. Withalit Pty Ltd was regis­
tered as a company in May 1958. Soon afterwards the company paid $300,000 
for the property at 453-55 Latrobe Street (Withalit House). At a later 
date the underground investigation committee decided that the underground 
loop should run along Latrobe Street instead of Lonsdale Street as was
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originally recommended by a Parliamentary committee in 1954. Since then 
Withalit has bought two other properties, as well as the laneway (which the 
MCC bought from the State Government then sold to Withalit) near the proposed 
Flagstaff Gardens underground station. In 1965 Withalit paid $183,000 for 
the property next to Withalit House and in 1966 it bought the burnt-out 
Salvation Army Building next to its existing holdings for $150,000. In 1973 
Withalit was paid $4.3 million compensation for the Withalit House property, 
which the government acquired for the underground railway. (Australian
23 Nov 1973)
These instances of individuals using their positions in and knowledge 
of the planning system for their own financial benefit are important 
because they not only undermine the aims of planning but they also under­
mine public confidence in and respect for the planning process. When such 
dealings become known they generate a public cynicism that results in detach­
ment and deliberate non-involvement (not apathy). This cynicism is well- 
justified, but it is also counter-productive. The despairing withdrawal of 
concerned and idealistic citizens leaves the field even more wide open for 
the shrewdies and manipulators. For this reason corruption at the individual 
level is almost as important as the legal 'corruption' that occurs when the 
political and administrative apparatus of the state are used to promote the 
interests of business and industry at the expense of environmental or social 
concerns. Both processes drastically reduce the effectiveness of city 
planning.
But we need to ask whether the development of the city would have 
taken very different shape if the Labor Party had been in office. Two 
matters suggest that it would not have. The first is the example of the Labor 
Party in office in NSW, both in state government and on the Sydney City 
Council. Chapter 8 shows that the experience of Labor in NSW was just as 
disastrous for urban growth as the rule of the Liberals in Victoria. There 
were two reasons for this. Firstly, Labor failed to realise the equity
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implications of single-centred, unrestricted city growth. And secondly, it 
shared with the Liberal Party the belief that economic growth was the most 
important social goal (if for different reasons) and regarded high-rise office 
development and the property boom as an exhilarating manifestation of that 
growth. There is no evidence that the Victorian Labor Party would have been 
more enlightened in this area than the Party in NSW. For when criticism 
began to emerge in Victoria of freeways, destruction of the environment, 
dehumanising of the city, it came not from the ALP but from small groups of 
residents in areas especially affected by proposed freeways, or pipelines, 
or oil refineries, or destruction of inner city terrace housing by the 
Victorian Housing Commission's high-rise, high-density redevelopment 
program.
3. The Inner Suburbs and the Housing Commission
Seldom has a public institution become as controversial as has the 
Victorian Housing Commission (VHC) over recent years. The Commission, 
brought into existence towards the end of the depression years by the 
missionary zeal of Christian social reformers like Oswald Barnett, began with 
the laudable objective of 'slum abolition'. (See Chapter III) But imper­
ceptibly 'slum abolition' in the post-war years became 'slum clearance' 
which became in the 1960s 'block demolition' and included pulling down 
perfectly sound hotels, shops, houses and factories.'*' Whether justified or 
not in particular cases, neither these operations nor those of the 
Commission's own estates were properly planned even from the point of view 
of physical coordination of other basic services like roads, schools,
1 Since 1937 the VHC has cleared 275 acres of 'slums', containing a total 
of 3,788 dwellings, of which 1,822 were deemed fit only for demolition. 
Another 1,559 were declared to have been repairable and 407 were not in 
any way substandard. (Jones 1972 : 76)
276
kindergartens, community centres and shops. Indicative of the seriousness 
of this problem was an announcement in October 1970 by the assistant 
Director-General of Education that children in overcrowded inner suburban 
schools would have to be taken by bus to outer-suburban schools. (Age 
16 October 1970)
So two main criticisms of the VHC emerged. It was depriving low 
income groups of housing and an environment which they did not want to leave, 
providing unacceptably rigid and unsatisfactory rehousing at high densities, 
and in the process more affluent workers were gaining from the own-your-own
2flats that private enterprise built on very cheaply-acquired clearance sites,
In October 1969 the Labor Opposition Leader (Mr Holding) attacked the VHC 
high-rise flat building programme as 'social irresponsibility', creating 
as many social problems as it was purporting to cure. He cited Fitzroy 
as an example of the social, human and environmental problems created by 
the VHC projects. The Commission had demolished houses holding 557 people 
and built flats which brought in 1,436 adults and 1,568 children. But 
there had been no provision for schools and welfare facilities to cater 
for this influx. (Age 30 October 1969)
Subsidies to Private Developers:
VHC sale of reclaimed land to developers, showing prices and sales of 
subsidies.
Area Acres Reclama­
tion costs
Selling
price
Subsidy % of 
subsidy 
to price
Developer
O'Shannassy St 
Nth Melb 
1959
2.51 $164,134 $ 95,000 $ 69,134 73% Original 
Co-op of 14 
builders
Harris St 
Nth Melb 
1961
5.04 $576,216 $264,000 $312,216 119% Some Co-op 
Some Jennings
Hanover St
Fitzroy
1963
2.7 $346,561 $184,650 $161,911 88% Co-operative
purchasers
De Murska St
Windsor
1965
2.07 $245,514 $ 95,000 $130,514 137% Jennings
Lee St
Carlton
1965
3.38 $444,376 $213,100 $231,276 109% Jennings
Woods St 2.75 $605,090 $208,800 $396,200 185% Jennings
Nth Melb 
1967
..../contd. over
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monopolised (two-thirds) by one firm. The VHC maintains that this is not a 
subsidy either to the developers or to their new tenants, but Jones (1972: 
37-88) argues convincingly that it is at least a three-fold subsidy.
The high-rise housing policy of the VHC generated many problems: 
it was expensive, block clearance was an inefficient way of dealing with poor 
housing and disruptive of local communities, and was of dubious benefit in 
alleviating the social problems (crime, violence and so on) that the Housing 
Commission was originally created to solve. (Jones 1972: 91)
Since 1968 a highly organised protest movement has made it difficult 
for the VHC to clear areas with the speed necessary to keep up with the 
production from its concrete building components factory. The building 
unions placed black bans on the clearance of areas for redevelopment by 
private enterprise. Inner suburban councils began to refuse to cooperate with 
the Commission, and local residents resisted efforts by the VHC to clear their 
areas. In May 1971 the VHC announced that it was phasing out high-rise 
redevelopment.
Why had the policy been embarked on in the first place? Which 
sections of the community stood to gain, in what ways, from high-rise inner 
suburban redevelopment? Viney argues that
(Contd. from previous page)
Area Acres Reclama- Selling Subsidy % of
tion costs price subsidy
________________________________________to price
Developer
Cross St 2.78 $480,268 $199,000 $281,268 131% University
Carlton Co-operative
1967 Purchasers
Note (1) The first three columns are based on figures in Hansard, 30 
September 1969, pp.450-1. The following columns are calculations based 
on these figures. (2) The original non-profit company known as Master 
Builders Redevelopment Ltd was taken over by Jennings after about half 
of the Harris Street development was complete.
Source: R. & M. Crow 1970: 142-3. A similar table appears in Jones 1972:
87.
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the idea of the inner core with net density pattern of 
200 per acre appears to have arisen from the pressures of 
ten years ago to retain a central business area to protect 
the heavy investment in the golden mile and arrest the 
movement out to the suburbs. Despite the continuing move­
ment outwards property values in the city have not fallen 
and the business community whose very survival depends upon 
an accurate analysis of trends and patterns of behaviour 
have quickly adjusted to the situation by the movement of 
Bourke Street to the suburbs. (Viney 1967: 119)
Fifteen years ago the commercial interests of the 'golden mile' favoured 
higher densities to bring back the middle class to the inner areas, boost 
city revenues and revive a declining CBD (which was the conventional wisdom 
about inner city redevelopment in the United States in the 1950s) . These 
commercial interests, it would be fair to speculate, exerted strong pressure 
on official policies for the inner areas, urging the use of VHC slum acqui­
sition powers to create higher densities.
This was confirmed by Mr R.A. Gardner, current President of the Town 
and Country Planning Association, who was executive director in the 1950s 
of a group which called itself the City Development Association (CDA). The 
CDA was formed in the early 1950s with a membership comprising the leading 
banks, insurance companies and property owners of the 'golden mile'. Their 
aim was to promote the city centre and campaign for policies to cater for its 
needs. It urged the changing of the building height from the limit of 132 
feet to the present plot ratio formula, the establishment of a traffic 
engineering department in the City Council, a freeway program, and estab­
lishment of city centre car parks. It was also concerned about the residential 
development of inner city areas, as papers by the Association and by one of 
its members indicate.^- Both papers lament the loss of population in the 
inner areas and recommend government acquisition of large tracts of these
City Development Association, Redevelopment of Rear-City Areas. Three 
Proposals for Private Enterprise Participation (1958) and Maurice Gold 
Your City & Heart Trouble: a review of a problem that oonoems every 
person who earns his living in the inner City of Melbourne (1964).
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areas for redevelopment, mainly for middle to high income earners, by private 
enterprise. Clearly the CDA was a predecessor of the Civic Affairs Division 
of the Chamber of Commerce, formed in 1969, to investigate the problems of 
the inner suburbs.
As Viney percieved as early as 1967, there has been a change of 
attitude by big corporations and a policy of redevelopment at lower densities 
has been gaining ground in recent years. The biggest retailers pioneered the 
exodus from Bourke Street to the 'regional centres'. The banks and head 
offices are more concerned with ease of access by car for their important 
customers than they are with throngs of people in the city. The oil, steel, 
rubber, spare parts and motor industrie s all support a radial freeway system 
centering on the city, but high densities in the inner areas would overtax 
the capacity of the freeway system. So the new policy backed by these power­
ful business interests supports freeway's right into the city, massive 
increase in parking in the golden mile, redevelopment at low densities 
in the inner areas. This new policy finds expression in the Transportation 
Plan and in a booklet by the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce in 1969, Outline 
of a proposal for the establishment of a oivio affairs division within the 
Chamber to deal with the problems of inner area redevelopment. Listed 
among the initial supporters of this move were ICI, Ansett, Dunlop, Mobil 
Oil, Jennings, Hooker, McEwans, Waltons, the National Bank and the ANZ Bank. 
(Crow 1970: 79) This body, set up to tackle the redevelopment problems of 
'the half dozen suburbs largely in a state of decay' around the city, advocated 
increased parking in the city, an inner ring road, and 'an extension of 
residential development schemes based on private enterprise and government 
acquisition and clearing of land.' (Crow 1970: 79)
It is a sobering thought for the residents action groups who believed 
that they alone were responsible, by their persistent protests, for the 
change in official policy of redevelopment, that that change coincided with 
the changing interests of some of the most powerful commercial and industrial
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corporations in the state.
4. The Industrial Development of Westernport:
'Speculators Dream ... Environmental Nightmare'.
Governments may be solely concerned with the better running 
of 'the economy.' But the description of the system as 'the 
economy' is part of the idiom of ideology, and obscures the 
real process. For what is being improved is a capitalist 
economy; and this ensures that whoever may or may not gain, 
capitalist interests are least likely to lose.
(Miliband 1969: 73)
Australia as a patient will be unhealthy if these sorts of 
enterprises [oil refineries] don't find locations here.
Mr B.C.S. Harper, Director, Westernport Regional 
Planning Authority. (Age 11 Dec 1970)
The decision of the Bolte government to promote industrial develop­
ment in Westernport Bay was made, the agreement with British Petroleum (BP) 
was signed, and the enabling Bill was rushed through Parliament without time 
for it even to be read by members. (VPD 1962-3 : 3789) The fate of Western- 
port indicates the priorities of and the interests behind the Bolte govern­
ment's decisions concerning the state's development. And the history of 
land transactions in the area over the past ten years provides one of the best 
examples available of the way the powers available under statutory planning 
are exploited (and the objectives undermined) both by individuals using
positions of influence within councils and by big companies using their
2political leverage at state government level.
The agreement between the State government and BP was followed by 
one with Esso-Hematite (Westernport Development Act 1967) and another with 
Lysaghts (Westernport Steelworks Act 1970). In March 1969 the Westernport
 ^ Subtitle of pamphlet 'The Shame of Westernport', published by the Save 
Westernport Coalition, July 1971.
Space forbids elaboration in this chapter but interested readers may turn 
to Appendix 1 for highlights of the history of these land transactions.
2
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Regional Planning Authority (WRPA) was formed to prepare and eventually 
implement a planning scheme for the area. It comprises two councillors from 
each of the six shires in the region and a full-time Director. Members of 
the Authority are not restricted from voting on matters affecting their own1’ 
properties and meetings are not open to the public. No provision is made 
for a .representation of residents or for qualified architects, biologists or 
conservationists. There is no provision for representation for future 
residents of the peninsula - workers and unions. Conflicts between the 
professional officers on the WRPA and the councillors are settled by council­
lors making their decisions 'in camera', which results in parochial bias 
and self-interest being the hallmark of decision-making, particularly on 
re-zoning .
Of the twelve councillors on the Authority in 1971 at least six were 
known to be involved in land dealings in the area. Other landholders at 
Westernport included BHP, Esso, BP and the Gas and Fuel Corporation. BHP and 
East Coast Development Pty Ltd also own land on French Island, which is not 
represented on the Authority. In 1970 the Authority accepted a report from 
Dr R.M. Buchanan, a Sydney chemist, on the feasibility of using French Island 
for most of the industry to be located at Westernport. Buchanan was also a 
Director of East Coast Development Pty Ltd. Also in 1970 the WRPA received 
a draft report on the feasibility of re-zoning certain land in Westernport 
for industrial use, prepared by international consultants, Plant Location 
International. They recommended the re-zoning of thousands of acres of 
rural land around the bay. This draft report was then referred to the 
Authority's Industrial Development Advisory Committee (which included 
representatives from BHP, BP, Lysaghts, Esso, CIG, Nylex Corporation and Dowd 
Associates). These members all had financial interests in land and industrial 
activities in the area. Heavy speculation followed for six months (December 
1970 - June 1971)-before the Director reported to the Authority on the 
findings of the consultants and the proposed designation of boundaries
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within which industry could locate (June 1971).
By then local residents were objecting to the fact that the future 
of the Peninsula was in the hands of 'American consultants, the WRPA, and a 
combine of industrial speculators' (Age 3 April 1971) and that they were not 
allowed to see the consultants' reports received by the WRPA. The Save 
Westernport Coalition"*“ did manage to see a copy of the American report, 
however, and revealed its contents in a pamphlet The Shame of Westernport 
in July 1971. It concluded that
The needs of human beings evaporate into the pages of 
statistics: people are simply 'the labour supply', to
be moved as close as possible to the industrial area while 
simultaneously being robbed of all its recreational 
possibilities. ... The most urgent study of all - the 
relationship of the scheme to the welfare of the city - 
has not even been undertaken. . .. It is doubtful if, in 
recent years, any large city anywhere has been asked 
to hand over such an enormous recreational area to so 
few people. (Save Westernport Coalition 1971: 3-8)
Nevertheless, despite rising local opposition, the WRPA voted in 
July 1971 to zone a 5,000 acre belt of farmland for industry. Conservationists, 
local action groups, some local councillors and over 1,400 individuals deci­
ded to oppose the re-zoning and Westernport Peninsula Protection Council 
raised several thousand dollars for a 'fighting fund'. But Bolte still 
maintained that the industrial zone would be 'a big lift for Victoria. I 
can see it having the biggest tonnage of any port in Australia'. (Age
9 July 1971) And later in the year the Government overrode objections by 
Hastings Council and granted large rate concessions to the $1,000 million 
Lysaghts steelworks.
Consisting of the Port Phillip Conservation Council, the Westernport & 
Peninsula Protection Council, the Citizens Environmental Action League and 
the Clean Air & Environment Council of Victoria.
'He does not play down the threat that both industrial fumes and industrial 
wastes are now imposing on the atmosphere and waters in and around Melbourne. 
He is palpably very concerned about parks, the devastation created by free­
ways, and the need for more "lungs" in the ever spreading outer suburbs 
where Sir Henry was inclined to allow speculators and "developers" to run 
riot'. (Rohan Rivett, Canberra Times3 11 May 1973)
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Such heavy-handed Government and WRPA action provoked increasing 
local protest and dissent. A Save Westernport Rally attracted 2,000 people.
The Peninsula Conservation League and the Institute of Landscape Architects 
called for a freeze on development until an independent review of plans for the 
the heavy industrial complex was carried out, and they made a 25 page sub­
mission criticising the WRPA. By August 1972, 28,400 people had signed a 
petition calling for a freeze on development pending ecological, economic and 
social surveys. (Age 16 March, 19 July, 19 August 1972)
It should be emphasised that it was not just the nature of the plans 
for Westernport that angered residents. It was also the planning procedure.
Not only was the industrial plan drawn up first, with the ecological study to 
follow at some point in the distant future after the industrialists had 
virtually taken what they wanted, but also the land use planning was done in 
the greatest secrecy, excluding local residents, yet including the 
industrialists.
In February 1973, under what many regard as a more enlightened 
Premier, the State Government announced a freeze on the development of heavy 
industry for two years during a $1 million environmental survey. No doubt 
this decision was influenced by the fact that the popularity of the Minister 
for Local Government, whose electorate lies on the Peninsula, and of the 
Government in general in this usually-Liberal voting area, was seen to be 
somewhat precarious in a pre-election period.
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5. The Western Suburbs
The old city was centred where forty miles of basalt and delta 
plain met forty miles of valleyed hills and sandy beaches. As 
the poor spread thickly over the plain and the rich thinly over 
the hills and coast, neither love nor justice ever had much 
chance. Realism won without trying. To its topography 
Melbourne may owe a good deal of its past and present unkind­
ness to its poor ... It has had the ill-effect of segregating 
the city severely . (Stretton 1970: 123-4, 197)
Perhaps the most recent issue to gain publicity in Melbourne planning 
though certainly not the most recent problem, is that of deprivation in the 
western suburbs. In this twilight zone, extending west from Footscray to 
Werribee and Melton, and south to Altona and Williamstown, live upward of 
300,000 people. Twenty per cent of the region's population is under the 
age of ten, forty per cent is under twenty. Compared to, say, Kew or Camber­
well, it is a significantly younger population. It is also a strongly 
migrant population. In parts of West Sunshine and St Albans migrants 
outnumber Australians six to four. In the 'suburban West' sector in 1966 
there were 36.1 per cent migrants. In the whole of Melbourne the migrant 
population is 9.9 per cent (Figures from 1971 MMBW Regional Rolioies3 p.105).
It is also a population lacking professional, managerial and adminis­
trative talent. Men and women from these walks of life work but don't live 
in the western suburbs. Proof of this can be found in the census of 1966. 
Kew, five miles east of the GPO, was then home for 317 doctors and dentists. 
Footscray) which is the same distance west of the GPO (but has an extra 25,000 
residents) could muster only 37. In all the western suburbs - Altona, 
Footscray, Keilor, Melton, Sunshine, Werribee and Williamstown - only 100 
resident doctors and dentists were to be found. In Camberwell alone, with 
one third their population, there were 442.
In the case of teachers the same trend is evident. Kew had 763 
resident teachers, Camberwell 2,089, and the whole of the western suburbs
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1,661. Two out of every three teachers employed in the schools in the 
western suburbs live elsewhere. As the principal of Altona High School said 
in a report to Altona Council (Age 6 January 1971), teachers preferred to 
spend up to 100 minutes twice a day in travelling rather than live in or 
near Altona.
Down the map of this metropolis of two and a half millions 
the founders of its latest university drew one straightish 
line. Children born west of it have a chance in twenty- 
two of reaching a university. East of it, a chance in seven.
Where 50,000 families occupy one block of five rich suburbs, 
their children have a chance in four, and the other three 
chances - of success without education - are fairly comfort­
able too. (Stretton 1970: 124)
Overall, Camberwell has an 8.8 per cent professional population and 
Kew 9.5 per cent. Among the western suburbs Williamstown has the highest 
professional percentage - three per cent - and Sunshine with 1.9 per cent 
the lowest. The figures are similar for administration and management.
Keilor has the highest (1.7 per cent) and Williamstown the lowest (0.96 per 
cent) compared to Kew's 5.5 per cent and Camberwell's 6.2 per cent. (Age 
6 January 1971). The west is also deprived of social and cultural amenities. 
There are a few private day nurseries but no government-subsidised ones.
There are virtually no beds available in private nursing homes for the aged. 
There are no day-care centres for the aged as there are in Kew. And cultural 
facilities are almost non-existent. (Crow 1972: 43)
In the Legislative Council, November 1970, Mr A. Knight, member for 
Melbourne West, claimed that the west was the victim of political discrimi­
nation. He said the reason for the poor education facilities in Footscray 
and the western suburbs generally was that the area was represented in 
Parliament by the Labor Party. Mr Knight listed a number of problems 
currently facing the west. They included education, hospitals, rail services, 
pollution and an inadequate police force (VPD 1970: 1632-41).
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The first stirrings of consciousness from the people in the area came 
in May 1972 when 500 of them attended a seminar called 'The Deprived West' 
organised by the Sunshine Lions Club. Papers were given to the Seminar on 
hospital care, primary and secondary and pre-school facilities in the west.
A Sunshine councillor pointed out that the industrial output of the western 
suburbs in 1967-8 was $846 million - twice that of the next highest region.
But the value of new houses and flats for the same period was only $23 
million - the lowest for the Melbourne region. (Age 8 May 1972)
Later in the year ACTU president Bob Hawke called for the formation of 
a joint committee to control industrial development in the west. Industry 
had been allowed to prosper in the west regardless of the social and economic 
needs of the people and the environment had been 'systematically eroded and 
demolished through the mistakes of industry and pollution connected with 
economic activity', he argued to a seminar on industry, transport and 
employment in the western suburbs. (Age 30 October 1972)
The Lower Yarra crossing Auth ority (LYCA), the Western Industries 
Association and the 1971 MMBW Regional Policies Plan all advocate subsidised 
development of land in the West. They have not advocated subsidies for 
better community services. The LYCA, a group of wealthy companies and 
individuals formed to build the Westgate B ridge (to improve travel time 
from places of residence in the east to places of work in the west and from 
the west to the CBD) and backed by government-guaranteed loans, 'naturally 
supports any new development in the western area which will enhance its own 
financial stability. Every effort must be made to develop large residential 
communities that will depend on the Crossing for their link with the CBD'. 
(Hanover Holdings Ltd, submission to State Government November 1972, p.14). 
The LYCA is naturally anxious for Westgate Bridge tolls to pay for the 
bridge construction. Powerful interests support the promotion of industrial
development and growth in the west - the CBD interests behind the 'balanced
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growth’ 1971 corridor plan of the MMBW and industrialists concerned to 
utilise the cheap land in the west^ ($12,000 per acre compared with $40,000 - 
$90,000 in Notting Hill, Waverly, etc. in the south-east) and therefore to 
attract an abundant labour supply close at hand. 'Industrial growth of the 
type envisaged requires people; and already many of the industrialists in 
the area complain that there are shortages in the supply of local skilled 
and unskilled labour’. (Hanover Holdings 1972: 16). Hanover Holdings there­
fore were proposing the development of 700 acres at Altona (400 acres of 
which is Crown Land that they are requesting the Government to sell to them) 
’to provide the population that would in turn encourage further industrial 
development in the Laverton-Altona sector’. (Hanover Holdings 1972:16) Of 
the 2,000 acres of industry at Altona some two-thirds is owned by large 
industrial corporations - Dow Chemicals, BP, CSR, etc.
With those kinds of pressures to ’develop' the west, and their 
influence on the State Liberal Government, it is not surprising that the 
western suburbs municipalities decided to form a region to bypass the State 
Government for direct aid from Canberra. Eight western councils formed an 
interim committee in January 1973 to approach the Federal Government for 
between $200 and $500 million for education, hospitals, parkland, drainage, 
sewerage, and better public transport. Their aim is to bring facilities 
in the west up to the standards of the eastern and south-eastern suburbs.
(Age 29 January 1973)
Under the new Federal Labor Government it is likely that they will 
succeed. The Federal Minister for Urban and Regional Development (Mr Uren) 
referred to the west as a ’wasteland. There is squalor, educational and 
social starvation' and announced sweeping changes to be made. ’If Cabinet
1 The President of the Western Industries Association is J. McIntosh, 
Managing Director of ICI. He is also on the LYCA.
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approves the concept then the western suburbs of Melbourne - probably the 
largest deprived area in Australia - will have remodelled schools, new 
hospitals, controlled industry, sewerage, play grounds and a host of other 
amenities this area has lacked for years'. (Age 19 January 1973)
4.
Public Protest. Residents' action groups. Liberal progressivism: 
the rhetoric of reform.
Never, it is safe to say, has the language of orthodox 
politics been more generous with words like reform, 
renewal, even revolution ... Much of the crusading rhetoric 
which is now part of the common currency of politics is ... 
utterly bogus. But some of it is not. It would be trivial 
to depict the men in whose hands state power lies as entirely 
indifferent to poverty, slums, unemployment, inadequate 
education, starved welfare services ... and other ills 
which afflict their societies. To take such a view would be 
to engage in a crude demonology which conceals the real 
issue. The trouble does not lie in the wishes and inten­
tions of powerholders, but in the fact that the reformers 
... are the prisoners, and usually the willing prisoners, 
of an economic and social framework which necessarily turns 
their reforming proclamations, however sincerely meant, 
into verbiage.
(Miliband 1969: 24102)
The tacit Boltean assumption had been that bread, circuses, freeways 
and large new industries was an adequate political philosophy with which 
to meet the electoral challenges of the late 1960s. That the public did 
not fully agree is evident in the abundance of citizens action groups which 
grew in the late 1960s out of a number of planning issues that aroused 
considerable public opposition: the VHC's high-rise redevelopment of the
inner suburbs; the social and environmental destruction of the freeway 
programme; the neglect of the western suburbs; the industrial development 
of Westernport; general environmental unconcern and encouragement of 'growth' 
at whatever cost. This section examines the interests of residents' 
associations, the methods open to them, their effectiveness so far in
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influencing urban planning policies, and their potential for influencing 
the shape of the urban environment.
A survey by Floyd (1972) of eleven inner suburban residents' groups"*"
indicates that their composition is predominantly middle-class/professional,
that all are primarily defensive, and some narrowly self-interested, in
their aims. Most of their stated aims run something like this - 'to
preserve the present character of the area', usually against what they
regard as undesirable intrusions by the VHC high-rise flats, freeways,
traffic blight, and undesirable private flat development. Most of the
groups were formed in direct response to threats to their areas from VHC
slum reclamation or the Metropolitan Transportation Study freeway programme.
There has even been some uniting of groups, like the Committee for Urban
Action, which was originally formed to attack the VHC, but has since taken
2up the freeway issue, as has the United Freeway Action Group (UNFAG), 
another joint association of inner suburban groups.
The Carlton Association, formed in 1969, is typical of most of these
3groups in all but size, it being by far the largest. its aims are to 
promote and develop the social, educational and cultural well-being of the 
residents of Carlton; to press for the comprehensive planned development of 
Carlton; to maintain its historical character; and to cooperate with 
kindred associations when desirable. (Floyd 1972: 219) It has subcommittees
Fitzroy, Emerald Hill, East Melbourne, Hawthorn, Richmond, South Port, 
Collingwood, Melbourne/South Yarra, North Melbourne, Parkville, Carlton. 
Floyd's survey does not deal with 'associations of associations1, like 
the Committee for Urban Action and the United Freeway Action Group.
It issued a well-argued case against freeways in a 1970 publication 
A Transport Folioy and Evaluations December 1970.
1,200 members, compared with the next largest, Fitzroy, 200. (Floyd 1972: 
211-3).
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dealing with architecture and town planning, community services, education, 
and environment, an Underground Railway Group (concerned with the prevention 
of any increase in rates for the new underground), a Freeway Action Group 
(concerned with the encroachment of the F19 freeway into Carlton),^  and an 
Urban Renewal Action Group (created to look into the VHC's recent moves in 
Carlton). (Floyd 1972: 218-9)
Strategies of these groups have ranged from the publishing and 
distribution of literature outlining and criticising government policies, 
to public demonstrations, meetings, petitions, protest letters and visits 
to Cabinet Ministers, and the enlistment of union cooperation to black ban 
certain developments. All groups have shown great respect for property 
rights (i.e. they have been non-violent) and for respectable democratic 
procedures (both salient characteristics of middle-class reformers). They 
have not allied themselves with any particular political party (many have 
stood and been elected as Independents, e.g. in Fitzroy and Carlton, in 
opposition to the old Labor machine politicians). But they are aware of 
the political nature of all planning issues. This includes the conservation 
and environmentalist groups like those comprising the Save Westernport 
Coalition and the Yarra Valley Action Group.
To what extent so far have these diverse issue-oriented groups been 
successful in influencing government policy? The foregoing account suggests 
that they have only been successful in areas where they have directly 
threatened the political power of the ruling Liberal Party. For example, 
campaigns against the VHC high-rise redevelopment had little impact until 
the Chamber of Commerce and other CBD interests decided that it was no 
longer in their interest to support high density inner suburban redevelopment.
1 It published Freeway Crisis in March 1972.
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Public opposition probably lacked effect because it came from areas that 
traditionally voted Labor anyway. Similarly the freeway programme was 
first modified in 1971 because opposition had arisen in eastern suburbs 
like Malvern where the Liberal vote could conceivably have been affected 
(hence the eastern ring route was abandoned), and the freeway programme 
was only cut in half a few months before the May 1973 elections, and after 
the new Federal Government had indicated it would only advance money for 
public transport improvements. The recent freeze on heavy industrial 
development at Westernport can be seen as a pre-election response to wide­
spread opposition in the usually Liberal-voting Mornington Peninsula. 
Environmentalists have been successful in forcing the Government to divert 
its proposed outfall sewer from Carrum to Cape Schank, in forcing the oil 
companies to put their pipeline around the bay instead of under it, and in 
persuading the government to introduce an Environment Protection Bill 
creating an Environment Protection Authority. (Age 23 April 1971) But the 
oil pipeline victory was in one sense a hollow one. Seven Liberal members 
voted against it in Cabinet. (Age 26 March 1970) They all lived in the 
bayside electorates. Apparently the Liberal Party can stand up to the 
large corporations only when its own power is directly threatened.
It may be that Hamer's new look progressive policies of environmental 
concern are genuinely motivated."^ Recently the Government has announced 
that it would 'put brakes on the population growth of Melbourne ... Plans 
for a city of five million people were no longer acceptable', (Age
'Repeatedly he shows concern, which seems very genuine, about waste- 
disposal, water pollution, freeway destruction of green spaces, ancient 
homes and other irreplaceables ... The new Hamer-Thompson administration 
is not indifferent to the mass of Melbourne voters who lack powerful 
industrial companies, stock exchange seats, nation-wide organisations or 
racing fraternity credentials to support their approaches to Ministers in 
Spring Street. All this is very new in Victorian politics since the 
early fifties'. (Rohan Rivett, Canberra Times 3 April 1973)
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5 December 1972), and that it would limit the physical growth of Melbourne 
to within thirty miles of the city by buying land in a belt beyond the 
thirty mile radius. (Australiern 7 July 1973) But as one sceptical observer 
has noted: 'The Victorian Government appears to set up departments and
authorities at the drop of a hat'. (Bunker 1971: 382) It has yet to be 
shown that the Liberal Party is willing or indeed able to directly 
contravene the wishes of its largest financial supporters. At the moment 
it seems to be procrastinating with enquiries and surveys to avoid such a 
confrontation between Hamer's stated ideals and Liberal Party political 
realities.
Rivett argues that 'the odds are not so heavily in favour of the 
moneyed or the ruthless as they have been throughout Melbourne's past ...
The battle is going to be far less lop-sided this time than ever before. 
Because today many citizens have really begun to care'. (Canberra Times 
7 December 1971) But caring is not enough. Power & Dempsey (1973: 616), 
writing of environmentalist action groups, suggest three questions that 
might help establish the potential future effectiveness of residents' action 
groups. What resources are available to the groups in any issue area? How 
difficult is it to mobilise these resources behind a feasible set of demands 
on the government? And how difficult is it to get governments to accede to 
these demands?
The resources available to residents' groups so far have included 
the support of strategic unions able to black ban undesirable developments: 
the availability of a whole range of professional skills (legal, architec­
tural, environmental, planning, etc.) and access to and knowledge of the 
bureaucracy by these professionals: 'advocacy journalism' (like that of
Ben Hills and others on the respectable Melbourne Age) and increasingly 
environmentally conscious residents and students with flexible time and 
ideas that have been, to date, inventive, resourceful and colourful.
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Bradley & Levett (1973: 51) suggest that there is advantage when 
policy-makers are pressured in a variety of ways from many vantage points.
On some of the issues described this has already happened (e.g. opposition 
to the freeways, VHC). But the issues are not always so clear-cut as to be 
a straight-forward battle between 'the people' and 'the filthy capitalists'. 
To begin with, there is potential class conflict within the protest movement 
between middle class professionals who are increasingly taking over the 
inner suburbs and displacing the old working class, and between owners and 
tenants in the inner areas.
Some deep-rooted cultural values also present obstacles to change, 
in particular^ attitudes towards the institution of private property and 
to the imperatives of economic growth. These values have only recently 
begun to be questioned. Liberal Premier Hamer has publicly questioned the 
unlimited growth of Melbourne. But the relatively secure political position 
of the Liberal Party in Victoria has made it less receptive to change and 
has forced environmentalists to fight rear guard actions against fait 
accompli. Their success depends more on the threat they are able to pose 
in specific cases to the power of the ruling Liberal Party, which is not 
always a weapon available to them; on their ability to take over, influence 
or reform local councils; and especially now on their ability to make so 
much noise that they persuade the Federal Government to threaten to move 
in on the issue, as has recently happened with public transport, CBD office 
building and speculation, and the deprivation of the Western Suburbs.
Of one thing we can be certain - eight lane freeways or Westernport- 
type 'planning' schemes increasingly politicise the community. But although 
perceptions of urban problems are quickening, so too are the problems.
CHAPTER EIGHT
SYDNEY: Development without Improvement. The Failure
of Labor and the dominance of the 'growth' ideology.
'It is a government's job to create an atmosphere where private enterprise
can flourish and make profits.'
Sir Robert Askin, Premier of N.S.W. since 
1965 (Nation Review 4-10 May, p.882)
'When the planner's client is the city, he must plan for a heterogeneous 
population, and in this process he is inevitably allocating scarce resources 
among sectors of the population, providing benefits to some and costs to 
others ... Consequently the planner must decide how to allocate resources 
among competing groups, and for which people to plan. This is probably the 
most difficult and perplexing question in planning, and only now is it 
beginning to be asked. In the past the planner avoided the question 
altogether, for by focussing on buildings and land uses, he did not have to 
think about who would use them and benefit from them.'
[Gans 1972: 380]
’’It (the Cumberland County Plan) could certainly have been a better and 
more radical plan; but then it would have had little hope of being carried 
out under our system of representative government where so many shades of 
opinion have their influence on public policy.'
[Winston 1957: 79]
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1 .
At the inaugural meeting of the Cumberland County Council (CCC) 
on 13 November 1945 an important principle was stressed by the Labor Minister 
of Local Government (J. Cahill) -
The scheme [for metropolitan Sydney] must be considered 
as a whole - not a collection of arbitrary prohibitions and 
restrictions. I stress this because it is the Government's 
intention that town and country planning shall be democratic 
and that, under skilled guidance, the people themselves shall 
join in the planning to the greatest extent possible. We 
will not have planning imposed from above.
(McKell 1946: 52)
In the words of the Premier, W. McKell, the most significant feature of 
his government was its determination to work on the lines of a master plan'. 
There was to be no more 'bits and pieces reforms dictated by the expediency 
of the moment', no more 'jabs and stabs at public works, all disconnected, 
often overlapping, never fitting together into any general pattern', no 
more 'merely haphazard development in industry, in the growth of cities 
and towns as huge jumbles of confusion'. (McKell 1946: 5)
For McKell had a vision, not unlike that of the Federal Labor Party 
at the time, (chapter 5) of a better post-war world, an integral part of 
which involved a social reformist approach to city planning. Slums would 
be removed, outer areas would be zoned for residential, commercial and 
industrial development, land would be preserved or resumed for parks and 
recreation areas, foreshores protected, and sites reserved for public 
buildings, educational and cultural centres. (McKell 1946: 52) And above 
all, legislative authority would be given to town planning. (McKell 1946: 50) 
At last it seemed, (in answer to planners' prayers) there was a government 
prepared to give to planning the prestige and support without which it
cöuld achieve nothing.
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Yet twenty years later a Liberal Minister for Local Government and 
Highways (P.H. Morton) gave a keynote address on the failures of planning:
One serious failure has been the inability of 
government and planners to generate public enthusiasm 
and sympathy for the cause of planning. This is a 
serious handicap for we live in a democratic state 
where things can only be done if the people approve.
Like other states, N.S.W. has encountered problems 
with cumbersome administrative procedures ... The 
problem of how to plan efficiently and quickly while 
still affording sufficient protection to the individual 
citizen is a very real one.
I regard the indifference of some planners to the 
rights of the individual as another serious failure.
(Morton 1967: 96)
(When a Liberal parliamentarian talks about the rights of the 
individual, he is usually talking about the rights of those who own property 
to make a profit from it. When he talks of freedom and democracy and argues 
that people should be able to do as they want with their own property this 
generally means rich people should. Nevertheless, planning regulations do 
sometimes injuriously affect small home owners as well as big property 
interests, and when they do the opposition to planning cuts across the 
party-political spectrum and enlists the support of that 75 per cent of the 
electorate who are, or are becoming, or want to become property owners.)
We may not fully agree with Morton's explanation of the 'failure of
planning' in N.S.W. What should be noted is the general consensus that
2planning had failed. The Cumberland Plan seemed anachronistic and
At the Australian Town Planning Jubilee Conference held in Adelaide, 
fifty years after the first such conference organised by Charles Reade 
(chapter 1).
There was little consensus, however, on precisely what it was supposed 
to have achieved. As Winston (1957: 65) noted, in all of the discussions 
on the Cumberland County Plan 'the one thing that was mentioned least 
of all was the adequacy or otherwise of the actual plan itself and the 
physical proposals included in it'.
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inflexible in the context of Sydney's rapid post-war growth, and the 
original planning body, the Cumberland County Council, had been disbanded 
in 1963 and replaced by a different kind of planning authority - an obvious 
admission of inadequacy.
What then, had gone wrong? Unlike the 1954 Melbourne Plan and the 
1962 Adelaide Plan, which were both born into politically hostile worlds 
and hence doctored to be politically acceptable to the conservative govern­
ment of the day, no such constraints surrounded the birth of the Cumberland 
Plan. The McKell Government considered town planning a key to their post­
war utopia. And to McKell himself planning was not simply the latest fad 
of the 1940s. (As it is with some politicians in the 1970s) For, as 
chapter 4 has shown, he had been influenced by the campaign and ideology of 
the middle class reformers active in the town planning movement of the 
thirties - a movement preoccupied with slum eradication and government 
adoption of Town Planning legislation. Consequently one of his government's 
first acts when it assumed office in 1941 was to establish the N.S.W.
Housing Commission.
Powell (1968) argues that the real short-comings of planning under 
the CCC were inadequate planning techniques. Legislation evolved at a rate 
reasonably related to social and economic change, but planning methods 
remained static and inflexible. Fraser (1972) on the other hand, (Chief 
Planner of the CCC for ten years) argues that its main weakness was 'the 
lack of direction of planning at Government level' - that is, a failure in 
political support.
Although Labor governed N.S.W. from 1941 to 1965 its personnel 
obviously changed in that time. McKell moved out of State politics in 1947 
and J.J. Cahill, the Minister for Local Government in charge of planning, 
and Premier from 1953-59 died at a critical period in the evolution and 
testing of planning methods (1959). This chapter explores some of the
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weaknesses and failures of planning in N.S.W. in the post-war period by 
looking at some of the personalities involved, the planners' ideas, planning 
legislation and administration. The first section describes the evolution 
of statutory planning, the second looks at issues that burst its seams, the 
growth of the city centre and the role of local government in the planning 
process. The final section deals with some citizens' recent responses to 
what they consider to be a failure in state and private planning (e.g. re­
development schemes for the Rocks, Woolloomooloo) and looks at the emergence 
of new cross-class alliances in a 'Popular Front' demanding 'grass roots' 
planning.
Part of what the story tells is that planning can fail not simply 
because of the resistance of property interests and the dominance of the 
profit motive in a capitalist society but because of the complexities of a 
large and rapidly expanding metropolis, the difficulties of devising methods 
to cope with it, and because all political parties shared the 'growth 
ideology'.
2.
The Evolution of Statutory Flanning
The first really significant incident in the history of the CCC was 
the insistence by local government interests that they should be given the 
control of metropolitan planning. (Fraser 1972: 7) The Local Government 
(Town and Country Planning) Amendment Bill introduced in 1945 by the Minister 
for Local Government (J.J. Cahill) was primarily concerned with the pre­
paration of a statutory land use plan for the County of Cumberland. Its 
preparation was to be the responsibility of a town and country planning
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advisory committee, established by the legislation,1 with the assistance of 
the Town Planning branch of the Local Government Department. The committee's 
role as the principal author of the Cumberland County Plan was challenged 
by the defenders of local government. The Local Government Association 
pressed for the establishment of a second-tier local government body to 
prepare the plan, and the Bill was amended accordingly.
The creation of the Cumberland County Council of ten members, one 
representing the Sydney City Council and nine elected by constituencies of 
from five to twelve local councils, was indicative of the weight of 
influence that local government was able to exert in the Legislative Council. 
Athough the CCC was only 'a shadow of the ideas for a Greater Sydney 
administration, it did give some promise of the first comprehensive 
consideration of the metropolis and its physical development'. (Harrison 
1972: 65)
During the debates on the Bill certain fundamental issues were 
raised concerning the rights of private landowners, the autonomy of local 
government vis-a-vis the State, and the fact that planning as a process was 
basically undemocratic and harmful in a free enterprise society. Although 
these views did not carry the day, they did exert a certain influence. But 
the general understanding of the Bill was that it was aimed at making 
Sydney an orderly and efficient city.
A very fundamental criticism was put forward by the Liberal member 
for Gordon (Mr Turner), who argued that the Bill had been put forward 
without any reasoned statements of policy, without prior expert investigation,
To comprise an architect, engineer and surveyor each nominated by his 
professional institute, a Local Government Department officer, an 
alderman nominated by the Local Government Association and two members 
nominated by the Minister.
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and without any opportunity being provided for public discussion. It was 
true that at no time in the debates, or by way of public statements, did 
the Government identify the policies which the Bill was designed to imple­
ment. When called upon, Cahill refused to identify a policy basis. His 
view appeared to be that in the light of the manifestly deficient physical 
environment of our cities the need for the measure was self-evident. (NSWPD 
1945: 2469-76)
A number of basic defects in the proposed legislation were pointed 
out during the debates, some of which perhaps should have been recognised 
at the time as salutory warnings (given that experience in England and 
America had shown that there were difficulties to be resolved). This was 
particularly true in regard to the effect of planning regulations on land 
values, the difficulties in ironing out zoning inconsistencies, the problem 
of financing the implementation of planning schemes, and the twin issues 
of compensation and betterment. (Powell 1968: 3-8)
It was evident to many that neither the government nor the community 
could afford to finance the kind of schemes that were envisaged unless drastic 
alterations were made to the fiscal priorities of the Government. Foremost 
in their minds were probably the costs of slum removal, road works and the 
acquisition of land for public open space and the removal of non-conforming 
uses. Given the orientation of the legislation towards the problems of 
Sydney it was not surprising that the strongest opposition came from Country 
Party members who thought the Bill was centralist and undemocratic.
Because most of the information on planning was presented in terms
of social benefits and civic enhancement and its administrative and
regulatory character played down, public response (as reflected in letters
to the editor) was generally favourable. The newspapers themselves tended
to favour Town Planning, particularly its application to the problems of
slum removal and traffic congestion, the main pre-occupations of the Town 
Planning movement during the twenties and thirties.
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The architects were the most vocal of the professional groups 
supporting the legislation and to a large extent it was the architects 1 
view of planning which was adopted by the framers of the legislation and 
put forward through newspapers and journals for the edification of the 
general public.
This acceptance by the Government of what might 
well be called the 'architectural bias' almost certainly 
hindered the growth of a synoptic view of planning 
encompassing the allocation of regional resources at one 
end of the scale to the planning of neighbourhoods at 
the other. The architectural point of view tended to be 
design-oriented and conservative, inclining towards the 
idea of satellite towns as a solution to urban growth 
and traffic congestion problems, and pre-occupied with 
the conservation of rural land and the need to maintain 
access to the countryside.
(Powell 1968: 3-9, 10)
Some of the reasons for the eventual demise of the CCC can be 
traced to this original legislation. Numerous difficulties were to arise 
out of the fact that the metropolitan planning authority was exclusively 
a local government body. As such, it had to rely on the support of the 
Minister in its attempt to coordinate the activities of other state 
authorities. But the Minister was advised by the planning staff of the 
Local Government Department and the town and country planning advisory 
committee, neither of which was on very good terms with the CCC because 
the original legislation had allocated full planning responsibilities to the 
Local Government Department and its advisory committee, whereas the legis­
lation finally enacted gave these duties to the CCC.
A further source of weakness stemming from the character of the CCC 
was the tendency of the councillors to take a parochial rather than compre­
hensive or metropolitan viewpoint. While Councillor Marsden (Campbelltown) 
did take a metropolitan view, and was not re-elected by the councils that 
he represented, the behaviour of the Mayors of Ryde, Ashfield and Liverpool 
simply ignored the express wishes of the CCC and permitted commercial ribbon
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developments along county road frontages, tended to be the norm. For 
although Councils in principle supported the CCC, in practice each council 
was reluctant to restrain development and resented curbs on possible future 
growth of their municipalities.^
Hence the CCC encountered gradually mounting suspicion from several 
quarters in its early years, followed eventually by outright hostility.
The first adverse reaction came late in 1946 after the CCC had introduced 
an interim plan. This was a mild form of restraint sufficient only to 
gently check some of the worst and most obvious excesses of unbridled 
sprawl, one of which was galloping land subdivision on the fringe of the 
metropolis. The affected councils began to chafe. (Fraser 1972: 7) However 
the first real shock came with the presentation of the Cumberland Plan in 
1948. It had a green belt the aim of which was correctly interpreted by 
the affected councils as a permanent check on urban expansion in their 
areas. They were not pleased. Nor were councils in the established areas 
unaffected by the green belt, for the Plan had boldly designated large 
tracts, consisting partly of prime building land, as a network of parkland 
which criss-crossed the metropolitan area. (Fraser 1972: 7)
Though the Government had created the Council it had not undertaken 
to underwrite the cost of its planning proposals. To publicly earmark for 
park purposes such large tracts of land, without knowing how it was to be 
acquired, was perhaps a mistake. The State Government did ultimately agree 
to help finance the land acquisition programme, but not until three years 
later, by which time large areas of the proposed park system had been 
sheared off to placate irate land owners. For just as local councils 
resented restraint on the development possibilities of their areas, similarly
1 From interviews with three of the original planning staff of the CCC; 
H. Wardlaw, 10 October 1973, J. Jordan 16 October 1973, P. Harrison.
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property owners did not accept that what had traditionally been regarded by 
common consent as a basic freedom could be withdrawn for the benefit of 
the public interest. Here were two unpopular proposals that began to 
acquire for the CCC (what might today be called) a bad image.
There were other equally grave problems that the CCC had to contend 
with in the first six years of its existence before the Cumberland Plan was 
finally given legislative authority in 1951, not the least of which was the 
uncertainty surrounding both the acceptance (because of local government 
hostility) and the financing (because of the Federal Liberal Government's 
refusal to assist on the grounds that it was not a matter of commonwealth 
concern) of the Cumberland Plan submitted to the Minister in 1948. This 
uncertainty had several unfortunate results. Firstly, as Winston (1957: 73) 
noted, development occurring in this period, although nominally subject to 
the interim control powers of the County Council, more often than not had 
to be allowed to go ahead as there were no funds to pay compensation nor 
any certainty that there ever would be. Secondly, the hesistancy with which 
the State Government reacted to submission of the Plan in 1948 led to the 
resignations of most of the experienced staff, who were not replaced. And 
finally, the years of uncertainty had adversely affected any status that 
the Council might have enjoyed in the hierarchy of public authorities 
concerned with metropolitan development. 'The optimism of the early years 
was never recovered.' (Harrison 1972: 67)
Nevertheless the planning scheme adopted by the Government in 1951 
has been described as 'the most definitive expression of a public policy on 
the form and content of a metropolitan area ever attempted'. (Harrison 1972: 
9). Winston (1957: 39) summarised its aims as 'coordination, consolidation 
and conservation'. The Cumberland approach could be described as idealistic, 
compared to the very pragmatic attitudes adopted in the case of Melbourne 
and Adelaide. Town Planning was based on a few broad concepts concerned
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primarily with the future form and structure of the metropolis. It 
contained three broad proposals for giving effect to its aims. Firstly, 
to improve people's journeys to work a good deal of employment should be 
decentralised to outer industrial zones and shopping and office centres in 
the suburbs. These should be linked by expressways and improved railway 
networks. Secondly the new centres should become focal points of recogni­
sable districts, separated from each other by open space, and given some 
sense of identity by local planning schemes. Most importantly, the whole 
metropolis should be enclosed by a green belt,
It would keep open country close to the city 
dwellers. It would keep some farming and market 
gardening close to their city markets. And by limiting 
the suburbs outward sprawl it would force developers 
to fill up the vacant land and lots within the city's 
existing boundaries.
(Stretton 1970: 238-9)
The Plan showed a pattern of zoned Living Areas sufficient to provide for 
a total population of between 2.35 million to 2.4 million, a capacity for 
increase of 700,000 people. This increase was envisaged as being spread 
over 25 years and was based on the best demographic advice then available. 
(Clarke 1960: 28)
How effective were the provisions of the plan in achieving its 
objectives, and how well did it fare in the political arena? Summaries by 
Powell (1968) and Harrison (1972) indicate that most of the planners' 
ambitions were frustrated. The prevention of sprawling urban development 
was probably the most significant achievement of the Cumberland Plan in the 
1950s, although other methods might have achieved a similar result, such as 
making the availability of services an essential requirement for subdivision. 
The programme of open space acquisitions, although reduced from its original 
ambitions because of lack of funds, did preserve some 200 acres of foreshore 
lands around the Harbour and significant tracts of parklands in the western 
suburbs. But this did not win popularity with the local councils involved,
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who resented the loss of rateable land and the prospects of meeting the 
costs of development and maintenance of the parklands.
There was some improvement in the living: working relationship
in regard to manufacturing and retailing employment, but there was no 
restraint on the build-up of employment in central and inner areas.
District centres did develop in accordance with the pattern proposed by 
the Plan, many of them on railway routes, but these centres have been 
predominantly retail. (Logan 1963) At best, Powell (1968: 5-9) suggests, 
it can only be said that without county planning the concentration of employ­
ment would have been worse than it is.
Two of the most formidable obstacles to the successful implementation 
of the Plan were the expansion of the city centre and the quality and 
quantity of local government planning. These will be dealt with separately 
in the next section. Suffice to say here that most local councils were 
reluctant to complete local planning schemes, preferring to exercise the 
discretionary control over private developments which was conferred by the 
County Planning Scheme Ordinance. And under the Labor-controlled Sydney 
City Council the old city centre continued to grow without limit, inevitably 
increasing traffic problems and land prices.
Although many of the difficulties experienced by the CCC in the 1950s 
were administrative and political, some were undoubtedly due to technical 
shortcomings in the plan itself. The primary weakness of the Plan lay in 
its under-estimation of future population growth and the consequent 
inadequacy of residential and industrial zonings. (SPA 1967: 69) Immigration, 
together with changes in demographic structure, (Neutze 1971: 92) and insuffi­
cient funds to allow the extension of services into new areas, generated 
considerable pressure on the limited amounts of land in the living area 
zones and contributed to rising land prices.
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It was apparent after the 1954 census that population growth was 
almost twice that estimated by the planners in 1946 when work began on the 
Plan. But the Council published amended population forecasts through the 
1950s. Clearly then the failure was not so much inaccurate forecasting but 
failure to carry out comprehensive revisions of the Plan. This can be 
partly explained by the fact that built into the Plan was the idea that it 
was a plan for limited long term growth of the continuous built-up area.
It was intended that growth beyond 2.4 million would be accomodated in 
decentralised locations in the County of Cumberland or, in accordance with 
the State's long-standing policies of decentralisation/ in country areas.
But it was also true that because of the precarious position occupied by 
planning at the time many planners felt that, above all, the Plan had to be 
supported in the face of widespread public antagonism. To criticise it or 
alter it may have been interpreted as an admission of basic weaknesses 
which would seriously undermine the credibility or authority of the Plan in 
the public eye. (Wardlaw 10 October 1973)
Because of the manner in which the Planning Scheme had been approached 
it was a plan based on assessments of future needs rather than estimates of 
potential resources. The Plan was based on a framework of major public 
utilities, but very few of the required works were carried out because 
neither Federal, state nor local government has been willing or able to 
finance long term planning from either current annual revenue or through 
loan funds. (Powell 1968: 5-12) So little eventuated throughout the 1950s 
or early 1960s of the plans for a county road system, electric railway 
extensions, an overall pattern of county open space, the elimination of 
slums or satellite towns beyond the Green Belt.
But shortage of funds was not the only reason for the failure of 
these plans. For none of them was within the direct control of the CCC, 
which had to rely on the cooperation and goodwill of other government
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departments and authorities. And this was not usually forthcoming, their 
attitudes towards the CCC varying 'from indifference to hostility'.
(Harrison 1972: 69)
The railways took no notice at all of the new 
planners and refused to build their new lines. The 
Housing Commission defied the zoning - but the plan 
didn't provide land of the kind the Commission wanted.
When the water and sewerage refused to dive under the 
green belt it was partly because the planners were 
doing nothing effective to get settlers to jump over 
it. The damage these utilities did to the plan was 
helped on by their choice of locations to do it from 
- they steadily expanded their own offices in the old 
city centre.
(Stretton 1970: 240)
Departments of Transport, Lands, Industrial Development, and the Maritime 
Services Board consulted or ignored the Council as they saw fit. As Fraser 
(1972: 9) observed, they used the Plan to protect their interests when it 
suited them, but were not prepared to engage in direct encounter to uphold 
the Plan.^ 'The CCC would find that at height of a struggle to maintain a 
proposal a government authority would have surrendered independently to the 
opponent.'
Ultimately, of course, major issues were determined in Cabinet, where 
the Council's views needed the support of the Minister for Local Government. 
And the Minister's views on the issue were shaped by the planning staff of 
his own department and by consultation with the Advisory Committee. What 
strength the CCC had 'stemmed from its role as custodian of the important 
elements of the Plan, the provisions of which the Minister had the power ... 
to change'. (Harrison 1972: 70-71)
On two particularly important issues during the 1950s the Minister 
did choose to exercise this power, thereby creating a rupture between the 
State Government and the CCC which never healed and which contributed to
1 Even the Water Board, which had a massive backlog of works, was only 
'silently grateful' for the restraint imposed on peripheral sprawl by 
the green belt zoning. (Harrison 1972: 69)
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the eventual dissolution of the Council in 1963. The first of these was a 
proposal by Caltex to establish an oil refinery on Kurnell Peninsula, an 
area zoned as open space. In January 1953 the Minister, supported by the 
Advisory Committee, over-rode the CCC's objections on the grounds that the 
development was regarded as of great importance to the well-being of the 
State's economy.
The second issue, one which epitomised the evolving problem of 
reconciling the decision-making functions of the Government, public 
authorities and the County Council, involved the pressures which began to 
build up from 1953 onwards for the re-zoning of certain parts of the Green 
Belt. As a result of the County Plan the amount of land in broad acres 
capable of being acquired cheaply at non-urban values was, by 1957, greatly 
restricted. This had long been a bone of contention between the Housing 
Commission and the CCC, resulting in 1954 in the release of 10,000 acres 
from Green Belt zoning. From that time on, to preserve and maintain the 
green belt became the major preoccupation of the Council. (Powell 1968: 4-6)
Early in 1958 a proposal was put forward by the Housing Commission 
to establish a satellite town at Minto for 60,000 people. The CCC refused 
to release the land for urban development on the grounds that the Commission 
should concentrate on vacant area still within the existing Living Areas.
The Commission replied that this land was only in small parcels and that it 
was too expensive.
The issue was referred to the Town and Country Planning Advisory 
Committee with the request that it recommend to the Minister for Local 
Government a suitable compromise aimed at meeting the needs of the Housing 
Commission whilst preserving the basic intentions of the County Plan. Mean­
while the CCC set about an overall review of the green belt zoning, providing 
for the release of 11,500 acres, which it submitted to the Minister in
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October 1959. The Advisory Committee's recommendation for the release of 
over 30,000 acres was not communicated to the CCC for comment upon likely 
implications. It was submitted to the Minister in December 1959 and his 
endorsement meant in effect that the Advisory Committee was the effective 
county planning authority. At this time the Premier, J.J. Cahill, died.
He had been a staunch supporter of the CCC since its inception. In the 
resulting re-shuffle of portfolios the Ministry of Local Government went 
from Mr Renshaw to Mr P.D. Hills, a former mayor of Sydney not noted for 
his concern with planning, as Cahill had been. It was unfortunate that at 
the same time as the Plan was under fire from the Housing Commission a 
swelling band of real estate subdividers and developers began to doubt the 
ability of the Council to continue to protect the Green Belt zoning, and 
were taking up options on large tracts of land in the Green Belt. And local 
councillors, property owners and businessmen of the fringe municipalities 
(Sutherland, Liverpool, Baulkham Hills etc) were growing increasingly restive 
about what they felt was the 'stranglehold' the Green Belt had on the future 
growth of their districts. This local feeling was impressed upon State 
members of Parliament, who in turn put pressure on the Local Government 
Minister. (Clarke 1960: 34-5) Mr Hills had been hailed as a man of action, 
and he gave the impression of wishing to justify his reputation. The long- 
drawn out controversy over the Green Belt gave him an opportunity.
This issue emphasised the administrative weaknesses in the overall 
planning system (and the dependence of planning on sympathetic politicians 
like McKell and Cahill). The conclusion was therefore drawn that a body 
was needed which could deal with government departments and ad hoc authori­
ties on an equal footing and which had positive and direct lines of 
communication to the Minister and hence to Cabinet. (Powell 1968: 4-19) The 
State Planning Authority Act of 1963 marked the legislative and political 
working out of this line of planning thought.
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Two significant changes in metropolitan development policy emerged 
from the green belt releases. The first was the idea of the development 
areas, or neighbourhoods, which must be comprehensively planned as units 
before subdivision could take place. The second was the requirement that 
subdividers should pay for water and sewer reticulation and at least a 
share of the trunk services for new areas. This was an attempt to make 
everyone connected with 'promiscuous urbanisation' face up to the heavy 
costs of their activities, costs which previously had been accumulating 
as long term social debt. (Clarke 1960: 37)
It has often been argued that the green belt issue caused the downfall 
of the CCC, Bunker (1972) being the most recent example. It would be more 
accurate however to regard the green belt releases as a sympton of more 
basic problems involving the composition and powers of the CCC. Wedged 
uneasily between the local and state government hierarchies it was seen as 
a rival political body in a contest it had little hope of winning. For 'no 
state government could be expected to put its central powers into the hands 
of a crowd of part-time municipal councillors, but the County Council could 
not do its duty except by usurping some of the government's central political 
responsibilities'. (Stretton 1970: 242) The State government seemed to want 
those goods which the planners expressed concern with, from efficiency, order 
and amenity to slum eradication and improved communities, but it divorced 
town planning from most economic and social planning, leaving industrial 
and regional development to a branch of the Treasury and housing and trans­
port to their own autonomous departments.
Most large locational decisions made in a city have income distri­
butional results. As the spatial form of a city is changed (by relocating 
housing, transport routes, employment opportunities, sources of pollution 
etc.) so also is the price of accessibility and the cost of proximity for 
any one household. Decisions made in the public sector of an urban system
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can be made with redistributive effects in mind. If real income is defined 
as command over resources, then real income is a function of location and 
accessibility to open spaces, health and educational services, shops and 
jobs, entertainment and transport facilities and so on. Many of these 
resources are located by the public sector and it is therefore important to 
recognise that 'the redistributive aspect of general governmental functions 
is far from trivial and increases with city size'. (Thompson 1965: 117) It 
is strange that there are so few criteria developed for determining the 
location of public activities. Public finance concepts have 'up to now been 
largely spaceless', (Thompson 1965: 257) while location theorists have 
neglected the problem of public facility location. Given that no adequate 
location criteria have been developed it is not surprising that the locational 
decisions of public authorities have been and still tend to be almost 
entirely the result of political pressures. For twenty years the N.S.W.
Labor Government, a government supposedly concerned with the redistribution 
of income in the interests of a more egalitarian society, allowed government 
departments and public utilities to make locational decisions with no thought 
about or in ignorance of their class distributional effects. It is hard to 
see the benefits to the working class of the decisions to build the eastern 
suburbs railway or the Warringah Expressway. Both these involved the 
destruction of workers' homes close to the city and forced their inhabitants 
twenty miles out on to the cheap land on the fringes or onto Housing 
Commission estates.
Labor may have been slow to see the redistributional possibilities 
implicit in locational decisions by the public sector. The private sector 
had not been so tardy. People involved in profiting from property were 
quick to see the advantages to be gained from zoning changes, for example.
They alternately used the planning system to enhance the value of their 
property or abused it for threatening their speculative expectations. (This 
will be made clearer in the following section on the city centre and local
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government planning.) Neither reaction has enhanced the effectiveness of 
the planning process, which was fighting for its life in the political arena.
The CCC never enjoyed much popularity. At various times there had
been signs of unrest at the restrictive effects of planning on the land
market and at inequities suffered by landowners because of resumptions. In
the state election campaign of 1956 town planning and local government
emerged as important issues. (Powell 1968: 4-6) The Liberal Party promised
to abolish the CCC on the grounds that it was a centralisation of power
detrimental to local government and that it operated against the legitimate
interests of private property owners. It was a theme repeated by the Liberal-
Country Party coalition in successive election campaigns. The problems
raised by the existence of the CCC obviously tried the patience of the
Minister of Local Government, Mr Hills. The Council
was not susceptible to the kind of direction that a 
minister or government seeks to wield. Its meetings 
were open and most of its documents were available 
to the public. It publicised its aims and intentions 
and, when the occasion demanded, its disagreement 
with the Minister. All the Minister could do to 
influence the Council was to suspend or amend its 
plan by overt public action; he could not dzveot *• 
the Council to do anything.
(Harrison 1972: 76)
On the other hand, in exercising his power to suspend the plan in 
cases involving matters of principle the Minister had seriously diminished 
whatever status the Council had held as an authority with powers over 
metropolitan development. Change was inevitable. But the form of the 
change was not. That became the subject of intense debate in the early 
1960s.
As the weaknesses and anomalies of the CCC became more apparent there 
were increasingly frequent statements by both parties that metropolitan 
planning should be the direct responsibility of the State. The Premier's 
1962 election policy speech foreshadowed the abolition of the CCC and the
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setting up of a State Planning Authority whose primary responsibility would 
be to coordinate development programmes of public authorities in the 
metropolitan area and throughout the State.
The State Planning Authority and the Sydney Region
Outline Plan
The concept of a State Planning Authority (SPA) began as an idea for 
an expert technical body cast in the mould shaped by the regional planning 
theorists of the post-war reconstruction era. However the evolution of 
political attitudes towards planning transformed these initial concepts so 
as to produce an Authority with significant political characteristics. In 
particular, the close relationship between the Minister and the Authority, 
and the local government representation on it, embodied in the legislation, 
constituted an attempt to come to terms with the politico-technical nature 
of planning. As such it represented a refinement in terms of planning as 
a function of government.
The State Planning Authority Act came into effect in December 1963 
after lengthy debate in Parliament (NSW PD Vol. 47-49, September-December 
1963). The constitution of the SPA and the extent of the Government's 
financial obligation became key issues during the debates in both Houses.
The purpose of the Bill was stated by the Minister (Mr Hills) as being a 
measure to coordinate all aspects of planning by public bodies, particularly 
those concerned with land use and transport and public utility services. 
Experience had shown that the necessary coordination could only be achieved 
at state level, hence a SPA was being proposed which would be subject to 
the direction and control of the Minister (NSWPD: 4892-4904). Both the 
Opposition parties agreed with the need for legislative change and both 
agreed that a SPA should be established. The most significant amendment was 
to increase the extent of local government representation on the Authority
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to five members/ and hence to increase the size of the Authority from seven 
to twelve. The final membership comprised a full-time chairman and deputy 
chairman (respectively the former chief town planner and chief clerk of the 
Department of Local Government) and ten part-time members, five from local 
government (the Lord Mayor of Sydney, two nominees of the Local Government 
Association and two nominees of the Shires Association) and four 'departmen­
tal' or public utility representatives (the Commissioner for Main Roads, the 
Under Secretary of the Transport Department, the Assistant Under-Secretary 
of the Department of Local Government and the secretary of the Sydney Water 
Board). The final member was selected from a panel of four submitted by 
the professional institutes (RAIA, RAPI and the Surveyors and Engineers 
Institutes). Significantly none of [what Stretton (1970) has called] the 
'civilised spenders', housing, health, education, were represented. This 
was indicative of the continuing failure by the Labor Party to recognise 
the significant distributional effects of the locational decisions made by 
those authorities. Further evidence of Labor's lack of an overview of 
planning was the continued separation of town planning from both regional 
and economic planning. There was no clear definition of the new Authority's 
relations with the Decentralisation and Industrial Development Section of 
the Premiers Department (which was not included on the SPA) and fiscal 
support for State development and resources planning continued to be 
directed by Treasury agencies rather than the SPA (Powell 1968: 6-22).
On the question of finance the Government continued to display a 
reluctant attitude towards accepting the full financial implications of 
planning administration and implementation. Treasury would not support the 
view that the Government should bear the whole of the administrative costs 
of the SPA because some of the proposed planning activities were 'a direct 
service to local government', which should therefore continue to bear part 
of the costs. This principle of shared costs, subsequently endorsed by 
Cabinet, guaranteed that the technical character of the Authority would be
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weakened by the introduction of increased local government representation. 
(Powell 1968: 6-24)
An amendment to the Act in 1972 added to SPA membership a represen­
tative of the Minister for Lands, the Treasury Under-Secretary, the 
Commissioner for Railways, the Director of the Department of Decentralisation 
and Development and a representative of commerce and industry nominated by 
the Minister for Local Government. (This latter addition is interesting in 
view of the fact that the 1971 amendment to the South Australian SPA member­
ship deleted representatives who had any connections with commerce and real 
estate because of possible conflicts of interest). This 1972 amendment has 
generated an administrative rather than local government outlook and has 
reinforced the bureaucratic nature of the SPA. Within the Authority there 
is a conflict of interests and resource allocation between the planning and 
administrative functions. The Secretary of the Administrative division, and 
not the Chief Planner, is Secretary of the Authority. The legal and 
administrative sections are equal in status and effectiveness to the 
Planning Section. Thus 'the image of the Authority as being strongly 
bureaucratic, following the procedure of planning by committees and committ­
ing undue resources to administrative rather than planning functions.'
(Meares 1972: 2-7)
The SPA assumed its full responsibilities in June 1964. It took over
the work and the staff of the Cumberland and Northumberland Councils, the
town planning branch of the Department of Local Government and the role of
the Town and Country Planning Advisory Committee, which was disbanded.
Difficult relations between the former Cumberland County Council staff and
their rivals from the Local Government Department led to the resignations
of the four most senior of the old CCC planners’*’ and recruitment of staff
Interviews with members and ex-members of SPA, J.Jordan (16 October 1973) 
and H. Wardlaw (10 October 1973). Jordan claimed that ex-CCC men in the 
SPA were treated as 'second class citizens'.
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became a major problem. (SPA Annual Report 1966/7 and 1969/70) 'To plan 
for five million people throughout the state it has less developmental 
planning staff than planned Canberra for its first hundred thousand'. 
(Stretton 1970: 249)
On April 10 1967 history began to repeat itself with the announcement 
by the Premier that the National Capital Development Commissioner would 
survey and report to the State Government on the redevelopment of the Rocks 
Area and land and sites owned or occupied by the State. Mr Hills, then in 
opposition, was quick to point out that the Authority was being by-passed 
by the Government. (S.M.H. 12 April 1967) Apparently the SPA had failed up 
to this stage to obtain the Government's confidence as to its technical 
capability and general competence.
Nevertheless, after five years of these difficulties, the SPA produced 
a strategic metropolitan plan, the Sydney Region Outline Rlccn3 1970-2000 A.D. 
(1968). The Cumberland Plan was a reflection of the dominant characteristics 
of contemporary British planning ideology - the traditional interest in the 
reform of the urban environment, the use of planning as a basis for large 
scale civic design, and the concept of the master plan as an instrument of 
public administration through which land use and urban development can be 
regulated. The 1968 Outline Plan, on the other hand, is a broad advisory 
sketch, not a statutory plan, and reflects the current American pre­
occupation with 'goals' and 'objectives' and 'flexible strategies' rather 
than with static and 'utopian' master plans.
Although a Liberal Government had won office in 1965 the 1968 Plan 
reveals less subservience to this new political reality than to some of the 
older ones, like the pressures which celebrated the continued overgrowth of 
the city centre and the apparently untouchable autonomy of the older state 
departments and public utilities each with their own separate developmental
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plans. Plenty of Sydney people, notes Stretton, (1970: 246) planners, 
politicians and others, 'like to regard their centralised overgrowth as 
natural, unavoidable, an international phenomenon.'
This celebratory tendency certainly appears with monotonous regula­
rity on page after page of the 1968 Plan. Planning of the region, we are 
told,
should be directed towards ensuring that, in a world where 
administration, decision-making, and economic activity are 
increasingly concentrated in large city complexes operating 
on a world scale, Sydney shall retain its pre-eminent position 
as Australia's greatest city, commercial centre and port, 
and as a city and port of world status and importance.^
(SPA 1968: 11)
Commentators have castigated the lack of coordination of the 
development programmes of New South Wales government departments and 
agencies (Atkins 1961, Colman 1969). Colman (1969: 8) claims that these 
departments and agencies run on parallel lines and never meet.'The State 
machine ... has never shown enthusiasm for the kind of interdepartmental 
cooperation upon which the implementation of the Sydney Region Plan will so 
utterly depend'. Harrison (1972: 88) even suggests that the Outline Plan 
Report may have deliberately aimed to point up the obvious lack of co­
operation and coordination with other public authorities in the formulation 
of the Plan. For although the Report emphasises the massive public expendi­
ture required to meet the needs of the expanding metropolis, only the Sydney 
Water Board supplied authoritative estimates of the costs of their services 
keeping pace with the estimated population expansion of 2.75 million people 
by the year 2000, 1.75 million of whom are expected to locate within the 
County of Cumberland.
1 Other statements of this Sydney patriotism recur on pages 1, 10, 12, 27, 
33 of the 1968 Outline Plan.
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The importance of location to the 'real income' of people living in
a large city has been noted earlier in this chapter. Two of the older
political and administrative realities by which the 1968 Plan is constrained -
the widespread acceptance of the importance of the primacy and therefore
continued growth of Sydney"*’ and the role of the government departments and
statutory agencies as virtual planning authorities in their own right have
also been noted. Bearing in mind the further constraint of Sydney's 'cruel'
topography, which means that there is a strictly limited supply of pleasant
land within reasonable reach of the 'magic' of the old city and the
facilities only available there, perhaps the most important question to ask
of the Sydney Region Outline Plan is just how does it affect the distribution
of 'wealth' (i.e. 'real income' - accessibility to the goods and services
that a big city has to offer) within the Sydney region. Does it accentuate,
or try to make amends for, the existing differences between the rich, nestling
around the shores of the harbour and occupying the good land on its northern
side, and the poor, stretching across the hot, flat western plain and forced
further out by the influx of the 'new middle class' into the traditionally
2working class old inner suburbs (itself a product of the shortage of good 
suburban land reasonably close to the city). Where does it propose to locate 
the extra 1.75 million people expected in the County of Cumberland in the 
next thirty years?
The Outline Plan Report uses 'linear' language to describe the future 
direction of growth (SPA 1968: 15) but the diagram illustrating the growth 
principles for the region shows that development within a 40 mile radius of
'The plan proposes no practical new methods of forcing or enticing 
industry away from Sydney, or offices away from its centre'. (Stretton 
1970: 252)
Manning's (1972) statistics support these social geography generalisations, 
as do the computer maps of social class of Davis and Spearritt (1974).
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the city centre is expected to take a radial pattern, with outward expansion 
to the west, south-west and north-west, rather than a simple linear pattern. 
(SPA 1968: 18-26) The Plan proposes considerable growth to the west around 
Blacktown, Liverpool and Fairfield (460,000) which, on paper, and in the 
Plan's functional language, looks like a logical piece of urban infilling. 
The reality however is that 460,000 people must live in areas which suffer 
from all the discomforts and few of the advantages of Sydney's climate, on 
poor land with poor existing services. Given that the other two corridors 
marked for expansion, to the south-west and particularly north-west, offer 
much better land, and given the nature by which land is allocated in a free 
market situation, then it is inevitable that only the poor will go west. 
(Their only consolation is that without planning they would still be living 
in these areas, and would have no sewerage or made roads.)
'In this [western] corridor, and the inner half of the Campbelltown 
[south-west] corridor, and the fattening-all-round of the whole western 
perimeter, the Outline Plan thus accepts a gross increase of segregation 
without any public expression of regret or misgiving.' (Stretton 1970: 258) 
(my italics)
Where a few of the middle classes are expected, south-west at 
Campbelltown,the SPA has spent an estimated $10 million (Harrison 1972: 91) 
acquiring land for a town centre, university and teachers' college, for 
residential estates for the New South Wales Housing Commission, for a 
hospital and other public purposes. 'Where workers only are expected in 
the fifty square miles west from Parramatta to Penrith, no such luxuries 
are mooted.' (Stretton 1970: 258) The Outline Plan is long on rhetoric 
about the need for a new city centre at Parramatta (SPA 1968: 34) but short 
on practical measures (incentives or penalties) for diverting investment 
from the old city centre, and expansive on the need to encourage Sydney's 
'primacy'. Any deployment of investment from the old centre to the suburbs
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or new cities 'must be done without prejudicing the essential role of 
Sydney as the main commercial centre in Australia and as a commercial and 
financial centre of increasing world importance.' (SPA 1968: 33)
Colman has drawn attention to the general lack of means to implement 
the 1968 plan. He noted that the Outline Plan Report devotes only four 
pages out of 108 to 'the implementation process'. (Colman 1969: 11) The 
good intentions of the Campbelltownproject for a 'new city' of nearly half 
a million are particularly vulnerable to this inadequacy. A Campbelltown 
Development Committee/ chaired by the associate chairman of the SPA and 
including representatives of the Department of Main Roads, Water Board and 
Treasury, and the Mayors of Campbelltown and Camden have the task of co­
ordinating a massive programme of public works by various agencies but 
without real executive authority and with only statutory planning control 
over the private sector. (Harrison 1972: 91) For this small fraction of 
its state-wide responsibilities the SPA can supply ’less talent than plans 
Canberra's growth at half the speed or Elizabeth's at a quarter the speed.' 
(Stretton 1970: 255)
The only clearly defined objective of the Outline Plan is the 
direction and staging of suburban expansion within the County of Cumberland. 
Accordingly the Plan has been criticised for its lack of transportation 
proposals, insufficient provision for regional open space, for its unjusti­
fiably optimistic reliance on local government to undertake detailed develop­
ment planning of new areas and for allowing Water Board decisions about the 
location of sewerage services to unduly influence its choice of areas for 
urban expansion.
There has been far too little criticism of some of the fundamental 
assumptions of the Plan, assumptions which are illustrative of 'trend 
planning' of the worst kind. The most important of these assumptions are
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that the population and economic growth of the Sydney region should have 
no limits; that the physical form of this growth will continue to be low 
density detached housing; and that freeways are the only solution to the 
urban transport problem.'*'
The Report gives almost as little space (7 pages) to the means for 
financing the Outline Plan as it does to the means for implementing it.
The chapter on 'Finance1 sketches 'in a broad way' the extent of capital 
investment which the Plan involves. It acknowledges the impact of land 
prices on the capital investment needed for adequate servicing of Sydney's 
growth. Land owners would, 'under present practice, receive a financial 
benefit from the zoning of land in the Outline Plan for urban purposes, 
totalling about $1000 million or more'. (SPA 1968: 98) Given that assistance 
from Federal funds at that time seemed unlikely the Report goes on to 
suggest, very tentatively, that a charge on the increment in value of 'raw' 
land 'warrants very serious consideration' as a new source of revenue. (SPA 
1968: 100)
The Land Development Contribution Act of 1970 provided for the 
collection of 30 per cent of the increase in value of land arising from 
urban zoning calculated from a base date of August 1969 and applied to all 
non-urban land in the Sydney Region. The Minister (P.H. Morton) introducing 
the Bill explained that the Government believed it to be 'not unreasonable 
that part of the increment in value which arises primarily f$om the 
expenditure of public and private funds on essential services should be made 
available to meet the cost of such services.' (NSW PD 1970: 4361-2) This 
reluctant retreat by a Liberal Government from a philosophy that previously
■*■ The Plan states baldly that 'advice has been received from the Department 
of Main Roads as to which of their road proposals shouljä be regarded as 
reasonably firm committments for future regional planning purposes ...' 
(SPA 1968: 43-44) This is a classic example of that endemic problem, in 
N.S.W. and elsewhere, of a road planning authority calling the regional 
planning tune, of a regional planning authority having its policies 
determined by a highway plan formulated in the early 1940s.
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had supported complete freedom for the individual in respect of his property 
gives some indication of the extent to which rapid growth of the state 
population and the concentration of an ever-increasing proportion of it in 
the Sydney-Newcastle-Wollongong area had begun to place unmanageable strains 
on public services. However, as history has shown us, 'any action which 
limits the development rights attaching to land sooner or later comes under 
an unrelenting state of seige' (Harrison 1972: 95) and any efforts to limit 
the profits made from property are resented by that majority of the electo­
rate who are, or aspire to be, property owners. It was ironic therefore, 
but revealing, that it was the Labor Party leader of the Opposition, Mr Hills, 
who first promised"*" to abolish the Land Development Contribution if his 
Government were re-elected. Naturally the Liberal leader felt obliged to 
match this promise and on 30 March 1973 this radical but lucrative source 
of revenue was disposed of. And it had been one of the few positive steps 
to emanate from the Outline Plan.
Three issues central to the success of urban planning yet politically 
volatile and, to date, elusive of any lasting solution are the problems of 
transportation, decentralisation and rising land prices. Each issue reveals 
a different set of vested interests that have posed enduring dilemmas for 
planners.
The history of transportation planning in Sydney since the early 
1940s has been beset with most of the problems we have already noted in 
Adelaide and Melbourne in the 1960s. This integral aspect of urban planning 
has been the responsibility of a separate government department the 
Department of Main Roads, (but responsible to the same Minister who is in 
charge of town planning) which established the primary road system for the 
Sydney Region in the immediate post-war years and had its plans written into 
the Cumberland County Plan. These plans placed maximum emphasis on the use
1 In the Hawkesbury by-election campaign of February 1973.
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of the private car, providing for approximately 200 miles of expressways 
across the metropolis in six directions and all radiating from and converging 
on the centre by means of an inner system of 'distributor' roads surrounding 
the central area.^ Because of the prohibitive resumption and construction 
costs involved, only a few miles of these freeways were built under the 
Labor Government. But the building of the Warringah Expressway, begun by 
the Labor Government, was indicative of Labor's inconsistent and ill-thought 
out urban philosophy. The first section of the Warringah Expressway north 
of the Harbour Bridge, extending one and a half miles, cost $25 million,
49 per cent of which was attributable to property acquisition costs. (SPA 1968: 
101) The land resumed involved the destruction of hundreds of working class 
houses, whose occupants were forced to relocate elsewhere (most probably 
further away from the city) while the chief beneficiaries of the Expressway 
were the middle and upper class residents of the North Shore.
In spite of the shortage of funds for the building of freeways the 
Department of Main Roads hired the firm of De Leuw Cather (the engineering 
consultants who produced the Adelaide Transportation Study) in 1960 to 
review their transportation plans. The result of their report was the 
addition of a further 100-150 miles of expressways to the Department of 
Main Road's plans despite the strenuous objections of the Cumberland County 
Council planners, who criticised the report for being biased in its failure 
to consider public transport alternatives. (Wardlaw 10 October 1973)
The Department of Main Road's plans have been formulated by engineers 
whose sole criterion is efficiency and who are dominated by 'technical 
rationality' (Chapter six). And to this day, in spite of universal acceptance
1 The six routes were the Warringah Expressway, the North Western Express­
way, the Western, South Western, Southern and Eastern Expressways.
(Winston 1957: 54-55) Each route involves considerable destruction of 
inner city working class low-rental housing.
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of the notion that transportation and land-use planning are inseparable, 
the Department of Main Roads remains 'steadfastly autonomous and largely 
independent of the SPA and of the various government transport agencies'. 
(Colman 1969: 9)
As in 1948, so in 1968, the Department of Main Road's transportation 
plans were adopted by the SPA for the Sydney Region Outline Plan which 
'tentatively estimated that as much as 350 miles of new freeways may need 
to be constructed in the Region if there is to be an efficient main roads 
system to match the urban proposals in the Outline Plan'. (SPA 1968: 101)
The Outline Plan Report estimated that, at $7.5 million a mile, this would 
mean a capital investment of $2,600 million over the next thirty years.
Apart from the Department of Main Roads, transport decision-making 
has also devolved to three significant ad hoc committees - the County 
of Cumberland Passenger Transport Advisory Committee, the Traffic Advisory 
Committee and the Parking Advisory Committee - all of whom deliberate on 
aspects of the same problems. In the City of Sydney conflicts have fre­
quently arisen because traffic policies designed to relieve road congestion 
have been nullified by parking policies which encourage the influx of 
commuter vehicles, both policies operating to the detriment of public trans­
port. (S.M.H. 17 March 1967) These Committees, and the autonomy and 
influence of the Department of Main Roads, stand as good examples of policy 
making by the bureaucracy.
Ironically, the weight of country interests in State and federal 
politics has perhaps been the most important obstacle (until the recent 
flourishing of anti-freeway community action groups) in the way of the 
Department of Main Road's road building programme. A report by the political 
correspondent of the Sydney Momdng Herald in February 1969 showed that in 
New South Wales 88 per cent of all Commonwealth revenue for roads is spent
in the country and argued that neither the Labor or Liberal parties were
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prepared to seek substantial changes for fear of antagonising country 
electorates. (S.M.H. 21 February 1969)
By April 1972, when the climate of public opinion concerning express­
ways had reached a critical peak, the conservative Sydney Momdng Herald 
ran an editorial suggesting that there were 'strong reasons why the 
Government should hesitate' in its freeway programme to carefully consider 
some of the social costs involved, and their efficacy in achieving the ends 
that they were designed for.
Experience in overseas cities suggests that there are 
grounds for second thoughts about the desirability of 
expressways leading into the City. The danger is that, 
after destroying valuable residential areas, the express­
ways will be self-defeating. They will merely encourage 
more people to drive private motor cars into the City, 
thereby increasing congestion, pollution and parking 
problems, and drawing patronage away from public transport.
(S.M.H. 6 April 1972)
The editorial pointed out that Toronto, Washington and San Francisco 
were reverting to development of their long-neglected public transport 
systems and building rapid transit railways, and expressed hope that the 
Sydney Area Transportation Study (still in progress) would give 'special 
thought to the desirability of inner city expressways and to the objections 
and alternatives suggested by bodies such as Leichhardt Council'.
It remains to be seen whether inner city residents' action group 
opposition to freeways, assisted by wide community support and 'professional' 
objections by architects and planners, conservationists and so on, will be 
sufficient to resist the powerful 'freeway lobby' - car and oil companies, 
tyre and spare parts companies, and the NRMA (Each year the world's motor 
industry produces 23 million cars. (S.M.H. 23 April 1972)) In the greater 
Sydney area in 1972 there were 2.8 million people and 800,000 cars. By 
1983 the number of cars is expected to double and by the turn of the century, 
when greater Sydney's population will be about 4.6 million there could be
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2.5 million cars in the area. That constitutes another powerful 'vested 
interest'. Every man wants and expects to be able to drive his car when 
and where he pleases and for the Government to make this possible. Along 
with property ownership and property rights car ownership has become an 
entrenched part of the Australian ethic of private property and until a 
majority of car owners are willing to secede some of their 'car rights' the 
end of expressways will not be a practical political programme.
• • •
Decentralisation, as Neutze (1965) noted, has long been 'everyone's 
policy but no-one's programme'. Like transportation, it has been a volatile 
political issue subject to the influence of country electorates.
Winston (1957: 82) wrote of the impossibility of implementing the 
provisions of the Cumberland Plan unless that plan were assisted and supple­
mented by an active decentralisation policy which, he added, would need the 
help of the Commonwealth as well as the State Government. He also emphasised 
the need for better coordination between the Regional planning section of 
the Premier's Department and the Town Planning Branch of the Local Government 
Department.
For the McKell Labor Government in the immediate post-war years 
decentralisation had been an essential part of the vision of a better world. 
McKell's own attitude was clear in 1946.
The McKell Government determined ... to concentrate 
its efforts on creating a properly balanced state with a 
better distribution of population and industries.
Decentralisation was essential if the State was to make 
progress after the war ... there were vital economic, 
health and also cultural reasons for a wider distribution 
of our population.
(McKell 1946: 48)
Yet when Winston wrote in 1957 there had been no positive steps taken 
to implement the decentralisation policy. He attributed this failure to the 
simple fact that 'Sydney is a good deal pleasanter than most other places to
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live in from the average person's point of view' (Winston 1957: 7). The 
reality is more complicated. Most commentators have attributed the demise 
of the Cumberland County Council in part to its inability to institute 
policies for growth beyond the green belt. That criticism may explain the 
promise by the Liberal Party at the 1965 election to set up a Department of 
Decentralisation and Development, which it subsequently did in 1966.
One of the functions of the new Department was to formulate policies 
to encourage non-metropolitan growth and to assist in relieving pressures 
in the Sydney region, for by the mid-1960s arguments in favour of decentra­
lisation had changed their emphasis from the need to stem the drift from 
the country to the urgency of curbing the growth of the city. Yet in 1968 
the absence of the Department from the list of 'bodies consulted' in the 
Sydney Region Outline Plan (SPA 1968: 110) was one reason why Colman (1969: 
12) describes that Plan as 'a very cool document which carefully steers 
clear of all political hot potatoes'.
Although the Outline Plan assumed that one million of the 2.75 
million expected population increase of New South Wales by the year 2000 
would locate in areas outside the County of Cumberland, with half of that 
million outside the Sydney Region, there existed no real means for ensuring 
this distribution, and the Outline Plan Report suggested none.
There are two main reasons for the failure of all Governments since 
1945 to actively pursue a policy of decentralisation. One is revealed in 
the words of the Deputy Director of the Department of Decentralisation and 
Development in 1971:
We are out to increase the efficiency of private 
enterprise and remove inhibitions upon industrial expansion 
and development generally ... Decentralisation can only 
succeed if we have a sound basis of development here in 
the metropolitan centre. Sydney can put on a few more 
millions ...
(quoted in Harrison 1972: 83)
327
The desirability of continued economic growth of the Sydney region has 
never been questioned by either of the two major political parties. Rather, 
each party has tended to compete with the other for the credit of promoting 
the faster growth rate.
The role of the Country Party and the importance of country interests 
in state politics provides the second reason for the failure of successive 
governments to decentralise. The State Development and Country Industries 
Assistance Act of 1966, which set up the Department of Decentralisation and 
Development, gave the Department generous powers and finance to assist 
industry and local government and the authority to acquire and develop land 
and construct buildings. Grants and loans totalling $27 million have been 
made since 1965 to assist over 500 country industries estimated to employ 
about 10,000 workers. (Day 1971) The Department produced a Report on 
Selective Decentralisation in 1969 which criticised the policy of dispersed 
decentralisation and recommended that the government select particular 
regional centres for concentrated development. The Report did not nominate 
the centres but said that the North Coast, Northern Tablelands, Central West, 
South Coast and Tablelands, and the Riverina (i.e. almost everywhere in the 
State apart from the far west) suggested themselves as potentially capable 
of sustaining growth centres. Despite this deliberate cautiousness, politi­
cal controversy was quick to follow.
Even if it can arrange the finance (wrote the 
Sydney Morning Herald political correspondent) the State 
Government will have to find a political means of over­
coming the hot contest between country towns for 
selection as regional centres in order to make the 
scheme practical. Unless it does this it will risk the 
defeat in elections of its members representing centres 
which are not selected.
(O'Hara 1969)
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Needless to say, no growth centres were subsequently selected and 
two years later O'Hara wrote two critical articles on the reason for this.
Six years after it was elected with a policy committment to a 'dynamic 
decentralisation drive', the New South Wales Government was in 1971 faced 
with the fact that the $27 million it had given and lent for decentralisation 
had failed to arrest the accelerating movement of population from the 
country to the coastal cities. 'Bitter parochial rivalries between country 
centres', together with narrow Country Party concern for immediate political 
self interest were, claimed O'Hara (1971 a), paralysing action to combat 
the drift to the city. While experts had argued convincingly that there 
was no prospect of a cure emerging from the policy of dispersed decentrali­
sation and had recommended concentration of resources to develop one growth 
centre at a time, Country Party MLAs had little enthusiasm for promoting 
development of inland cities for fear that such centres, once urbanised, 
would fall to the Liberal and Labor parties. And to make matters worse, 
the change in the State Electoral Act of February 1971, brought about by 
Country Party pressure, ensures that rural electorates will have 33 seats 
in State Parliament no matter how far the population falls. So the failure 
of the New South Wales Government to come to grips with decentralisation 
'stems largely from the decision of the Liberal Premier, Mr Askin, to leave 
the shaping of its rural policy to the Country Party'. (O'Hara 1971 b)
The State Labor Party went to the polls in 1971 naming tentative 
growth centres for six country regions: Grafton-Lismore, Tamworth, Bathurst-
Orange, Wagga, Albury-Wodonga and Broken Hill. Although the Liberal Party, 
since retaining office, has nominated Bathurst-Orange as a growth centre 
the persistence of political difficulties was still evident in August 1973.
The Director of the Department of Decentralisation and Development (Mr Fuller) 
had announced that the planning of the growth centre would be switched from 
his department to the SPA. There were suggestions that the switch in
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planning responsibility was a political capitulation to wealthy Country 
Party land-holding interests in the Orange district who oppose resumption 
of their land at October 1972 prices. Sir Charles Cutler, Deputy Premier 
and Country Party MLA for Orange, as Minister for Local Government is 
Ministerial head of the SPA (S.M.H. 8th, 9th August 1973)
• • •
Land speculation has been the greatest social disaster and
public scandal of the post-war period.
Gough Whitlam, 1970 [quoted in Thomas 1973: 95]
Since the late 1950s the problem of rising land prices has been 
endemic in New South Wales. In the light of evidence that speculators were 
deliberately withholding land from sale in order to push up prices a Liberal 
Minister for Local Government, Mr P.H. Morton, a 'free enterpriser from way 
back' (O'Hara 1972) was forced to threaten a special 'holding tax' on such 
land, and now his successor is faced with the need to give effect to this 
threat.
The Plans themselves have frequently been blamed for causing this 
increase in the price of land; the Cumberland Plan for creating an artificial 
shortage by imposition of the Green Belt, the 1968 Outline Plan for being a 
'speculator's guide' by delineating future corridors of urban growth and the 
approximate dates of their release for development; and planning in general 
for its cumbersome, dilatory procedures. Even the radically-intentioned 
Land Development Contribution Fund introduced in 1970 has been accused of 
an inflationary effect on land prices because, it has been suggested, the 
30 per cent contribution has simply been passed on from the original land 
owners via the developers to the final consumers, the home buyers.
It is instructive to ask who stands to benefit from the continued 
inflation of land values, for the answer reveals on the one hand a powerful 
set of vested interests profiting from the process of urban growth and on
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the other hand, an equally powerful set of cultural values about home and 
land ownership, both of which impose heavy constraints on any government, 
even one with the best of reformist intentions (like the current Federal 
Labor Government).
Vandermark and Harrison have noted the movement into the property 
market since the early 1960s of finance companies, insurance companies and, 
since 1969, superannuation funds. They use the examples of the finance 
companies A.S.L. and Cambridge Credit and the insurance company A.M.P. to 
illustrate the extent to which these groups have become involved in 
property investment and development.(Vandermark and Harrison 1972: 181)
The life insurance offices are withdrawing from mortgage lending for 
housing and transferring to property. In 1959 A.M.P. invested $4 million 
in freehold property and $3.7 million in office premises in New South Wales.
By 1969 their investment was $27.7 million in property and $18.4 million in 
offices. 'Behind the names of the multitude of new development companies 
displayed on development projects, there usually stands a life office with 
a significant if not a 100 per cent interest in them.' (Vandermark and 
Harrison 1972: 185) But there has been very little work done on the 
financial structure of the development industry and the increasing concent­
ration of its profits into a few large companies.^
In a mere three months to the end of September 1972 life offices 
poured$63 million into real property. (Thomas 1973: 78) Because of the 
device of 'nominee groups', described by the F-inanei-ai Review as the 'faceless 
men' of finance, details of company ownership are often clouded. But 
insurance companies are high on the list of Lend Lease's top twenty share-
'The concentration of the development business in relatively few and 
poweful companies has facilitated the organising of the major companies 
into new but influential pressure groups'. (Vandermark and Harrison 
1972: 173)
331
holders. MLC is No.2, AMP is No.5. T. & G. Insurance Co. is the third 
largest shareholder in the Hooker Corporation (Thomas 1973: 81). And so on.
Vandermark and Harrison (1972: 187) predicted that metropolitan 
planning schemes, forecasting continuing growth in and around the existing 
urban centres 'will be used as a punter's guide to real estate speculation 
further encouraging the confidence in real estate investment on the urban 
fringe and in the city centres'. In fact this had already happened. On 
12 September 1971 the Sunday Australian ran the front-page headline 'Big 
Developers Bring Off $10 million Land Coup'. The developers included 
Hooker, Stocks and Holdings and F.C.A. Finance Pty Ltd. Executives of 
Hookers and Stocks and Holdings explained that they had used the 1968 
Sydney Region Outline Plan 'as a guide to their successful speculation'.
Lend Lease, Stocks and Holdings, Parkes Development and L.J. Hooker 
all bought land in the Gosford and Penrith areas soon after publication of 
the Outline Plan. (Sunday Australian 5 March 1972) The inability of local 
and state government services to keep pace with the rate of subdivision by 
these developers was contributing, according to the Sunday Australian (5 
March 1972) to the escalating price of blocks. In 1970 the average price of 
vacant land in Sydney was $7,240 per acre, in 1971 $8,969, and by 1972 had 
risen to $11,802 an acre. (Financial Review 28 July 1972)
The beneficiaries of rising land prices are clear enough. According 
to the present Federal Minister for Urban and Regional Development (Mr T. 
Uren, MHR) the poor in general and young couples in particular are the ones 
who suffer. Given that in 1972 the average price of a block of land and 
dwelling was $20,000 a young couple would need a deposit of $5,000: then,
to get a building society loan, they would need to be in the $110-120 per 
week income bracket - whereas 70 per cent of wage earners were below the 
average (at that time) of $91 in weekly earnings. Since _949-50, Mr Uren
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wrote, land prices in Sydney had risen 14 fold but average weekly earnings 
had risen only 4.3 fold. So land had risen 3h times more than weekly 
earnings. (Financial Review 24 April 1972)
But the Financial Review put the other dimension of the land price 
problem decisively in an editorial on the 8 August 1972 expressing concern 
for the 'moral fibre of the community'. It said:
Almost everyone has been tainted by a self- 
administered virus of greed fuelled by spiralling land 
prices which give those who already own property steady 
capital gains and those who struggle to buy property 
an even stronger vested interest in ensuring that the 
spiral will continue. In such a situation, the pressures 
on both individuals and professional real estate 
developers to become out-and-out land speculators 
become intolerably strong ...
In an electorate consisting of a majority of property owners and 
their families all enjoying the appreciation of the capital investment in 
their own home and land because it is outpacing most other costs and prices, 
any government is reluctant to make decisive efforts to restrict the 
potential profits of property ownership. For, as Harrison has explained 
in a brief outline of the problems facing the Federal Labor Government's 
new programmes,'*’ 'the property-owning electorate sees itself, or can all 
too easily be persuaded to see itself as having a convergence of interest 
with the property interests who are marshalling the opposition to the new 
programmes.'
The three problems just discussed lie beyond the traditional powers
of statutory land-use planning. But failure to adequately resolve them has
limited the success of metropolitan planning to date. Local councils,
including the Sydney City Council, have had statutory planning powers since
1945. Their failure to use these powers, and in many cases their abuse of
them, and the effect of this on the overall impact of metropolitan planning, 
are the subjects of this next section.
1 Unpublished summary of the proceedings of the RAPI Conference at Terrigal, 
N.S.W., September 1973.
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The City 3 the City Council and the Redevelopment Boom
Winston, writing in 1955, listed planning for the City of Sydney as 
one of the three key planning issues then facing the County Council and 
upon the successful resolution of which the continued existence of the CCC 
depended. (Winston 1957: 84) The City of Sydney Planning Scheme was not 
prescribed however until 1971, after two decades in the course of preparation. 
Some of the reasons for this outstanding example of neglect of 'local 
planning' are explored in what follows.
Notwithstanding weaknesses in the statutory planning procedure, the 
Sydney City Council (SCC) had consistently failed in the twenty years since 
the promulgation of the Cumberland Plan (1951) to do much about its planning 
responsibilities or to allow planning considerations to enter into its 
policy or decision-making processes.
A property or redevelopment 'boom' began to engulf Sydney in the mid- 
1950s. Schemes to limit and disperse central office building have been 
proposed since 1953 'and regularly murdered by the lobbies of the central 
investors'. (Stretton 1970: 246)1 The causes, nature and beneficiaries of 
the redevelopment boom are as worthy of examination as the reasons why 
nothing was done about it.
The rapid increase in the value of new buildings completed each year 
in the central area, from $2.6 million in 1957 to $51 million in 1971, and 
the doubling of land values in the northern sector of the city between 1956
3.
Stretton adds that for nearly half a century London has limited its 
central office development to less than half the densities which were 
about to be enshrined in Sydney's new regulations of 1971.
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and 1962 indicated a 'boom' situation. (Archer 1967: 275) The first projects 
were mainly owner—occupied buildings/ (Kodak/ ICI Unilever) begun as soon 
as war-time building restrictions were removed in 1952.^ Nearly 90 per cent 
of the $195 million spent on new buildings completed between 1956 and 1966 
was spent on office buildings, 75 per cent of them concentrated in the area 
of 120 acres bounded by Circular Quay, Macquarie, King and George Streets. 
(Archer 1967: 276-77)
The market value of land for development is based on the expected 
capitalised net income from the developed site less the cost of the develop­
ment. The prospect of a more intensive use of land (e.g. a multi-storey 
office block) generates an increase in land values. One successful redevelop­
ment project generates a general increase in the site value of all surround­
ing land with this potential use, and the resulting increase in rates and 
taxes encourages surrounding site owners to redevelop or sell for redevelop­
ment. This was the case with the increase in land values generated by the
2AMP Building and the other redevelopment in the Quay area. (Archer 1967:
282)
Archer's study of the main features of the development and use of 
the twenty largest private buildings completed in the inner city area 
between 1956 and 1966 reveals the chief beneficiaries of the redevelopment 
boom. Of these twenty largest buildings four and a half were the main 
offices of insurance companies while another six and a half were owned by 
insurance companies. The AMP Society owns five and a half of these. 'This
Shortages of some materials did continue though and structural steel was 
not available for multi-storey buildings until 1955.
This redevelopment caused the assessed value of the site of the Customs 
House, adjacent to AMP, to rise from $220,000 in 1952 to $540,000 in 1956 
and to $1,140,000 in 1962. It is clear that if the Customs House had 
been a privately owned building paying rates and taxes then it is doubtful 
if it could have supported the increase in land tax and council rates 
from $13,000 in 1952 to $63,000 in 1962. (Archer 1967: 283)
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and other data suggests that it is the major single force in the redevelop­
ment of the city , its investment complementing the development operations 
of the two property development firms of Lend Lease Corporation and L.J.
Hooker Ltd who were completing major buildings at the rate of one each year 
between 1956 and 1966. (Archer 1967: 276, 285)
The role of the life insurance companies in equity investment in 
the redevelopment process is shown by Archer (1967: 303) in a table listing 
the real property assets of the seven largest life companies operating in 
Australia. They increased their real property assets from $71 million in 
1957 to $399 million in 1965 and the relative importance of these property 
assets as a proportion of their total assets rose from 4 per cent to 9.3 per 
cent for the same period. Of these companies the AMP has played the major 
role, its annual rate of investment in real property rising from $7 million 
in 1957 to $35 million in 1965. Over 75 per cent of this property acquisitior 
has been concentrated in N.S.W. and Victoria. (Archer 1967: 293) Archer 
(1967: 298) concludes therefore that the AMP Life Assurance Society has the 
largest single vested interest in the future viability and prosperity of 
the central business area.
Perhaps the most important feature of the redevelopment of the city 
over this crucial ten year period was that it was completely unguided by 
any overall plan to control the location and size of new building in relation 
to the public facilities which they were based on. The net result of the 
excessive building development was serious congestion problems and drastic 
deterioration in the amenity and efficiency of the area. Why was this 
allowed to happen?
The City Council was the appropriate authority to take the necessary 
measures to improve the amenity and efficiency of the CBD. It had full 
responsibility for preparing the city planning scheme and it also had the
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richest property tax base in Australia. Yet the Council made only a modest 
response to its responsibilities and opportunities. Tbis was partly due 
to the political complexion of the Council from 1949-67 and partly to the 
power of those interests who opposed any restraint on city growth.
The long ALP control of the City Council was secured by the (Labor) 
State Government's Local Government (Areas) Bill 1947. This Bill created 
an enlarged City Municipality which included the Labor-voting areas of 
Paddington, Redfern, Darlington, Glebe, Alexandria, Erskineville, Waterloo 
and Newtown, enlarging the Council's residential population from 95,925 to 
213,900 (1947 Census figures). ALP aldermen were much more concerned with 
the City's residential areas and with welfare provisions of a palliative 
nature than with city planning.
Although the Council began preparation of a planning scheme in 1951 
which included proposals for the zoning of the CBD and for the imposition 
of a floor space index on city buildings (intended to limit the density of 
building) this scheme was never adopted. Strong reactions followed the 
public exhibition of the draft scheme in 1952. The Pitt Street Property 
Owner's Defence League was formed and a propaganda battle waged. Is Planning 
Stifling Development?, a booklet by S.E. Wilson of the Retailers Association, 
challenged the 'right' of any section of the community 'to interfere with 
and damage other people's property causing great capital loss without even 
a suggestion of compensation'. (Harrison 1972: 72)
The Council's response to this challenge from the property owners # 
was to delete from its draft planning scheme submitted to the Minister in 
1959 all proposals for bulk (floor space index) and height restrictions. 
(McLachlan 1967: 634) The scheme was amended by the Minister and exhibited
again in 1964-65.
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This time it included proposals for floor space ratios 
drawn up by the SPA. Following public hearings of 
objections ... the scheme was again exhibited in 1968 
and attracted further objections on the issue of floor 
space densities. The scheme was promulgated in August 
1971 without establishing controls on floor space.
(Harrison 1972: 73)
It should be noted that while the Labor City Council did little to 
control the boom in private office development, the State Labor Government 
made no effort to decentralise its own activities from the City to suburban 
or country locations.1 'Both the Commonwealth and N.S.W. Governments have 
major roles as land users owning and renting considerable property, carrying 
out building development and generally carrying out a range of state and 
metropolitan scale administration functions from their CBD offices.'
(Archer 1967(a): 14)
While the financial beneficiaries of city over-development are clear, 
what are the costs involved and who pays them? 'The benefits of continued 
CBD growth flow from having so many tertiary activities close together.
The costs arise largely in the lengthening journey to work for a rising 
proportion of the working population and an uneconomic use of resources in 
catering for high peak-period travel, twice a day, to and from the one spot.'
(Pollard 1967: 12) Besides the mounting proportion of investment which has 
to go to destruction and replacement before it achieves any additional 
transport or floor space, Stretton (1970: 263) has noted the following
Sydney Central Area 'Office User' Statistics, 1972.
Office User Net Square feet % Office workers
State Public Service 6,249,400 27.2 58,485
Commonwealth Public Service 2,730,000 11.9 17,062
Other 13,996,519 60.9 87,478
Total 22,975,919 100 163,025
Source: D. Nelson (NCDC) unpublished estimate, February 1973.
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effects if unlimited growth continues in and around a centre of limited 
area: each central activity expands, imposing its own monotony on a bigger
proportion of the centre; fewer types of activity can afford to pay the 
rising rents - so 'more and more of the artistic, squalid, surprising, way­
ward, intellectual, picturesque, marginal and shoe-string activities which 
are a main part of a good city's attraction and diversity are forced out.
And most important of all from a redistributional point of view, as the 
number of central employments increases there is a corresponding fall in 
the proportion of workers who can live on good land in easy reach of the 
centre, with real family use of the central attractions and services. In 
Sydney this only aggravates existing inequalities, 'sending more poor 
further out west to allow more of their masters to work at Circular Quay'.
Up to 1967 it was a Labor Party City Council who allowed these 
inequalities to be aggravated by remaining narrowly preoccupied with welfare 
provisions for its inner city residents and bowing to the demands of city 
property owners. In this apparently contradictory course of action however, 
the ALP was acting consistently with its state-wide failure over these 
years (discussed earlier) to understand the redistributional significance 
of locational decisions.1 It must also be added that a further reason for 
the ALP failure to control and develop the CBD was that they too subscribed 
to the 'growth' ideology that acclaimed the convulsive changes in the CBD as 
tangible evidence of metropolitan progress.
The Marxist argument concerning the overgrowth of the CBD is that those 
who suffer are the office workers and shop assistants in their de­
humanising, soul destroying jobs. It may be true that the nature of their 
work is alienating (or at least it seems so to left intellectuals) but it 
is not necessarily seen to be so by the workers themselves, who seem (in 
the absence of survey evidence) to enjoy working in air-conditioned sky­
scrapers and shopping in Centrepoint or Australia Square at lunchtime.
So the most trenchant criticism of CBD over-development tends to come 
from professional planners concerned with the inefficiency of the city 
and left intellectuals concerned with the lack of revolutionary 
consciousness of its workers, rather than from those who are supposed to 
be disadvantaged.
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But the ALP has not been the sole 'villain' of the piece. In 1965 
the Liberal Party won the state election and in 1967 ALP control of the 
City Council ended with the dismissal of the Council by the Askin Government 
and the appointment of three City Commissioners to re-draw the Council's 
boundaries. The new City Council so created controlled one of the smallest 
city areas in the world, confined virtually to the commercial centre,1 and 
enabled the right-wing Civic Reform Association (CRA) to gain control of 
the Council in the 1969 elections. Meanwhile the 'business-minded City 
Commissioners allowed $300 million worth of inner city development appli­
cations on a 10:1 floor space index where the planners were urging a 6:1 
index' in the 22 months of their rule. (O'Hara 1972)
In 1970 the Civic Reform Council commissioned a team of private 
planning consultants to prepare a strategic plan for the City which was to 
be completed (strategically) a few months before the Council elections of 
1971. The next part of this discussion focusses of the nature of the 
Civic Reform Association (CRA), its role in city politics and planning and 
the nature of the City of Sydney Strategic Plan produced under its guidance.
CRA is a non-Labor group that exists only in the City of Sydney 
Council electorate and has been since its formation in 1921 traditionally 
backed by the business interests in the City. On its letterhead it 
describes itself - 'Towards a better Sydney - Non-political'. (Meares 
1972: 3-1). The CRA's view of party politics is apparent in this statement 
from its 1966 Annual Report.
The Sydney Electoral Redistribution Act of 1968 reduced the area of the 
city to approximately its pre-1947 size. As a result two Civic Reform 
Association wards were created, two safe ALP wards, and Fitzroy ward, 
which could be doubtful. In effect approximately 55 per cent was lopped 
off the City's area and about 50,000 of its former voters.
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The task of the political parties is to provide 
a good government or vigorous opposition in State or 
Federal spheres and to leave City Government to those 
whose sole interest is to raise the importance of 
Sydney ...
The CRA is made up of 'corporate members' (companies with interests in the 
City) and 'personal members' (individual ratepayers and residents). Their 
greatest source of finance comes from companies/ many of whom do not exist 
on CRA's register as 'corporate members' because they do not wish to be 
identified as supporting CRA or being involved in City politics. (Meares 
1972: 3.3)
An executive Council of up to fifty members is elected annually to
administer the running of the CRA. Most of these members are involved in
the fields of finance, insurance, manufacturing, retailing and commerce in
the City. Of the forty two members of the 1972 Council at least thirty were
directors of several companies.'*’ There are also several prominent members
of the State Liberal Party on the CRA executive. Of the twelve CRA aldermen
on the present Council only three were directors in large companies, but
2the proportion of professional people is high. Eleven of the twelve live 
at North Shore and other upper class addresses outside the electorate, 
compared with one ALP non-resident alderman of the eight ALP members of the 
Council. (Loveday 1972: 142)
The City of Sydney Strategic Plan was released in July 1971 and 
adopted by ordinary resolution of Council in August 1971. The 'teeth' of 
the Plan - the Development Control and Floor Space Ratio Code and the 
Parking Policy and Control Code for New Development3 were adopted in December
17 executive members between them held 43 directorships in banking, 
finance and insurance. 8 members held 9 directorships in building and 
development industries. 9 members held 19 directorships in minerals, oil 
and other resources, and 12 members held 18 directorships between them 
in retail, transport and other services. (Meares 1972: 3.4)
Ten of the twelve are self-employed. The two employees are in white 
collar jobs. (Meares 1972: 3.7)
341
1971. The Development Control and Floor Space Ratio Code sets out the basic 
floor space ratios for each precinct and the bonuses of floor space area to 
be given to a developer who provides certain public amenities. The amount 
by which a developer can exceed the basic permissible FSR 'is scaled to give 
the developer a financial advantage greater than the cost of the facility 
he provides, thus creating a powerful incentive'. (Strategic Plan 1971: 93) 
The Parking Policy and Control Code for New Development gives policy pro­
posals to govern the amount, distribution and regulation of commuter and 
visitor parking to serve the CBD. The Code gives the Council a guide as to 
how many car spaces should be provided in relation to the gross floor area 
of a new building and how many of these spaces should be located within that 
building.^
Like the 1968 Sydney Region Outline Plan, the Strategic Plan for the 
City talks about 'goals' and 'objectives', 'implementation strategies' and 
'action plans' rather than formulating prescriptive statutory planning 
controls. The aim of the Strategic Plan is 'to improve the quality of life 
for the people who use the City'. (Strategic Plan 1971: 5). Four objectives 
are recommended to fulfil this aim:
Management: Foster economic growth by managing, guiding
and directing the conservation and redevelop­
ment of the City as a whole.
Accessibility: Improve access to, and ease of movement within 
the City.
Diversity: Conserve and increase the diversity of community
activities and services throughout the City.
Environment: Conserve, enhance and improve the physical
environment of the City.
When the number of car spaces required exceeds the number a developer 
is allowed to provide within his building, he must pay a contribution 
of $2,400 per car space towards the building of Council car parks on 
the City's perimeter.
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Within each of these objectives there are four policies, directed towards 
achieving the relevant objective. Within the sixteen policies there are 
eighty three Priorities of Action - some calling for the preparation of more 
detailed plans, others calling for Aldermen and Council officers to bring 
pressure to bear on areas outside Council's direct control."'"
Can the Plan's objectives be fulfilled? Are they internally consis­
tent? Who are the real beneficiaries of the Plan, as distinct from its 
rhetorical beneficiaries? What is the Plan's relationship to and impact 
on metropolitan planning objectives as expressed in the 1968 SPA Plan?
For George Clarke, head of Urban Systems Corporation (one of the
three consulting firms who prepared the Plan) successful planning needs some
2combination of knowledge, power and consensus. Given the short time to
prepare the Plan 'knowledge' had to be limited to existing data on the City.
Given the circumscribed power of the Council it was hoped to encourage other
bodies to support the Plan. The heavy public relations emphasis of the Plan
indicates therefore that consensus was seen as essential, for public,
professional and media acceptance and much emphasis in the rhetoric was
placed on public participation. In practice this meant that the consultants
3approached by letter several hundred organisations and 'participation' was 
derived from general comments by the organisations that the planners had 
invited to participate. The consultants' summary of 'the needs and demands
e.g. 'Prepare and submit representations to the State Government regarding 
redefinition of the responsibilities and structure of the SPA so that the 
City Council may plan and control City development effectively.'
(,Strategic Plan 1971: 4)
Discussion with George Clarke 21 September 1973.
Community groups, professional bodies, government departments, schools, 
welfare organisations, finance companies, banks, churches, hospitals, 
builders and developers.
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of the community1 was so general that they were impossible to reject - e.g. 
'improve access to and movement within the city'. (Strategic Plan 1971: 13)
In effect the participation programme was a means by which the planners 
tried to ensure that many interest groups could feel that they had been 
involved in the determination of objectives for the City. From the planners' 
point of view they could point to the participation programme in an effort 
to legitimise their Plan.
There were three main sources of criticism of the Plan - the ALP,
the local residents1 action groups, and professional architects and 
1planners. All made similar basic criticisms attacking the assumptions of 
the Plan. The ALP expressed concern in Council that the Plan 'merely 
channelled the obvious current over-development into the Central Spine with­
out offering any firm policies to control and redirect that over-development
to decentralise to outer city areas and secondly that it did not go far
2enough in ensuring adequate future residential development'.
Professional criticism has centred on the economic and transport 
implications of the Plan's work-force prediction of between 360,000 and 
400,000 in the CBD by the year 2000. (The 1972 workforce was 240,000.) The 
Plan expected and accepted that 70,000 peak hour train travellers would be 
drawn from the outermost urban areas, Penrith,Campbelltown and Gosford-Wyong, 
generally35-50 miles away. Seidler and Gruzman have criticised the advantage 
to developers from the system of bonus floor space and have suggested that 
developers were influential in formulating the provisions of the Plan.
 ^ See articles by Bryce Mortlock (architect), S.M.H. 2 December 1971;
Harry Seidler (architect)!?^ Australian 27 July 1971 letters; Neville 
Gruzman S.M.H. 22 June 1972 'Strategy for a Heart Attack' ; John 
Paterson (consultant planner) Financial Review 22 March 1972 'Can We 
Afford It - and Do We Want it?'
2 Alderman G. Draper (ALP), statement to Council 22 May 1972. Quoted in 
Meares (1972: 5.15).
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Mortlock further criticised the system of bonuses in return for 'amenities'. 
He argued that what was needed was to plan for a comprehensive, publicly- 
controlled pedestrian network, not to wait and see what developers were 
willing to provide. Paterson has argued that the success of the bonus 
system depends on demand for premium office space. He anticipated that only 
owners receiving high rents will be able or willing to subsidise non-office 
uses in the shape of public amenities.
Overall, the strategic plan seems likely to reinforce all those
inequalities mentioned earlier that result from over-concentration in the
centre of a large metropolis. Workers must live further out and travel
longer distances; the public sector is called on to finance the additional
strain on roads and public transport; and the diversity of the City itself
is reduced by increasing rents (contrary to the rhetoric of the Plan). It
must be doubted whether 'the series of strategies and actions' can achieve
the Plan's stated objectives of encouraging diversity and a better City
environment. It may be that the way to retain the City's residential
pppulation, to encourage diverse land uses such as retailing, entertainment
and tourist facilities, to provide more public amenities and pedestrian and
open space and to ease traffic congestion is to reduce the floor space ratio,
to encourage lower densities and to disperse the workforce to metropolitan 
1centres.
But the Strategic Plan favours Bigness. This is indicated by its 
restrictions on the development potential for small sites, its encouragement 
of site amalgamation and its implicit encouragement of the provision of
Despite its reformist rhetoric the CRA City Council did not wish to 
restrain the growth of the CBD. This is evident in the figures for the 
number of buildings completed, under construction, or given approval since 
1971. $51 million was spent on new buildings completed in 1971, $26
million in 1972. In July 1973 there were 49 multi-storey buildings under 
construction (average height 25-30 storeys), a further 96 were proposed, 
and 80 of them had approval. (Sydney City Council, City Planning and 
Building Department. July 1973)
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premium office space. The Plan shares with the large business interests of 
the City its First Objective: 'Foster economic growth by managing, guiding
and directing the conservation and redevelopment of the City as a whole.'
It maintains the status of the biggest businesses and investors in 
the City. To a much greater extent than the developers the established 
business interests in the City are concerned with the long-run prosperity 
and economic viability of the City and therefore with improvements to its 
commercial efficiency and amenity.
The current City Council's predominant concern with the potential 
greatness of Sydney (synonymous with bigness, growth, high density) was 
evident in its approval in principle in 1972 of the Woolloomooloo 
Redevelopment Project. Since 1964 Woolloomooloo had been designated by the 
State (Labor) Government as an area for comprehensive redevelopment. The 
incoming Liberal Local Government Minister (P.H. Morton) was keen for action 
on the matter and established a Steering Committee in 1968 which decided to 
pay the SPA $30,000 as a consultant to the City Council Commissioners to 
prepare a redevelopment proposal. The resulting plan was displayed and open 
for comments in 1969 but never went through the process of becoming a 
statutory plan.
The newly elected CRA Council accepted this plan outline and several 
developers began to acquire the land and amalgamate sites. The SPA's plan 
offered considerable floor space bonuses for site amalgamations. The 
coincidence of the market features of cheap land, availability of finance 
and demand by developers resulted within two years in site amalgamations 
(and hence potential densities) much greater than the SPA had ever envisaged.
 ^ This point has been made by J. Toon in a paper delivered to the Institute 
of Real Estate Developers on 22 September 1972, 'The City of Sydney 
Strategic Plan'.
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In May 1972 the City Council was presented with a proposal for the
largest private redevelopment project in Australia, worth $400 million.
The Woolloomooloo Redevelopment Project3 a ninety page document prepared
for the owners and developers of the eleven acre site^ by a firm of private 
, 2planners, proposed the construction of approximately eighteen high-rise
3buildings of an average height of twenty storeys. This would draw an 
estimated workforce of 80,000 to the eleven acre area, 68,000 of them office 
workers. It was estimated that 63,000 of this workforce would come by train, 
62 per cent of them during peak hour. The major land uses of the Project 
were office space 56 per cent, retail 23 per cent, luxury hotel motels 17 
per cent, as compared with a mere 0.9 per cent of the gross square footage 
allotted to theatre, cinemas and sports centres. On May 19, 1972 the City 
Council granted its approval in principle to this project. (S.M.H. 20 May 
1972)
There are several grounds for criticism of this decision. Firstly 
it ignored the recommendations of the Strategie Rian that Woolloomooloo 
remain an area of low-rise residential redevelopment. In allowing compre­
hensive high-rise office and hotel redevelopment it was discriminating 
against the low-income residents of the area in favour of developers1 
profits and transient demands of wealthy tourists. The density of redevelop­
ment would cause considerable strain on transport facilities and again the 
public sector would be required to meet the costs (externalities) imposed by 
private sector development. Finally the office redevelopment ignored the 
Strategic Plan's recommendation that high density office development be 
confined to the City's North-South central spine, served by the underground 
rail loop.
Gateway Developments Pty Ltd, Davlon Pty Ltd, Regional Investments Pty 
Ltd, Jesselton Pty Ltd.
2 4D Planning & Design Pty Ltd, Town Planners and Architects.
Calculated from details of building in the six sectors of the Woolloomooloo 
Redevelopment Project 1971.
3
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Faced with a choice between the interests of the existing low-income 
residents of the 'Loo, the financial interests of a few large property 
owners and developers and the metropolitan-wide implications of the project 
on the redistribution of 'real income', it was the interests of the developers 
which carried the day on the property-oriented CRA Council. As this next 
section shows, the practice of councils favouring the interests of developers 
and property owners is not uncommon. In fact it persistently undermines 
the best intentions of the best-laid planning schemes.
Local government3 inequality and the role of planning.
The reluctant attitude adopted by local government during the passage 
of the 1945 Local Government (Town & Country Planning) Amendment Act has 
carried over in the half-hearted response of local councils towards their 
responsibilities under Part XIIA of the Act. Although under the terms of 
the Local Government (Areas) Act of 1948 all councils in the County of 
Cumberland were required to prepare planning schemes, by 1963, when the CCC 
was dissolved, only three local planning schemes had been prescribed out of 
a possible total of forty two. (Powell 1968: 4.27) Most councils preferred 
to remain in the interim-development phase because it allowed development 
to be controlled with wide discretion.
Because this kind of attitude was so prevalent amongst local councils 
the reaction of the Department of Local Government has been to place increas­
ing restrictions on the freedom of local councils to exercise their planning 
powers under part XIIA of the Local Government Act. In November 1955 the 
Minister announced a series of proposed amendments to the County Scheme 
Ordinance by which the power of development consent on land fronting a 
county road would be vested in the County Council. Certain other major 
classes of development, regardless of location, were also to be referable
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to the County Council - hotels, factories greater than 20,000 square feet, 
shops greater than 15,000 square feet, transport terminals, theatres, etc. 
The effect would have been the loss by local councils of planning controls 
over all major development in their area. Only the first amendment 
(regarding development consent on land fronting county roads) was carried 
(although not until 1962), but it was a measure of the Department's general 
dissatisfaction with the manner in which local councils allowed development 
to take place to the detriment of traffic and other considerations of 
metropolitan significance.
The record of local council administration of statutory planning
powers has not been impressive. 'Local councils exercise development control
with scant regard for the metropolitan implications of their decisions',
Harrison (1972: 98) concludes:
Development, unless judged beyond all possible 
doubt to be detrimental to the locality (and not 
always then) is usually regarded with favour by 
aldermen ... The discretion available under 
statutory planning carries with it the possibility 
of patronage, to be granted, delayed or withheld 
for a variety of good or bad reasons. With a few 
notable exceptions, the local councils are ill- 
equipped to exercise these powers.
Painter's (1973: 224-282) detailed case studies of planning and 
development control in six local government areas of Sydney reinforce this 
assessment. As was the case in Melbourne (chapter 7) the receptiveness of 
local councillors to pressures both from developers and from local resident 
groups concerned with 'amenity' has persistently undemined the intentions 
of metropolitan planning. Painter's work shows that the nature of local 
planning is closely allied with the class character of an area and its stage 
of economic growth. Thus in Kuring-gai, a well-established upper class north 
shore area, the council had been predominantly receptive to the 'amenity'
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demands of local residents , even to the extent of rejecting development 
applications by prestigious developers like David Jones, (Painter 1973: 251- 
56) and protecting streets from use by heavy trucks.
Other councils, particularly in those developing outer suburban areas 
like Liverpool, could not afford to be so cavalier towards developers and 
commercial interests. Successive (ALP) Liverpool Councils have supported 
most pressures to convert non-urban land to urban uses, believing these 
moves to fulfil the major goals of 'city development', expansion and progress. 
The Council's initial draft scheme of 1966 coloured vast areas of the map 
pink and purple, for residential and industrial uses. (Painter 1973: 241)
In councils where the class character of an area is less homogeneous 
than in, say, Kuring-gai or Liverpool, conflicts have arisen between the 
social and economic needs and demands of different classes. In Leichhardt 
for example, once a predominantly working class municipality, the recent 
influx of the middle class into areas like Balmain and Glebe has led to 
clashes of interest between middle class values associated with residential 
amenity and the interests of industrial land users and of the working class, 
who are more prepared to tolerate the location of industry in the area in 
order to live close to their work.
Since the 1920s the Kuring-gai Council exercised control over most new 
development through Residential District Proclamations, which were a 
simple but effective form of zoning that permitted only single dwelling 
residential development and restricted commercial development to the 
Pacific Highway - a good example of the use of planning powers to re­
inforce class advantages.
'In an area where initiative and enterprise were praised in economic life, 
and where unfettered growth and expansion were major community goals, the 
council often saw no reason why abstract principles of town planning or 
building regulations should be allowed to inhibit such enterprise. The 
Labor Party added a gloss of social welfare motives to distributive 
decision making, but Labor aldermen were as pliant in the face of pressures 
for distributive decisions from developers as from 'battlers' '. (Painter 
1973: 362)
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Some of the more spectacular cases of abuse of discretionary planning 
powers in Liverpool (Painter 1973: 45, Vandermark & Harrison 1972: 125-28) 
and Bankstown (Painter 1973: 235-36; Vandermark & Harrison 1972: 104-108) 
illustrate the influence that developers can exert on the planning process. 
They are not isolated instances. Cases of revealed corruption occurred in 
North Sydney in 1969 and in Liverpool in 1953 and 1963. Bankstown Council 
was dismissed in 1963 following bribery charges laid against several aldermen 
and the dismissal of the Leichhardt Council in 1953 revealed several 
varieties of malpractice and corruption, among them the soliciting of bribes 
for the approval of building and development applications. Most recently, 
in May 1973, the Randwick Council was dismissed following allegations that 
the Mayor and some aldermen were contravening the local planning scheme by 
consenting to flat development on land owned by themselves and members of 
their families. Members of both political parties have been guilty of mis­
use of discretionary planning powers, with perhaps the most frequent 
offenders being ALP members.
The frequency with which abuse of planning intentions by local 
councils is revealed suggests that local government is not the most approp­
riate agency to deal with planning matters. The question of what development 
matters should be left to local councils has never been satisfactorily 
resolved, partly because it is not easy to decide which decisions have purely 
local impact as distinct from those which may have metropolitan significance. 
Local planning schemes are scrutinised and often amended by the SPA on behalf 
of the Minister, but the Minister himself is vulnerable to political pressures 
and the degree of political support that he gives to planning objectives can 
be subject to party-political ideology or to personal conviction. The 
initial political support given to planning by McKell and Cahill for example, 
was not perpetuated by the Labor Minister for Local Government from 1959 
onwards, Mr Hills, and the Liberal Minister responsible for planning
administration from 1965-72 has been described as 'a free enterpriser from 
way back*. (O'Hara 1972)
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Gross inequalities between the resources, human and financial, of 
different local councils reinforces the argument that, given the present 
structure of local government, it is not an appropriate agency to administer 
planning controls. Sydney's topography, and the disposal of land in a free
I
market economy, has resulted in a residential segregation more conspicuous 
than in any other Australian city, thus reinforcing existing inequalities 
between different socio-economic classes. Manning (1972: 16-35) has 
measured and described the extent to which the population of Sydney lives 
in different suburbs according to the attributes of income and wealth, and 
age and ethnicity. Stretton (1970: 259) has put the matter more graphically 
by noting that (according to 1964 figures) Kurging-gai's citizens occupied 
$4,800 worth of real estate per head compared with Liverpool's about $2000 - 
for a family of five, $24,000 and $10,000 respectively. 'On the rateable 
part of this - the "unimproved" land only - Kuring-gai needed a rate of 
1.18 per cent to raise $37 per head. As a fine example of regressive 
taxation Liverpool had to nearly double that rate, to 2.19, to raise $29 per 
head.' In other words, the poor pay more than the rich, in terms of pro-: 
portion of income, and get less in return.^
Clearly, in this present situation of inequality of resources, to 
increase local council's powers, especially in an area of social policy 
like urban planning, without first redistributing the resources available 
to each local government area, would simply aggravate existing inequalities. 
(Manning 1973)
What then of those 'democratic' arguments in favour of increased 
local government planning powers on the grounds that people should be given 
the maximum opportunities to participate in decisions which vitally affect
1 Manning (1972: 151) concludes that 'the lower the prosperity of an LGA's 
people, the higher the rate, and the lower revenue a head'.
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the quality of their daily lives, that power should remain at all times 
with or as near as possible to the people, and that local government is the 
best safeguard against excessive centralisation and bureaucratisation of 
government?
It may be that individuals value their power to influence decision­
making at the local government level. But this power is not always 
exercised in the best interests of metropolitan planning concerns. Painter's 
(1973) study shows that most of the pressures applied to local government by 
individuals or groups, whether developers or residents groups, are based on 
local self-interest, be it of the profit-motive or environmental variety, 
and have shown scant consideration either for neighbouring areas, other 
social classes or metropolitan-wide welfare. Property owners act to defend 
or enhance the value of their properties. Residents want a particular stan­
dard of amenity in their areas in the form of good roads, other sorts of 
councils services, or the sort of land use they want to see next door. This 
applies to occupants of industrial, commercial and residential property 
alike. Expressions of political involvement by owners or tenants tend to 
occur not when the council makes policy decisions such as how much to 
allocate to kerb and gutter construction, but when a decision is made as to 
whether kerb and gutter is to be provided to their particular street; not 
when council formulates a zoning scheme for a municipality, but when a 
developer lodges an application to build a multi-storey block of flats on 
the next-door property. No one wants freeways, or rubbish dumps, or 
factories, or high-rise ghettos or flats located near them. But everyone 
drives cars, dumps rubbish, and needs a place to work and live.
Thus while the purely local impact of the recent residents' action 
groups concern with protecting the amenity of their areas may be beneficial, 
the metropolitan and national implications have scarcely been thought about. 
The impasse in metropolitan growth and change which is the logical culmination
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of the current reluctance of most local areas to see industry, high density 
housing, airports and so on located in their vicinity may well be desirable. 
This would be true if it had the effect of persuading the government to 
pursue an energetic decentralisation policy. But in the absence of decisive 
government policies on such things as transport, the role of the private 
car in the context of accelerating resource shortages, and decentralisation 
(and these strong policies have to date been lacking) the overall effect 
of the current spate of environmental protectionism may be to penalise still 
further those people at the bottom of the socio-economic scale. In other 
words there is a potential conflict between environmental concerns and 
redistributive or equity objectives. In Sydney for example, the 'drawbridge' 
actions by the middle class in the inner, eastern and north shore suburbs 
in protecting their areas from further growth or intrusion by undesirable 
land uses enhances the advantages of those who already have considerable 
resources at their disposal. The likely effect of their drawbridge tactics 
will be to send industries, low cost government housing and so on to those 
outer suburbs (like Blacktown and beyond) which welcome growth yet have less 
amenity and accessibility advantages to offer their poorer inhabitants.
In short, the reluctance of most individuals to give up their cars, 
single-family dwellings (and attendant property rights and values) or to go 
and live in the country, combined with the ability of the rich to pay on the 
open market for the choicest residential areas and then to protect their 
choices politically from what they regard to be undesirable environmental 
intrusion, in the long-run, and in the absence of decisive government action 
to reverse the trend, will continue to exacerbate existing inequalities 
between rich and poor in Sydney.
Given the limited scope of present local council functions and powers 
it is often the case that the issues affecting broad categories of people 
are resolved elsewhere than at the local level. Thus real estate interests
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and business groups seek to influence the administration of local planning 
schemes to further their interests by approaching members, Ministers and 
the SPA. Major decisions about development at the urban fringe, sitings 
of new industries, the location of expressways, the installation of sewerage 
and water services are made by State Government or by semi-government 
authorities. Although some of these decisions vitally affect the quality of 
people's lives and their futures, they are not as amenable to direct politi­
cal pressure as are those issues which are resolved at the local level. The 
realisation by many individuals that they are powerless in such important 
issues as freeway location and desirability and inner city redevelopment has 
led in recent years to new forms of political action, the most effective of 
which have been the 'green bans' placed on particular projects, areas or 
buildings by the Builders Labourers Federation. (BLF) These are discussed 
in the next and final section.
The New Politics
Resident and union stands for the environment and 
against mindless destruction for profit ... demonstrate 
a refusal any longer to concede that the rich and 
powerful and entrenched interests have any unchallenge­
able right to make all the decisions - decisions which 
affect the lives of people on the job and in their 
homes and communities. It is a recognition that, if 
qualities are to be preserved, then responsibility 
cannot be left to those whose obsession is with profits, 
amassed by exploitation regardless of the irreparable 
destruction and the long-term costs to the community.
(Thomas 1973: 131-32)
The face of local political action in Australia, and especially in 
N.S.W., has been undergoing considerable changes in the past five years or 
so. The recent (since 1971) alliance between some middle class environ­
mental groups and the radical BLF marks perhaps, a third stage in the 
evolution of the 'new politics'.^
The term was first used in 1969 by John Power in an article in Quadrant3 
13, 'The New Politics in the Old Suburbs'.
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The first stage was the emergence in the old inner suburbs of local 
'Associations', the best known of which is the Paddington Society.
Paddington was the first area to attract 'the new middle class'1, with a 
cosmopolitan and essentially aesthetic concern for the quality of its 
residential environment. The Paddington Society has tried to have its area 
zoned as an historic precinct freed from the uncontrollable inroads of 
demolishers and the possibly (in their view) unholier pastel paints of the 
Southern European migrants. Their behaviour has been demonstrably that of 
a special interest group concerned to preserve the special environment of 
the area and to protect their property values. Membership and participation 
in the running of the Society included few of the older residents and 
migrants (Jakubowicz 1972: 344).
The local Associations were originally set up as local amenity groups 
and prided themselves on not being 'political'. This tended to hobble them 
when they were caught in local political situations and the Paddington, 
Balmain and Glebe Societies have all resorted to political action when their 
special interests were directly threatened. The Jersey Road affair, when 
the Department of Main Roads attempted to demolish a row of terrace houses 
for a distributor road, was a good example of this. The Paddington Society 
linked professional expertise and access to decision makers with the 
organisational ability to bring out a large number of people over a single 
issue. Presumably it was their status that forced the State Government to
1 Defined by Jakubowicz (1973: 61) as '... looking for an alternative to - 
the 'suburban' life. They are mainly self-employed, are employees in 
corporations, the public service, the media, universities or in the 
professions. They tend to be well-educated, literate, articulate, and 
have middle class skills that make the mystifying process of government, 
if not comprehensible, then at least accessible. Freed from the day to 
day insecurity of the manual worker, and from the entrepreneurial 
responsibility of the traditional bourgeois, middle class, they have the 
option of dealing with the wider questions that they feel affect them'.
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set up a special enquiry, which duly advised against the proposal. It was 
then quietly shelved. Similarly in Glehe the academics and other profes­
sionals in the Glebe Society have been successful in having the proposed 
western freeway driven into an underground tunnel beneath the high status 
Toxteth Estate. (At the other end of Glebe the route of the distributor 
was shifted to avoid proposed extensions to a restaurant on the greyhound 
racecourse, at the expense of a further forty low-income homes)
These exclusively middle class Societies were precursors to the 
more politically-oriented 'residents action groups' which made their 
presence felt in the local council elections of 1971. Typified according 
to Dempsey (1971) by their concern with pollution and amenity these groups 
have emerged in suburbs of varied class character, from upper north shore 
to inner city working class, on a variety of environmental issues. Perhaps 
the most common issues have been opposition to flat development (e.g. North 
Sydney) and expressways, and to high-rise inner city redevelopment projects 
(e.g. the Rocks, Woolloomooloo, Darlinghurst).
Until 1971 the major political resource available to resident groups 
such as these was their access to professional skills, particularly in 
communication, and their ability to run successfully for local council 
positions. Cloward and Piven (1965) argue that a fundamental conflict 
between 'elite' and 'low-income' protests arises because they are based on 
'quite divergent beliefs about the nature of social, economic and political 
institutions and what it takes to change them'. The elitist approach assumes 
that institutions and policies change by persuasion and education and that 
issues are capable of analysis in terms analogous to a cost-benefit evalua­
tion. Low-income protest movements, by contrast, view institutions as 
responsive to naked power and pressure; issues are defined in personalised 
terms; opponents are seen as culprits. This distinction is certainly rele­
vant to the different residents' action groups which have emerged in Sydney 
over the last few years. Middle and upper class groups on the north shore
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or in the more prestigious inner suburbs like Paddington, Balmain and 
Glebe have been prepared to work through existing political channels. Those 
groups deriving from the working class communities in the Rocks,
Woolloomooloo and Darlinghurst have modelled their actions on Alinsky's work, 
attempting to sustain committment by polarising a community around an issue 
and then ruthlessly attacking the 'villain' who created the problem. In 
the case of the Rocks the 'villain' is Colonel Magee, Director of the Sydney 
Cove Redevelopment Authority; in the 'Loo it is a consortium of big 
developers and financiers who bought eleven acres and prepared the 
Woolloomooloo Redevelopment Project (mentioned earlier), personalised by 
the man behind it all, Sidney Londish: in Victoria Street (Kings Cross) the
arch-villain is the developer Thiemen. A combination of working-class 
distrust of the usual political processes (especially as embodied in the 
right-wing Sydney City Council since 1969) and the influence of the 
libertarian/anarchist movement through some individuals in the inner city 
groups has led these groups to more unconventional forms of protest, like 
'squatting'.^
But the realisation by many middle and upper class 'greenies'
(Whitton 1973) that some environmental matters of great concern to them 
(like the preservation of old buildings and parklands from developers and 
freeway builders) were not susceptible to political influence at the local 
level has led over the past two years to an unusual alliance, which consti­
tutes a third stage in 'the new politics'. This is the working-middle class 
'Popular Front' between 'Establishment greenies' and the radical Builders 
Labourers Federation, led by communist Jack Mundey.
1 The Digger 28 July-11 August 1973 has an article on the Victoria Street 
protest, 'Sydney Street Demolishers Stymied by Squatters'.
358
This unusual and somewhat unholy alliance between one group with a 
comprehensive socialist critique (that opposes everything that the north 
shore life stands for ) and those members of the middle class who have 
passed beyond the fight for economic survival and are concerned with the 
quality of their living environment emerged in June 1971 when some residents 
of upper class Hunters Hill, as a last resort, sought union aid to protect 
Kellys Bush from the home-unit plans of A.V. Jennings. (Thomas 1973: 42)
It has since been cemented by BLF 'green bans' on a multitude of development 
projects from the Parkes Developments home-units proposals for Eastlakes to 
the AMP Society's $4 million car park plans beneath the Botanic Gardens, the 
Askin Government's plans to build an Olympic Games sports complex in the 
Moore Park - Centennial Park area, the Sydney Cove Redevelopment Authority's 
$500 million redevelopment proposals to dismember Sydney's historic Rocks 
area and Londish's $400 million redevelopment plans for Woolloomooloo.
An article by Marion MacDonald in the Bullet-in in May 1973 said that 
Sydney development projects worth $2500 million had been halted by 'green 
bans' and 'cultural bans'. Two months later an article in the Brisbane 
Courtev-Mail said that the BLF in N.S.W. 'has invoked an incredible 36 bans 
against using labor on projects worth a massive $3000 million because the 
projects would mean the tearing down of historic buildings or could violate 
parklands within metropolitan Sydney'. (Thomas 1973: 54)
This paradoxical alliance of groups of basically conflicting political
philosophy in a common environmental cause bears a certain resemblance to
2the 'Radical Chic' of New York society a few years ago - the brief espousal
The maintenance and consolidation of affluence and the concomitant life­
style of consumerism while poverty and deprivation still exists in 
Australia and more especially in the Third World.
Title of a book by Tom Wolfe (1970) which satirises this brief flirtation.
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by the social and economic elite of east side Manhattan of the Black Panther 
movement (a movement aimed at the revolutionary overthrow of American 
capitalism). That flirtation was abandoned as soon as the real threat to 
the Establishment was perceived. Is the fate of the BLF environmental 
activism destined for similar 'betrayal'?
The BLF is in fact vulnerable on several fronts. The October- 
November 1973 confrontation between it and the Sydney Cove Redevelopment 
Authority illustrates some of these. Mundey himself has admitted1 that the 
leadership of the BLF is ideologically far in advance of the rank and file 
and that probably only 30 per cent of the union fully understand and support 
his philosophy. Given this, rank and file support of the green bans may 
well be undermined if the eventual outcome of the green ban actions is to 
put large numbers of builders labourers out of work. It is also true that 
the leadership of the BLF is far in advance of the political awareness of 
the working class generally. It has already been the case that some working 
class residents of Woolloomooloo and the Rocks have been quite content to 
sell out to developers, or, in the case of tenants, to move out to more 
modern dwellings offered them.
2The BLF stand is subject to erosion not only from within but by the 
joint action of the Master Builders Association and the State Government.
In discussion with the author, September 24 and 25, 1973.
A further internal difficulty has been the conflict between the N.S.W. 
Leader, Mundey, a member of the central committee of the non-aligned 
Communist Party of Australia, and the Federal Secretary, Victorian Norm 
Gallagher, a member of the Peking-oriented CPA. At the height of the 
Rocks confrontation Gallagher announced that the N.S.W. BLF would get 
no support from the Federal body for its green bans. This conflict 
was resolved in Mundey's favour at a meeting of the Federal executive.
(Financial Review 25 October, 1973)
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In October 1973 the SCRA tried to use scab labour to break the Rocks green 
ban and the Department of Main Roads tried to break the bans in Glebe and 
Rozelle. The resulting strike by the BLF and clashes with police in The 
Rocks led the Master Builders Association to lodge an (unsuccessful) 
application to have the BLF deregistered. And the 'violent' confrontation 
between police and unionists brought disapproving noises from the ladies of 
Hunters Hill and the 'Establishment greenies' in general. (Whitton 1973) 
Subsequently the Master Builders Association have imposed a lock-out on all 
projects worked by BLF members in Sydney in protest against the green bans 
and the BLF has retaliated with threats of an indefinite nationwide strike 
(.Australian 10 November 1973) . Obviously the continuing existence of the 
green ban policy is fraught with difficulties, enhanced by the close links 
between the State Liberal Government and the interests of the Master 
Builders Association and big developers.
The 'Popular Front' has definitely been effective in delaying major
development and redevelopment proposals and bringing the issues involved,
issues basic to the welfare of the metropolis, to the attention of state and
federal governments and the general public. If the green ban policy succeeds
eventually in changing State Government priorities in development matters
which have metropolitan-wide consequences then the BLF will be judged
favourably by future historians and future residents of Sydney. If, on the
2other hand, (as seems more likely) the Liberal government continues to be
The SCRA was set up by the Liberal State Government in 1968 to implement 
the plans for the redevelopment of the Rocks. It consists of six 
members: Chairman, Sir W. Pettingell (General Manager of Australian
Gaslight Company); Deputy Chairman and Director, Colonel D. Magee; 
members - W.R. Bunning (architect), W.M. Leonard (Chairman Ampol 
Petroleum) , J.C. Leonard (director, Public Works Dept) , Alderman 
McDermott (ex-Lord Mayor of Sydney) (Cox & Howard 1973: 56).
Given that a Liberal State Government seems assured for at least another 
six years according to psephologist M. Mackerras in the National, Ti-mes 
10-17 November 1973.
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more receptive to the growth/free enterprise ideology then the continued 
'drawbridge' or defensive tactics by environmentalists may have the 
regressive effects on the distribution of wealth (i.e. 'real income') 
explained in the previous section.
That is, in the absence of decisive government action to curb and 
provide alternatives to the continuing expansion of the Sydney region, 
and given the political and economic powers of the rich to protect their 
immediate environments, the only place for 'undesirable' elements of urban 
growth (like polluting industries, low-income housing estates etc) to go 
will be out west where they will further increase the disadvantages already 
suffered there by the poor.
CHAPTER NINE
Planning in a Property-owning Democracy : 
past, present and future
A man with much property has great bargaining strength and a great 
sense of security, independence and freedom; and he enjoys these things 
not only vis-a-vis his property - less fellow citizens but also 
vis-a-vis the public authorities. An unequal distribution of property 
means an unequal distribution of power and status.
Meade 1964: 38
In the case of land use changes, opposition to the notion of 
poblic appropriation of unearned increments came mainly from those with 
vested interests in appropriating the gains for themselves - land dealers 
and some (but not all) developers.
Report of Commission of Inquiry Into Land Tenures
November 1973.
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1.
This thesis began by outlining the redistributive possibilities of 
city planning then proceeded to analyse why, in practice, these possi­
bilities have not been realised.
In exploring the ideas and social values of planning advocates it
was found that there were certain inadequacies in their social theory. The
town planning movement emerged from the social reform movements of the
late nineteenth century and its rhetoric has traditionally supported the
aim of improving social conditions. It has at different times even
emphasised its mission to help the urban poor. It was concerned about
*
social problems (crime, violence, delinquency, overcrowding, ill-health) 
but its solution to these problems was to improve physical conditions, 
to provide better and cheaper housing, parks, playgrounds and open spaces, 
and to eradicate slums. This 'physical determinist' approach failed to 
come to terms with the real causes of the problems - the existence of 
poverty and the nature of the economic system.
Most of the planning advocates up to the late 1940s believed that 
garden suburbs and garden cities were the answer to urban problems. They 
had adopted the physical planning component of Howard's Garden City 
concept but had neglected the radical element of Howard's theory, that 
of municipal ownership of land. The notions of 'community' and social 
integration were central to town planning ideology. So was the assumption 
that both could be achieved by physical arrangements. Both concepts looked 
backwards to the supposed organic solidarity and gemeinschaft of the social 
structure of a rural society while ignoring the inequalities in the 
distribution of land, wealth and power in such a society. This assumption
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that physical arrangements rather than economic and political change 
could bring about social reform has been a persistent weakness in the 
social theory of planning advocates.
Few participating in the early town planning movement perceived that 
in order to achieve their professed social aims, town planning must be 
allied with economic planning and with the political question of the 
allocation of resources. The Department of Post-War Reconstruction 
'planners' did recognise that physical planning was only part of the 
broader problem of national economic and social goals and resource allo­
cation. The most important reform of the 1940s, the Commonwealth-State 
Housing agreement, originated in the Department of Post-War Reconstruction. 
Together with Commonwealth reforms in welfare services, this did more 
for redistribution than anything before or since. Following this achieve­
ment planners gave less emphasis to welfare considerations than they had 
done before the war, because they assumed that the poor were being taken 
care of by the State Housing Commissions.
While the Post-War Reconstruction 'planners' understood that 
physical planning was only part of the broader problem of resource allo­
cation they did not take the next logical step - the creation of an 
authority in which economic, social and physical planning were functionally 
integrated. The need for such an authority was made explicit for the first 
time in Stretton's Ideas for Australian Cities -
Big time metropolitan planning ... must be integrated 
as the land-use and communications branch of central 
economic planning. The 'chief planner' will have to be 
the Premier. The chief 'planning document' will have to 
be his budget. His chief executants will probably include 
massive development corporations, directed by economists 
and dealing in as much as a third of all new urban land.
(Stretton 1970: 267)
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Since that was written a new Federal Government has established a 
Department of Urban and Regional Development, with a redistributive 
philosophy which it is attempting to implement in most of the ways out­
lined by Stretton;capital budgeting for resource allocation, dealings in 
urban land, economists and development corporations.
All this is a far remove from the planning advocates of the past 
seventy years who have been, above all, a-political. They were disturbed 
by what was happening to the cities aesthetically, and by the living 
conditions of the urban working class whose shum life threatened both the 
physical health and political stability of the city. So their motives 
were both humane and expedient. Property was also a major consideration. 
The need to keep it inviolate imposed limitations on the reforms that might 
be attempted. Perhaps because of their middle class backgrounds (Spearritt 
1974) and their respect for property, these reformers sought to ameliorate 
harsh conditions and to avoid divisive social conflict. Town planning was 
presented as an issue that transcended class and party divisions and 
benefitted all sections of the community from workers to middle class 
residents and landowners (by safeguarding property values and protecting 
the character of particular neighbourhoods) and capitalists (by cultivating 
an efficient work force).
Between 1900 and 1950 planning -ideas were influenced by the economic 
and social circumstances of the time - hence the emphasis on slum reform 
in the depressed thirties compared with the concern in the booming twenties 
with catering for business efficiency in a rapidly expanding city.
But action on planning issues was dependent on the state of politics, 
and suffered accordingly. For, as a contemporary planner has explained -
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A development plan must be acceptable and workable; and 
to that end judgment must be based on what can or cannot 
be done in the prevailing economic, social and political 
situation. (Hart 1972)
Planners themselves, while not often espousing radical social values, 
have attempted to regulate through zoning and subdivision control the worst 
abuses of a free market and its consequences for urban growth. Their 
modest successes have been due not so much to the inadequacies of their 
ideas as to the lack of political support which planning has received.
The reasons for this failure of political support stem from the 
nature of politics in a property-owning democracy. The structure of 
political power has been and is such as to protect property owners and 
to pamper rural interests. This business, rural and conservative bias 
has dominated the very political instituions through which efforts have 
been made to implement planning: Lower Houses in S.A. and Victoria
dominated by coalitions of country and city rich; Upper Houses in each 
state at the mercy of big property owners and rural conservatives; City 
Councils whose members have vested interests in protecting existing property 
and privileges or in real estate and land speculation; local councils 
whose main aim has been to attract as much development as possible, 
preferably private rather than public because of rateable values; a 
Liberal Party1 dependent on the business and financial community and 
governing in its interest. Through these political institutions the
The Liberal Party has been, in Miliband's sense, the ruling party -
There is usually one party in each country which is the conser­
vative party, which commands the greatest degree of support among 
members of the dominant classes, and which is pre-eminently 'their' 
party. In most of these countries, moreover, this is usually one of 
the largest and best implanted of all parties, the 'party of govern 
ment' par ex ceZZence3 with other political formations, particularly 
of the Left, only occasionally achieving office and remaining, what 
Professor La Palombara aptly calls 'guests in power.' (Miliband 1969: 
166)
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'class of owners' has acted to protect encroachments on and threats to 
its property rights. Hence most efforts to introduce even the mildest 
forms of planning legislation have been met, especially in the States 
Upper Houses, with a 'compulsive shudder of the property instinct.'
In NSW Greater Sydney Bills proposing metropolitan government and 
incorporating town planning functions were defeated in the Legislative 
Council in 1915 and 1931. Town Planning Bills were rejected in 1919 and 
1922 and the 1945 Town and Country Planning Bill was amended in the Upper 
House to place planning control in the hands of local government. The 
appearance in 1952,following the exhibition of the City of Sydney planning 
scheme,of the Pitt Street Property Owners Protection League to oppose any 
reduction in plot ratios (building densities) on city sites was further 
evidence of the resistance offered by property owners to any restrictions 
on development rights. The proposed restraints were never imposed.
In Victoria Greater Melbourne Bills were rejected in the Legislative 
Council in 1913, 1915, 1936, 1937 and 1951-2, and a Town Planning Bill was 
shelved in 1930. Outside the legislative sphere Melbourne property 
owners, following the Sydney precedent, established a Building Owners and 
Managers Association to resist any reduction in allowable plot ratios in 
the city.
In South Australia the Legislative Council rejected the Town Planning 
and Housing Bill in 1917 and heavily amended the Town Planning and Develop­
ment Bill in 1920 after the Adelaide City Council and real estate agents 
had voiced opposition to it. In 1929 the conservative Lower House 
reduced the mild 1920 Act to an innocuous control of subdivision Act.
Again in 1954 and 1960 Town Planning Bills were rejected by the Legislative 
Council after protests from the Real Estate Institute and the Chamber of
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Commerce and in 1966 the Council heavily amended the Labor Government's 
Planning and Development Bill. In 1959 the South Australian Landowners 
Protection League was successful in persuading the government to censure 
town planner Stuart Hart for his deliberate delaying tactics in approving 
applications for subdivision of the hills face.
Whenever they have deemed it necessary then property owners have 
been able to use the political institutions of the state to prevent 
encroachments on their property rights by planning legislation or regulations. 
This form of action was used especially before the second world war. Since 
then they have been able to manipulate the planning process itself to make 
gains from property ownership, and to use the same political institutions 
to support the 'national hobby of land speculation.' Such planning as has 
been attempted has therefore been hampered at every level by private 
property interests exerting influence on public authorities and by the 
corruption of some public officers and politicians with foreknowledge of 
planning decisions. The land-use plans produced in each city have been 
subject to constant pressure as a result of the capital gains in land 
value which can accrue to individuals from changes in the plans. In 
Sydney and Melbourne the plans themselves have become 'speculators guides' 
indicating which areas are to be serviced at what time and re-zoned from 
rural to urban. Government service authorities have also been subject to 
pressure to change their programmes to provide services which would increase 
the value of particular areas of land.
... these problems,and most of the difficulties of equity 
and compensation related to planning and servicing develop­
ment, could be avoided if the land was in public ownership 
for a period prior to urban development. It would also 
enable planning to play an initiating and leading role in 
development. (Urban Research Unit 1973: 169)
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The most important obstacle then to a redistributive approach to 
city planning has been lack of control over the fundamental resource - 
land. The effects of this have included land speculation, especially on 
the urban fringe, land shortages due to withholding by landowners, shortages 
of development funds because of the high prices public authorities must pay 
on the open market to acquire land, and the limitation of planning to the 
negative role of responding to planning applications and to major private 
developments.
Consider what happens when a town decides on the comprehensive 
redevelopment of its central area, or some part of it (e.g. Woolloomooloo 
or the Rocks in Sydney). Through shortage of capital the scheme has to 
be made attractive to the private developer. To ensure an adequate return, 
intensive development of retail and office space is necessary. This 
limits the role of the town centre as a focus for a wider variety of 
activities and imposes on the authorities the need to improve the transport 
system serving peak period movements to the city centre. With rising car 
ownership this imposes a further problem in central area road congestion.
More generally commercial and industrial growth in and around a 
city centre and increasing central employment reduces the number of 
workers who can live within easy reach of the centre, while the public 
sector is called on to finance the additional demands on transport services.
The proposed industrial development of Westernport indicates the 
fate of environmental objectives in a society which universally accepts 
both the right to speculate in land and the sanctity of the growth ideology. 
The nationwide worship of economic progress is perhaps best illustrated by 
the fact that there is agreement between all major political parties on
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the desirability of increasing G.N.P.^ State governments of all political
complexions have been keen to attract private capital from abroad and to
establish new industries within their territories. Thus governments have
equated the interests of private enterprise with the national interest
and the political and administrative apparatus of the state has been
used to promote the interests of business and industry at the expense of
equity and of environmental and social concerns. This class power in
action in urban development is evident in the unrestricted growth both of
the central business areas of the capital cities and of their metropolitan
areas; in the transportation plans for massive freeway programmes; in
schemes like the proposed industrial development of Westernport Bay; and
in the failure so far of environmental authorities in NSW and Victoria to
2control pollution.
The Labor Party has seen the achievement of high growth rates as a way 
of supplying funds with which to finance its health, education and 
transport proposals. In 1961 and 1963 the Party promised to achieve 
a national growth rate of 5% per cent a year. ... this growth-mindedness 
put the Liberal Government on the defensive and forced Menzies to 
promise a growth rate programme during the 1963 election campaign. 
(McFarlane 1968: 18) The ALP's worship of growth is also reflected 
in its poor record in city planning in Sydney from 1945 to 1965.
In Victoria the Environment Protection Authority has launched only 
three prosecutions in twelve months. In NSW after two and a half 
years the Department of the Environment and the State Pollution Control 
Commission has not yet sought the prosecution of a single company.
Top business leaders in both states occupy positions on environment 
protection authorities. The Director of the NSW Department of the 
Environment is a former manager of the Caltex refinery at Kurnell.
The government's appointed conservation representative on the SPCC 
is NSW manager of the big chemical firm ICI and a former president of 
the Chamber of Manufacturers who was awarded the OBE in 1971 for 
services to industry. He told a meeting of the Chamber in 1970 that 
to blame industry for environmental pollution was an 'emotional fallacy.' 
See 'Why Pollution Laws Don't Work' National Times 21-26 Jan 1974.
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The overall aim of an improved planning system would be to control 
these defects. It should replace much of the private dynamic for develop­
ment with a dynamic which allocated land to uses according to overall 
economic efficiency and social needs, rather than to maximise individual 
profits.
The impact of the changing structure of power since the second world 
war on the process of urban development and city planning has been especially 
noticeable in the influence of new industries like car manufacturing and in 
the rising influence of the 'technocrats,' especially those working for 
state planning and highways authorities. But neither of these new sources 
of power has supplemented the enduring influence of that older source based 
on property ownership. Nor have they eroded the continuing influence of the 
Country Party.
In December 1972 a Labor Government was elected to Federal Parliament 
for the first time since 1949. A major thrust of its election programme 
was its urban policy. This next section looks at its new approaches to old 
problems and old sources of opposition.
2.
Keith Hancock wrote in 1930 that it was a weakness of democracies 
that, 'having willed an end, they try to shuffle out of willing the means'.
It was argued in chapter 5 that this was a weakness of the Federal Labor 
Government of the 1940s (plagued as it was by opposition from the High 
Court, State's Upper Houses, the medical profession, oil, insurance and 
banking corporations and so on). In the urban field it failed to tackle 
the problem of private ownership of land, although the Commonwealth 
Housing Commission Report had recommended an inquiry into land nationalisation;
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it failed to devise means of citizen participation in the planning process, 
although it claimed this as one of its aims; it failed to implement its 
programme of regional decentralisation before it was defeated in 1949.
In 1973 the Department of Urban and Regional Development (DURD) 
tackled each of these problems, and several others with what at present 
seems to be far more inventiveness and determination than was displayed in 
the 1940s. DURD's philosophy is avowedly redistributive. It is concerned 
above all with the equity effects of urban development and with improving 
the lot of that twenty percent of the national population 'at the bottom'.^
The best indication of the degree of committment of the government 
to urban affairs is in the 1973-74 Budget brought down in August 1973.
This provides $136m. for the cities, raises the allocation for the states' 
public housing programme by 25 per cent, and provides $32m. of a proposed 
$700m. programme of improvements to urban public transport systems. $30m. 
is provided for the states to begin to tackle the backlog in urban sewerage 
services, (the start of a programme which needs an estimated $850m. to 
complete) and special grants have been made to local councils in the poorer 
western suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne to improve their services and 
amenities, $5m. in Sydney and $3m. in Melbourne.
More significant evidence of the government's wider ambitions in
urban development is the provision of $33m. for urban growth centres and
$30m. for land commissions. $9m. of the $33m. for urban growth centres
2was allocated to Albury-Wodonga in the three Bills introduced in November
DURD's objectives and programmes were outlined by several of its top 
public servants at a weekend planning conference at Terrigal, 21-23 
Sept 1973, organised by the Royal Australian Planning Institute.
The idea of the development of Albury-Wodonga, which spans the NSW- 
Victorian border, as a growth centre figured prominently in the 1972 
election campaign; a demonstration of selective decentralisation by 
the building of 'another inland city the size of Canberra'.
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1973 authorising the $63m. financial grants for land acquisition schemes.
The other $24m. was for the nominated growth centres of Bathurst-Orange, 
Holsworthy, Campbelltown and Gosford-Wyong in NSW, and Melbourne's 
south-east sector and Geelong, Monarto in S.A. and Salvado in W.A.
0Australian 22 Nov 1973).
The purpose of the proposed Land Commissions is to purchase large 
areas of land in or near major urban areas suitable for urban development 
or redevelopment order to provide land at low capital cost to the
average citizen, to effectively plan and service the large areas involved, 
and to retain some of the equity in land in community ownership. The funds 
for the land commissions are contingent upon the establishment by each 
state of a commission to acquire and develop land by June 1974 and on the 
introduction by each state of land price stabilisation legislation to prevent 
land speculation in growth areas both on the metropolitan fringes and in 
growth centres. The intention was that land would be made available for 
building on long-term leases without the necessity for homebuyers to pay 
a capital sum for the grant of a lease. However since the release of 
the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Land Tenure the Minister has 
indicated his willingness to accept a system of freehold (but with'’.no devel­
opment rights attached) rather than leasehold for residential land.
The prospective role of the commissions has been accepted readily 
enough by the governments of S.A. & W.A. S.A. has established a Land 
Commission but the Legislative Council amended the Land Commission Bill to 
prevent the leasing of land of less than one fifth of a hectare (about half 
an acre) in area and to prevent compulsory acquisition of land on which 
there is a dwelling, factory, workshop, warehouse, shop or other 
commercial or industrial premise, (SAPD 1973: 1435) an amendment which
373
reduces the redevelopment powers of the Commission- The Legislative 
Council has also rejected outright the Bill to stabilise land prices.
In W.A. the Legislative Council shelved the Land Control Bill, the 
Land Commission Bill and the Salvado Development Bill in Dec 1973 (West 
Australian 23rd Dec 1973). All three Bills had been under seige from real 
estate and business interests as represented by the Land Legislation Study 
Group, which published an elaborate Report on Proposed Land Legislation to 
the Government of Western Australia (August 1973) claiming, among other 
things, that the state and local governments would be by-passed, providing 
'a major opportunity for the Federal Government to dominate the decisions 
of the state.' Similarly an Adelaide real estate developer described
4
'the whole thing as a Commonwealth plot' (Financial Review 24 May 1973) 
and senior executives of the Master Builders Association, the Housing 
Industry Association, the Real Estate Institute and the Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry in S.A. formed a Land Use Advisory Committee to fight the 
land price stabilisation legislation {Australian 10 Sep 1973).
The Liberal-Country Party governments of Victoria, NSW and Queensland 
have been more reluctant to cooperate with the federal government. While 
quiety welcoming the extra money for sewerage, the conditions attaching to 
the funds for growth centres, land commissions, local government {Financial 
Review 29 Oct 1973) and urban transport {Australian 26 Jan 1974) are 
resented. The Deputy Premier of NSW, Sir Charles Cutler, expressing the 
views of the Country Party, has said that the Budget 'while increasing 
allocations to the major cities, is robbing the country of its rightful 
share of finance. It is thus fertilising the Federal Government's idea of 
a centralist authority.' {SMH 28 Aug 1973) The Country Party President 
in Queensland has similarly described the land commission proposals as 
'contrary to Country Party philosophy'. {Courier-Mail 23 June 1973)
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The Victorian government introduced land-price stabilisation legi­
slation in November 1973 but the Bill contains no new machinery and 
contains no powers of acquisition {Australian 23 Nov 1973). This 
refusal to establish a Land Commission means that if the government wants 
to buy land in a growth centre it will have to be acquired through the 
Housing Commission or by an especially set up development corporation.
NSW and Queensland have, as yet, not been persuaded to cooperate with the 
federal government's new initiatives.
Yet again the influence of the Country Party and of big property 
owners on the states' political institutions threatens to undermine the 
ambitious plans for reform. Some aspects of the new urban policy can be 
achieved through Federal Government action, for example the recent decisions 
to purchase the Church of England's housing estate in Glebe (inner Sydney) 
and provide 700 new and renovated homes there in the next five years in 
a mixed income scheme {Australian 10 Nov 1973) and to move 30,000 of its 
own public service staff from the city centres of Sydney and Melbourne 
to outer suburban and country locations. {Australian 19 Dec 1973) But 
most of DURD's new initiatives, especially the roles proposed for the land 
commissions and development corporations and the recommendations of the 
Royal Commission of Inquiry into Land Tenures which submitted its Report 
in November 1973 require the exercise of state powers and therefore the close 
cooperation of the states.
The commission of inquiry into land tenures ■under the chairmanship of 
Mr Justice Else-Mitchell was set up in July 1973 to recommend appropriate 
policies and procedures for the administration of publicly-owned land.
The Report submitted by the commission in fact went further than its
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initial terms of reference in recommending the public ownership of 
development rights, that is, the elimination of private gains from land-use 
changes. This, the Report argued, would have five major advantages. The 
first was social equity:
under the present system of land tenure the good fortune of 
holding land within an area for intensive development is 
a matter of chance for the individual landowners; millions 
of dollars are won or lost by a decision of an elected 
local council or by the stroke of a planner's pen. Those 
millions of dollars come from the collective pockets of the 
community. (Land Tenure Report 1973: 42)
Secondly the reservation of development rights would improve the planning 
process by removing pressures for planning changes which are profitable 
to individual land owners rather than desirable in the public interest. 
Removal of speculation, the Report argued, would also reduce costs and 
prices and benefit government finances, and finally, it would reduce 
pressures for premature development. (Land Tenure Report 1973: 41-45)
The Report does not advocate a freeze on the price of land. Rather it 
suggests a freeze on an owner's right to change the nature of its use and 
in so doing profit at the community's expense. The Report thus attacks 
pure speculators, but not developers, who are encouraged to cooperate with 
the envisaged development corporations. Most Developers appearing before 
the Inquiry did not oppose this.
Bearing in mind 'the deep-seated psychological attachment which many 
people have to land' (Land Tenure Report 1973: 28) the recommendations do 
not affect the right of individuals to buy and sell their blocks or their 
homes, provided the use of the land is not changed in the transaction.
In short, the Report perpetuates the Australian tradition of a man owning 
his own land and building his own house on it. It rejects the ideal of
1 which were to recommend appropriate land tenure systems for the 
administration of public land.
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all land being leasehold, recommending that residential land in the new 
metropolitan and regional growth centres should be made available on the 
basis of a fee simple title but with restrictions limiting the use of the 
land to residential purposes. For commercial and industrial development 
in the new centres the Report recommends leasehold tenure so that all land 
remains in public ownership and is leased at economic rentals. (Land 
Tenure Report 1973: 121-165)
The Federal government can adopt these proposals for the ACT and 
Northern Territory. But since the basic objective of the recommendations 
is to bring a uniform stability to land prices throughout Australia the 
States must be persuaded to adopt similar measures. Therein lies the main 
difficulty in implementing the Commission's recommendations. It is clear 
that the non-Labor state governments are reluctant to support the new urban 
policies, which they regard as inconsistent with their 'philosophies’ and 
as an erosion of state sovereignty. Their opposition is likely to prove 
the most intractable of all difficulties facing DURD.
The next and final section examines some recent changes in public 
opinion which may provide the underpinning of support necessary for DURD 
to overcome the opposition of the recalcitrant Liberal states and the 
political power of the big property owners.
3.
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 outlined certain aspects of the structure of 
political power in Australian society that militate against a redistri­
butive approach to city planning. But those chapters also noted 
complementary attitudes among the general public.
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Thus the worship of economic growth as synonymous with 'progress' 
is reinforced by the Labor Party's belief that more growth means a bigger 
slice of the cake for the workers and the poor. The interest of insurance, 
development and finance companies and big property owners in speculative 
development is reinforced by an electorate consisting of property owners and 
their families all enjoying the appreciation of the capital investment 
in their own home and land, which is outpacing most other costs and prices. 
The Manhattan syndrome, the overdevelopment of the central business area, 
not only makes profits for insurance companies like AMP and developers 
such as the Lend Lease Corporation but is applauded by many citizens who 
find the rising, ever-changing skyline exhilarating. And pressure for 
freeways comes not only from automobile, oil, spare parts and hire purchase 
companies but also from the desire and expectation of every car owner (4 out 
of 5 Australian households) to drive his car when and where he pleases, and 
for governments to make this possible.
We are dealing therefore not simply with a capitalist conspiracy but 
with a powerful set of cultural values."*" How entrenched are those values?
In Adelaide over the past five years there have been major changes 
in urban policy in the fields of transportation, redevelopment, decentral­
isation and public participation in the planning process. These have been 
brought about partly by public protest, partly through the initiatives of 
the Labor Government and partly because of a changing pattern of interests 
among some sections of the business and property-owning communities.
Marxists would argue that the values themselves are determined by the 
capitalist class, that the ideas of the ruling class are the ruling 
ideas. This seems to me to be only partly true of the Australian 
situation in which the 'Good Life' has, at least since the second 
world war, been within the grasp of the majority.
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Changing attitudes on the part of some leading property developers 
are reflected in the ideas of Mr G.J. Dusseldorp, Chairman of Lend Lease 
Corporation and a member of the Commission of Inquiry into Land Tenures.
He supports the public ownership of development rights, regional develop­
ment, limitations on city size (he argues that Sydney is already too big 
by half a million) and some control on the overbuilding of the central city. 
(National Times 21-26 Jan 1974) His ideas involve both a new environmental 
concern and a recognition that profits can still be made under the umbrella 
of state developmental planning. But his attitudes are clearly not in the 
interests of pure land speculators.
In Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide over the last five years middle 
class residents action groups have protested against a variety of 
environmental issues precipitated by both government bureaucracies and 
private developers - freeways, high rise inner suburban redevelopment, 
environmental pollution, the destruction of historic buildings and so on. 
Their protests on particular issues have led to a more general questioning 
of the supremacy of technology and profits over nature and human values, 
although in many cases their stands have been based on their own local 
self-interest with little awareness either of wider metropolitan concerns 
or of the conflict between their middle class environmental objectives and 
the more welfare-oriented objectives of the working classes.
But their willingness to transform their disquiet with what is 
happening into radical forms of action is a measure of the strength of the 
feeling involved. The most radical form of action yet espoused by the 
middle classes has been their alliance, in Sydney, with the radical Builders
Laborers Federation.
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Culturally the BLF is concerned with turning back today's 
seemingly irreversible trend towards the megalopolis - 
necropolis of Mumford's prophetic vision; in other words, 
with protecting and where necessary restoring the right 
of people to live in circumstances that allow the 
geographical integration of work and play, that put 
communal pleasure above private profit, visual aestheticism 
and a sense of history above environmental exploitation. 
Economically, its aim is to help in establishing priorities 
for building projects, especially in an atmosphere where 
speculative finance, much of which has been pumped in from 
abroad, is swelling land prices and distorting the whole 
pattern of urban growth. ... What the BLF opposes, in 
true neo-Marxist fashion, is the domination of technology 
over nature and human values. (Ashbolt 1973: 348).
The BLF's methods have been, in cooperation with residents action groups, 
to place 'Green Bans' on undesirable development projects. Right-wing 
politicians have described these methods as the 'democracy of the lynch- 
gang'.
That some of the middle classes have supported these methods 
illustrates the central problem. At present, nowhere within the existing 
administrative and political structures which are responsible for the 
development of the cities, is there a place for the voice of the consumer 
to be directly heard and considered as an effective factor.
History, especially the more recent history of the 1960s, has given 
rise to disillusion with the omniscience of the specialist and the 
omnipotence of government. This disillusion has generated the feeling 
among the more aware sections of the middle and working classes that they 
must take matters into their own hands. They are forced to do this because 
to back up their convictions they have only moral rights, whereas the 
other party in these conflicts (private developers or public authorities) 
are backed with a full panoply of legal rights. It is this conflict of 
legal and moral rights, individual and community rights, which is at the
heart of the problem.
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for the conflict to be resolved it is necessary that 
the moral rights of the community be given a place within 
the legal and administrative framework. Moral rights 
must become legal rights and in the current temper of 
society the community must be put ahead of the individual. 
Only governments can solve this problem. They, and only 
they, can adjust the system to accommodate to the 
circumstances, and the first call upon them is for 
legislation which will give the people's wishes and the 
people's voice a proper and effective part in the total 
process of deciding future developments. (Freeland 1973: 4)
Further indications of changing public attitudes are evident in the 
recent appearance in the usually right-wing, free-enterprise defending 
press, of editorials supporting the redistributive approach to city planning 
and the emphasis on equity embodied in DURD's programmes. Heading its 
editorial of 14 Jan 1974 'Social Equity an issue in society,' The National 
Times argued that
One of the more popular illusions in Australia is that 
Australians are an egalitarian lot who are not worried by 
class conflict. Any serious examination of this argument 
quickly exposes its fallacy. ... It is economic success, 
not egalitarian attitudes, which has dulled class conflict 
in Australia. ... Urban changes can discriminate against 
working class people. It was perhaps the most encouraging 
fact about the election of the Whitlam Government a year ago 
that a majority of Australians endorsed Labor's rhetoric for 
some redressing of priorities, so that the poor and the 
lower income croups in areas in the cities could be given a 
better deal. ... The reformism of the Whitlam Government 
is likely to prove one of its most significant long-term 
influences. ... it is the essence of intelligent conserv­
atism to deflect what could be revolutionary by offering 
reform. This is something that the more crustily conservative 
of the State Government critics of the Whitlam Government 
might well remember.
And in a similar vein the Australian editorial of 29 Jan 1974 observed of 
DURD's special grants to the western suburbs of Melbourne and Sydney that
these are projects which a civilised society should regard 
as part and parcel of its normal social welfare activities 
No society should feel morally comfortable when large 
sections of its less-affluent urban population are forced 
to live in barely-serviced, amenity-less wastelands which 
have the sole advantages of being dormitories more or less 
within reach of their places of work.
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Whether or how far these changes will proceed depends on both the 
degree of democratic pressure on governments and the extent of consciousness 
of what the issues are, and each of these depends partly on the other.
The seriousness of the obstacles should not be underestimated. But nor 
should the possibility of their being overcome: not by goodwill, nor by
any improbable conversion of ruling elites to a new morality; nor by 
traumatic revolutionary action; but by a combination of the disunity and 
changing sets of interests within the capitalist class and increasing public 
awareness of the problems.
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APPENDIX I
Selected highlights of land dealings in the 
Westernport Region 1963-73
In 1960 a group of people living in the triangle between Springvale, 
Frankston and Portsea set out to 'put Westernport on the map'. They called 
themselves the Westernport Development Committee and were supported, through 
overlapping memberships, by the Hastings Council. Some of the people 
involved had properties which would be 'profoundly affected' by any boom 
which might result. (Save Westernport Coalition 1971: 7) Investors began 
buying cheap rural land, even on French Island, and BHP acquired 2,000 acres 
on the island's western shore.
In 1963 Premier Bolte made an agreement with BP for a refinery at 
Crib Point. The land was swiftly rezoned and the agreement ratified by 
Parliament. The terms of the agreement required very little from the company 
and millions of dollars from the government, not only for supplying water, 
roads and power to the site but also in outright subsidies of company 
operations.1 The Act also stripped the Hastings Council of any authority in 
the matter. But criticism of this Act as a 'rubber stamp job' did not
This Act gave the company the right to compulsorily acquire easements 
from private landholders. (A power reserved for the government until this 
time. It was also the forerunner of a number of Acts which gave the 
Governor-in-Council, at the behest of private companies, the power to 
overrule public authorities such as the SEC as to easements affecting 
their property and lines). Other major terms of the Act were: that the
State would pay up to $7 million toward construction of jetties, channels 
and tugs of the company's design; that the company would be permitted to 
dispose of all effluent waters into the bay without fee or penalty, 
negotiate its own water and poy/er rates, use sea water for refinery pur­
poses and lay pipelines as it saw fit; that the state would reimburse the 
company for repairs to jetties, channels and tugs for twenty years; and 
that the state would pay for pilotage, navigational aids and channels 
beyond the company's jurisdiction (which was 600 yards offshore from BP's 
property). Only two major requirements were made of the company. It was 
expected to pay for its own pipelines and to build a refinery which would 
comply with 'modern refinery standards'. These standards were not 
specified. Bolte and two officers of BP signed the agreement before it 
went to Parliament.
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prevent the passage of two further Acts in a similar vein — the Westernport 
Development Act 1967 (an agreement between the government and Esso-Hematite) 
and the Westernport Steelworks Act 1970, which gave birth to the $1000 
million Lysaght (a BHP subsidiary) project.
In March 1969, several years after the government had decided to 
'industrialise' the Westernport area, the Westernport Regional Planning 
Authority (WRPA) was formed under an amendment to the Town and Country 
Planning Act of 1961 to 'prepare and submit for approval a planning scheme 
for the area specified ... and enforce and carry out the scheme in that 
area'. (Order of the Governor-in-Counci1, 5 March 1969)
The WRPA is made up of two councillors elected from each of the six 
shires in the region (Bass, Cranbourne, Flinders, Hastings, Mornington and 
Phillip Island). Of the twelve representatives on the Authority in 1971 at 
least six were involved in land dealings in the area. The Chairman, 
Councillor Leake (President of the Mornington Shire Council) was general 
manager of and property advisor to Colortone Property Developments Pty Ltd, 
which owned a large number of land holdings on the Mornington Peninsula. 
During 1969 Colortone bought four blocks each of ten acres, priced between 
$20,000 and $25,000 each. During early 1970 the other Mornington represen­
tative on the WRPA (Councillor Hast) moved that these lots be rezoned from 
rural to residential. This was approved by the Council. Cr Leake 
recommended rezoning to 'residential' three lots of land, one owned by the 
wife of the Shire secretary, one owned by Merri Wendi Woke Woke Pty Ltd (of 
which Hast and his wife were the sole directors) and the third owned jointly 
by Mrs Leake, a solicitor, and Merri Wendi Woke Woke Pty Ltd. (Confidential 
Departmental Report 1972: 57-58)'*' When asked if there were a possibility of
1 Most of the information in this appendix was obtained from a Confidential 
Report prepared within a State Department on the WRPA in 1972. It was 
never made public but a copy can be made available to the examiner of 
this thesis.
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conflict of interest arising from his dual roles on the Authority and his 
management of Colortone Property Developments, Councillor Leake replied 
'It's fair to say there is' (Sunday Observer 21 February 1971).
One of the Flinders Shire representatives on the WRPA was the 
director of a private land company which owned 412 acres north of Cape 
Schank. In October 1970 this company offered to sell this land to the 
Authority for $160,000 to give it the chance of buying it for conservation 
purposes. Independent valuation showed that the current market valuation 
was only half the company's asking price. When notified that its price was 
too high the councillor indicated to the Authority that if it did not go 
ahead with the purchase for $200,000 then he would see that it was rezoned 
residential by the Flinders Shire and have it subdivided and sold for 
residential lots. (Confidential Report 1972: 67-68) That councillor became 
Chairman of the Authority in September 1971.
The wife of Councillor Caldwell, a Hastings Shire representative, 
had an interest in Westernport Investments Pty Ltd (which owned land in 
Tyabb, Phillip Island, Bittern and Maryvale) and was a director of the 
company (Sunday Observer 21 February 1971). Cranbourne shire's representa­
tive also had companies involved in land dealings on the peninsula and on 
French Island (Confidential Report 1972: 79) as did the other Hastings 
representative, Councillor Mair, who used his influence as Shire president 
to have land belonging to relatives rezoned. (Confidential Report)
In 1970 the press revealed that a group of Hastings councillors 
stood to make more than $100,000 on land deals (Age 23 April 1970). The 
sales hinged on an increase in land prices sparked by proposals for Lysaght's 
$1,000 million steelworks. At least three councillors had subdivided land 
on the market near Hastings and two more were real estate agents (Age 23 April
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1970). Other landholders in the area included BHP, Esso, BP, the Gas and 
Fuel Corporation. BHP and East Coast Development Corporation also own 
land on French Island (Age 29 January 1971) .
French Island is within the regional planning area but, being unin­
corporated, is not represented on the WRPA. In 1970 the Authority accepted 
a report from Dr R.M. Buchanan, a Sydney chemist, on the feasibility of 
using French Island for most of the industry to be located at Westernport. 
Buchanan was also a Director of East Coast Development Pty Ltd which had a 
considerable area of the Island under its control (through ownership and 
options). (Save Westernport Coalition 1971) Buchanan's report recommended 
the provision of a major aerodrome on French Island on land owned by East 
Coast Development Pty Ltd. There was also apparently an agreement between 
some Hastings councillors and council officers to prevent the rezoning of 
800 acres from rural to industrial owned by Ampol-Sleigh, on which those 
companies wanted to build a refinery. Consequently 400 acres held by 
Starport Pty Ltd was sold to Ampol-Sleigh. (Confidential Report 1972: 82)
In July Ampol-Sleigh announced that they were considering French Island 
for their $80 million refinery. (Age 13 July 1971) Earlier in 1971 the 
WRPA had asked the Government to carry out a $100,000 investigation into 
developing an international industrial complex on French Island. This 
suggestion was based on Buchanan's study. A number of major industries 
were interested in the island, including BHP, ICIANZ, Dow Chemicals and 
DuPont. The investigation recommended by the WRPA to the government was to 
be financed by Esso, BHP and others. (Sunday Observer 7 March 1971)
Meanwhile a draft report on the feasibility of rezoning certain land 
in Westernport for industrial use had been presented to the Authority in 
December 1970. It was prepared by Plant Location International and recommended 
the rezoning of thousands of acres of rural land around the Bay. The report 
was then referred to the Authority's Industrial Development Advisory
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Committee, which included representatives from Nylex Corporation, Dowd 
Associates, BHP, Lysaghts, BP, Esso and Commonwealth Industrial Gases.
These members all had financial interests in land and industrial activities 
in the Westernport area. By this time local residents had been angered by 
the fact that the future of the peninsula was in the hands of 'American 
consultants, the WRPA or a combine of industrial speculators' (Age 3 April 
1971), and that they were not allowed to see the reports submitted to the 
WRPA. However the Save Westernport Coalition did manage to see a copy of 
the Report, and revealed its contents in a pamphlet published in July 1971. 
They revealed that plans for Westernport included reshaping of the coast 
by filling in many miles of the bay; two causeways to French Island and later 
a tunnel; all of French Island to be allocated to Industry (two-thirds of it 
was Crown Land); the Island to be squared off for wharves and cheap land; 
disposing of chemical wastes through a single pipeline which would cross 
Phillip Island and emerge from its southern coast at the 30 fathom mark; 
wharves and commercial enterprises to be developed along the northern shore 
of French Island; other industries would include a gas centrifuge for 
enriching uranium, a cracking plant to provide power for the island, a 
large petro-chemical plant and another refinery, aluminium smelters and 
processing plants for paper and zinc. The report dismissed the western 
shores of the Bay by saying that BP and Lysaght had 'set the character' of 
the area and that the 'expensive infrastructure' had been developed to cater 
for their needs. The report also forecast a wide commercial/industrial 
corridor from Dandenong to Hastings, to be generated by growth both of 
population and industry.
The needs of human beings evaporate into the pages of 
statistics: people are simply 'the labour supply', to
be moved as close as possible to the industrial area
1
Whose chairman is Sir Charles MacGrath, also chairman of Repco and 
Bolte's good friend and supporter.
387
while simultaneously being robbed of all its recreational 
possibilities ... The most urgent study of all - the 
relationship of the scheme to the welfare of the city - 
has not even been undertaken ... It is doubtful if, in 
recent years, any large city anywhere has been asked to 
hand over such an enormous recreational area to so few 
people.
(Save Westernport Coalition 1971: 3-8)
The Director of the WRPA reported to it in June 1971 on the proposed 
designation of boundaries within which industries could locate. In July 
the Authority voted to zone a 5,000 acre belt of farmland near Hastings for 
industry. An angry Hastings Council meeting of 7 July accused the WRPA of 
plotting the 'industrial devastation' of the Westernport area. In the 
proposed industrial zone were large tracts of land owned by BHP (2000 acres) , 
Ampol-Sleigh, and the Gas and Fuel Corporation. (Age 8 July 1971) Some 
local councillors, conservationists, local organisations and 1400 individuals 
decided to oppose the rezoning and the Westernport Peninsula Protection 
Council raised several thousand dollars for a 'fighting fund'. (Age 9 July 
1971) Nevertheless Premier Bolte still maintained that the industrial zone 
would be
a big lift for Victoria. I can see it having the biggest 
tonnage of any port in Australia. I am confident that 
the character of the Mornington Peninsula will not be 2
significantly altered by the Hastings industrial development.
And later in the year the government over-rode objections by the Hastings
Council and granted large rate concessions to the $1000 million Lysaghts
steelworks. As Hastings Shire president W. Nabbs commented, 'It appears
that the government is prepared to go to any lengths to satisfy the selfish
demands of large industrialists'. (Age 26 November 1971)
The Save Westernport Coalition includes the Port Phillip Conservation 
Council, the Westernport & Peninsula Protection Council, the Citizens 
Environmental Action League and the Clean Air and Environment Council of 
Victoria.
Age 9 July 1971. In 1972 Bolte still described the plans for Westernport 
as 'the greatest proposed development ever entered upon by this state'.
(Age 9 March 1972) Back in 1969 he had forecast that Westernport would 
be 'Australia's Ruhr' and had made several overseas trips to attract 
capital to the area. He was obviously heavily committed to the develop­
ment .
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APPENDIX II
Land Speculation and Public Authorities: 
a case study.
One reason for the recommendation of the Commission of Inquiry into 
Land Tenures Report (November 1973) that the devleopment rights attaching 
to land should be publicly owned was to avoid situations where speculation 
as to likely changes of land use forces public authorities to pay highly 
inflated prices to acquire land for their various programmes. The following 
case of acquisition by the Victorian Housing Commission of rural land at 
a price which had risen in previous months to include the possible change 
of use to urban, illustrates the problems.
In March 1962 the VHC, after consultations with the State Electricity 
Commission in mid 1961, moved to acquire 1500 acres near Morwell in the 
Latrobe Valley for a satellite town. It found that 500 acres of this land 
was the subject of options obtained by a private company, which had indicated 
to the Morwell Shire Council its intention of constructing a satellite town.
A local real estate agent had approached the Morwell Council on behalf of 
the company Parksun Proprietary Ltd late in 1961 seeking the approval of the 
Council. It was unlikely that Parksun, with a nominal share capital of 
$10,000 and a paid-up capital of $10, really intended to build a satellite 
town. Having received approval in principle neither the agent nor Parksun 
took steps to have the land rezoned. The real estate agent who acted for 
Parksun was also the VHC's agent in the Latrobe Valley.
Next to step in was a company (Milgar Rural Industries Pty Ltd) which 
had a list of directors from St Kilda, Toorak, Brighton and Collins Street.
The interest of these people in the Latrobe Valley 
was such that if they were told where it was they 
could not find their way there ... Overnight these 
gentlemen suddenly discovered the Latrobe Valley and
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all this lovely rural land for which the VHC was going 
to pay residential prices. I ask the House to note 
the dates on which these transactions took place ... 
discussions took place between the SEC and the VHC 
in July 1961. The VHC moved to make its acquisition 
in March 1962, but in February 1962 the hucksters 
jumped the gun by a month ... The total purchase price 
paid (by Milgar) was $57,474, not cash, but as a 
terms sale ... when the piece of land was sold to the 
VHC eight months later for $98,000 the actual profit 
was $40,526.
(Labor Opposition Leader, C. Holding,
VPD 1967: 3816)
As Mr Phelan (MLA, Kara Kara) commented, 'I could not be persuaded 
to believe that a Collins Street institution would buy this land unless it 
knew that it would later be acquired by the VHC at enhanced values'. (VPD 
1967: 3812-3831)
This case is one of the smaller examples of the land acquisition 
problems of housing commissions, but most of the notorious larger cases have 
not found their way into Parliamentary Debates so details about them are not 
as readily available.
A more spectacular example of course was the price which the 
Victorian Government had to pay in 1973 ($4.3 million) to acquire property 
in Latrobe St. Melbourne owned by Withalit Pty Ltd (shareholders, Sir Bernard 
Evans, Lady Evans and a solicitor) for the underground rail route - property 
which had cost Withalit less than half a million dollars (chapter 7). Part 
of that property, a lane, had previously been sold to Evans by the State 
Government via the Melbourne City Council.
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